Image provided by: University of Oregon Libraries; Eugene, OR
About Portland observer. (Portland, Or.) 1970-current | View Entire Issue (Nov. 19, 1979)
Portland Observer November 16.1979 Page 3 ‘ American portrait of the Iranian Revolution Part I: Do the Moslem Mullahs really run Iran? By T.D. Allman (Editors note: The Iranian revolution was one of the most im portant political events of the decade. It not only toppled the United States’ number one ally in the Middle East, but has catapaulted America into an energy crisis that will probably be felt for the remainder of the century. It has also unleashed a wave of Islamic revival that could charge the face of the geo-political globe. T.D. Allman, a contributing editor to Harpers magazine, who has covered the Middle East and Asia since the 1960s, travelled throughout Iran, compiling what is probably the most accurate and detailed portrait of Iran that has been made available to the American people. Writing prior to the current take-over of the American Embassy, Allmon saw aspects of Iranian life now closed to foreign journalists.) QUM, IRAN (PNS)-Has one dic tatorship replaced another in Iran? Have the Ayatollah Khomeini and his mullahs created a totalitarian theocracy as absolute as the secular police state once run by the Shah and SAVAK? The immense secular influence the Ayatollah Khomeini exercises from this small pilgrimage town 85 miles south of Tehran recently was illustrated in a very graphic way. In order to confer with the Ayatollah, the entire Iranian cabinet, including Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, boarded a mini-bus in Tehran and subjected itself to the hot and tedious five-hour round trip from the capital to Qum. Khomeini could have spared the cabinet this inconvenience with a 20- minute helicopter flight to Tehran. But Iran today, is a country where the mountains all go to Mohammad. In fact, hardly a week passes without the Ayatollah and the Revolutionary Council issuing some sweeping order-ranging from nationalization of the banks to a dress code for the Caspian beach resorts-w ithout consulting the government in Tehran, or even in forming it in advance. Does this mean the real capital of the country is Qum? To a large ex tent, many Iranian officials com plain, it means Iran has no national government at all. Even what Khomeini orders, the government frequently lacks the power to im plement. While many Iranians, after 30 years of harassment by an all- powerful central government, savor the widespread local autonomy that results, others, including those ap pointed to office by Khomeini him self, find the situation intolerable, and are doing what they can to com bat it. Both the danger of the Shah’s ab solutism being replaced by a religious one, and the checks working inside Iran against it, are summed up by a new word that has recently entered the Iranian political vocabulary, the world’s latest "ism ." Called "A koundism ,” it is the word Iranians use to refer to the misuse of authority by Shi'ite Moslem clerics--ranging from Khomeini himself down to the village mullah. On the least harmful level, Akoundism arises when the local mullah simply gets too big for his britches and starts interfering in his neighbors’ lives too much. It takes a more serious form when a prominent cleric turns himself into an Islamic Pharisee-flaunting his piety at the mosque while using his power to enrich his family and deny the rights of others. At its worst, Akoundism becomes what Iranians call “ coun ter-revolutionary activity" actions which not only violate clerical ethics, but bring the Islamic religion itself into disrepute. How do Iranians deal with Akoundism? At the lowest level the weapon is ridicule, social ostracism and, in some villages, running the Akound out of town. More serious offenders, especially those holding powerful offices, are attacked at public meetings and in the press, and sometimes dismissed from office. And in the worst cases, if the Gov ernment does not issue an arrest warrant, indivduals take matters into their own hands. Since the triumph of the Islamic revolution here, a variety of clerics have been shot dead—including several close to Khomeini himself. Perhaps Iran’s most controversial Ayatollah-according to many, the worst perpetrator of Akoundism—is Ayatollah Khalkhali, former head of the revolutionary courts. He has been dismissed from his post because of what even fervent Islamic revolutionaries call flagrant in justices. In his most criticized action yet, Khalkhali offered a bounty to anyone who would kill the Shah, and then fabricated the story that he had retained Carlos, the international terrorist, to do it. High Iranian of ficials were appalled, and quickly denied the report. But Khalkhali’s own reputation may have suffered as much inside Iran as Iran's reputation suffered abroad as a result of the in cident. Recently a variety of Iranians around the country were asked it they considered Akoundism a serious danger. Some of their replies: An umemployed youth in a Tehran low-income area-"in a few months things will improve, and we will rid ourselves of these Akounds, the way we got rid of those SAVAK goons.” The governor of a province— "Tens of thousands of Iranians did not sacrifice their lives for Akound ism. It must be controlled because if Islam fails it will be the com munists who inherit Iran.” A young, affluent, westernized in tellectual—"T he Akounds are the new SAVAK." For most Iranians, of course, Islam remains not a God that has failed, but one that has succeeded beyond their wildest expectations. Thev renard the mullahs not as threats to their freedom, but as a- gents of God who helped bring it about. But even Khomeini himself has warned that Akoundism could defeat the revolution. For the moment, the primary danger to Iran’s stability is that the Akounds will wreck the Iranian economy by driving out skilled workers and managers with their repression of secular life styles. They could bankrupt Islam itself as a positive force by their attacks on progressive Islamic groups, and they many even provoke civil war through repression of the leftists and the ethnic and religious minorities. While that danger has been em phasized, even over-rated, by many observers, there also has been a ten dency to under-rate the effectiveness of opposition, both open and in direct, to unbridled theocracy. Khomeini himself, for one thing, commands the unquestioning loyalty of far less than the 95 percent of the population many assume. More than a third of Iran’s 35 million people are either not members of his Shi’ite sect or are not native speakers of Farsi, the language in which he preaches, or both. Typical are the Arabs of oil- producing Khuzistan province. They are Shi’ites, but they oppose Khomeini because they regard him as a Persian chauvinist. When op position from his fellow Farsi speaking Shi’ites—ranging from communists to religious rivals more orthodox than he-is counted in, the proportion of his following drops agains. Perhaps two-thirds of all Iranians do support the Ayatollah with per sonal fervor, but as the symbol of successful revolution, not as a political leader with a specific program. When controversial issues come up, the majority becomes much more tenuous. He has banned liquor from restaurants, music from the radio and Iranian women—though not Charlie's Angeles-from performing on TV—while often leaving im plementation of Koranic custom to local committees, who disregard it as they wish. And while constantly quoting the Koran’s support for private property, Khomeini has ap proved measures to nationalize the banks, insurance companies, heavy industry and even undeveloped land within city limits-which as a check on real estate speculation is probably the most revolutionary of all measures for Iran’s urban poor. Although the Koran stipulates that those who do not work should not be paid, the massive social security system Khomeini’s revolutionary council set up has already transferred several billion dollars to workers left jobless by cancellation of the Shah’s building contracts. Far from turning Iran into the base camp for an Islamic holy war, Khomeini has done away with the draft and cut military expenditures in half. The prospects for a total victory for Akoundism in Ir a n -if indeed that is what Khomeini wants, and the signs are very contradictory-are also limited by the nature of Shi’ite Islam itself. Congregations choose-and rid themselves-of mullahs when and as they wish. As for the Ayatollahs-the numbers of which are expanding as rapidly under Islam as courtiers once proliferated under the Shah-no one either hires or fires them. A man becomes an Ayatollah simply by being accepted as one. Indeed all that differentiates the devout layman, the robed mullah, the revered Ayatollah and an exalted Imam-holder of the highest spiritual dignity of all, and the title by which Iranians refer to Khomeini-is that each variously is esteemed as such. Khomeini—as Imam—enjoys no ex plicit hierarchical authority over another Ayatollah or even over the lowliest village mullah. Only respect for his piety can make them obey. This is because, at the most basic level, Khomeini-unlike the Pope or the Imams of Sunni Moslem coun tries-does not even control the purse strings. Each mosque is spiritually, financially and these days militarily independent. This independence explains why the Shah—for all his money and secret agents-was never able to stop revolution bubbling upward from the Shi’ite mosques. The Shah could not cut off their money because they raised their money themselves. For every mullah the Shah arrested, another took his place. And when SAVAK did succeed in turning one Ayatollah or another to the Shah's cause, their spiritual authority vanished and their following faded away. Those same constraints con tinue to prevent Shi’ism from being used as the instrument of one man’s autocracy today. What happens to an ordinary m u llah-or even an Im am -w hen enough people decide his Akoundism has gone too far? It is significant that of the 12 great Imams of the Shi'ite faith, cvey one of them died a violent death. The faithful remember these political- religious leaders as saints, too good for this world, who were martyred by the forces of heresy and unrighteousness. But to the secular student of politics, it is inconceivable that every one of these men should have suffered the identical fate, without having also alienated many of their own followers. Asked if he thought Akoundism could undo the revolution, Mehdi Adib Azad, the 32-year-old manager of a Mashhad food processing plant, replied: “ I don't see how. Either the mullahs will continue to be basically a constructive force, o r...” He stop ped, having decided to answer with a question. "W e had one revolution,” Azad said. "D on't you think we can have another?” (Copyright Pacific News Service 1979) More than the mere supplying o f mortgage money, Lincoln also provides the knowledge, the organization, and the courtesy which speeds each transaction from application to completion o f financial arrangements. and IO A N ASSOt IA T IO N ( Head Office: 12320 S.W. First, Beaverton Fourteen branch offices for vour convenience Y. The Morns Morhs House 1501 SW Hornson Street Portland 97201 Telephone 227-2668 DES C O N N A L L Professional Corpororion LEGAL CLINIC CONCENTRATING IN THE FIELDS OF: CRIMINAL LAW INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF INTOXICANTS DOMESTIC RELATIONS WORKERS' COMPENSATION BANKRUPTCY PERSONAL INJURY WILLS - PROBATE AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS CONSUMER PROTECTION If you have a problem that is not covered in this list, please call and ask whether we can help. Chances are, we can. If not, we can recommend someone else for you to call. One way or the other, we want to see you get the kind of professional legal counsel you're entitled to. The best time to call us, or any attorney, is before you are embroiled in a legal problem. This is called preventative law and it makes a lot of sense. Regardless, when you call us we will arrange for an initial consultation at your convenience. Cost: $20. We probably can't solve anything in this meeting, but it is a chance for you to explain your particular problem and for us to give you some idea of what it'll take to reach a solution. If you want us to proceed, we'll give you an estimate of the fees you should plan on. In writing. 3ft
