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About Oregon daily emerald. (Eugene, Or.) 1920-2012 | View Entire Issue (Jan. 26, 1972)
Vol. 73, No. 85 An Independent Student Newspaper University of Oregon, Eugene Wednesday, January 26,1972 Forces to be withdrawn within six months Nixon discloses Vietnam peace plan WASHINGTON AP — President Nixon disclosed Tuesday night a Vietnam peace plan which he said had been secretly of fered to the Communists and which calls for withdrawal of all U.S. forces within six months and new South Vietnamese presidential elections, if North Vietnam frees American prisoners of war and agrees to a cease-fire in Indochina. In a national radio and television ad dress from his oval office, Nixon said his top foreign affairs adviser, Henry Kissinger, had made a dozen secret trips to Paris in the past 30 months to pursue the private negotiations with North Viet namese leaders. Nixon’s speech was timed to coincide with a broadcast by South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu from Saigon. Until recently, the secret negotiations “showed signs of yielding some progress,” Nixon said but now, he added, “it is my judgment that the purposes of peace will best be served by bringing out publicly the proposals we have been making in private.” Kissinger, who made a secret trip to Peking last summer to arrange Nixon’s February journey to China, began the secret peace negotiations in Paris on Aug. 4, 1969, Nixon said. During the ensuing months, he said, the United States offered a variety of proposals—always in private. Nixon said the “most comprehensive peace plan of this conflict” was offered on Oct. 11 but “lies ignored in a secret channel while the enemy tries again for military victory.” The main elements of that eight-point plan, which he said he has instructed Ambassador William J. Porter to present publicly in Paris this Thursday are: —Total withdrawal from South Vietnam of all U.S. forces within six months of an agreement. —An exchange of prisoners which will begin the same day as the troop with drawals and will be completed when they are completed. —A general cease-fire throughout In dochina beginning when an agreement is signed and barring any infiltration of outside forces into any of the countries of Indochina. —New presidential elections in South Vietnam within six months of an agreement, supervised by an independent body, with incumbent President Van Thieu resigning one month prior to the election. —The other four points in the Nixon plan include an agreement that there will be no foreign intervention in Indochinese countries as set forth in the 1954 Geneva Agreement and the 1962 Laos pact; that there will be international supervision military aspects of the agreement ; that all armed forces must remain within their national frontiers and that there will be an international guarantee for the fun damental rights of the Indochinese and the status of all countries in Indochina. Nixon’s bombshell disclosures have election-year political implications. His Democratic critics, especially presidential aspirant Sen. George McGovern, D-S.D., have contended the North Vietnamese would release the nearly 400 American POWs if Nixon agreed to a withdrawal date. Administration officials acknowledge that if Hanoi accepts the terms he outlined, Nixon can claim progress towards returning POWs. But if the Communists reject the offer, they say, the Democratic critics will have lost one of their arguments against Nixon's Vietnam policy. “It is a plan to end the war now,” Nixon said of the offer he outlined. . . Its ac ceptance would mean the speedy return of all the prisoners of war to their homes.” He said progress in the public negotiations had been disappointing. “The American people deserve an ac counting of why it has been disap pointing,” he added. “Tonight I intend to give you that accounting, and in so doing, to try and break the deadlock in the negotiations.” The chief executive then traced the 30 months of private negotiations, which included secret meetings on last May 31, June 26, July 12, and Aug. 16. At the Aug. 16 session, Nixon said, “we . . . offered the complete withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops within nine months after an agreement on an over-all settlement." But less than a month later, he said the North Vietnamese rejected the proposal and continued “berating us at the public sessions for not responding to their . . . publicly presented seven-point plan.” “The truth is,” Nixon said, “that we did respond to the enemy’s plan, in the manner they wanted us to respond— secretly.” By publicly denouncing the U.S. stance, Nixon said the North Vietnamese "induced many Americans in the press and the Congress into echoing their propaganda— Americans who could not know they were being falsely used by the enemy to stir up diviceness in this country.” Nixon said his latest private initiative came Oct. 11 when he set an unspecified communication to the North Vietnamese containing new elements. He said he urged a meeting on Nov. 1 between Kissinger and one of Hanoi’s top political leaders. Le Due Tho. The North Vietnamese agreed and suggested a Nov. 20 date, he said. But on Nov. 17 the President continued, the North Viet namese reported Le Due Tho was ill and called off the meeting. Since then, he said, “the only reply to our plan has been an increase in troop infiltration from North Vietnam and Communist military offensives in Laos and Cambodia. Our proposal for peace was answered by a step-up in the war.” Disclosing full details of the plan “will prove beyond doubt which side has made every effort to make these negotiations succeed,” Nixon said. "It will show un mistakably that Hanoi—not Washington or Saigon -has made the war go on.” Nixon said the new South Vietnamese elections would be organized and run by an independent body “representing all political forces in South Vietnam, in cluding the National Liberation Front”— the Viet Cong. After President Thieu and his vice president resign one month before the election, he said, the chairman of the South Vietnam senate would serve as caretaker head of the government. Support given to ethnic program By PHIL vVALDSTEIN Of the Emerald A statement supporting the formation of an ethnic studies program as framed in the Ethnic Studies Committee’s 1970 report and calling for efforts to insure that the program plans are not ignored was en dorsed by members of that committee at Monday’s meeting. With the endorsement of this statement the committee members voiced solid opposition to any proposals that might replace the program, particularly a proposal being considered to use ethnic studies allocations to finance a part-time teaching position in the history depart ment. Dean Moyer of the College of Liberal Arts is currently in charge of the disposition of the ethnic studies and will meet with the Ethnic Studies Committee early next month to decide how money will be used. Members of ethnic minorities at the University expressed disapproval during the meeting over the plans for an ethnic studies program because they feared such a program would hold no significance to minority students. The minority students also were opposed to the guidelines proposed at the meeting Woman.’ an art exhibit currently showing at the University Museum of Art. consists of 522 photographs arranged by Karl Pawek and organised by Germany's Stern magazine. See Review of the Arts for story. Photograph by Annette Gurdjian for selecting a director for the Ethnic Studies Program since the guidelines called for someone who would support the program outlined in the 1970 report. The criteria for selecting a Director of Ethnic Studies, as proposed by Hon Rousseve, faculty committee member and acting chairman, is: —A background of life and academic experiences which reflects a mature philosophic commitment to the essential thrust of the June 1970 proposal relative to a broadly based and long range ethnic studies program, viewed as a necessary extension of the liberal and pre professional education tradition at the University. —Evidence of sufficient academic credibility and administrative promise to negotiate effectively with various departments, schools, and colleges on campus regarding the possible rearrangement of curricular priorities which may be required for the expansion and enrichment of learning experiences in the area of ethnic studies. —Personal leadership qualities and breadth of social-political vision equal to the task of launching with creative and resourceful vigor a progression of planned activities designed to sustain adequate interest in and support for an ‘emergent’ ethnic studies curriculum of high quality. These guidelines as well as proposals that the minority student unions screen candidates and that the selection of can didates be open to others than those already nominated will be submitted to Dean Moyer along with the 1970 proposal when the committee meets with him early next month. The 1970 proposal calls for starting with a general enrichment program and moving towards a certification program with an accredited department in the College of Liberal Arts.