Grants Pass daily courier., January 10, 1920, Page 2, Image 2

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GENERAL PERSHING'S OWN STORY
OF OPERATIONS OF AMERICAN
TROOPS DURING THE WORLD WAR
Commander in Chief of Expeditionary Forces Submit*
Special Report to Secretary Baker—Fate of
Central Powers Decided by Work of
t
the United States Army.
FOCH ADMITTED ALLIES WERE FACING DEFEAT
First and Second Divisions, in Company With French Moroccan
Troops, Attacked on July 18 Without Preliminary Bombard*
ment, Smashed Through the German Lines. Overwhelmed
Both Infantry and Artillery, and Cut the Enemy's Communica­
tions. Compelling a General Retreat From the Marne and
Starting the Military Collapse Which Forced Germany to Sue
for Peace.
Washington.—The final report of
Gen. John J. Pershing as commander
In chief of the American expeditionary
forces in Furois? was made public by
the secretary of war. Gen. Pershing
says in effect. although not in terms,
that the American army won the war.
“It was this spirit of determination
animating every American soldier."
says General Pershing, referring to the
Meu’e-Argonne battle, “that made it
impossible for the enemy to maintain
the struggle until 1919.”
The’report in its more Important de­
tails is as follows:
In order that the reasons for many
important decisions reached in the
early history of the American expe­
ditionary forces may be more clearly-
understood and the true vulti# of the
American effort more fully appreci­
ated, it is desirable to have in mind
the main events leading up to the
time of our entry into the war.
191 -Although the German drive
of 1914 had failed in its immediate
purpose, yet her armies had made
very important gains, German forces
were In complete possession of Bel­
gium and occupied rich industrial re-
(ions of northern France, embracing
one-fourteenth of her population and
about three-fourths of her coal and
Iron.
The German armies held a
strongly fortified line 468 miles in
length, stretching from the Swiss
border to Nleuport on the English
channel; her troops were within forty-
tight miles of Paris and the initiative
remained in German hands.
In the east the rapidity of the Rus-
elan mobilization forced Germany,
even before the battle of Marne, to
«end troops to that frontier, but the
close of 1914 found the Russian arm­
les ejected from East Prussia arvi
driven back on Warsaw.
The entry of Turkey into the war.
because of the moral effect upon the
Moslem world and the Immediate con-
•tant threat created against allied
communications with the Far East.
led to an effort by the allies in the
direction of the Dardanelles.
Allies Helped by Italy.
1915—Italy joined the allies In May
and gave their cause new strength,
but the effect was more or less offset
when Bulgaria entered on the side of
the central powers.
■The threatening situation on the
Russian front and in the Balkans was
still such that Germany was compelled
to exert an immediate offensive effort
In those directions and to maintain
only a defensive attitude on the west­
ern front. German arms achieved n
striking series of successes In the vicin­ [
ity of the Mazurian lakes and in
Galicia, capturing Warsaw. Brest lA-
tovsk and A’llna. The central powers
overran Serbia and Montenegro. Mean­
while the Italian armies forced Aus­
tria to use approximately one-half her
strength against them.
In the west the French and Brit­
ish launched offensives which cost the
German armies considerable loss; bat
the objectives were limited and the
effect was local. The Dardanelles ex-
pedition, having failed in its mission,
was withdrawn in January. In Meso­
potamia the allied operations had not
been successful. Although the British
fleet had established its superiority on
the sea. yet the German submarine
blockade had developed into a serious
menage to allied shipping.
,
Russia Still Powerful.
1916—Germany no doubt believed
that her advantage on the eastern
front at the close of 1915 again war­
ranted an offensive tn the west, and
her attack against Verdun was ac­
cordingly launched in the spring af
1916. But Russia was not yet beaten,
and early in June, aided at the same
time by the threat of an Italian offen­
sive in the west, she began the great
drive in Galicia thut proved so d Is­
astrous to Austria.
Roumania. having entered on the
side of the allies, undertook a promls-
ing offensive against Austria. The Brit­
ish and French armies attacked along
the Somme. Germany quickly returned
to the defensive in the west, and In
September initiated a campnigu in the
east which, before the close of 1916.
proved unfortunate for Russia as well
as Roumania.
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Spring of 1917—-Retaining on the
eastern front the forces considered
sufficient for the final conquest of Rus­
sia, Germany prepared to aid Austria
in an offensive against Italy. Mean­
while the Russian revolution was well
under way, and by the mid-summer
of 1917 the final collapse of that gov­
ernment was almost certain.
The relatively low strength of the
German forces on the western front
led the allies, with much confidence,
to attempt a decision on this front;
but the losses were very heavy and
the effort signally failed. The failure
caused a serious reaction, especially
on French morale, both in the army
and throughout the country, and at­
tempts to carry out extensive or com­
bined operations were indefinitely sus­
pended.
Sank Millions of Tons.
In the five months ending June 30
German submarines had accomplished
the destruction of more than 3.250,000
tons of allied shipping. During three
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years Germany hail seen practically all
her offensives except Verdun crowned
with success. Her battle lines were
hel l ou foreign soil und she had'with­
stood every allied attack since the
Marne. The German geueral staff
could now foresee the complete elim-
luatlou of Russia, the possibility of de­
feating Italy before the end of the
year and, finally, the cumpalgn of 191.S
against the French and British on the
western front which might terminate
the war.
It cannot be sahl that German hopes
of final victory yvere extravagant,
either as viewed at that time or as
viewed in the light of history. Finan
dal problems of the allies were diffi­
cult, supplies were becoming exhaust­
ed and tlielr armies hail suffered tre­
mendous losses. Discouragement ex­
isted not only among the civil popula­
tion but throughout the urmles as well.
Such was the allied morale that,
although their superiority on the west­
ern front during the last half of 1910
and during 1917 amounted to 20 per
cent, only local attacks could lie under­
taken. and their effect proved wholly
Insufficient against the German de­
fense. Allied resource« In man power
at home were low and there was little
prospect of materially Increasing their
armed strength, even In the face of the
probability of having practically the
whole military strength of the Central
I'owers against them In the spring of
1018.
This was the state of affairs that ex­
isted when we entered the war. While
I our action gave the allies much encour-
| agement, yet this was temporary, mid
a review of conditions made It appar­
ent that America must make a supreme
material effort as soon ns possible.
After duly considering the tonnage pos­
sibilities I cabled the following to
Washington on July 6. 1917:
“Plans should contemplate sending
over at least 1,000.000 men by next
May.” A general organization project,
onerlng ns fur as possible the person­
nel of all combat, stuff and iidmlnls-
tnitlve units, was forwarded to Wash­
ington on July II. In this I stated:
Needed 1,000,000 Men.
“It is evident that a force of about
1.0(10.000 Is the smallest unit which in
modern war vvill be n complete, well-
balanced ami lnde|H-mlcnt fighting or­
ganization.
However, it must be
equally clear that the adoption of bl-
size force as a basis of study should
not be construed as representing the
maximum force which should tie sent
to or which will l»e needed In France.
It Is taken as the force which may be
expected to reach France In t i e for
nn offensive In 1918. and as a unit and
basis of organization. I'hiii- for the
future should be based, especially in
reference to the manufu-1 m• "f artil­
lery. aviation and other muter al, on
three times tills force—1. ••.. a: least
nn ii."
Resolved on an Offensive.
Before developing plans for a line of
comim i 'cations it was necessary to
decide ii | hiu the probable sector of the
front Tor the eventual employment of n
distinctive American force. Onr nils
«Ion »11« offensive and It was essential
to nuila- plan« for striking the enemy
win !■•• a definite military decision
could be gained. While the allied
arni'es mid endeavored to maintain the
offeris’ve 'b ■ British. In order to guard
the <1 rnmei ports, were committed t<>
operatmi • u Flanders ami the French
to tiie pm n of the front protecting
Paris. Both lacked troops to operate
elsewhere • • h a large scale.
To the e •est the great fortified ills-
trlr* east of Verdun and a rotimi Melz
menaced central France, protected the
must exposed portion of tin? German
line of communications. Hint tietween
Metz and Sedan, und covered the
Brley Iron reg.on. frorti which the en­
emy obtained the greater part of the
iron required for munitions and ma­
terial. The coni H<*l<is <»HMt of Metz
were also covered by these same de-
• fences. A deep advance east of Metz,
or the capture of the.Brley region, by
threatening the InvitHon of rich Ger­
man territory ill the Moselle valley
and the Saar basin. thus curtailing
her supply of coal or Iron, would have
a decisive effect in forcing a with­
drawal of German troops from north­
ern France.
The military and eco­
nomic situation of tlie enemy, there­
fore. Indicated Lorraine ns tile field
promising the most fruitful results for
the employment of utir arm •■<.
Tlie complexity of trench life had
enormously Increased tlie tonnage of
supplies required by troops. Not only
whs it a question of providing food,
but enormous quantities of munitions
and material were needed, Upon the
railroads of France fell the burden of
meeting the heavy demands of
3.500.000 allied combatants then
gaged, If the American army was to
have an Independent ami flexible sys­
tem It could not 'i**e the lines behind
tlie British-Belgium front nor those
in rear of the French front covering
Pa i i •.
Chose the Southern Ports.
Tlie problem confronting tlie Amir-
iciin expeditionary forces was then tn
“U|HTlmpose Its rail communications
on those of France where there would
tie tlie least possible disturbance to
tlie lll'telies of supply of tile two great
allied armies already n tin* field. Tlie
lilies selected, therefore, were those
lending from tlie comparatively uti­
lised South Atlantic ports of France
to tlie northeast. where it was believ­
ed tlie American armies could be em
ploy i d to the best advantage.
I <i all practical purposes tlie Amer­
ican evpi ditloniiry forces were bused
vu Luv
ivuu continent. Three tlmti-
I
sand mllis of ocean to cross, with the
growing submarine menace confront
Ing us, the quantity of ship tonnage
that would be uvallublt then tin
known, and a line of conimunicktlona
by land 400 miles long from French
port» to our probable front presented
difficulties that avemed almost Itistir
mountable its compared with those of
our allies.
In providing for the storage und dis
trlbutlon of reserve supplies mi al
low mice of 45 days In the base «ec
(Ions was planned, with .'to days In the
Intermediate section, and 15 days In
the advance section. After the safe
t.v of our sea transport was practical­
ly assured, this was reduced to a total
of 45 days, distributed proportionate­
ly. When the armistice was signed all
projects for construction had been
completed mid supplies were on hand
to meet the needs of 2.000.000 men,
while further plans for neceseary con
s traction and for the supply of nn nd
dltlonal 2.000.090 were well umler
way.
Our Own Fighting Ooctrln«.
A similar scheme was adopted In
August. 1917. for our armies. In which
the Importance of teaching through
out our forces a sound fighting doc­
trine of our own was emphasized. It
provided for troop training In all units
up to Include divisions. Corps cen­
ters of Instruction for noncommlaalou
•*<1 officers and unit commanders of
all anus were established. The army
and corps schools graduated 21.XU'
noncommissioned officers mid 13.01«
officers.
Fending the organization and devel
opmen t of our own school«, a large
number of our officer» were sent to
centers of Instruction of the b III ih I
The training of our earlier
armies,
divisions was begun In close •Morl-
atlon with the French divisions under
conditions set forth In the following
paragraph on divisional truining:
“Trench warfare naturally given
prominence to the defensive as op
(Continued on Page 3 1
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