SfidTION" ; TWO PART
At' ' w i ,' '
r
4" : "'?
'4
General Hunter Liggett,
W' TWO PART TWO.
i, " - 1 y - " ' eta- sr a a-aar a m. a aba AVa a m m. a a m- u a. .a a a . rm a - r. - - w a
FresSi Legions Go
To Take Up Battle
As Midsummer Approaches With Allied' Forces in Ascendancy in
Numbers, Hun Hopes for Victory in the Field Go
Glimmering.
BY FRANK H. SIMONDS
Copyntht, 1018. br th Tribon AmocUUob (the New . Tort Tribune).
(Thi rticle tu wrtUon prior to the Krmnco-Americn offensiro becun bat week. Ed.)
rpHE announcement made for the Fourth of July that our first -million had
arrived In Europe stirred the American people profoundly, as it shoulo
have moved them. Looked at from the side of national pride and-patriotic
performance, it will .remain memorable in the history of this, the greatest of
all wars, and it is a feat commensurate not with what we expected of ourselves,
but of what our allies hoped of us. Yet if is not on this aspect of the
achievement that Americans will care now to lay emphasis, when so much
sttii remains to be done and our enemy continues dangerous and defiant if
It Is to the military side of America's
contribution that "moit minds will turn
at this moment. What will 1.000.000
American soldiers mean at this crisis in
the world war? What will they mean in
the restoring of the balance between the
German and his opponents on the west
ern battlefront, the balance destroyed
by the collapse of Russia? Before at
tempting to answer these questions it
Is essential to point out certain facts.
We 'have sent 1,000,000 men to France
and they are a solid fact on French
soil; but we cannot reckon that we have
sent 1.000,000 fighting men across the
ocean or that all of the fighting men
who - have crossed are yet In line or
ready for service. ' " " -
To begin at-' t 'beginning., we are told
by the war department that of the 1.000.
000 some 8 per cent may be counted as
fighting men. and this would mean 692.
000 men. Add to this total the number
sent In the two weeks that have passed
since the announcement-was made, and
we may safely estimate that on Bastille
day there were in France three quarters
FF
LIFT
Freezone is magic f Apply a few drops on
a lore, touchy corn or a painful callus. Instant
ly that corn or callus stops hurting you. Then
shortly you lift that bothersome corn or callus
. right off, rbot ana all, with the fingers'. No I
tfJot one bit of pain no soreness, no irritation.
' VV
A few cents buys a tiny bottle of the magic Freezone at any drug
store. Sufficient, to remove every hard corn, soft corn, corn between
the, toes and painful callus from one's feet. Freezone is the much-'Ulked-cf
ether discovery of a Cincinnati-genius. , Corns and calluses
lift away without even a twinge of pain. Why Wait? No humbuz!
TWO.
ism
.mm
commanding first corps.
of a million Americans already on the
iignung ime or destined soon to be
reaay to apptear there.
By Way of
Comparison
This means that we have now In
France an army whose organised
strength is greater than that of the
vrerman army in peace time, more than
half as strone aa th mam vhich n.r.
many hurled at Fmnc i
campaign and three quarters as strong
a mo rrencn army which defeated the
German bid for supreme victory between
Paris and Verdun In September, 1314.
inow, or this 750,000, a third, approxi
mately. 260.000. hftv hwn n,nl.l
into the firat Amnrtxan
w -v,.. ,uijr, ailU LillJS
army may be reckoned- as representing
m reauy iormiaaDie rorce, since It in
cludes all of the trnnm wriliMi Kan
longest in France and Is commanded by
(.nose oi our oincers wno nave had the
best training and the most experience.
It Includes the First division, which has
CORN
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E ' ' y rf '4 " v ' vK
General Pershing,, commanding American forces In France.
.... 'If
KlV.n .ruft n .nn. . . ( ... 1 1 ,
auu.iv iucii m wvcfM
sectors and won the smart little sue-
v-anugny a lew weeks ago. Tnis
mrrmr In . . . . ' . 1
oucugui reprewnii aoouc ui
same numbers as the army with which
Petair defended Verdun, and Its units markea ,or ultimate use on the west
ln physical etrene-th in .nmrinr t rn front. Now. I have no access . to
In physical strength are superior to
Petaln's soldiers because of their youth.
At Verdun France was already using
middle aged men. although the fighting
achievement of these middl iul man
will stand as an everlasting monument
v. wunge ana endurance.
We have! then, given the allies our
.men one army, which, if still inferior
to the best of the British and French
armies, is a resource of great Import
ance. In addition.
another force, equally strong, scattered
along the front In British and French
units, getting its training on the firing
line anff contributing mightily to reliev
ing the strain upon tne older troops. All
conmaerea, tms army may be con
sidered about eona.1 tn tV flrt -.r
Kitchener armies, which came out after
ipres ana got Its bloody and bitter
training on the line, but held its share
of that line.
Large Numbers
In Sight
There remain 250,000 troops, which are
ouii iacKing in the necessary training
In France, which serves mt.rriin.
ate course for our graduates of the
noma camps. But experience has al
reaay snown in France that a month
after they land our American troops
can be sent to the front that Is. to a
quiet sectorprovide,! that they are,
strongly supported by French or Rrttiah
units. Thus it is not too much to say
"y we miaaie or August we shall
have two armies of 250.000 each on the
line, if it be decided to use them In
separate formation, or, in any event.
we enau nave troops capable of
taking their place in two. urmUa Af kl.
Blze- nd by the middle of September
'" nave inree. This is the way
we must reckon the availability of our
overseas forces in th
. " IIIUUU1B.
With these preliminary remarks let us
now get back to the main question
" eneci nas America's contribution
had upon the numerical balance between
the Germans and - their opponents in
France? At what point will the Ameri
can troops restore equality between the
forces directed by jLudendorff and those
raarsnauea by s FochT ; In askmr. these
questions we enter, the domain of specu
lation and attack the problem -which has
pussled all military observers - outside
the official secrets for the last three
months. Nor is any exact answer pos
sible until the statistics of the German
army become public property.
But we have certain things to guide
us. No allied report has : placed . more
than 206 German divisions on the west
ern front up to the Present moment 1.
though there have been credible reports
that before the campaign was over at
least 225 would appear, German divi
sions are now reckoned at 12,000 men,
and 206 civlsions . would thus mean
around 2.500,000 men. -Add another 250,
000 for those that are to m: twmuhihw
and the brute strength of the German
thrusting power for the
p&tgn would be 2,750,000 men but It is
wen to pear in . mind that no- more than
2,500,000 have yet been accounted for,
and hot all ; of these, by a,ny means,
have been engaged In the sever! nr.
fenaives. . .
Franco-British'
Strength '
Aralnst this mass what tn al
lies able to oppose in Hunhf imt
March we. were for all practical pur-
poses out or n. The organised strength
of the British army In France, using
German reports, has varied from 60
to ; 70' divisions. I believe the latter
figure to be more nearly correct, ; but
certain British military writor n.v.
suggested that many divisions were be
low strength. A British division should
have about 18.000 men, but. accepting
ine iigure : or eu divisions and the
strength of 15,000 for the divisions, the
British had around 900,000 men in line
when Hlnaenburg-began on March 21.
The - French. - on their nart. had. anm
sir aivtsions, . reckoning a division atl",7r. OIV'8in (our own
15.000 and. . allowins-. for I divisions are more than- twice u.lrr.
some of these divisions, they must still
have counted at least 1.250.000 on the
line or In reserve, ready for line service.
As for the Belgians they have had six
divisions in lini for several years and
n...t ...mh.f t least 7K00ffl i-a-:
their all facnitte. V,or Vee
their losses have b.ll,i
; s . i
strong. complete the list. ,
' " v,
SlliniT!,7I.mCrt!n' " njtter
fart that . th. tntal vraa Ann I
- . " wjrca i to ui line somewhere by the
i . w- 7 ,'i
.I III f' , ..y-'wl. t x,l
i uuv i,iou,uuu r Tenon ano sometning
more than 100,000 Belgians and FOrtu-
AAA . A r A HAA ...
guese Jn all 2,350,000 allied troops,
. . -. . ...
tgsniBi i,ow),vuv uermans in une or in
reserve and some 250,000 more probably
oniciai figures or private sources of
information, and if I had them I could
not make use of them here, but, using
the German t a t,m,nt n nain. auH of
ficial Information as the allied staffs
have permitted to come through, it
seems to me that on March 21 the Ger
mans COUld Tint hflVA Vi n H mnra , than 4-
500,000 on the western front and the
aines certainty not less than 2.250.000,
ana prooaoiy not less than 2,350,000.
This would mean that the immediate
disparity in numbers was not above
250,000 at the most, and probably not
more than lfio.nnn. s.ir in v
ever, that at this time the relatively
miui auierence in numbers .was only
one of the huulfnna r
- - - , W
Slon. OX -KOmmaTirt tn.Uri.llv
the -value of-the numbers actually in
ia.uu comriDutea to the first dis
aster, which was the Battle of Plcardy,
But in addition to a possible disparity
ox .250,000 at the moment, the allies
were Douna to look forward to the time
when, another 2.rn nnn -
the German numbers by the arrival of
urner aivisiona already marked for use
niween Switzerland and the sea.
No New Units
Created
In this situation the allies could not
Increase the number of their divisions.
It takes time many months to create
new divisional units, with the necessary
Officers and rnnl(ln. t ii -m
fact, the French stopped Increasing the
. ureir units in tne rlrst year
of the war. the. -R,HtiaK , .
The French and British were both of
w.n uriven to ao this by the approach
"I ct . on or their man-power,
-iney bad to rMaiiiiot
serves of men left to them, how long
uppiy wastage in existing
S. .if "A." th" Frnch hy W50.000
In their fighting army.they must keep an
equal number-behind to fill gaps made
??tle'- ?nd th BrtU8l "UuaUon
is the same, of course. It Is misappre
hension of this detaU which contributes
T,kT:. general confusion when
numbers are mentioned.
The Germans t. ... .
. ure, uia increase
the number of their divisions as recently
as last Tfar K v j.j . 'W""J
K ' r a,a mainly
by redudnr th itn.. . .. .
, , vi, ul wren aivi-
greater mo-
,rr'u"'"jr "ey am not much in-
an.t,,;j,,Umb!rs- !h they did
a little of this. As it stood in March
Foch when he took over supreme!
? ?VJaJ?0t rkon on more, divi
sions, derived from British or French
dUHn the Pairr.. save 1
troop were recalled from Italy and Sa-
rinl "V??" Brttlsh hne garC
the British several fine divisions, Vrhlch
were practically destroyed.
Feth f,M Vtlt r8rv employed,
. ,r0t bHB hta number of or
ganised unit much above 2.250.000 or
r?Z3l;- J. was' bi5
ti. - - " nanas at one
1: 7" me 2,500,000 German.
7r T. ' 7 p'u" so.00a scheduled
to arrive. Both the British and the
French armies ,m MirZLiZr
serves" to-Jt :
' ana no more. .T
JnSZZ yi?? tn
tn in.ri v. "Vi-MM was made
whlT V, , fP?61 in March.
tiLL.JvltrJhmA"bm answered by
the nresencA nf - . .
tei- .. . Americans In
Pnce. at least 750,000 of them fight
Ingrnen. .Now. if you reckon allied ud
k- 7-1 "T". "JlJt upon the basia of
the strenarth of a r-.. ,
. - vwiom Division, me
SfJf,?! .We 225 divisional
I"! Zl 'ZT tZ'",xi u not less than Its
foSr J?rm.nent in,
2 and" .7 SvlaWTT , wtween
Numerical iC-':. '
Superiority"
- Oar first army; now In the field; con
sists Of "something la.a
ntlnr ' the . German way. That : i
counUng the - German way. . That ; la.
L ttieGerinan and net to be confused
Zl Sf'' ttou vat tnU
nVbmr;of dlvJ-
TfjZLfSF of our troP8
? fln1 w among French, and Brit-
"nits, but may, be counted. Thoa
uie vrcrnia.il aaa.-. bui we have Uia th
numerical equivalent ef another 20 Ger-
uiviBiuua aireaay - in France 'and
getting- their first training, all of whom
. . ... u
Is
XtinnniecS
V
General Duncan, commanding the
middle of August. When they get on
the line the allied total will stand be
tween 248 and 256 divisions, as against
225 for our German foes.
In other words and this Is the big
gest fact of all we have already sent
to France enough organized units to
restore and more than restore the bal
ance between the enemy and our allies,
when all of our units are ready ; and all
of our nnits will be ready to do some
thing within the next month and to do
considerable before the middle of Sep
tember, while from four to six weeks
still remain for campaigning. It may
be that our first 40 divisions have al
ready evened things up; certainly they
would have if the Germans are still
but 206 divisions strong, as they were
last March, accepting for the basis of
calculation the. lowest conceivable esti
mate of allied divisions. But, . allowing
for everything, it seems fair to say
that by,the middle of August America
win have met the demand made upon
her to turn the tide and supply the
numbers to counterbalance the advan
tage accruing to the Germans through
the vRussian collapse and the conse
quent transfer of German divisions to
the Western front.
By the middle of August the Germans
will no longer have any advantage of
numbers on the west front; they may
not have It by August 1, And with the
loss of this advantage goes the hope of
winning the war ; if it be not won before
that time. . For it Is apparent that Oer
many has no new reservoir from which
to draw tother divisions as she drew dl
visions from Russia. As for Austrian
divisions, the events along the Plave
have exhausted German hopes of aid
from this direction, while neither Bui
garia nor Turkey can or will supply
men in any numbers: it may be doubted
if either nation would lend the kaiser
a single division. As for divisions or
ganised out of Russian recruits, this is
merest moonshine., Germany could not
find officers for them ; it would take a
ear to create the organizations essen
tial to effective units, and if all these
difficulties were surmounted there is
nothing to suggest that the Russians
would be willing to fight.
Hun Leaders
Hard Pressed t
The truth is that Hindenburg and Lu
dendorff went to the bottom of the Ger
man barrel last spring and last winter.
They gathered up all that was left, they
borravMl f n- th. ftitn,. a.
ent needs and opportunities, they took
. . .... .
Liieir Ramoie ana iney nave staked
their -last dollar on the last card.
Now, it Is essential to avoid undue
optimism and equally necessary to avoid
exaggeration. The Germans still have
a slight advantage in numbers on the
line or available for active service. They
will preserve, that advantage for a few.
weeks more, but will lose any numer
ical superiority "some time In -August.
Thereafter, ' if our troops continue to
go to Europe at the present rate that
lS. Some half mllllnn v.rv tWA.
-.--... v.v. (HUM L4ja
the balance will swing sharply in our
ivor. cut . rew. ii any or the troops
which reach Europe after the middle of
September can be uaad in th. nr.un.
campaign. ,-.
We may. conclude, then,-that' the Ger
mans, knowing that the Americans have
Sent enoueh Irootta ta Rnrnn tn unit.
lse the situation by mid August . will
make .their: next offensive some time
before; this ehanr nonnra. TOT. maw
conclude that Ludetidorff is putting the
twisning toucnee upon the organization
of a. final attack which shall equal that
of March 21. I do not - believe that
be can. deal a. heavier blow. ' anf that
he is using the remaining time In making
., , . . . . .
uup plans in- mat metnoaicai and amas
mgly skilful fashion which was re
vealed in the last great attack which
produced the hart' at Ptcardv- tnr n
other attacks, since by comparison have
vva minor. . . ' - .
If this second malor attack falla tn
bring a, decision and' I believe it will
iau wen there will not be, time left
to orsranixa- a third twrM-a 'ha Mtt,a.
conditions ' close the campaign of 1816.
Great g-ains In. ground like those made
earlier, tn the. year;' provided they do
BOt open the wit to a . decisive tim
a success which will break the military
power ana civilian will of - France ' or
Britain, will not count, for' they will
not chance the situation.' , W. m.v
safely say to- ourselves with every rec
ognition e, xne terruic . weignt or the
blow-that- 1a mmlnr that , It 'la v.
last, and that, if it falls, then, before
tne uermans can prepare, a new blow,
the. fighting for the. year will be over.
Outlook for
Next Year .';.''
' Looking to the future, this means that
when - next . yearns . campaign comes
America can have on the line not less
-mm
77th (national army) division.
than 1,500.000 men. ready to go In by
May of next year. This will be an army
larger than the British br French has
ever been and numerically stronger
that the Germans have used on the
Western front between the first battle
of Ypres and the opening of the pres
ent campaign. It will represent 125
German divisions in numerical strength.'
and. added to at least 190 d'vislons of
our all lea. will give our combined armies
at least 115 divisions for next year,
against a German total Which In all
probability cannot exceed 225. and at
worst will not pass 250, if all German
divisions in Russia and the Balkans are
drawn in for service on the western
frorrt.
We are getting on, then, approaching
the end of what must prove the last
bad crinia nf th. war m. -
J " . W, IllMIBB.
using the policy of Kanoleon In th.
Waterloo campaign, have endeavored to
deal with one set of enemies before
another could arrive. Napoleon's pur
pose was to defeat the British and the
rrusstans before the Austrlans and
Russians could arrive . In Western
Europe. Ltidendorffs purpose has been
to deal with the British and French be
fore the Americans, could arrive. Tl
was with this Idea In mind that he
struck his terrific blow of Mamh si
but this blow, while bringing one of
tne great victories of the war, did not
accomplish the larger purpose. Time
for America to come still remained
More than three months have passed
since the battle of Picardy began, and
upward of three quarters of a million
American fighting men are now 'in Eu
rope. Ludendorff has now to strike his
second blow, and with it his numerical
advantage will disappear. If he falls
to win the war with this blow he win
be outnumbered, and before he can or
ganize a third blow weather aa mil n
numbers will have turned against him.
were are oases ror real optimism, for
sane confidence. We must not expect
too much of our new troops; we must
not, and naturally do not. reckon them
tne equal or German veterans of picked
divisions, but we may think of hit
equally untrained British troops accom
plished against the best of the kaiser's
army arter Tpres. and thus appreciate
the value to our hard-pressed allies of
the American contingents.
Non-Combatants
Unavailable
Further than this, outside the calcu
lation of 750.000 fighting troops stand
more than 300.000 Americans, who are
at work on communications, at the
ports, in All the behlnd-the-lme tasks
which must be performed. The contrt
button of these men to winning the war
Is quite as great as that of their com
rades On the firing line. They have re
built railroads, created portsy performed
labor which will be of great value this
year, and even greater next It Is
mistake to reckon these men as fighting
units.. It is an even greater error to
eliminate them from the reckoning at
this time, when France and Britain, as
well as Germany, are suffering from
a terrible lack of labor.
There Is another phase of America's
contribution . which must be considered,
although one will speak of It with some
hesitation. When Russia collapsed the
war was lost for our allies had we
failed' to do all of what we have done.
We could not do less and perform our
duty to the nations which had been
fighting f this y struggle, which is our
Biruggic, owr uinw years oi agony.
But if the United States had not been
ready and willing to step into the breach
Germany would have won the victory.
There might be some Question of the
extent of this victory, but at the least
she would have been left with free hands
in r astern Knrope and .the resources
would have been in her hands to re
sume the march toward supreme power.
The knowledge of the fact that Amer
ica was coming served to bridge the
difficult time between the diaaDDoint-
menta of last year at the Aim and in
Flanders and the arrival of th flrt
considerable contingents of Pershing's
army. Again, .after the battle of Plc
ardy; In March and "April, our allies
wonia nave been beaten had there been
no American reserves to rush to France
to restore the balance between th two
armies.; numerically. Not only this
transport of -troops bat th knowledge 1
that our troops- were coming enabled f
the British and the French to use their
reserves as they could, not have .used
them. had. there been no other reserves
soon-to become, available. r.
Americans in Europe trembled last
year when they realized how. much was
expected of - their country, wnen they
saw how terrible -was the crisis and how
great the need. ; But I do not believe
the French, who were most optimistic
In their views as to what America was
- i
ill -K;v 1
III 1 -J A
General Edwards, commanding the
1 ,
Worst Situatiori
- i
Her Own Forces, Wearied by Fou r Futile Offensives in W st in
Three Months, Face Grim Fact That No Fresh Armies
Are Available in Reserve.
going to do. can be disappointed now,
when our first million is in France. Just
a little more than a year after Pershing
was welcomed by all Paris and exactly
a year after the first American battalion
struggled to keep Its ranks amid , the
charges of Parisian crowds, eager., to
pay honor to America's first contingent.
Allies' Appeal
Is Answered
We have the next German blow to
parry, and It will be a terrible task.
Beyond that is the German peace of
fensive, which will not be lees danger
ous and we shall have to be as efficient
in meeting the peace offensive as we
have been in getting the men over to
meet the military blow. But the mil
lions are there and we are understand
ing the character of the German menace
to us. a a. civilized nation, more clearly
and more generally each week.
1: "
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J TP
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An Institution for
the Common Good
THE Finley institution otters to alf the
refinement and elegance of a fine home.
Our service' remains-always the same.
Lack of great means is ho longer a barrier tb
the best funeral.
In the chapel, warmth and softness have replaced
the cold, $ternv wrroundinf of years gone by. No
inconvenience mars the solemnity. Adjoininr the
?j?Lar? Jlrivtlf rS?mt for relatives, and
directly off the.cbapeMs our private driveway one
of the features of the Finley establishment most
unique In all America. .
' We believe the public. should know of these bet
tered funeral methods, and w hope to win the ap
proval of those who shall learn of us throujh these
messages, Do not think because the Finley Institu
- ..If H1' nd up-to-date that our prices are not
-. within the reach of everyone. ;;w bile our price Is the
same to Tryone. money has never been s barrier
to any worthy family. ...'.;-. "icr
in
J. P.
Finley
PrbjTeajtvc Funeral Directors -
Montgomery .
1 ' Si voir
10
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5-:
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S--?ri'..i
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5 i --j-Tr
1
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26th (national guard) division.
,
"
After alL it Is something tn fa.1 that
we met the appeal of our gallant allies
between March and July, that we gave
them the necessary men, that we re
stored the balance destroyed by Russian
collapse. Our soldiers are not yet com-
. . vi ipm or oi
Verdun. Our officers are not the offi.
cers of the French army at the Mama,
but on the physical side we have now
the finest troops in Europe and they"
bring the added advantage which to the
possession of fresh and unwearied
troops going Into an action which baa
endured for a long time.
What we celebrated upon our own na
tional holiday on July 4 we may there,
fore" believe the French hailed with,
equal enthusiasm on their - BastlUs
day. As for the British but they cele
brated the Fourth of July . with vs.
which Is again something of enduring
significance.
-11
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up?1 'ill
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A'
& Son
Street at Fifth