Albany daily democrat., January 06, 1920, Page 6, Image 6

GENERAL PERSHING'S OWN STORY
: OF OPERATIONS OF AMERICAN
: TROOPS DURING THE WORLD WAR
Commander in Chief of Expeditionary Forces Submits
i Special Report to Secretary Baker Fate of
Central Powers Decided by Work of
the United States Army.
FOCH ADMITTED ALUES
First and Second Divisions, in Company With French Moroccan
Troops, Attacked on July 18 Without Preliminary Bombard
ment, Smashed Through the German Lines, Overwhelmed
Both Infantry and Artillery, and Cut the Enemy's Communica
tions, Compelling a General Retreat From the Marne and
Starting the Military Collapse
for Peace.
'(Continued from January 1)
In order to hinder -the enemy's con
quest of Russia and. if possible, pre
vent a German attack on ltalj. or In
the Near East, the allies sought to
maintain the offensive on the western
front as tur as their diminished
strength and morale would permit.
. Notwithstanding these allied attacks
on the western front, the Immense
gains by the German armies In the
east, culminating at Kim on Sept.- 8.
precipitated the collapse of Uussia.
The following months, the Austrluus
with German assistance surprised the
Italians and broke through tlielne at
Capuretto. driving the Italian armies
bark to the Dave river. Inflicting a loss
of SOO.000 men. OWmo rifles. S.il
guns, and enormous stores. This seri
ous crisis coiuelled the withdrawal of
ten French and British divisions from
the western front to Italy. The Ger
man sitiiHtioo on all other theaters was
so favornbfe that as early as Novem
ber they began the movement of divi
sion toward the western front. If
needed, her divisions conld be with
drawn from the Italian front before
the French and lirltish dared recall
their divisions.
At first the tlltes, could hardly hope
for a large American army. Marshal
Jnffre during his visit to America had
made special request that a combat
division be sent at once to Europe as
visual evidence of onr purpose to par
ticipate actively In the war. and also
asked for engineer regiments and other
special service units.
The arrival of the first division and
the parade of certain of Its elements In
I'nrls on July 4 caused great enthust
asm. and for the- time being French
morale was stimulated. Still, allied
apprehension was deep-seated and ma
terial assistance was Imperative.
Outlook Dark for 1918.
A review of the situation showed
that with Russia out of the War the
central powers would be able to release
a large number of divisions for service
elsewhere, and that during the spring
and summer of 1918, without Interfer
ing with the status quo at Salonlkl,
they could concentrate on the western
front a force much stronger than that
of the allies. In view of tbla It was
represented to the war department In
December as of the utmost Importance
that the allied preparations be expe
dited. My conclusion was that, although
the morale of the German people and
of the armies was better than It had
been for two veara. onlv an uutoward
combination of circumstances could
friv the enem'v a decisive vlctorv be
fore American support as recommend
ed could be made effective, provided
the allies secured unity of action.
However, a situation might arise which
would necessitate the temporary use of
all American troops In the units of onr
allies for the defensive, but nothing In
the situation Justlfled the relinquish
ment of our firm purpose to form.our
own army under our own flag.
While the Germans were practicing
for open warfare and concentrating
their most aggressive personnel In
shock divisions, the training of the
allies was still limited to trench war
fare. As our troops were being trained
for open warfare, there was every rea
son why we could not allow them to be
scattered among our allies, even by di
visions, much less as replacements, ex
cept toy pressure of sneer necessity.
Any sort of permanent amalgamation
would Irrevocably commit America's
fortunes to the ,bands of the allies.
Moreover, It was obvious that the lack
of homogeneity would render these
mixed divisions difficult to maneuver
and almost certain to break up under,
stress of defeat, with the consequent
mutual recrimination.
Again, there was no doubt that the
realisation by the German people that
Independent American division, corps,
or armies were In the field with deter
mined purpose would be a severe blow
to German morale and prestige. It was
also certain that an early appearance
of the larger American units on the
front would be most beneOclnl to the
morale of the allies themselves.
Accordingly, the "first division, on
Jan. 10, 1918, took over sector north
of Toul ; the twenty-sixth division went
to the Soissons front early In Febru
rrx. ,. rnre-wcnnd division entered
WERE FACING DEFEAT
Which Forced Germany to Sue
the line near Luuevllle. fc'eb. 21, and
the..' second division near Verdun.
March IS. Meanwhile; the first army
corps headquarters. Major Gen. Hunter
Liggett commanding, was organised at
Neufrhateau on Jnn. 10. and the plan
to create an Independent American sec
tor on the Lorraine front waa taking
shape.
This was Ihe situation when the
great German offensive waa launched
on March 21. 1918.
Figured on 21 Divisions.
The war department planned as
early as July. 1UIT. to send to France
by June 15. 101S. twenty-one divisions
of the then strength of 20.000 men
each, together with auxlllnry and re
placement troops, making a total of
some 650.000 men. While the numbers
fell short of my recommendation ofl
July 8. 1917. which contemplated at
least l.OtW.iKW men by May. 1918. It
should be borne In ui'nd that the
main factor In the problem was Ihe
smount of shipping to become avail
able for military purposes. In which
must be Included tonnage required to
supply the allies with steel, coal and
food.
On Pec. 2. 1917. an estimate of the
itu:itlon was cabled to the war deport
ment with Ihe following recommenda
tion: '
"In view of these conditions. It Is
of the-titmost Importance to the allied
cause that we move swiftly. The
minimum number of troops we should
plan to have In France by the end of
.tune I four array corps of twenty-four
llvls'ons. In addition to troops for serv
ice of the rear. This figure Is gven
s the lowest we should think of and
is placed no higher because the limit
of avr.1I.ihle transportutloo would not
seem to warrant It.
A study of transportation facili
ties shows sufficient American ton-
jnnge to bring, over this number of
J troops, but to do so there must be a
i reduction In the tonnage allotted to
f other than army need. The use of
"hipping for commercial purposes
'must he curtailed as much as possi
ble. The allies sre very weak and
we must come to their relief this enr.
1918. The year after may be too late.
It la very doubtful If tbey ran hold
on until 1919 unless we give them a
lot of support this year. It Is there
! fore strongly recommended that a
j complete readjustment of transporta
tion be made and that the needs of
j the war department us set forth above
ihe regarded as Immediate
In the latter part of January Joint
note No. 12, presented by the military
! representatives with the supreme war
council, was approved bythe council
I This note concluded that France would
ihe safe during 1918 only under certain
conditions, namely:
"That the strength of the British
' and French troops In France are con
i tlnuously kept np to their present
total .strengtji snd that they receive
1 the-expected! re-enforcements of not
less than two American divisions per
month." r
The first German offensive of 1918,
beginning Murch 81, overran -all re
sistance during the Initial period of
the attack. The offensive made such
Inroads upon French and British re
serves that defeat stared them In the
face unless the new American troops
should prove more" Immediately
available than even the most optimis
tic had dared to hope. On Murch
27 the military representatives with
the supreme war council prepared
their Joint note No. 18. This note re
peated the previously quoted state
ment from joint note No. 12, and
continued:
"The battle which Is developing at
the present moment In France, and
which ran extend to the other thea
ters of operations, may very quickly
place the allied armies In a serious
situation from the point of view of ef
fectives. .
"The military representatives are of
the opinion that It Is highly desirable
that the American government ahould
ssslst tha allied armies as soon As
possible by permitting In principle the
temporary service of American units
in allied army corps and divisions.
Such re-enforcement must, however,
he obtained from other units than
those American divisions which ire
now operating with the French, and
the units so temporarily employed must
-rent-mllr he returned to the Amert-
lUll MfMI.
The military representative are of
the opinion that from Ihe present time.
In execution of the foregoing, and un
til otherwise directed by the supreme
war council, only American Infantry
and machine gun unit, organised aa
that government may decide, he
brought to France, and that all agree
ments or conventions hitherto made In
conflict with this decision l modified
accordingly."
Planned an American Army.
The secretary of war, who waa In
France at the time; General Rlbta. Ihe
American military representative wtih
the supreme war council, and I at once
conferred on the terms of this nole.
with the result that the secretary rec
ommended to the president that Joint
note No. 18 be approved In the follow
lug sense: -
"The purpose of the American gov
ernment Is to render the fullest co
operation and aid, and therefor the
recommendation of the military rep
resentatives with regard to the pref
erential transportation of American
Infantry and machine gun units In
the present emergency Is approved.
Such units, when transported, will be
under the direction of the command
er In chief of the American expedi
tionary forces, and will be assigned
for training and use by him In his dis
cretion. He will us these ami all
other military forces of the United
States under bis command In such
manner as to render the greatest mili
tary assistance, keeping In mlud al
ways the determination of this gov
ernment to have Ita varied military
forces collected as speedily as their
training aud the military situation per
mits. Into an Independent American
army, acting In concert with the
armies of Great Britain and France,
and all arrangements made by him
for their temporary training and
service will be mnde with that end In
view."
British Losses Heavy.
The battle line In the vicinity of
Amiens had hardly stabilised when,
on April 9. the Germans made anoth
er successful attack against the Brit
ish lines ou a front of some 40 kilo
meters In the vicinity of Artnentlerea
and along the Lys river. As a result
of Its being Included In a en I lent form
ed by the German advance, I'asschen
daele ridge, the capture of which had
cost so dcnrly In 1017. was evacuated
by the British on April 17..
The losses hid been heavy and the
British were unable to replace them
entirely. They were, therefore mak
ing extraordinary efforts to Increase
the shipping avsltshle for our troop.
Ou April 21. I went to London to
clear ap certain questions concerning
the rate of shipment and to reach the
further agreement provided for In Ihe
April 7 conference. The result of this
London ' agreement was cabled to
Washington April 24. as follows:
"That only the Infantry, machine
guns, engineers and signal troops of
American divisions and brigade be
sent over In British 'and American
shipping during May for training and
service with the British army In
t'nin--e up to six .:-.-ibns ami that
any shipping In excess of that re
quired lor these troop he utilised to
tronrt troops necessary to make
these divlsTons complete.
"That the A merlin n personnel of
the artillery of these divisions and
such corps troops as may lie required
to build up American corps organisa
tions follow Immediately thereafter,
and that 'American artillery.. personnel
be trained with French mnlerlnl and
loin Its (iroper divisions as soon aa
thoroughly trained.
"That It Is contemplated American
divisions and corps when trnlned and
organized shall he utilized under the
American commander In chief In an
Ainerh-an group.
"That the American rominniMler In
chief shall allot Aniericiin troop in
the French or British for training or
train I hem with American unlis nt hs
discretion, with the timlprxttinrtliig
thai troops alrendy trnnsmrter by
Rrltlsh shipping or Included In the six
divisions mentioned are to be trained
with the British army."
At a meeting of the supreme nnr
council held at Abbeville May 1 ai"l
2. an urgent npiieal came from both
French and Italian representative for
American replncrmenta or unit t
serve with their armies. The follow
ing agreement was reuched. commit
ting the council to an Independent
American army and providing for the
Imnjedlute shipment of certain troops:
Under American Flag.
"It Is the opinion of the supreme
war council that. In order to carry the
war to a successful conclusion, an
American army should be formed aa
early as poeslble under' Its own ling:
In orIer to meet the present emer
gency it I agreed that American
froojis should he brought to France
aa rapidly as allied transportation fa
dllties will permit, and that, as far a
consistent with the necessity of build
ing up an American army, preference
will be given to Infantry and machine
gun units for training and service
with French and British armies." -
The next offensive of the enemy was
made between the Olse and Berry-au
Bac against the French Instead of
against the British, as was generally
expected, and It came as a complete
surprise. The Initial Aisne attack,
covering a front of thirty-five kilo
meters, met with remarkable em-ccsa,
as the German armies advanced no less
than fifty kilometers In four days, tin
reaching the Marne that river was
used 'as a defensive flnnk and Ihe Ger
man advance was directly towards
Paris. During the first days of June
something akin to a panic seised linn
city, and It was estimated thai l.uoo.oou
people left during the spring of 1918.
Such extensive priority had already
cau intuutry anil uiucuiu guuuvrs uim
the troops of those categories which
had received even partial training lu
the United Stales were practically ex
hausted. Moreovvr, lit strait on our
survlce of supply mad II essentia!
that early relief b afforded by Increas
ing Us iiersonnel. The final agreement
was iblcd to the war uVwrtinent on
June A, as follows:
"I'll following recommendations si
mad un tha assumption that at least
2.VI.000 men ran lis lraiisHirtd In each
of'th months of June and July by the
employment of combined British aud
American tonnage. We recommend :
"For the mouth of June: Absolut
priority ahull be given lo the trans.
portntlou of 170.000 combatant troop.
23.400 meu for the service of the rail
ways, tha balance to be troop of
categories to be ilelermltUd by the
coiiiuiander-ln-chlff. Amerlrau expedi
tionary forces.
"For Ihe month of July: Absolut
priority for the shipment of 140.000
combatant troops, the balnur lo con
sist of troops lo l designated by the
eommander-la-chlef. American etpcill
tlonary force.
"We recognise that the combatant
troops to he dispatched In July may
have to Include troops which have bad
liisuttlclent training, hut w consider
the present emergency Is such as to
Justify a temporary and exceptional
departure by the United State from
sound principles of training, especially
as a similar course Is being followed
by Franc and Orenl Britain.
"Signed FOTH.
" "MII..NKII.
"I'KKSIIINO,"
Raised Dellcat Questions.
The various proposal Uur.ug the
conferences regarding priority of ship
ment, often very Insistent, raised ques
tions that were not only most dllttctilt
but most delicate. On Ihe one hand,
there was a critical situation which
must be met by Immediate action,
while, on the oilier baud, any priority
accorded a partlculsr arm necessarily
postponed the formation of a distinc
tive American, fighting force and th
means to supply It. Such a fore ,
In my opinion, absolutely accessary lo
win th war. A few of the allied rep.
resentatlvea became colivlm-ed that th
American services of supply olionld not
b neglected hut should be develocd
In the couimou luteresl. The success
of our divisions daring May and June
demonstrated fully thai It was not
uccessary to draft Americans under
foreign flags In order to utilise Amer
ican manhood most effectively.
' When, on March 21. 191 S. the Ger
man army on Ihe extern front began
Ha series of offensives. It was by fur ,
Ihe most formidable force the world j
hail ever seen. In fighting men and '
guns It had a great superiority, but ;
this was of less Importance than tha :
advantnge In morale. In experience. In
training for mobile warfnre. and In ;
unity of command. Ever since the col-,
lapse of the Russian armies and th ;
crisis on the Italian front In the fall
pf 1917. German armies wer being a- '
sembled and trained for the great cau :
(To be Continued) .'
Among the unique occupations re
cently brought to tight in London is
.that of a man who makes a specialty
to tattooing dogs with their owner'
names and crests. '- -
-MAXWELL .
Cars and Trucks
To Advance in Price February 15
We have just received a telegram from the factory announc
ing an increase of $70 on Maxwell Cars and $125 on Trucks.
On and after February 15, 1920 the price will be 7
Maxwell Cars . .'. , $1220
Maxwell Trucks '...r... ..:. .$1510
Place Your Order Now j
We will continue to
. stock lasts. "
Waldo
ALBANY
SEDUCTION
IS CHARGED
Alleged Common Law Wife
of Navy Man Deserted
la Claim
SEATTLE-t-Charlea E. Cllmur, Jr.,
24, an ex-football star at th Univer
sity of Washington, waa arrested to
day on charge of seduction prefer
red by Fern Cannon, 20, said to be his
common law wif and th mother of
hi 2-year-old daughter.
Following th filing of an Informa
tion in superior court by Prosecuting
Attorney Brown, Cllmur was arrested
at tha home of his parent, Sheriffs
Jarrett and Beeb. Gilmur waa taken
to the county Jail, wher he produced
bond in the-sum of $1000 and was re
leased. Miss Cannon, formerly a resident of
this city, has lived In Portland, where
tha child waa born, for nearly two
year. She came to Seattle recently
and askrd th prosecuting attorney's
office for a complaint against Gilmur,
who, sho declared, had betrayed her
when she waa 17 years old. Deputy
Prosicutinff Attorney Clay pool, after
an investigation and an examination
of documentary evidence, drew up the
Information.
The girl is said to have passed as
Gilmur' wife before the war. She
told the county authorities tliat she
had represented to her parent that t
she was married to Gilmur and told!
the truth only after the birth of her
child. According to letters in posses
sion of Prosecutor Clsypool, purport
ing to have been written by Gilmur,
he promised repeatedly to marry her.
During th war Gilmur served in the
navy, but corresponded regularly with
Misa Cannon.
Living microbe have been found in
manutcripts hundrara of years old.
I
I
I
The constant drip of water
Wears away the hardest stone.
And the constant gnaw of Towier
Masticates the hardest bone;
The constant cooing lover
Carries off the bashful maid,
And the constant advertiser
Is the one who gets the trade. .
.'. Foster
fill orders at the old prices as long as the S
55
HURRY! SAVE MONEY!! ; ffi
Anderson
Distributors
SOLDIERS GO
BACK TO LAND
Down on the Farm Life Ap
peals to Boys, Vocational
. Board Says
Acordlng to reort just issued by
the Vocational Summary it appear
that th back to th farm movement
has started In earnest.
Th report state that 1J.869 pupil
over th country wer enrolled in
agricultural subject In vocational
school during 1918 and IBID.
Tl-f report further state that Oil
la aa IncNas of 4,442 students being;
trained in this subject. This la only
th second year in which practical In
struu(lun of this sort has been within
reach of the average child of school
aa. A
Th Bureau of tha Census ap-roxitnatcs-an
Increase of on million
farms in th United States during tlio
last ten years. This increase, togeth
er with th increase of scientifically
trained men to operate them, has se
cured th future of agricultural
America.
Ask for
HILL'S
riVS MILLION PF-OPLK
UttKD IT LAST YKAR
HILL'S
gQUININL
CASCARA
to
luim nil.
ir-Ut brft r CfM Is 14
fsov snp in o7.
swv bull If U klk. 1h
vsutn fcs t s R4
Ilk Mr. HUI
pkttfr
Al Alii
I!
& Son
!
OREGON
rv
3L
M liHfere-