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GREAT DECISIONS
Topic 3
What U.S. Policy
For North Africa?
THE PROBLEM
French North Africa, a Mos
lem domain stretching along a
thousand mile coastline from the
Atlantic to the Mediterranean,
flanks the Straits of Gibraltar
and faces the underbelly of
Europe. Along the top of this
continent, during World War II,
the armies of Hitler fought for
control of the Mediterranean
sea and the Middle East . . . and
lost.
Now new battles rage between
Arabs and Frenchmen for free
' dom and independence..
against political chaos and eco
nomic collapse.
The U.S., experts say, has an
important stake in these politi
cal and military skirmishes.
There are four strategic U.S. air
bases in North Africa; the region
supplies us with essential miner
als: and both sides in the con
flict are important U.S. friends
The U.S. sees France, one of
her key allies in Western Eu
rope, torn by internal dissen
sion, drained of . money and
troops, trying unsuccessfully to
put down widespread revolts. In
the past 18 months, three French
cabinets have fallen, each time
in debates largely concerned
with North African policy. The
near paralysis of French gov
ernment encourages French com
munists and fascists and gave
to both greatly increased
strength in the January elec
tions.
Arabs of the region also are
looked on as friends and allies.
We understand their ambitions
for self-government; we recog
nize they are part of an influ
ential Moslem civilization that
stretches from North Africa
through the Middle East, Iran
and Pakistan, to Indonesia and
the Philippines.
Where are France and North
Africa going in 1956? What can
or should the U.S. do in this
crisis? Here are the background
facts.
THE BACKGROUND
French North Africa is three
separate entities two protec
torates, Morocco in the West
and Tunisia in the East, theo
retically nations under the "pro
tection" of France, and, between
them, the vast territory of Al
geria. The latter is considered
a part of France, elects repre
sentatives to the national par
liament in Paris and enjoys the
privileges of French citizenship.
' In the other two, France han
dles all external affairs and key
internal affairs, such as defense
and police security.
The following facts help to
understand the whole problem
of violence and terror, nation
alism, reform and compromise
in North Africa.
Tunisia
France established a protec
torate over Tunisia in 1881. The
country had been a weakly
supervised province of the old
Ottoman (Turkish) empire and
had never developed its own
strong patterns of government.
During 70 years of French ad
ministration, Tunisia made con
siderable economic progress. The
population has doubled and the
country's agriculture is relative
ly prosperous. Tunisian mines
are now supplying the western
allies with vital strategic mate
rials such as phosphates, cobalt
and manganese.
French Control
The pattern of government in
Tunisia has been a kind of part
nership between the French resident-general
and the Bey of
Tunis. The resident-general is
the ultimate authority, appoint
ed by Paris. French support is
strongest in the rural areas,
where the French administra
tion received a 60 per cent ma
jority in the 1953 election.
Independents Movement
A well-organized nationalist
party, the Neo-Destour (new
constitution), has operated in
Tunisia since before World War
I. It stands for Tunisian inde
pendence but is not a revolution
ary party advocating violence.
The party president, Habib
Bourguiba, is a moderate, Paris
trained lawyer who appears will
ing to compromise in stages on
the road to independence. France
outlawed the Neo-Destour in
1934 and Bourguiba has been
in and out of French prisons
for 20 years. Yet France con
tinues to negotiate with him
and his party and he is current
ly head of the Tunisian gov
ernment. Neo-Destour strength is con
centrated in the cities and works
closely with the Tunisian labor
movement.
In 1950-51, in response to a
long list of Neo-Destour de
mands, France introduced re
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form by appointing more Tunis
ians to top administrative posts.
In December, 1952, the first na
tional elections were held, fol
lowed by municipal and rural
elections in 1953.
Since French reforms still fell
far short of Neo-Destour de
mands, the party called for a
national boycott of the elections.
Only in the cities did voters
respond to the boycott. In rural
areas the -ote was strongly pro
French and the administration
secured a national majority.
Violence and imprisonment of
Neo-Destour leaders marked the
entire attempted compromise
period.
One of the bitterest points of
difference between the French
and the nationalists is the ques
tion of political rights of Euro
pean settlers in Tunisia. The
European element comprising
10 per cent of the total popula
tion occupies the key economic
position, paying heavy taxes.
They insist on political repre
sentation in proportion to their
influence rather than number.
Stepped up reforms and" recent
compromises in Tunisia stem
from the July, 1954, promise of
French Premier Mendes-France
for Tunisian home rule and
eventual independence. Positive
steps were taken in this direc
tion but, in Feb., 1955, the
Mendes-France government was
voted out of power on the basis
of its moderate policy toward
Tunisia.
Morocco
A country about the size of
California, Morocco has been
a French protectorate since 1912.
Spain also acquired at the same
time similar status in a smaller
area known as Spanish Morocco.
In theory the sultan of Morocco
rules over both zones and over
the International Zone on Tan
gier on the Mediterranean coast.
Actually, his effective domain is
limited to the French protec
torate. French Control
French administration of Mo
rocco, as in Tunisia, has been
based on the principle of part
nership between the French
resident-general and a coopera
tive sultan. France also has re
lied heavily on the friendly sup
port of the rural population.
Feudal religious - political lead
ers have until recently delivered
the support of nearly 70 per cent
of the entire Moroccan popula
tion. With the growth of nation
alism in recent years, "back
woods" support of the French
administration has become less
reliable and consistent.
Independence Movement
The nationalist or independ
ence movement in Morocco con
centrates its power in the cities.
The fiercely nationalistic Istiqlal
party was launched in 1944
with the issuance of a revolution
ary manifesto demanding imme
diate and complete independ
ence. Until 1947 Sultan Sidi Mo
hammed ben Youssef cooperated
with the French government and
helped keep the Istiqlal under
control. In that year perhaps
as a result of the post war
spread of anticolonial sentiment
the sultan announced open
support for the Istiqlal independ
ence movement.
In 1950, while on a state visit
to Paris, he demanded abroga
tion of the 1912 treaty which
had set up the protectorate.
French reaction no compro
mise was prompt and firm.
In the succeeding three years,
with the sultan's support, the
Istiqlal gained in membership
and influence throughout the
country, making serious inroads
into formerly pro-French ele-
Investments made
by the 10th of the
month earn divi
dends as of the
First.
gf row wtets q
ments. As the French countered
with political and economic re
forms to meet local demands,
the Istiqlal leaders and the sul
tan combined forces to sabotage
the reforms. They did not want
compromise; they demanded
independence.
On Aug. 20, 1953, the French
government forced the sultan
into exile and placed on the
throne a more cooperative, pro
French wealthy landowner, Sidi
Mohammed ben Moulay Arafa.
The Istiqlal was outlawed. Ter
rorism and guerrilla warfare
broke out in Morocco and con
tinued throughout autumn of
last year.
The nationalists refused to
compromise on" anything short
of the sultan's restoration and
the election of an all-Moroccan
assembly. French efforts to
stamp out the rebsllion by
force failed. Even the tamest
compromises advanced by Paris
raised bitter objections from
the third of a million French
colons (settlers) in Morocco.
Last lear the exiledr Sultan
was permitted to return to his
throne and France promised re
forms similar to those already
granted in Tunisia.
Algeria
The largest of France's North
African territories was acquired
in 1830 by a military expedi
tion. It too had been a part of
the Ottoman empire. From the
earliest days French policy was
assimilation, integrating the
country with France politically
and economically. At great ex
pense to France, Algeria's agri
culture, industry, mining and so
cial institutions were developed.
French colonists and a few
other Europeans transplanted
themselves to Algeria and new
generations grew up thinking of
the country as their own-France-in-Africa.
Independence Movement
Algerian resistance to France
continued for 80 years after the
annexation but, by 1910, the en
tire country was under French
military control. The Southern
Territories, on the borders of
the Sahara desert, are still under
French military government.
Only the coastal departments
are under civil administration.
In the wave of anti-colonialism
that swept the world after
World War II, Algerian nation
alism broke out again in vio
lence, terrorism and an ultima
tum for independence. In 1945
an estimated 40,000-45,000 Al
gerians were killed by French
troops attempting to control the
rebellion. The violence led in
1947 to a major French compro
mise the Organic Statute of
Algeria.
Reforms
Under the new law, Algeria
has obtained limited self-government
in the form of an Algerian
assembly. One house is domin
ated by Algerians of European
extraction; the other, by Alger
ian Moslems. All legislative acts
of the assembly are subject to
the approval of the resident-general
appointed by Paris.
Underlying the reform and
all subsequent French actions
is the concept that this territory
is an integral part of metropoli
tan France, like Brittany or
Provence on the mainland . . .
not a territory, not a colony, but
part and parcel of the French
Union, with the rights and privi
leges of French citizenship.
Algeria elects representatives
to the national legislature in
Paris and participates in the
government of the entire French
Union. This, French legalists
explain, makes "nationalism" in
Algeria an impossibility . . . any
talk of Algerian "independence"
is clearly rebellion against the
French State.
Algerian nationalists, on the
other hand, maintain that .this
legal concept is itself a fiction,
that Algeria does not enjoy pro
portional representation in the
national legislature and that Al
gerian Moslems are second-class
French citizens.
They point to the manner in
which Algerian senators and
deputies to Paris are elected . . .
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assuring 'the one million Euro
pean Algerians equal voice with
"l 0,000,000 Moslem Algerians.
They point a swell to French
government control over Mos
lem mosques, to European con
trol over finance and industry,
French tariffs on Algerian goods
and differences in wages and
educational opportunities be
tween Algerians of European ex
traction and of the Moslem,
faith.
Divisions Within
If the issues were clear-cut be
tween Moslems and Frenchmen,
the solutions might be simpler.
But there are great differences
in point of view among French
men on the one hand and among
Moslems on the other.
The French colons vigorously
oppose , any reforms which will
weaken Algeria's ties with
France or diminish their influ
ence in Algerian government.
In the national parliament in
Paris the colons are supported
by rightwing legislators. Moder
ates in the legislature seek a
compromise. Leftwing legisla
tors, especially Communists, are
willing to see Algeria drift
closer to independence or
autonomy.
Among the Arabs there are
extremists who will settle for
nothing less than complete in
dependence; moderates who ask
only equal status with the Euro
pean colons; and pro-French
Moslems who fear the conse
quences of French withdrawal
from Algeria.
The crisis is at its peak now.
One French government already
has collapsed because of its Al
gerian policy . . . others may
follow.
Different groups of Algerian
nationalists have at different
times made a wide variety of de
mands on France. The national
ist leaders generally considered
to be the most responsible, how
ever, have made demands which
boil down to four points:
1. Establishment of a sove
reign Algerian national assem
bly, to be elected by universal
suffrage (male and female, Arab
and European, Christian and
Moslem).
2. Release of all political pris
oners held by France.
3. Restoration of full civil iib
erties suspended during the
emergency.
4. Negotiation between France
and the national assembly for
the future status of Algeria.
The two principal nationalist
parties (the movement is not so
unified nor so strong as it is in
Tunisia and Morocco) are: the
Triumph of Democratic Liber
ties party, which advocates com
plete independene, and the Dem
ocratic Union of the Algerian
Manifesto, which advocates in
ternal autonomy within the
French Union.
WHERE IS NORTH AFRICA
GOING IN 1956?
The native population of
French North Africa includes
about 18,000,000 Berbers and
Arabs of the Moslem faith and
about 500,000 Jews. There are
also about 1,500,000 European
settlers, mostly of French origin.
By agreement between the
U.S. and France in 1950, the U.S.
was permitted to build five air
bases and to maintain 7,000 Air
Force troops in Morocco. France,
in turn, was to provide 200
guards for each base. So far, the
U.S. has built four bases. The
U.S. Air Force says the ceiling
on personnel set by the agree
ment is too low for effective
maintenance and operation of
the bases.
Can we deal with French
North Africa as a single problem
. . or are Tunis, Morocco and
Algeria three distinct problems?
What are the similarities and
differences? Do French reforms
or repressions in one territory
seem to influence nationalist ac
tivities in the others? How real
is France's claim that Algeria is
a part of metropolitan France?
What effect does this concept
have on French policy? Would
complete assimilation of Algeria
into France, with full equality
of French and Moslems be pos
sible ... or desirable?
Are the independence move
ments in Morocco and Tunisia
irresistible? If France "pulled
out" completely this year, what
would happen to these countries
a) economically? b) politically?
How would this affect France's
economy? . . . her importance as
a world power? Is North Africa
simply a problem of colonialism
vs. nationalism? Or are other
factors at stake. If so, what?
Is North Africa strategically
important to the U.S.? Is
France's dilemma important to
the U.S. . . . does it affect Euro
pean defenses or the strength of
the anti - communist alliance?
How will U.S. action or inaction
be interpreted in the rest of the
world?
The Arab states in the Middle
East are strongly sympathetic to
the nationalists in North Africa.
So are other newly independent
peoples in Asia and Africa. Rus
sia supports Arab self-determination.
Are these facts important
to the U.S. in our North African
policy?
WHAT ARE OUR CHOICES?
Should the U.S. interfere, or
keep hands off? In U.N. debates
on North Africa the U.S. has
consistently abstained from vot
ing. Can we afford to take sides
openely in these controversies?
If so, which side? Why?
Should the U.S. attempt to ap
ply pressure quietly, behind the
scenes? Under what circum
stances if any should the U.S.
support France openly in North'
Africa? Under what circum
stances if any should the U.S.
openly support the Arab nation
alists? What kind of settlement
in North Africa would best suit
U.S. interests? Should the U.S.
do anything to bring about such
a settlement?
A partner in NATO, France is
using troops in Algeria which
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Sunday. April 8, 1956
Woodcock Installed
As Ruler of Elks
Dick Woodcock was installed
as exalted ruler of the Medford
Elks lodge at the annual meeting
of the organization last week,
held following the annual crab
feed at the Elks temple.
Franklin H. Van Pelt, former
exalted ruler, served as acting
grand exalted ruler and install
ing officer during the installa
tion ceremony, with other past
exalted rulers assisting as acting
grand officers.
Newly -installed officers in
clude Galen R. Knox, esteemed
are under NATO command,
withdrawn from Western de
fense bases iri Europe. Should
we insist these troops be re
turned? On this basis could we
dictate a French compromise?
Should we?
YOUR OPINION COUNTS
Whatever policy the U.S.
adopts in North Africa in 1956,
it should be a policy based on
informed opinions of the Ameri
can people. What you believe
on the basis of study and discus
sion is important to U.S. policy
makers in Washington.
The "Great Decisions" pro
gram offers a way that individ
ual opinions may be heard and
noted.
The Great Decisions commit
tee will receive letters, or 'the
ballots included in the fact
sheets, to be tabulated. The re
sults will be forwarded to the
U.S. Department of State and to
our representatives in Congress.
The material above is a con
densation of the fact sheets pre
pared for use in the Great De
cisions program.
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DICK WOODCOCK
Elks Exalted Ruler
leading knight; Budd Gail, es
teemed loyal knight; Herbert G.
Robbins, esteemed lecturing
knight; Donald D. Davis, secre
tary; Allen F. Perry, treasurer;
William Ruck, esquire; Wayne
Harris, assistant esquire; George
W. Howard, tiler; Joe Hosick,
chaplain; Herbert Wing, inner
guard; and L. G. Miles, new
member of the board of trustees.
Salem (U.R) Improved
human relations in communities
throughout the state will be
stressed during urban league
week in Oregon April 16 to 22,
Gov. Elmo Smith said.
American composer Gian Car
lo Menotti has composed seven
operas.
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MEDFORD (OREGON) MAIL TRIBUNE FIVE
DIES OF INJURIES
Longview, Wash. (U.R) Gene
W. Maddock, 36, Longview, died
in a local hospital Friday from
injuries suffered in a two-car
accident Wednesday night on the
Ocean Beach highway near the
Cowlitz-Wahkiakum county line.
Dead line Sunday Classified M at
noon Saturday: 10 a.m Monday for
Monday: other days 5:30 oreviousday.
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