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About Spilyay tymoo. (Warm Springs, Or.) 1976-current | View Entire Issue (April 30, 1982)
Spilyay Tymoo Warning for new milk products An imitation milk product W.I.C. vouchers lor use by called M eadow Fresh or infants, children, or women. Mellow Fresh is being sold in Milk is an important source several western states. The of calcium, riboflavin, and produce is a powder that is protein. When the nutritional mixed with water. Meadow value of Meadow Fresh is Fresh/ Mellow Fresh is not sold compared to nonfat dry milk in stores, but by individual there are several differences. salespersons. Meadow Fresh contains about Meadow Fresh should not be one-third as much riboflavin used as an infant formula. It and protein as milk and only does not meet the minimum one-fourth as much calcium as sta n d a rd s of the In fa n t milk. Meadow Fresh contains Formula Act of 1980. This act almost twice as much sodium established minimum levels of as milk. Because of this fact, nutrients and standards for such a product would not be quality and safety in the suitable for use by individuals manufacture of infant formula. with high blood pressure or Meadow Fresh does not meet other conditions which restrict W .I.C. requirem ents and sodium intake. cannot be nurchased with week. A rt medium ranging from photography to pottery, pencil drawings to stained glass are shown. Above, Vem Rowe and Nancy Garrison put finishing touches on display. The show will be open through M ay 26 during regular school hours. Spilyay Tymoo photo by Behrend How effective was the Columbia River 5-year plan? This article is printed courtesy of the Columbia River In ter T rib al Fish Commission. O In February 1977,' four Columbia River treaty tribes, the governors of Oregon and Washington, and the Depart ment of Interior signed an ag reem en t fo r m anaging salmon and steelhead that originate above Bonneville Dam. The fisheries of the four tribes—Nez Perce, Umatilla, Warm Springs and Yakima— are made up of anadromous stocks that begin their lifecycle in the upper Columbia and its trib u ta rie s . Because the original management agree ment had a five-year duration, it became known as the 5-Year Plan. That original five-year period ended on February 25. 1982. How the plan came about, what it did and did not do, its goals and its deficiencies, were the subject of question and conflict throughout the five years. The plan's origin goes back to 1969, when the original court decision in Sohappy v. Smith affirmed the treaty fishing rights of Columbia River Indians. Because tribal fishers did not get their fair share of the harvest in the years following that decision, Judge Robert Belloni in 1974 issued a supplemental order declaring that the states must assure the tribes the opportunity to catch up to 50% of spring Chinook destined to pass the tribes’ usual and accustomed fishing places. (Belloni had retained jurisdiction in the case, which became U nited S ta tes v. Oregon after the federal government intervened on behalf of the tribes.) When B elloni m ade th e sam e determination for fall chinook the following year, he also ordered the states and tribes to negotiate an agreement to implement United States vs Oregon and his supplemental orders. This agreement became t h e 5 - Y e a r P l a n — th e culmination of those years of litigation. If a few words can describe the 5-Year Plan, they have to be “harvest-sharing plan.” Its stated p u rp o se in clu d ed m aintenance, perpetuation, and enhancement of the upper Columbia’s anadromous fish, with provisions for restricting the ocean harvest. But in practice the plan became prim arily a form ula for dividing the inriver harvest between n on-Indian, both sport fishers and lower river gillnetters, and Indians, who fish upriver, from Bonneville to McNary Dam. T h e p la n ’s f ir s t y e a r coincided with a precipitous decline in Columbia River salmon runs—a decline that continued th ro u g h o u t the plan’s duration. To Indian fishers this meant that fewer fish were caught after the plan went into effect than prior to it. A nd d e s p ite th e p la n ’s conservation provisions, at no time during those five years were effective restrictions placed on harvests of Columbia River stocks as they matured in the ocean from California to Alaska and returned to the mouth of the Columbia. That is, no harvest restrictions were applied until the fish began to reach their spawning grounds. At that point fishery agencies had to acknowledge that record low numbers of salmon were returning to the river and to spawning grounds, and last- minute conservation measures were imposed. Because the tribes fish at the end of the Columbia River salmon cycle, they were the ones most affected by c u tb a c k s in harvestable salmon and in fishing days. To tribal fishers, conservation under the plan was apparently applied to only one fishery—their own. Down on the river, where salmon are caught, traded, sold, or taken for home use, Indians clearly saw that they had fewer fishing days than their neighbors downstream, and that under this 5-Year Plan they were the ones who came up short on the harvest. Their deficit for the five years, under inriver sharing principles of the plan, is nearly 10,000 fall c h in o o k an d as yet an chinook. According to the plan, the inriver sharing formula was to be adjusted each year so that deficits were made up the following year. Instead, the Indian harvest deficit simply accumulated. During the plan’s five years, Indian fishers also saw special seasons, such as the one in Young’s Bay, created to give non-Indians more opportunity to catch salmon. And they saw special attention given to improving runs on tributaries below Bonneville Dam, such as those on the Willamette River. Meanwhile, in the upriver Indian fishing areas, seasons not only had fewer days, but often the days were only for those fortunate enough to have fishing sites in Bonneville pool, one of three pools where Indians set their nets. Each year Indian fishers watched upriver coho runs, once abundant above the dam, dwindle further—to so few that their coho catches did not exceed the “incidental catch” category. And each year they saw lower river and some upriver hatcheries producing coho and also chinook, both of which were reared only to be released in the lower river, and only to return there. At a January 1982 meeting, the four tribes’ Council of C o u n c ils c o n c lu d e d by unanimous motion that the 5- Year Plan had been a failure. The motion cited two reasons for this evaluation: first, the states did not implement en h an cem en t fo r u p riv e r stocks, and second, appropri ate ocean regulations were not enacted. Given the disparities in the way upriver, lower river and ocean fisheries were managed, it is little wonder that Indians viewed the 5-Year Plan as just a n o th e r m e c h a n ism fo r “conserving” salmon from the nets of Indian fishers; and little wonder that when they referred to it as a “conservation plan” they did so with bitterness. What was wrong with the plan was th a t it was not a conservation plan as carried out by the agencies. Although the plan contained provisions for upriver hatcheries and re le a se s a n d fo r o c e a n . regulation, it was only- used to ‘ a l l o c a te a d im in is h in g resource. Without conserva tion and enhancement, harvest ■ allocation is not the most important concern, because as they say on the river, “50% of zero is still zero.” Although the 5-Year Plan cam e and w ent w ith o u t improving upriver fisheries, some segments of it could serve as a good blueprint for restoring upriver salmon runs. It did call for “upriver...hat chery rearing programs... to rehabilitate runs to their maximum potential” and for sharing of “hatchery salmon and steelhead released to restore runs above Bonneville Dam.” It did include, “The states agree to enact or recommend for enactment by the Pacific Fishery Manage m ent Council ap p ro p riate conservation regulations for th e o c e a n fis h e ry th a t will...provide for adequate escapement of mature fish into the Columbia River.” But, as reflected in the Council of C o u n c ils m o tio n , th o se sections and others were written without the implemen tation specifics that would bind state and federal fish agencies to a course of action. The plan needed specifics about which hatchery stocks, how many, and where they would be released; specifics about when and where ocean conservation measures should be applied; and specifics about new h a tc h e rie s , h a b ita t re s to ra tio n , and dam improvements, among others. N o n eth eless, the p lan , through the process of tribal participation that it engen dered, crytallized these issues for Indian fishers and their fish and wildlife committees, and it brought these issues to the forefront of debate among fish agency m an a g e rs. T he relationship of these issues to the future of Columbia River fisheries is now part of public discussion on fish and wildlife programs under the regional power act and the enhancement act. The plan also focused particular attention on the c r i t i c a l r o le o f o c e a n management in conservation. In 1979, 1980 and 1981 the tribes were in federal court c o n te stin g ocean fishing regulations, in part on the basis of disregarded provisions in the 5-year plan. Judge Walter Craig, in his August 1981 décision on the tribes’ suite- Yakima v. Baldrige—against the Secretary of Commerce (Baldrige had approved the ocean regulations), said “I would be hopeful that the parties would agree that the Columbia 'River plan (5-Year Plan) would continue. We have had almost five years of it. You certainly by ‘this time „have arrived at some conclusions with respect to its faulty features and maybe you can keep the good ones and amend the bad ones...” He ordered all parties (the tribes as plaintiffs and the states of Oregon and W a s h in g to n a lo n g w ith S e c r e t a r y B a ld r ig e a s defendents) to come up with a plan for managing Columbia River stocks th a t would improve returns to the river and the tribes. When the parties appeared before Craig in February 1982 for co n tin u a tio n for the Yakima v Baldrige hearings, the judge recreated his order that all parties negotiate to resolve “ the problem of Columbia River stocks” and that “the Columbia River plan should be reexecuted or renegotiated.” The 1981 ocean case is still in court, and still before Judge Craig. Craig will also oversee whatever replaces the 5-Year Plan. He views both Yakima v. Baldrige and a plan as related to his overall jurisdiction in United States v. Oregon, which he took over in 1979 when Judge Belloni removed himself from the case. Thus 13 years after Sohappy v. Smith, an effective plan for C o lu m b ia s a lm o n a n d steelhead management—a plan consistent with treaty rights that all management authori ties can willingly implement— is still in limbo. Questions about the 5-year Plan have T>een answered, mostly in the negative, but conflict about what a plan should be, and precisely what it should do to r e s to r e th e C o lu m b ia ’s anadromous fish resource, goes on. For how long, no one can tell. But in the courts, the tribes seek justice. And on the river, through the lean years and the few lead days of fishing, they wait.
