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About The Oregon daily journal. (Portland, Or.) 1902-1972 | View Entire Issue (July 21, 1918)
SfidTION" ; TWO PART At' ' w i ,' ' r 4" : "'? '4 General Hunter Liggett, W' TWO PART TWO. i, " - 1 y - " ' eta- sr a a-aar a m. a aba AVa a m m. a a m- u a. .a a a . rm a - r. - - w a FresSi Legions Go To Take Up Battle As Midsummer Approaches With Allied' Forces in Ascendancy in Numbers, Hun Hopes for Victory in the Field Go Glimmering. BY FRANK H. SIMONDS Copyntht, 1018. br th Tribon AmocUUob (the New . Tort Tribune). (Thi rticle tu wrtUon prior to the Krmnco-Americn offensiro becun bat week. Ed.) rpHE announcement made for the Fourth of July that our first -million had arrived In Europe stirred the American people profoundly, as it shoulo have moved them. Looked at from the side of national pride and-patriotic performance, it will .remain memorable in the history of this, the greatest of all wars, and it is a feat commensurate not with what we expected of ourselves, but of what our allies hoped of us. Yet if is not on this aspect of the achievement that Americans will care now to lay emphasis, when so much sttii remains to be done and our enemy continues dangerous and defiant if It Is to the military side of America's contribution that "moit minds will turn at this moment. What will 1.000.000 American soldiers mean at this crisis in the world war? What will they mean in the restoring of the balance between the German and his opponents on the west ern battlefront, the balance destroyed by the collapse of Russia? Before at tempting to answer these questions it Is essential to point out certain facts. We 'have sent 1,000,000 men to France and they are a solid fact on French soil; but we cannot reckon that we have sent 1.000,000 fighting men across the ocean or that all of the fighting men who - have crossed are yet In line or ready for service. ' " " - To begin at-' t 'beginning., we are told by the war department that of the 1.000. 000 some 8 per cent may be counted as fighting men. and this would mean 692. 000 men. Add to this total the number sent In the two weeks that have passed since the announcement-was made, and we may safely estimate that on Bastille day there were in France three quarters FF LIFT Freezone is magic f Apply a few drops on a lore, touchy corn or a painful callus. Instant ly that corn or callus stops hurting you. Then shortly you lift that bothersome corn or callus . right off, rbot ana all, with the fingers'. No I tfJot one bit of pain no soreness, no irritation. ' VV A few cents buys a tiny bottle of the magic Freezone at any drug store. Sufficient, to remove every hard corn, soft corn, corn between the, toes and painful callus from one's feet. Freezone is the much-'Ulked-cf ether discovery of a Cincinnati-genius. , Corns and calluses lift away without even a twinge of pain. Why Wait? No humbuz! TWO. ism .mm commanding first corps. of a million Americans already on the iignung ime or destined soon to be reaay to apptear there. By Way of Comparison This means that we have now In France an army whose organised strength is greater than that of the vrerman army in peace time, more than half as strone aa th mam vhich n.r. many hurled at Fmnc i campaign and three quarters as strong a mo rrencn army which defeated the German bid for supreme victory between Paris and Verdun In September, 1314. inow, or this 750,000, a third, approxi mately. 260.000. hftv hwn n,nl.l into the firat Amnrtxan w -v,.. ,uijr, ailU LillJS army may be reckoned- as representing m reauy iormiaaDie rorce, since It in cludes all of the trnnm wriliMi Kan longest in France and Is commanded by (.nose oi our oincers wno nave had the best training and the most experience. It Includes the First division, which has CORN ' . Yl ,.-.". 5 V'' L '(J- , ' ' -, s i 1 -6 ' ''Iff,- ' ' 'I' i ' J '"( 'Jit ' :- E ' ' y rf '4 " v ' vK General Pershing,, commanding American forces In France. .... 'If KlV.n .ruft n .nn. . . ( ... 1 1 , auu.iv iucii m wvcfM sectors and won the smart little sue- v-anugny a lew weeks ago. Tnis mrrmr In . . . . ' . 1 oucugui reprewnii aoouc ui same numbers as the army with which Petair defended Verdun, and Its units markea ,or ultimate use on the west ln physical etrene-th in .nmrinr t rn front. Now. I have no access . to In physical strength are superior to Petaln's soldiers because of their youth. At Verdun France was already using middle aged men. although the fighting achievement of these middl iul man will stand as an everlasting monument v. wunge ana endurance. We have! then, given the allies our .men one army, which, if still inferior to the best of the British and French armies, is a resource of great Import ance. In addition. another force, equally strong, scattered along the front In British and French units, getting its training on the firing line anff contributing mightily to reliev ing the strain upon tne older troops. All conmaerea, tms army may be con sidered about eona.1 tn tV flrt -.r Kitchener armies, which came out after ipres ana got Its bloody and bitter training on the line, but held its share of that line. Large Numbers In Sight There remain 250,000 troops, which are ouii iacKing in the necessary training In France, which serves mt.rriin. ate course for our graduates of the noma camps. But experience has al reaay snown in France that a month after they land our American troops can be sent to the front that Is. to a quiet sectorprovide,! that they are, strongly supported by French or Rrttiah units. Thus it is not too much to say "y we miaaie or August we shall have two armies of 250.000 each on the line, if it be decided to use them In separate formation, or, in any event. we enau nave troops capable of taking their place in two. urmUa Af kl. Blze- nd by the middle of September '" nave inree. This is the way we must reckon the availability of our overseas forces in th . " IIIUUU1B. With these preliminary remarks let us now get back to the main question " eneci nas America's contribution had upon the numerical balance between the Germans and - their opponents in France? At what point will the Ameri can troops restore equality between the forces directed by jLudendorff and those raarsnauea by s FochT ; In askmr. these questions we enter, the domain of specu lation and attack the problem -which has pussled all military observers - outside the official secrets for the last three months. Nor is any exact answer pos sible until the statistics of the German army become public property. But we have certain things to guide us. No allied report has : placed . more than 206 German divisions on the west ern front up to the Present moment 1. though there have been credible reports that before the campaign was over at least 225 would appear, German divi sions are now reckoned at 12,000 men, and 206 civlsions . would thus mean around 2.500,000 men. -Add another 250, 000 for those that are to m: twmuhihw and the brute strength of the German thrusting power for the p&tgn would be 2,750,000 men but It is wen to pear in . mind that no- more than 2,500,000 have yet been accounted for, and hot all ; of these, by a,ny means, have been engaged In the sever! nr. fenaives. . . Franco-British' Strength ' Aralnst this mass what tn al lies able to oppose in Hunhf imt March we. were for all practical pur- poses out or n. The organised strength of the British army In France, using German reports, has varied from 60 to ; 70' divisions. I believe the latter figure to be more nearly correct, ; but certain British military writor n.v. suggested that many divisions were be low strength. A British division should have about 18.000 men, but. accepting ine iigure : or eu divisions and the strength of 15,000 for the divisions, the British had around 900,000 men in line when Hlnaenburg-began on March 21. The - French. - on their nart. had. anm sir aivtsions, . reckoning a division atl",7r. OIV'8in (our own 15.000 and. . allowins-. for I divisions are more than- twice u.lrr. some of these divisions, they must still have counted at least 1.250.000 on the line or In reserve, ready for line service. As for the Belgians they have had six divisions in lini for several years and n...t ...mh.f t least 7K00ffl i-a-: their all facnitte. V,or Vee their losses have b.ll,i ; s . i strong. complete the list. , ' " v, SlliniT!,7I.mCrt!n' " njtter fart that . th. tntal vraa Ann I - . " wjrca i to ui line somewhere by the i . w- 7 ,'i .I III f' , ..y-'wl. t x,l i uuv i,iou,uuu r Tenon ano sometning more than 100,000 Belgians and FOrtu- AAA . A r A HAA ... guese Jn all 2,350,000 allied troops, . . -. . ... tgsniBi i,ow),vuv uermans in une or in reserve and some 250,000 more probably oniciai figures or private sources of information, and if I had them I could not make use of them here, but, using the German t a t,m,nt n nain. auH of ficial Information as the allied staffs have permitted to come through, it seems to me that on March 21 the Ger mans COUld Tint hflVA Vi n H mnra , than 4- 500,000 on the western front and the aines certainty not less than 2.250.000, ana prooaoiy not less than 2,350,000. This would mean that the immediate disparity in numbers was not above 250,000 at the most, and probably not more than lfio.nnn. s.ir in v ever, that at this time the relatively miui auierence in numbers .was only one of the huulfnna r - - - , W Slon. OX -KOmmaTirt tn.Uri.llv the -value of-the numbers actually in ia.uu comriDutea to the first dis aster, which was the Battle of Plcardy, But in addition to a possible disparity ox .250,000 at the moment, the allies were Douna to look forward to the time when, another 2.rn nnn - the German numbers by the arrival of urner aivisiona already marked for use niween Switzerland and the sea. No New Units Created In this situation the allies could not Increase the number of their divisions. It takes time many months to create new divisional units, with the necessary Officers and rnnl(ln. t ii -m fact, the French stopped Increasing the . ureir units in tne rlrst year of the war. the. -R,HtiaK , . The French and British were both of w.n uriven to ao this by the approach "I ct . on or their man-power, -iney bad to rMaiiiiot serves of men left to them, how long uppiy wastage in existing S. .if "A." th" Frnch hy W50.000 In their fighting army.they must keep an equal number-behind to fill gaps made ??tle'- ?nd th BrtU8l "UuaUon is the same, of course. It Is misappre hension of this detaU which contributes T,kT:. general confusion when numbers are mentioned. The Germans t. ... . . ure, uia increase the number of their divisions as recently as last Tfar K v j.j . 'W""J K ' r a,a mainly by redudnr th itn.. . .. . , , vi, ul wren aivi- greater mo- ,rr'u"'"jr "ey am not much in- an.t,,;j,,Umb!rs- !h they did a little of this. As it stood in March Foch when he took over supreme! ? ?VJaJ?0t rkon on more, divi sions, derived from British or French dUHn the Pairr.. save 1 troop were recalled from Italy and Sa- rinl "V??" Brttlsh hne garC the British several fine divisions, Vrhlch were practically destroyed. Feth f,M Vtlt r8rv employed, . ,r0t bHB hta number of or ganised unit much above 2.250.000 or r?Z3l;- J. was' bi5 ti. - - " nanas at one 1: 7" me 2,500,000 German. 7r T. ' 7 p'u" so.00a scheduled to arrive. Both the British and the French armies ,m MirZLiZr serves" to-Jt : ' ana no more. .T JnSZZ yi?? tn tn in.ri v. "Vi-MM was made whlT V, , fP?61 in March. tiLL.JvltrJhmA"bm answered by the nresencA nf - . . tei- .. . Americans In Pnce. at least 750,000 of them fight Ingrnen. .Now. if you reckon allied ud k- 7-1 "T". "JlJt upon the basia of the strenarth of a r-.. , . - vwiom Division, me SfJf,?! .We 225 divisional I"! Zl 'ZT tZ'",xi u not less than Its foSr J?rm.nent in, 2 and" .7 SvlaWTT , wtween Numerical iC-':. ' Superiority" - Oar first army; now In the field; con sists Of "something la.a ntlnr ' the . German way. That : i counUng the - German way. . That ; la. L ttieGerinan and net to be confused Zl Sf'' ttou vat tnU nVbmr;of dlvJ- TfjZLfSF of our troP8 ? fln1 w among French, and Brit- "nits, but may, be counted. Thoa uie vrcrnia.il aaa.-. bui we have Uia th numerical equivalent ef another 20 Ger- uiviBiuua aireaay - in France 'and getting- their first training, all of whom . . ... u Is XtinnniecS V General Duncan, commanding the middle of August. When they get on the line the allied total will stand be tween 248 and 256 divisions, as against 225 for our German foes. In other words and this Is the big gest fact of all we have already sent to France enough organized units to restore and more than restore the bal ance between the enemy and our allies, when all of our units are ready ; and all of our nnits will be ready to do some thing within the next month and to do considerable before the middle of Sep tember, while from four to six weeks still remain for campaigning. It may be that our first 40 divisions have al ready evened things up; certainly they would have if the Germans are still but 206 divisions strong, as they were last March, accepting for the basis of calculation the. lowest conceivable esti mate of allied divisions. But, . allowing for everything, it seems fair to say that by,the middle of August America win have met the demand made upon her to turn the tide and supply the numbers to counterbalance the advan tage accruing to the Germans through the vRussian collapse and the conse quent transfer of German divisions to the Western front. By the middle of August the Germans will no longer have any advantage of numbers on the west front; they may not have It by August 1, And with the loss of this advantage goes the hope of winning the war ; if it be not won before that time. . For it Is apparent that Oer many has no new reservoir from which to draw tother divisions as she drew dl visions from Russia. As for Austrian divisions, the events along the Plave have exhausted German hopes of aid from this direction, while neither Bui garia nor Turkey can or will supply men in any numbers: it may be doubted if either nation would lend the kaiser a single division. As for divisions or ganised out of Russian recruits, this is merest moonshine., Germany could not find officers for them ; it would take a ear to create the organizations essen tial to effective units, and if all these difficulties were surmounted there is nothing to suggest that the Russians would be willing to fight. Hun Leaders Hard Pressed t The truth is that Hindenburg and Lu dendorff went to the bottom of the Ger man barrel last spring and last winter. They gathered up all that was left, they borravMl f n- th. ftitn,. a. ent needs and opportunities, they took . . .... . Liieir Ramoie ana iney nave staked their -last dollar on the last card. Now, it Is essential to avoid undue optimism and equally necessary to avoid exaggeration. The Germans still have a slight advantage in numbers on the line or available for active service. They will preserve, that advantage for a few. weeks more, but will lose any numer ical superiority "some time In -August. Thereafter, ' if our troops continue to go to Europe at the present rate that lS. Some half mllllnn v.rv tWA. -.--... v.v. (HUM L4ja the balance will swing sharply in our ivor. cut . rew. ii any or the troops which reach Europe after the middle of September can be uaad in th. nr.un. campaign. ,-. We may. conclude, then,-that' the Ger mans, knowing that the Americans have Sent enoueh Irootta ta Rnrnn tn unit. lse the situation by mid August . will make .their: next offensive some time before; this ehanr nonnra. TOT. maw conclude that Ludetidorff is putting the twisning toucnee upon the organization of a. final attack which shall equal that of March 21. I do not - believe that be can. deal a. heavier blow. ' anf that he is using the remaining time In making ., , . . . . . uup plans in- mat metnoaicai and amas mgly skilful fashion which was re vealed in the last great attack which produced the hart' at Ptcardv- tnr n other attacks, since by comparison have vva minor. . . ' - . If this second malor attack falla tn bring a, decision and' I believe it will iau wen there will not be, time left to orsranixa- a third twrM-a 'ha Mtt,a. conditions ' close the campaign of 1816. Great g-ains In. ground like those made earlier, tn the. year;' provided they do BOt open the wit to a . decisive tim a success which will break the military power ana civilian will of - France ' or Britain, will not count, for' they will not chance the situation.' , W. m.v safely say to- ourselves with every rec ognition e, xne terruic . weignt or the blow-that- 1a mmlnr that , It 'la v. last, and that, if it falls, then, before tne uermans can prepare, a new blow, the. fighting for the. year will be over. Outlook for Next Year .';.'' ' Looking to the future, this means that when - next . yearns . campaign comes America can have on the line not less -mm 77th (national army) division. than 1,500.000 men. ready to go In by May of next year. This will be an army larger than the British br French has ever been and numerically stronger that the Germans have used on the Western front between the first battle of Ypres and the opening of the pres ent campaign. It will represent 125 German divisions in numerical strength.' and. added to at least 190 d'vislons of our all lea. will give our combined armies at least 115 divisions for next year, against a German total Which In all probability cannot exceed 225. and at worst will not pass 250, if all German divisions in Russia and the Balkans are drawn in for service on the western frorrt. We are getting on, then, approaching the end of what must prove the last bad crinia nf th. war m. - J " . W, IllMIBB. using the policy of Kanoleon In th. Waterloo campaign, have endeavored to deal with one set of enemies before another could arrive. Napoleon's pur pose was to defeat the British and the rrusstans before the Austrlans and Russians could arrive . In Western Europe. Ltidendorffs purpose has been to deal with the British and French be fore the Americans, could arrive. Tl was with this Idea In mind that he struck his terrific blow of Mamh si but this blow, while bringing one of tne great victories of the war, did not accomplish the larger purpose. Time for America to come still remained More than three months have passed since the battle of Picardy began, and upward of three quarters of a million American fighting men are now 'in Eu rope. Ludendorff has now to strike his second blow, and with it his numerical advantage will disappear. If he falls to win the war with this blow he win be outnumbered, and before he can or ganize a third blow weather aa mil n numbers will have turned against him. were are oases ror real optimism, for sane confidence. We must not expect too much of our new troops; we must not, and naturally do not. reckon them tne equal or German veterans of picked divisions, but we may think of hit equally untrained British troops accom plished against the best of the kaiser's army arter Tpres. and thus appreciate the value to our hard-pressed allies of the American contingents. Non-Combatants Unavailable Further than this, outside the calcu lation of 750.000 fighting troops stand more than 300.000 Americans, who are at work on communications, at the ports, in All the behlnd-the-lme tasks which must be performed. The contrt button of these men to winning the war Is quite as great as that of their com rades On the firing line. They have re built railroads, created portsy performed labor which will be of great value this year, and even greater next It Is mistake to reckon these men as fighting units.. It is an even greater error to eliminate them from the reckoning at this time, when France and Britain, as well as Germany, are suffering from a terrible lack of labor. There Is another phase of America's contribution . which must be considered, although one will speak of It with some hesitation. When Russia collapsed the war was lost for our allies had we failed' to do all of what we have done. We could not do less and perform our duty to the nations which had been fighting f this y struggle, which is our Biruggic, owr uinw years oi agony. But if the United States had not been ready and willing to step into the breach Germany would have won the victory. There might be some Question of the extent of this victory, but at the least she would have been left with free hands in r astern Knrope and .the resources would have been in her hands to re sume the march toward supreme power. The knowledge of the fact that Amer ica was coming served to bridge the difficult time between the diaaDDoint- menta of last year at the Aim and in Flanders and the arrival of th flrt considerable contingents of Pershing's army. Again, .after the battle of Plc ardy; In March and "April, our allies wonia nave been beaten had there been no American reserves to rush to France to restore the balance between th two armies.; numerically. Not only this transport of -troops bat th knowledge 1 that our troops- were coming enabled f the British and the French to use their reserves as they could, not have .used them. had. there been no other reserves soon-to become, available. r. Americans in Europe trembled last year when they realized how. much was expected of - their country, wnen they saw how terrible -was the crisis and how great the need. ; But I do not believe the French, who were most optimistic In their views as to what America was - i ill -K;v 1 III 1 -J A General Edwards, commanding the 1 , Worst Situatiori - i Her Own Forces, Wearied by Fou r Futile Offensives in W st in Three Months, Face Grim Fact That No Fresh Armies Are Available in Reserve. going to do. can be disappointed now, when our first million is in France. Just a little more than a year after Pershing was welcomed by all Paris and exactly a year after the first American battalion struggled to keep Its ranks amid , the charges of Parisian crowds, eager., to pay honor to America's first contingent. Allies' Appeal Is Answered We have the next German blow to parry, and It will be a terrible task. Beyond that is the German peace of fensive, which will not be lees danger ous and we shall have to be as efficient in meeting the peace offensive as we have been in getting the men over to meet the military blow. But the mil lions are there and we are understand ing the character of the German menace to us. a a. civilized nation, more clearly and more generally each week. 1: " a fill hl r'" v- il". l J TP HI STf ' rr II .1 I I i j i fi. . . J 1 jaaaaa An Institution for the Common Good THE Finley institution otters to alf the refinement and elegance of a fine home. Our service' remains-always the same. Lack of great means is ho longer a barrier tb the best funeral. In the chapel, warmth and softness have replaced the cold, $ternv wrroundinf of years gone by. No inconvenience mars the solemnity. Adjoininr the ?j?Lar? Jlrivtlf rS?mt for relatives, and directly off the.cbapeMs our private driveway one of the features of the Finley establishment most unique In all America. . ' We believe the public. should know of these bet tered funeral methods, and w hope to win the ap proval of those who shall learn of us throujh these messages, Do not think because the Finley Institu - ..If H1' nd up-to-date that our prices are not -. within the reach of everyone. ;;w bile our price Is the same to Tryone. money has never been s barrier to any worthy family. ...'.;-. "icr in J. P. Finley PrbjTeajtvc Funeral Directors - Montgomery . 1 ' Si voir 10 '-:' n 5-: 1! S--?ri'..i -J'' -: i-.-i - 5 i --j-Tr 1 Ml 26th (national guard) division. , " After alL it Is something tn fa.1 that we met the appeal of our gallant allies between March and July, that we gave them the necessary men, that we re stored the balance destroyed by Russian collapse. Our soldiers are not yet com- . . vi ipm or oi Verdun. Our officers are not the offi. cers of the French army at the Mama, but on the physical side we have now the finest troops in Europe and they" bring the added advantage which to the possession of fresh and unwearied troops going Into an action which baa endured for a long time. What we celebrated upon our own na tional holiday on July 4 we may there, fore" believe the French hailed with, equal enthusiasm on their - BastlUs day. As for the British but they cele brated the Fourth of July . with vs. which Is again something of enduring significance. -11 ftl a J "I 1 v. . : a up?1 'ill v5 - w i : A' & Son Street at Fifth
