The
Hooe
River
OWIAT
It's a Cold Day When We Get Left.
VOL. IX.
HOOD RIVER, OREGON, FRIDAY, APRIL 15, 1898.
NO. 47.
A Practical Declaration
of War With Spain.
ARMED INTERVENTION ASKED
Spain's Armistice Decree Reported
Without Recommendation Recogni
tion of Cuban Independence Declared
to Be Unwarranted and Inexpedient.
President MoKinley Monday sent tb
- following message to the congress of
the United States:
Obedient to.that precept of the consti
tution which commands the president t
give from time to time the congress In
formation of the state of the Union and
to recommend to Its consideration such
i measures as he Bhall Judge necessary and
expedient. It becomes my duty now to
address your body with regard to the
grave condition that has arisen In the
relations of the United States and Spain,
by reason of the warfare that for more
than three years has raged In the nelgh
. boring Island of Cuba. I do so because of
the Intimate connection of the Cuban
question with the state of our Union, an
because of. the grave relations which the
course which is Incumbent upon the nation
.to adopt must needs bear to the tra
ditional policy of our government, if It
Is to accord with the precepts laid down
by the founders of the republic and re
ligiously observed by succeeding adminis
trations to the present day. ' '
The Cuban Revolution.
The present revolution Is but the suc
cessor of other similar Insurrections whieli
have occurred in Cuba against the do
minion of Spain, extending over a period
of nearly half a century, each of which,
during its progress, has subjected the
United States to great effort and expense
in enforcing Its neutrality laws, caused
enormous loss. to. American trade and
commerce, caused Irritation, annoyance
and disturbance among our citizens, and
by the exercise of cruel, barbarous and
uncivilized practices of warfare, shocked
the sensibilities and offended the human
sympathies of our people.
Since the. present revolution began, In
February, 1895, this country has seen the
fertile domain at our threshold ravaged
by fire and sword in the course of a
struggle unequaled in the history of the
Island, . and rarely paralleled as to the
number of the combatants and the bitter-
ness of the contest by any revolution of
modern times, where a dependent people
striving to be free have been opposed by
; the power of the sovereign state. Our
people have beheld a once' prosperous
community reduced to comparative want,
Jts commerce virtually paralyzed. Its ex
ceptional productiveness diminished, its
fields laid waste. Its mills In ruins and
Its people perishing by tens of thousands
from hunger and destitution.
Damage to American Interests.
We have felt ourselves constrained, In
the observance of that strict neutrality
which our laws enjoin and which the laws
of nations command, to police our own
waters arid watch our, own seaports In
prevention of any unlawful act In aid of
Cuba. Our trade has suffered; the capi
tal Invested by our citizens In Cuba has
been largely lost, and the temper and for
bearance of ' our people have been so
sorely tried as to beget a perilous unrest
among our own citizens, which has Inevi
tably followed Its expression from time
to time In the national legislature so. that
Issues wholly external to our body poli
tic engross attention and stand in the way
of more - close devotion to domestic ad
vancement that becomes a Belt-contented
commonwealth, whose primal maxim has
been the avdldance of . all foreign en
tanglements. All this must needs awaken
and has Indeed aroused the utmost con
cern on the part of this government as
well during my predecessor's as dur
ing my own administration.
A Previous Effort to Restore Peace.
In April, 1896, the evils from which our
country suffered through the Cuban war
became so enormous that my predecessor
made an effort to bring about peace
through the mediation of the government
in any way that might tend to an honor
. (i'-.le adjustment of the contest between
Spain and her revolting colony on the ba
, sis of some effective scheme of self
government for Cuba, under the flag
and sovereignty of Spain. It failed,
through the refusal of the Spanish gov
ernment then In power to consider any
form of mediation or indeed any plan
of settlement which did not I ggln with
the actual submission of the Insurgents
to the mother country and then only on
such terms as Spain herself might see fit
to grant. -
Weyler'a Inhuman Policy.
The war continued unabated. The re
sistance of insurgents was In no wise
diminished. The efforts of Spain were In
creased, both by the dispatch of fresh
levies to Cuba and by additions to the
horrors of the strife. The new and In
human phase, happily unprecedented In
the modern history of civilized Christian
- people, the policy of devastation and con
centration, Inaugurated by the captain
general's ban of October 21, 1896, In the
province of Pinar del Rio, was thence
extended to embrace all of the island to
which the power of the Spaniards was
able to reach by occupation or by mili
tary 'operations. The peasantry, includ
ing all dwelling in the open agricultural
Interior,' were driven Into the garrisoned
towns or Isolated places held by ths Span-
(sh troops. The raising of provisions of
all kinds was Interdicted. Fields were
laid waste, dwellings unroofed and fired
mills destroyed, and. In short, everything
that couiu desolate the land and render it
unfit for human habitation or support
was commanded by one or the other con
tending parties and executed by all the
powers at their disposal.
By the time the present administration
took office a year ago, reconcentratlon
so called had been effective over the bet
ter part of four central and western prov-
lnces, Santa Clara, Matanzas, Havana
and Pinar del Rio.- The agricultural pop
ulatlon, to the estimated number of 300,
000 or more, was herded within the towns
and their immediate vicinity, deprived of
all means of support, rendered destitute
of shelter, left poorly clad and exposed
to the most unsatisfactory conditions.
. Sufferlnurs of Reconcentradoa. ,
As the scarcity of food Increased with
the devastation of the depeopled areas of
production, destitution and want became
misery and starvation. Month by month
the death rate increased in alarming ra
tio, and by March, 1898, according to con
servative estimates from official Spanish
sources, the mortality among the recon
centradoa from starvation and the dis
eases thereto Incident exceeded 50 i per
centum of the total number. No practical
relief was accorded to the destitute. The
overburdened towns, already suffering
from the general dearth, could give no
aid. So-called zones of cultivation, estab
lished within the immediate area of effect
ive military control, about the cities and
fortified camps, proved illusory as a rem
edy for the suffering. The unfortunates,
being for the most part women and chil
dren, with aged and helpless men, en
feebled by disease and hunger, could not
have tilled the soil without tools, seeds
or shelter, for their own support or for
the supply of the cities. A
Reconcentratlon adopted avowedly as a
war measure, to cut oft the resourceis of
the insurgents, worked its predestined- re
suit. As I said In my message of last
December, it was not civilized warfare!
It was extermination, and the only peace
it could beget was that of the wilderness
and the grave. ,
Prosrreos of the War.
Meanwhile the military situation In the
island has undergone a noticeable change.
rne extraordinary activity that charac
terized the second year of the war, when
the Insurgents Invaded even the hitherto
unharmed fields of Pinar del Rio and car
ried havoc and destitution up to the walls
of the city of Havana Itself, had relapsed
into a dogged struggle in the central and
eastern provinces. The Spanish army re
gained a measure of control in Pinar del
Rio and parts of Havana, but under the
existing conditions of the rural country,
without Immediate improvement of their
productive situation. Even thus partial
ly restricted, the revolutionists held their
own, and their submission, put forward
by Spain as the essential and sole basis
of peace, seemed as far distant as at the
outlet. In this. state of. affairs my ad
ministration found itself confronted with
the grave problem of Its duty. My mes
sage of last December reviewed the sit
uation ,and detailed the steps taken' with
a view of relieving the acuteness and
opening the way to some form of hon
orable settlement. ,
- San-nata's Vain Promises.
The assassination of the prime minis
ter, Canovas, led to a change of govern
ment In Spain. The former administra
tion, . which pledged subjugation without
concession, gave place to that of a more
liberal party, committed long in advance
to a policy of reform Involving the wider
principle of home rule for Cuba and Porto
Rico.
The overtures of this "government made
through Its new envoy, General - Wood
ford, and loklng to an immediate effective
amelioration of the condition of the
Island, although not accepted to the ex
tent of admitted mediation In any shape,
were met by assurances that home rule
In -an advanced phase should be forthwith
offered to Cuba, without waiting for the
war to end, and that more humane meth
ods should thenceforth prevail In the con
duct of hostilities .......... .
Incidentally with these declarations the
new government of Spain continued and
completed the policy already begun by
Its predecessor of testifying friendly .re
gard for this nation by releasing Ameri
can citizens held under one charge, or
another connected with the insurrection,
so that, by the end of November, not a
single person entitled' In any way to our
national protection remained in a Spanish
prison. '
The Relief Movement. '
While those negotla Hons were in progress
the Increasing destitution of the unfor-:
tunate reconcentrados and the alarming
mortality among them claimed earnest at
tention. The success which had attended
the limited measure of relief extended to
the suffering American citizens among
them by the judicious expenditure,
through the ' consular agencies, of - the
money appropriated expressly for their
succor by the joint resolution approved
May 24, 1897, prompted the humane ex
tension of a similar scheme to that great
body of sufferers. A suggestion to this
end was acquiesced in by the Spanish au
thorities. On the 24th of December I
caused to be Issued an appeal to the
American people, Inviting contributions in
money or In kind for the succor of the
starving sufferers in Cuba.
Following .this, on the 8th of January,
was a similar public announcement of the
formation of a central Cuban relief com
mittee, which had headquarters In New
York city, composed of members rep
resenting the national Red Cross and the
religious and business elements of the
community. The efforts of that com
mittee have been untiring and have accom
plished much. ' Arrangements for free
transportation to Cuba have greatly aided
the charitable work.
The president of the American Red Cross
and representatives of other contributory
organizations have generally visited Cuba
and co-operated with the consul-general
and the local authorities to make effective
distribution of the relief collected through
the efforts of the central committee. Near
ly $200,000 in money and supplies has
reached the suffrers, and more Is forth
coming. The supplies are admitted duty
free, and transportation to the interior
has been arranged so that the relief at
first necessarily confined to Havana and
the larger cities is now extended through
most, if not all, of the towns where suf
fering exists. Thousands of lives have
already been saved.
. The necessity for a change in the con
dition of the reconcentrados Is recognized
by the Spanish government. Within a
few days past the orders of General Wey
ler have been revoked, the reconcentra
dos are, It Is said, to he permitted to re
turn to their homes, and aided to resume
the self-supporting pursuits of peace: pub
lic works have been started to eive them
employment, and a sum of $600,000 has been
appropriated for their relief,
Spain's Canse Hopeless.
The war In Cuba Is of such a nature
that, short of subjugation or extermina
tion, a final military victory for the other
side seems impracticable. The alternative
lies In the physical exhaustion of the one
or the other party, or perhaps both, a con
dltlon which In effect ended the 10 years'
war by the truce of Zan Jon. The pros
pect of such a protraction and conclu
sion of the present strife is a contingency
hardly to be contemplated with equa
nimity by the civilized world, and least of
all by the United States, affected and
objected as we are deeply and intimately
by Its very existence.
. - An Offer of Mediation.
Realizing this, it appeared to be my
duty, in a spirit of true friendliness, no
less to Spain than to the Cubans, who
have so much to lose by the prolongation
of the struggle, to seek to bring about
an Immediate termination of the war. To
this end I submitted, on the 27th ultimo,
as a result of much representation and
correspondence through the United States
minister at Madrid, propositions to the
Spanish government looking to an armis;
tice until October 1, for the negotiation
of peace with the good ottlces of the
president. -
In addition, I asked the immediate revo
cation of the order of reconcentratlon, so
as to permit the people to return to their
farms and the needy to be relieved with
provisions and supplies by' the United
States, co-operating with the Spanish
authorities, so as to afford full relief.
The reply of the Spanish cabinet was re-
ceived on the night of the 31st ultimo. It
offers as the means to bring about peace
In Cuba to confide the preparation there
of to the Insular department, Inasmuch
as the concurrence of that body would
be necessary to establish a final result
it being however understood that the
powers reserved by the constitution to the
central government are not lessened or di
minished. As the Cuban parliament does
not meet until th 4th of May next, the
Spanish government would not object, for
Its part, to accept at once a suspension
of hostilities if asked for by the Insur
gents through the general-ln-chlef, to
whom It would pertain In such cases to
determine the duration and conditions of
the armistice.
The propositions submitted by General
Woodford and the reply of the Spanish
government were both in the form of
brief memoranda, the texts of which are
before mentioned and substantially In the
language above given. The function of
the Cuban parliament in the matter of
' preparing peace and the manner of do
ing so are not explained In the Spanish
memorandum, but from General Wood
ford's explanatory reports of preliminary
discussion preceding the final conference
It Is understood that the Spanish govern
ment stands ready to give the insular
congress full power to settle the terms of
peace with the Insurgents, whether by di
rect negotiation or Indirectly by means of
legislation does not appear. . With this
last overture In the direction of immedi
ate peace and Its disappointing reception
by Spain, ' the executive was brought to
the end of his efforts. ' .
Recognition Not Warranted.
In my annual message of December last
I said: ' '.. y ' . '
"Of the untried measures there remain-
Recognition of thi insurgents as belllg
erents, recognition of the Independence of
Cuba and intervention to end the war by
imposing a rational compromise between
the contestants, or Intervention in favor of
one or the other party. I speak not of
forcible annexation, for that cannot be
thought of. That, by our code' of. mor
ality, would be criminal aggression."
Thereupon t reviewed these alternatives
In the light of President Grant' B message
in the words uttered in 1875, when after
several years of sanguinary, destructive
and cruel barbarities in Cuba, he reached
the conclusion that the recognition of the
independence of Cuba was Impracticable
and indefensible, and that the recognition
of belligerence was, not warranted by the
facts according to the texts of public law.
I commented especially upon that phase
of the question, pointing out the incon
veniences and positive dangers of recogni
tion of belligerence, which, while adding
Kjo the already onerous burdens of neu
trality without pur own Jurisdiction, could
not In any way extend our influence or
effective offices in the territory of hostili
ties.- ' " ' .
Nothing has since occurred to change
ny view in this regard, and I recognize
as fully now as then that the Issuance of
a proclamation of neutrality, by which
process the so-called recognition of bellig
erency is published, could, of itself and
unattended by other action, accomplish
nothing toward the one end for which we
labor, the Instant pacification of Cuba, and
the cessation of the misery that afflicts
the Island.'
A Precedent Cited. '
Turning to the question of recognizing
at this time the independence of the pres
ent Insurgent government In Cuba, we
find safe precedents In our history from
an early day. They are well summed up
in President Jackson's message to con
gress December 21, 1836, on the subject of
the recognition of the Independence of
Texas. He said:
"In all the contests that have arisen
out of the revolutions of France, out of
the disputes relating to Portugal and
Spain, out of the separation of the Amer
ican possessions of both from the Eu
ropean governments, and out of the nu
merous and constantly recurring . strug
gles for dominion ln Spanish-American
countries, so wisely consistent with
Just principles has been the action of our
government that we have under the most
critical1 circumstances avoided all censure
and encountered no other evil than that
produced- by a transient estrangement
of gqod will In those against whom we
have been, by force of evidence, com
pelled to decide. -
It has thus been made known to the
world that the uniform policy and practice
of the 'United States Is to avoid all Inter
ference in disputes which merely relate
to the internal government of other na
tions, and eventually to recognize the au
thority of the prevailing party without ref
erence to our particular Interests and
views or to the merits of the original
controversy. But In this, as In every
other occasion, safety is to be found In a
rigid adherence to these principles. In
the contest between Spain and the revolt
ing colonies we stood aloof and waited
not only until the ability of the new states
to protect themselves was fully estab
lished, but until the chance of their being
again subjugated had entirely passed
away. Then, and1 not until their, were
they recognized. Such was our course In
regard to Mexico herself. It Is true that
with regard to Texas the civil authorities
of Mexico had been expelled, Its lnvadl
army defeated, the chief of the republic
himself captured, and all present power
to control the newly organized govern.
ment of Texas annihilated within its con
fines. But, on the other hand, there is, In
appearance at least, an Immense dispar
ity of physical force on the side of Texas.
The Mexican republic again is rallying Its
forces under a new leader and menacing
a fresh Invasion to recover its lost do
main.
"Upon the Issue of this threatened in
vasion, the Independence of Texas may
be considered as suspended, and were
there nothing peculiar in the relations be
tween the United States and Texas, our
acknowledgment of its independence at
such a crisis could scarcely be regarded
as consistent with the prudent reserve
with which we have hitherto held our
selves bound to treat all similar ques
tions."
Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceeded
to consider the risk that there might be
Imputed to the United States motives of
selfish interests In view of the former
claim on our part to the ' territory of
Texas, and of the avowed purpose of the
Texans In seeking recognition of Inde
pendence as an Incident to the incorpora
tion of Texas In the Union, concluding
thus: - -
"Prudence, therefore, seems to dictate
that we should stand aloof and maintain
our present attitude, If not until Mexico
itself or one of the great powers shall
recognize the Independence of the new
government, at least until the lapse of
time or the course of events shall have
proved beyond cavil or dispute the ability
of the people of that country to maintain
their separate sovereignty and to uphold
the government constituted by them.
Neither of the contending parties can
justly complain of this course. By pur
suing It we are but carrying out the long
established policy of our government,, a
policy which has secured . to us respect
and Influence abroad and Inspired confi
dence at home."
These are the words of Andrew Jackson.
They are evidence that the United States,
in addition to the test imposed by pub
lic law as the condition of the recognition
of the independence of a neutral state.
to wit, that the revolted state shall "con
stitute In fact a body politic, having a
government in substance as well as in
name, possessed of the elements of sta
bility," and forming de facto "If left to
Itself a state . among the nations, rea
sonably capable of discharging the duties
of a state, has imposed for Its own gov
ernance in dealing with cases like these,
the further condition that recognition of
an Independent state is not due to a re
volted dependency until the danger of
its being again subjugated by the parent
state has entirely passed away." This ex
treme test was, In fact, applied in the
case or Texas.: , . -The
congress to whom President Jack
son referred the question as one probably
leading to war, and therefore an appropri
ate subject for a "previous understanding
with that body by whom war can alone
be declared, and by whom all the provis
ions for sustaining Its perils must be fur
nished, left the matter of recognition of
Texas to the discretion of the executive,
providing merely for the sending of diplo
matic agents when the president should
be satisfied that the republic of Texas had
become an '"independent state."
It was so recognized by President Van
uuren, who commissiaoned a charge d af
faires March 7, 1837, after Mexico had
abandoned an attempt tovconquer the
Texas territory, and then there was at the
time no bona fide contest going on be
tween the Insurgent province and Its for
mer sovereign.
Cuba Not Rlgrhtly a State.
I said In my message of Deoember last
"It Is to be seriously considered whether
the Cuban government possesses beyond
dispute the attributes of statehood, which
alone can demand the recognition of bel
ligerency, In Its favor. r
The same requirement must certainly
be no less seriously considered when the
graver issue of recognizing Independence
Is In question, for no less . positive test
can be applied to the greater act than to
the lesser, while on the other hand the
Influences and consequences of the strug
gle depending upon the Internal policy of
the recognizing state, which form impor
tant factors when the recognition of bel
ligerency is concerned, are secondary if
not rightly ellmlnable factors when the
real question Is whether the community
claiming recognition Is or is not independ
ent beyond peradventure. '.
Recognition Inexpedient.'
Nor from the standpoint of expedience
do I think it would be wise or prudent
for this government to recognize at the
present time the Independence of the so
called Cuban republic' Such recognition
not necessary In order to enable the
United States to Intervene and pacify the
Island. . To commit this country now to
the recognition of any particular govern
ment in Cuba might subject us to em
barrassing conditions of Interest obliga
tion toward the organization so recog
nized. In case of Intervention, our con
duct will be subject to the approval or
disapproval of such government. We
would be required' to submit to its direc
tion and to assume to it the .mere rela
tion of a friendly ally. When It shall
appear hereafter that there Is within
the Island & government capable of per
forming the duties and discharging the
functions of a nation, and having, as a
matter of fact, the proper forms and at
tributes of nationality, such government
can be promptly and readily recognized
and the' relations and Interests of the
United States with such nation adjusted.
Possible Alternative.
There remain the alternative forms of
intervention 'to .end the war, each as an
Impartial neutrality, by imposing a ra
tional compromise between the contest
ants or as the active ally of the one party
or the other. As to the first, it Is not to
be forgotten that during the last
few months the attitude of the
United States has virtually been one
of friendly intervention In many ways,
each not of itself conclusive, but all tend
ing to the exertion of a potential influ
ence toward an ultimate pacific result,
just and honorable to all Interests con
cerned. The spirit of all our acts hither
to has been an earnest, unselfish desire
for peace and prosperity In Cuba, untar
nished by differences between the United
States and Spam and unstained by the
blood of American citizens. The forcible
Intervention of the United States as a neu
tral to stop the war according to the
large dictates of humanity and following
the historical precedents wherein the
United States has Interfered to check the
hopeless sacrifice of Ufa by internecine
conflicts beyond their borders, is Justifi
able on national grounds. It Involves,
however, hostile constraint upon both par
ties to the contest, as well as to enforce
a truce as to end the eventual settle
ment. The grounds for such intervention
may be briefly summarized as follows:
First In the cause of humanity and to
put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed,
starvation and horrible miseries now ex-i
Isting there and which the parties to the
conflict are either unable or unwilling to
stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say
this Is all in another country, belonging
to another nation, and la therefore none
of our business. It Is explicitly our duty,
for It Is right at our door. V
Second We owe it to our citizens In
Cuba to afford them that protection and
Indemnity for life and property which no
government there can or will afford, and
to that end terminate the conditions that
deprive them of legal protection.
Third The right to intervene may be
justified by the very serious injury to the
commerce, trade and business of our peo
ple and by the wanton destruction of prop
erty and devastation of the island.
Fourth And which Is of foremost lm
portance, the condition of affairs In Cuba
is a constant menace to our peace, and
entails upon this government .enormous ex
pense. With such a conflict waged for
years In an island so near us and with which
our people have such trade and business
relations when the lives and liberty of
our citizens are in constant danger, their
property destroyed and themselves ruined-
when our trading vessels are liable to seiz
ure and are seized at our very door by war
ships of a foreign nation, the expeditions
of filibustering that we are powerless to
prevent altogether, and the Irritating ques
tions and entanglements thus arising all
these and others are a constant menace to
our peace and tend to keep us on a war
footing with that nation with which we are
at peace.
The Maine Incident.
These elements of danger and disorder
already pointed out have been strikingly
Illustrated by a tragic event which has
deeply and justly moved the American
people; I have already transmitted to con
gress the reoort of the naval court of In
quiry on the destruction of the battle-ship
Maine In the harbor of Havana during the
night of the 15th of February. The de
struction of that noble vessel has filled
the national heart with Inexpressible hor
ror; 258 brave sailors and marines and
officers of our navy, reposing In the fan
cicd, security of a friendly harbor have
been hurled to death. Grief and want are
brought to their homes ( and Borrow to the
nation. . -
The naval court of Inquiry, 'which, It is
needless to say, commands the unqualified
confidence of the government, was unan
imous In Its conclusion that the destruc
tion of the Maine was caused by an ex
terior explosion, and also by a submarine
mine. It did not assume to place the re
sponsibility. That remains to be fixed. In
any event, the destruction of the Maine,
by whatever exterior cause, Is a patent and
Impressive proof of a state of things in
Cuba that Is intolerable. That condition
Is thus shown to be such that the Spanish
government cannot assure safety and se
curity to a vessel of the American navy
In the harbor of Havana on a mission of
peace, and rightfully reference in this con
nectlon Is made to recent diplomatic cor
respondence. '., : -
A dispatch from our minister to Spain
of the 26th ultimo contained that - the
Spanish minister for foreign' affairs as
sured him positively that Spain will do all
that the highest honor and Justice re
quire In the matter of the Maine. v
The reply also referred to of the 81st
ultimo also contained an expression of
the readiness of Spain to submit to arbi
tration all the differences which, can arise
In this matter, which is subsequently ex
plained by the note of the Spanish minis
ter at Washington of the 10th lnst., as
follows: .
As to the question of fact which
springs from the diversified views between
representatives of the American And the
Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the
fact be ascertained by an Impartial in
vestigation by experts, which decision
Spain accepts In advance. To this I have
made no reply." ." . - ; -
. Another Precedent.
President Grant, in 1875, in discussing the
purposes of the Cuban contest as it then
appeared, and the hopeless and apparent
indefinite prolongation of such event, said
I am of the opinion that other nations
will be compelled to assume the responsi
bility which devolves upon them, and to
seriously consider the only remaining
measures . possible mediation and inter
vention. Owing, perhaps, tb the large ex
panse or water separating the Island from
the peninsula, the contending parties ap.
pear to have within themselves no depos
itory of common confidence to suggest
wisdom when passion and excitement
have their sway, and thus assume the
part of peacemaker.
In this view in the early days of the con
test the good offices of the United States
as the mediator were tendered in good
faith without any Belftsh purpose in the
Interest of -humanity and sincere friend
ship for both parties, but were at the time
declined by Spain with the declaration,
nevertheless, that at a future time they
would be indispensable. No Intimation has
been received that In the opinion of Spain
that that time has been reached: yet the
strife continues with all Its dread horrors
and its Injuries to the United. States and
other nations. Each party seems quite
capable of working great Injury and dam-
a&re to the other ns well ast tn nil the rela
tions and interests dependent on the exist
ence of neaee In the Island; but they
seem incapable of reaching any agreement,
and both have thus far failed of achieving
and success whereby one party Bhall pos
sess and control the island to the exclu
sion of the other.
Under the circumstances the agency . of
others, either by mediation or by Inter
vention, seems to be the only alternative
which must sooner or later be involved
for the termination of the strife.
In the last annual message of my im
mediate predecessor during the pending
struggle, it was said:
When the inability of Spain to deal
successfully with the Insurrection has be
come manifest, and If demonstrated that
her sovereignty Is extinct In Cuba, for all
purposes of Its rightful existence, and
when a hopeless struggle for Its re-establishment
has degenerated Into,, the strife
which means nothing more than the use
less sacrifice of human Hfe and the utter
destruction of the very subject-matter of
the conflict, a situation will be presented in
which our obligations to ths sovereignty
of Spain will be superseded by higher ob
ligations which we can hardly hesitate to
recognize and discharge."
In my annual message to congress De
cember last, speaking to this question, I
said: ...
"The near future' will demonstrate
whether the Indispensable condition of a
righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans
and Spain, as well as equitable to all our
Interests, so Intimately Involved in the
welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained.
If not, other action by the United States
will remain to be taken; when that time
comes the action will be determined in the
line If Indisputable right of duty; it will
be faced without misgiving or hesitancy
In the light of the obligation this govern
ment owes to Itself, to the people who con
fided the protection of their Interests and
honor and to humanity.
Sure of the right, keplng free from all
offense ourselves, actuated by upright
and patriotic considerations, moved neith
er by passion nor selfishness, the govern
ment will continue its watchful care over
the rights and property of American citi
zens, and will abate none of Its fi""ts
to bring about by peaceful agencies a
peace which Bhall be honorable and endur
ing. If It shah hereafter appear to be a
duty Imposed by our obligations to our
selves, to civllizatloi and to humanity
to intervene with force, It shall be without
fault on our part and1 only because the
necessity for Buch action will be so clear
as to con-maud the support and approval
of the civilized world." ,
Intervention the Only Hope.
The long trial has proved that the ob
ject for which Spain has waged war
cannot be attained. The fire of Insur
rection may flame or may Bmolder with
varying seasons, but It has not been and
It is plain that it cannot be extinguished
by present methods. The only hope of re
lief and repose from a condition which .
cannot longer be endured is the enforced
pacification of Cuba.
. In the name of humanity, in the name
of civilization, In behalf of endangered
American interests, which give us the
right and the duty to speak and to act,
the war in Cuba must stop; in view of
these facts, and these considerations, I
ask congress to authorize and empower,
the president to take measures to se
cure a full termination of hostilities be
tween the government of Spain and the
people of Cuba, and to secure In the
island the establishment of a stable gov
ernment capable of maintaining order
and observing its international obliga
tions, insuring peace and tranquillity and
the security of Its citizens , as well as
our own, and to use the military' and
naval force of the United States as may
be necessary for these purposes and , In
the Interest of humanity, and to aid In
preserving the lives of the starving peo
ple of the island I recommend that the
distribution of food and supplies be con
tinued and that an appropriation be made
out of the public treasury to supple
ment the charity of our citizens.
The Issue is now with congress; It Is
a solemn responsibility; I have exhausted
every effort to relieve the Intolerable con
dition of affairs which Is at our doors.
Prepared to execute every obligation im
posed upon ' me by the constitution and
law, I await your action, s , .
Spain's Last Snuterfngre.
Yesterday and since the preparation of
the foregoing message, official information
was received by me that the latest decree
of the queen regent of Spain directs Gen
eral Blanco, In order to prepare and facil
itate peace, to proclaim a suspension of
hostilities, the duration and details of
which have not yet been communicated
to me. This fact with every other point
In consideration will, I am sure, have
your careful and Just attention In the
solemn deliberations upon which you are
about to enter. If this measure attains a
successful result, then our aspirations as
a Christian, peace-loving people will be
realized; if It falls, It will be only another
Justification for our contemplated action.
william Mckinley.
Executive Mansion, Washington, April
1L 1898.
How Congress Received It.
The president's message was received
in the senate and referred to the com
mittee on foreign relations.'
The president's message did hot,
after the first reading, receive the in
dorsement of a majority of the senators,
and many excused themselves from
speaking about it until they could have
time for careful perusal. In a general ;
way the objections were based on the '
ground that it did not go far enough in
recognizing the rights of the Cubans.
A large number of the Democratic sen
ators refused to express themselves at
all, as did several Republicans, on the
ground that as they could not speak in
complimentary terms, they would say
nothing at all. '.' :
The reading of the message in the
house was greeted with scattering ap-'
plause from the Republican side, and
groans from the Democratic side. The
galleries made no demonstration. The
message was referred to the committee :
on foreign affairs without debate.
Our Motives Assailed.
Senor Emilio Castelar, the distin
guished Spanish republican leader, has
contributed an artiole to the Vienna '
Neuse Weiner Tageblatt, which, while
furnishing evidence of his ardent love
for his country, proves that little more
than a high pitoh of excitement pre
vails among all classes in Spain.
Senor Castelar retorts to the Amen- '
can critiq who attributed the Spanish
methods and style of today with the
uninterrupted intellectual decline of
that people For his part, Senor Cas- .
telar regards the aotion of the Ameri
cans, to whom he refers throughout as
Yankees, as evidence of the decay of
the once glorious American people.
He charges them with diplomatic tricks
and artifices, having for their object
the making of Spain responsible for
the result of the defective manning of
their fleet and negligence of officers of
the Maine. ; -
No Temporary Peace Wanted. ' 1 .
New York, April 18. The following
is an extract from a letter written to
Consul Barker, United States repre
sentative at Santiago de Cuba, by
Maximo Gomez, and will be presented
to President McKinley: '
'One year ago we reoeived a proposal
from Spain to agree to an armistice.
We refused then, as we refuse now. .
The rainy season will soon be at hand,
and Spain's troops would like an arm
istioe until it iB over. We shall throw ,
away no adavntage. On the other
hand, I am anxious that hostilities
shall oease, but it must be for all time.
If Spain agrees to leave Cuba, taking;
bei flag with her, I am willing to agree
to an armlstioe to last until Ootober 1,
when the loyal Cubans shall come into
their own.
"Please tell President McKinley this "
for me. Tell him. too, that I am
writing this at the direction of the Cu- ,
ban provisional government, with
which they may treat directly should;
they so desire."