The Hooe River OWIAT It's a Cold Day When We Get Left. VOL. IX. HOOD RIVER, OREGON, FRIDAY, APRIL 15, 1898. NO. 47. A Practical Declaration of War With Spain. ARMED INTERVENTION ASKED Spain's Armistice Decree Reported Without Recommendation Recogni tion of Cuban Independence Declared to Be Unwarranted and Inexpedient. President MoKinley Monday sent tb - following message to the congress of the United States: Obedient to.that precept of the consti tution which commands the president t give from time to time the congress In formation of the state of the Union and to recommend to Its consideration such i measures as he Bhall Judge necessary and expedient. It becomes my duty now to address your body with regard to the grave condition that has arisen In the relations of the United States and Spain, by reason of the warfare that for more than three years has raged In the nelgh . boring Island of Cuba. I do so because of the Intimate connection of the Cuban question with the state of our Union, an because of. the grave relations which the course which is Incumbent upon the nation .to adopt must needs bear to the tra ditional policy of our government, if It Is to accord with the precepts laid down by the founders of the republic and re ligiously observed by succeeding adminis trations to the present day. ' ' The Cuban Revolution. The present revolution Is but the suc cessor of other similar Insurrections whieli have occurred in Cuba against the do minion of Spain, extending over a period of nearly half a century, each of which, during its progress, has subjected the United States to great effort and expense in enforcing Its neutrality laws, caused enormous loss. to. American trade and commerce, caused Irritation, annoyance and disturbance among our citizens, and by the exercise of cruel, barbarous and uncivilized practices of warfare, shocked the sensibilities and offended the human sympathies of our people. Since the. present revolution began, In February, 1895, this country has seen the fertile domain at our threshold ravaged by fire and sword in the course of a struggle unequaled in the history of the Island, . and rarely paralleled as to the number of the combatants and the bitter- ness of the contest by any revolution of modern times, where a dependent people striving to be free have been opposed by ; the power of the sovereign state. Our people have beheld a once' prosperous community reduced to comparative want, Jts commerce virtually paralyzed. Its ex ceptional productiveness diminished, its fields laid waste. Its mills In ruins and Its people perishing by tens of thousands from hunger and destitution. Damage to American Interests. We have felt ourselves constrained, In the observance of that strict neutrality which our laws enjoin and which the laws of nations command, to police our own waters arid watch our, own seaports In prevention of any unlawful act In aid of Cuba. Our trade has suffered; the capi tal Invested by our citizens In Cuba has been largely lost, and the temper and for bearance of ' our people have been so sorely tried as to beget a perilous unrest among our own citizens, which has Inevi tably followed Its expression from time to time In the national legislature so. that Issues wholly external to our body poli tic engross attention and stand in the way of more - close devotion to domestic ad vancement that becomes a Belt-contented commonwealth, whose primal maxim has been the avdldance of . all foreign en tanglements. All this must needs awaken and has Indeed aroused the utmost con cern on the part of this government as well during my predecessor's as dur ing my own administration. A Previous Effort to Restore Peace. In April, 1896, the evils from which our country suffered through the Cuban war became so enormous that my predecessor made an effort to bring about peace through the mediation of the government in any way that might tend to an honor . (i'-.le adjustment of the contest between Spain and her revolting colony on the ba , sis of some effective scheme of self government for Cuba, under the flag and sovereignty of Spain. It failed, through the refusal of the Spanish gov ernment then In power to consider any form of mediation or indeed any plan of settlement which did not I ggln with the actual submission of the Insurgents to the mother country and then only on such terms as Spain herself might see fit to grant. - Weyler'a Inhuman Policy. The war continued unabated. The re sistance of insurgents was In no wise diminished. The efforts of Spain were In creased, both by the dispatch of fresh levies to Cuba and by additions to the horrors of the strife. The new and In human phase, happily unprecedented In the modern history of civilized Christian - people, the policy of devastation and con centration, Inaugurated by the captain general's ban of October 21, 1896, In the province of Pinar del Rio, was thence extended to embrace all of the island to which the power of the Spaniards was able to reach by occupation or by mili tary 'operations. The peasantry, includ ing all dwelling in the open agricultural Interior,' were driven Into the garrisoned towns or Isolated places held by ths Span- (sh troops. The raising of provisions of all kinds was Interdicted. Fields were laid waste, dwellings unroofed and fired mills destroyed, and. In short, everything that couiu desolate the land and render it unfit for human habitation or support was commanded by one or the other con tending parties and executed by all the powers at their disposal. By the time the present administration took office a year ago, reconcentratlon so called had been effective over the bet ter part of four central and western prov- lnces, Santa Clara, Matanzas, Havana and Pinar del Rio.- The agricultural pop ulatlon, to the estimated number of 300, 000 or more, was herded within the towns and their immediate vicinity, deprived of all means of support, rendered destitute of shelter, left poorly clad and exposed to the most unsatisfactory conditions. . Sufferlnurs of Reconcentradoa. , As the scarcity of food Increased with the devastation of the depeopled areas of production, destitution and want became misery and starvation. Month by month the death rate increased in alarming ra tio, and by March, 1898, according to con servative estimates from official Spanish sources, the mortality among the recon centradoa from starvation and the dis eases thereto Incident exceeded 50 i per centum of the total number. No practical relief was accorded to the destitute. The overburdened towns, already suffering from the general dearth, could give no aid. So-called zones of cultivation, estab lished within the immediate area of effect ive military control, about the cities and fortified camps, proved illusory as a rem edy for the suffering. The unfortunates, being for the most part women and chil dren, with aged and helpless men, en feebled by disease and hunger, could not have tilled the soil without tools, seeds or shelter, for their own support or for the supply of the cities. A Reconcentratlon adopted avowedly as a war measure, to cut oft the resourceis of the insurgents, worked its predestined- re suit. As I said In my message of last December, it was not civilized warfare! It was extermination, and the only peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and the grave. , Prosrreos of the War. Meanwhile the military situation In the island has undergone a noticeable change. rne extraordinary activity that charac terized the second year of the war, when the Insurgents Invaded even the hitherto unharmed fields of Pinar del Rio and car ried havoc and destitution up to the walls of the city of Havana Itself, had relapsed into a dogged struggle in the central and eastern provinces. The Spanish army re gained a measure of control in Pinar del Rio and parts of Havana, but under the existing conditions of the rural country, without Immediate improvement of their productive situation. Even thus partial ly restricted, the revolutionists held their own, and their submission, put forward by Spain as the essential and sole basis of peace, seemed as far distant as at the outlet. In this. state of. affairs my ad ministration found itself confronted with the grave problem of Its duty. My mes sage of last December reviewed the sit uation ,and detailed the steps taken' with a view of relieving the acuteness and opening the way to some form of hon orable settlement. , - San-nata's Vain Promises. The assassination of the prime minis ter, Canovas, led to a change of govern ment In Spain. The former administra tion, . which pledged subjugation without concession, gave place to that of a more liberal party, committed long in advance to a policy of reform Involving the wider principle of home rule for Cuba and Porto Rico. The overtures of this "government made through Its new envoy, General - Wood ford, and loklng to an immediate effective amelioration of the condition of the Island, although not accepted to the ex tent of admitted mediation In any shape, were met by assurances that home rule In -an advanced phase should be forthwith offered to Cuba, without waiting for the war to end, and that more humane meth ods should thenceforth prevail In the con duct of hostilities .......... . Incidentally with these declarations the new government of Spain continued and completed the policy already begun by Its predecessor of testifying friendly .re gard for this nation by releasing Ameri can citizens held under one charge, or another connected with the insurrection, so that, by the end of November, not a single person entitled' In any way to our national protection remained in a Spanish prison. ' The Relief Movement. ' While those negotla Hons were in progress the Increasing destitution of the unfor-: tunate reconcentrados and the alarming mortality among them claimed earnest at tention. The success which had attended the limited measure of relief extended to the suffering American citizens among them by the judicious expenditure, through the ' consular agencies, of - the money appropriated expressly for their succor by the joint resolution approved May 24, 1897, prompted the humane ex tension of a similar scheme to that great body of sufferers. A suggestion to this end was acquiesced in by the Spanish au thorities. On the 24th of December I caused to be Issued an appeal to the American people, Inviting contributions in money or In kind for the succor of the starving sufferers in Cuba. Following .this, on the 8th of January, was a similar public announcement of the formation of a central Cuban relief com mittee, which had headquarters In New York city, composed of members rep resenting the national Red Cross and the religious and business elements of the community. The efforts of that com mittee have been untiring and have accom plished much. ' Arrangements for free transportation to Cuba have greatly aided the charitable work. The president of the American Red Cross and representatives of other contributory organizations have generally visited Cuba and co-operated with the consul-general and the local authorities to make effective distribution of the relief collected through the efforts of the central committee. Near ly $200,000 in money and supplies has reached the suffrers, and more Is forth coming. The supplies are admitted duty free, and transportation to the interior has been arranged so that the relief at first necessarily confined to Havana and the larger cities is now extended through most, if not all, of the towns where suf fering exists. Thousands of lives have already been saved. . The necessity for a change in the con dition of the reconcentrados Is recognized by the Spanish government. Within a few days past the orders of General Wey ler have been revoked, the reconcentra dos are, It Is said, to he permitted to re turn to their homes, and aided to resume the self-supporting pursuits of peace: pub lic works have been started to eive them employment, and a sum of $600,000 has been appropriated for their relief, Spain's Canse Hopeless. The war In Cuba Is of such a nature that, short of subjugation or extermina tion, a final military victory for the other side seems impracticable. The alternative lies In the physical exhaustion of the one or the other party, or perhaps both, a con dltlon which In effect ended the 10 years' war by the truce of Zan Jon. The pros pect of such a protraction and conclu sion of the present strife is a contingency hardly to be contemplated with equa nimity by the civilized world, and least of all by the United States, affected and objected as we are deeply and intimately by Its very existence. . - An Offer of Mediation. Realizing this, it appeared to be my duty, in a spirit of true friendliness, no less to Spain than to the Cubans, who have so much to lose by the prolongation of the struggle, to seek to bring about an Immediate termination of the war. To this end I submitted, on the 27th ultimo, as a result of much representation and correspondence through the United States minister at Madrid, propositions to the Spanish government looking to an armis; tice until October 1, for the negotiation of peace with the good ottlces of the president. - In addition, I asked the immediate revo cation of the order of reconcentratlon, so as to permit the people to return to their farms and the needy to be relieved with provisions and supplies by' the United States, co-operating with the Spanish authorities, so as to afford full relief. The reply of the Spanish cabinet was re- ceived on the night of the 31st ultimo. It offers as the means to bring about peace In Cuba to confide the preparation there of to the Insular department, Inasmuch as the concurrence of that body would be necessary to establish a final result it being however understood that the powers reserved by the constitution to the central government are not lessened or di minished. As the Cuban parliament does not meet until th 4th of May next, the Spanish government would not object, for Its part, to accept at once a suspension of hostilities if asked for by the Insur gents through the general-ln-chlef, to whom It would pertain In such cases to determine the duration and conditions of the armistice. The propositions submitted by General Woodford and the reply of the Spanish government were both in the form of brief memoranda, the texts of which are before mentioned and substantially In the language above given. The function of the Cuban parliament in the matter of ' preparing peace and the manner of do ing so are not explained In the Spanish memorandum, but from General Wood ford's explanatory reports of preliminary discussion preceding the final conference It Is understood that the Spanish govern ment stands ready to give the insular congress full power to settle the terms of peace with the Insurgents, whether by di rect negotiation or Indirectly by means of legislation does not appear. . With this last overture In the direction of immedi ate peace and Its disappointing reception by Spain, ' the executive was brought to the end of his efforts. ' . Recognition Not Warranted. In my annual message of December last I said: ' '.. y ' . ' "Of the untried measures there remain- Recognition of thi insurgents as belllg erents, recognition of the Independence of Cuba and intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, or Intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that cannot be thought of. That, by our code' of. mor ality, would be criminal aggression." Thereupon t reviewed these alternatives In the light of President Grant' B message in the words uttered in 1875, when after several years of sanguinary, destructive and cruel barbarities in Cuba, he reached the conclusion that the recognition of the independence of Cuba was Impracticable and indefensible, and that the recognition of belligerence was, not warranted by the facts according to the texts of public law. I commented especially upon that phase of the question, pointing out the incon veniences and positive dangers of recogni tion of belligerence, which, while adding Kjo the already onerous burdens of neu trality without pur own Jurisdiction, could not In any way extend our influence or effective offices in the territory of hostili ties.- ' " ' . Nothing has since occurred to change ny view in this regard, and I recognize as fully now as then that the Issuance of a proclamation of neutrality, by which process the so-called recognition of bellig erency is published, could, of itself and unattended by other action, accomplish nothing toward the one end for which we labor, the Instant pacification of Cuba, and the cessation of the misery that afflicts the Island.' A Precedent Cited. ' Turning to the question of recognizing at this time the independence of the pres ent Insurgent government In Cuba, we find safe precedents In our history from an early day. They are well summed up in President Jackson's message to con gress December 21, 1836, on the subject of the recognition of the Independence of Texas. He said: "In all the contests that have arisen out of the revolutions of France, out of the disputes relating to Portugal and Spain, out of the separation of the Amer ican possessions of both from the Eu ropean governments, and out of the nu merous and constantly recurring . strug gles for dominion ln Spanish-American countries, so wisely consistent with Just principles has been the action of our government that we have under the most critical1 circumstances avoided all censure and encountered no other evil than that produced- by a transient estrangement of gqod will In those against whom we have been, by force of evidence, com pelled to decide. - It has thus been made known to the world that the uniform policy and practice of the 'United States Is to avoid all Inter ference in disputes which merely relate to the internal government of other na tions, and eventually to recognize the au thority of the prevailing party without ref erence to our particular Interests and views or to the merits of the original controversy. But In this, as In every other occasion, safety is to be found In a rigid adherence to these principles. In the contest between Spain and the revolt ing colonies we stood aloof and waited not only until the ability of the new states to protect themselves was fully estab lished, but until the chance of their being again subjugated had entirely passed away. Then, and1 not until their, were they recognized. Such was our course In regard to Mexico herself. It Is true that with regard to Texas the civil authorities of Mexico had been expelled, Its lnvadl army defeated, the chief of the republic himself captured, and all present power to control the newly organized govern. ment of Texas annihilated within its con fines. But, on the other hand, there is, In appearance at least, an Immense dispar ity of physical force on the side of Texas. The Mexican republic again is rallying Its forces under a new leader and menacing a fresh Invasion to recover its lost do main. "Upon the Issue of this threatened in vasion, the Independence of Texas may be considered as suspended, and were there nothing peculiar in the relations be tween the United States and Texas, our acknowledgment of its independence at such a crisis could scarcely be regarded as consistent with the prudent reserve with which we have hitherto held our selves bound to treat all similar ques tions." Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceeded to consider the risk that there might be Imputed to the United States motives of selfish interests In view of the former claim on our part to the ' territory of Texas, and of the avowed purpose of the Texans In seeking recognition of Inde pendence as an Incident to the incorpora tion of Texas In the Union, concluding thus: - - "Prudence, therefore, seems to dictate that we should stand aloof and maintain our present attitude, If not until Mexico itself or one of the great powers shall recognize the Independence of the new government, at least until the lapse of time or the course of events shall have proved beyond cavil or dispute the ability of the people of that country to maintain their separate sovereignty and to uphold the government constituted by them. Neither of the contending parties can justly complain of this course. By pur suing It we are but carrying out the long established policy of our government,, a policy which has secured . to us respect and Influence abroad and Inspired confi dence at home." These are the words of Andrew Jackson. They are evidence that the United States, in addition to the test imposed by pub lic law as the condition of the recognition of the independence of a neutral state. to wit, that the revolted state shall "con stitute In fact a body politic, having a government in substance as well as in name, possessed of the elements of sta bility," and forming de facto "If left to Itself a state . among the nations, rea sonably capable of discharging the duties of a state, has imposed for Its own gov ernance in dealing with cases like these, the further condition that recognition of an Independent state is not due to a re volted dependency until the danger of its being again subjugated by the parent state has entirely passed away." This ex treme test was, In fact, applied in the case or Texas.: , . -The congress to whom President Jack son referred the question as one probably leading to war, and therefore an appropri ate subject for a "previous understanding with that body by whom war can alone be declared, and by whom all the provis ions for sustaining Its perils must be fur nished, left the matter of recognition of Texas to the discretion of the executive, providing merely for the sending of diplo matic agents when the president should be satisfied that the republic of Texas had become an '"independent state." It was so recognized by President Van uuren, who commissiaoned a charge d af faires March 7, 1837, after Mexico had abandoned an attempt tovconquer the Texas territory, and then there was at the time no bona fide contest going on be tween the Insurgent province and Its for mer sovereign. Cuba Not Rlgrhtly a State. I said In my message of Deoember last "It Is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban government possesses beyond dispute the attributes of statehood, which alone can demand the recognition of bel ligerency, In Its favor. r The same requirement must certainly be no less seriously considered when the graver issue of recognizing Independence Is In question, for no less . positive test can be applied to the greater act than to the lesser, while on the other hand the Influences and consequences of the strug gle depending upon the Internal policy of the recognizing state, which form impor tant factors when the recognition of bel ligerency is concerned, are secondary if not rightly ellmlnable factors when the real question Is whether the community claiming recognition Is or is not independ ent beyond peradventure. '. Recognition Inexpedient.' Nor from the standpoint of expedience do I think it would be wise or prudent for this government to recognize at the present time the Independence of the so called Cuban republic' Such recognition not necessary In order to enable the United States to Intervene and pacify the Island. . To commit this country now to the recognition of any particular govern ment in Cuba might subject us to em barrassing conditions of Interest obliga tion toward the organization so recog nized. In case of Intervention, our con duct will be subject to the approval or disapproval of such government. We would be required' to submit to its direc tion and to assume to it the .mere rela tion of a friendly ally. When It shall appear hereafter that there Is within the Island & government capable of per forming the duties and discharging the functions of a nation, and having, as a matter of fact, the proper forms and at tributes of nationality, such government can be promptly and readily recognized and the' relations and Interests of the United States with such nation adjusted. Possible Alternative. There remain the alternative forms of intervention 'to .end the war, each as an Impartial neutrality, by imposing a ra tional compromise between the contest ants or as the active ally of the one party or the other. As to the first, it Is not to be forgotten that during the last few months the attitude of the United States has virtually been one of friendly intervention In many ways, each not of itself conclusive, but all tend ing to the exertion of a potential influ ence toward an ultimate pacific result, just and honorable to all Interests con cerned. The spirit of all our acts hither to has been an earnest, unselfish desire for peace and prosperity In Cuba, untar nished by differences between the United States and Spam and unstained by the blood of American citizens. The forcible Intervention of the United States as a neu tral to stop the war according to the large dictates of humanity and following the historical precedents wherein the United States has Interfered to check the hopeless sacrifice of Ufa by internecine conflicts beyond their borders, is Justifi able on national grounds. It Involves, however, hostile constraint upon both par ties to the contest, as well as to enforce a truce as to end the eventual settle ment. The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarized as follows: First In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation and horrible miseries now ex-i Isting there and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this Is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and la therefore none of our business. It Is explicitly our duty, for It Is right at our door. V Second We owe it to our citizens In Cuba to afford them that protection and Indemnity for life and property which no government there can or will afford, and to that end terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal protection. Third The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade and business of our peo ple and by the wanton destruction of prop erty and devastation of the island. Fourth And which Is of foremost lm portance, the condition of affairs In Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this government .enormous ex pense. With such a conflict waged for years In an island so near us and with which our people have such trade and business relations when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger, their property destroyed and themselves ruined- when our trading vessels are liable to seiz ure and are seized at our very door by war ships of a foreign nation, the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to prevent altogether, and the Irritating ques tions and entanglements thus arising all these and others are a constant menace to our peace and tend to keep us on a war footing with that nation with which we are at peace. The Maine Incident. These elements of danger and disorder already pointed out have been strikingly Illustrated by a tragic event which has deeply and justly moved the American people; I have already transmitted to con gress the reoort of the naval court of In quiry on the destruction of the battle-ship Maine In the harbor of Havana during the night of the 15th of February. The de struction of that noble vessel has filled the national heart with Inexpressible hor ror; 258 brave sailors and marines and officers of our navy, reposing In the fan cicd, security of a friendly harbor have been hurled to death. Grief and want are brought to their homes ( and Borrow to the nation. . - The naval court of Inquiry, 'which, It is needless to say, commands the unqualified confidence of the government, was unan imous In Its conclusion that the destruc tion of the Maine was caused by an ex terior explosion, and also by a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the re sponsibility. That remains to be fixed. In any event, the destruction of the Maine, by whatever exterior cause, Is a patent and Impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that Is intolerable. That condition Is thus shown to be such that the Spanish government cannot assure safety and se curity to a vessel of the American navy In the harbor of Havana on a mission of peace, and rightfully reference in this con nectlon Is made to recent diplomatic cor respondence. '., : - A dispatch from our minister to Spain of the 26th ultimo contained that - the Spanish minister for foreign' affairs as sured him positively that Spain will do all that the highest honor and Justice re quire In the matter of the Maine. v The reply also referred to of the 81st ultimo also contained an expression of the readiness of Spain to submit to arbi tration all the differences which, can arise In this matter, which is subsequently ex plained by the note of the Spanish minis ter at Washington of the 10th lnst., as follows: . As to the question of fact which springs from the diversified views between representatives of the American And the Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the fact be ascertained by an Impartial in vestigation by experts, which decision Spain accepts In advance. To this I have made no reply." ." . - ; - . Another Precedent. President Grant, in 1875, in discussing the purposes of the Cuban contest as it then appeared, and the hopeless and apparent indefinite prolongation of such event, said I am of the opinion that other nations will be compelled to assume the responsi bility which devolves upon them, and to seriously consider the only remaining measures . possible mediation and inter vention. Owing, perhaps, tb the large ex panse or water separating the Island from the peninsula, the contending parties ap. pear to have within themselves no depos itory of common confidence to suggest wisdom when passion and excitement have their sway, and thus assume the part of peacemaker. In this view in the early days of the con test the good offices of the United States as the mediator were tendered in good faith without any Belftsh purpose in the Interest of -humanity and sincere friend ship for both parties, but were at the time declined by Spain with the declaration, nevertheless, that at a future time they would be indispensable. No Intimation has been received that In the opinion of Spain that that time has been reached: yet the strife continues with all Its dread horrors and its Injuries to the United. States and other nations. Each party seems quite capable of working great Injury and dam- a&re to the other ns well ast tn nil the rela tions and interests dependent on the exist ence of neaee In the Island; but they seem incapable of reaching any agreement, and both have thus far failed of achieving and success whereby one party Bhall pos sess and control the island to the exclu sion of the other. Under the circumstances the agency . of others, either by mediation or by Inter vention, seems to be the only alternative which must sooner or later be involved for the termination of the strife. In the last annual message of my im mediate predecessor during the pending struggle, it was said: When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the Insurrection has be come manifest, and If demonstrated that her sovereignty Is extinct In Cuba, for all purposes of Its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for Its re-establishment has degenerated Into,, the strife which means nothing more than the use less sacrifice of human Hfe and the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our obligations to ths sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher ob ligations which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge." In my annual message to congress De cember last, speaking to this question, I said: ... "The near future' will demonstrate whether the Indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans and Spain, as well as equitable to all our Interests, so Intimately Involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not, other action by the United States will remain to be taken; when that time comes the action will be determined in the line If Indisputable right of duty; it will be faced without misgiving or hesitancy In the light of the obligation this govern ment owes to Itself, to the people who con fided the protection of their Interests and honor and to humanity. Sure of the right, keplng free from all offense ourselves, actuated by upright and patriotic considerations, moved neith er by passion nor selfishness, the govern ment will continue its watchful care over the rights and property of American citi zens, and will abate none of Its fi""ts to bring about by peaceful agencies a peace which Bhall be honorable and endur ing. If It shah hereafter appear to be a duty Imposed by our obligations to our selves, to civllizatloi and to humanity to intervene with force, It shall be without fault on our part and1 only because the necessity for Buch action will be so clear as to con-maud the support and approval of the civilized world." , Intervention the Only Hope. The long trial has proved that the ob ject for which Spain has waged war cannot be attained. The fire of Insur rection may flame or may Bmolder with varying seasons, but It has not been and It is plain that it cannot be extinguished by present methods. The only hope of re lief and repose from a condition which . cannot longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. . In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, In behalf of endangered American interests, which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop; in view of these facts, and these considerations, I ask congress to authorize and empower, the president to take measures to se cure a full termination of hostilities be tween the government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure In the island the establishment of a stable gov ernment capable of maintaining order and observing its international obliga tions, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of Its citizens , as well as our own, and to use the military' and naval force of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes and , In the Interest of humanity, and to aid In preserving the lives of the starving peo ple of the island I recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be con tinued and that an appropriation be made out of the public treasury to supple ment the charity of our citizens. The Issue is now with congress; It Is a solemn responsibility; I have exhausted every effort to relieve the Intolerable con dition of affairs which Is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation im posed upon ' me by the constitution and law, I await your action, s , . Spain's Last Snuterfngre. Yesterday and since the preparation of the foregoing message, official information was received by me that the latest decree of the queen regent of Spain directs Gen eral Blanco, In order to prepare and facil itate peace, to proclaim a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which have not yet been communicated to me. This fact with every other point In consideration will, I am sure, have your careful and Just attention In the solemn deliberations upon which you are about to enter. If this measure attains a successful result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peace-loving people will be realized; if It falls, It will be only another Justification for our contemplated action. william Mckinley. Executive Mansion, Washington, April 1L 1898. How Congress Received It. The president's message was received in the senate and referred to the com mittee on foreign relations.' The president's message did hot, after the first reading, receive the in dorsement of a majority of the senators, and many excused themselves from speaking about it until they could have time for careful perusal. In a general ; way the objections were based on the ' ground that it did not go far enough in recognizing the rights of the Cubans. A large number of the Democratic sen ators refused to express themselves at all, as did several Republicans, on the ground that as they could not speak in complimentary terms, they would say nothing at all. '.' : The reading of the message in the house was greeted with scattering ap-' plause from the Republican side, and groans from the Democratic side. The galleries made no demonstration. The message was referred to the committee : on foreign affairs without debate. Our Motives Assailed. Senor Emilio Castelar, the distin guished Spanish republican leader, has contributed an artiole to the Vienna ' Neuse Weiner Tageblatt, which, while furnishing evidence of his ardent love for his country, proves that little more than a high pitoh of excitement pre vails among all classes in Spain. Senor Castelar retorts to the Amen- ' can critiq who attributed the Spanish methods and style of today with the uninterrupted intellectual decline of that people For his part, Senor Cas- . telar regards the aotion of the Ameri cans, to whom he refers throughout as Yankees, as evidence of the decay of the once glorious American people. He charges them with diplomatic tricks and artifices, having for their object the making of Spain responsible for the result of the defective manning of their fleet and negligence of officers of the Maine. ; - No Temporary Peace Wanted. ' 1 . New York, April 18. The following is an extract from a letter written to Consul Barker, United States repre sentative at Santiago de Cuba, by Maximo Gomez, and will be presented to President McKinley: ' 'One year ago we reoeived a proposal from Spain to agree to an armistice. We refused then, as we refuse now. . The rainy season will soon be at hand, and Spain's troops would like an arm istioe until it iB over. We shall throw , away no adavntage. On the other hand, I am anxious that hostilities shall oease, but it must be for all time. If Spain agrees to leave Cuba, taking; bei flag with her, I am willing to agree to an armlstioe to last until Ootober 1, when the loyal Cubans shall come into their own. "Please tell President McKinley this " for me. Tell him. too, that I am writing this at the direction of the Cu- , ban provisional government, with which they may treat directly should; they so desire."