

GERMANY ADMITS HER CRIME AGAINST CIVILIZATION.

German Propaganda that England Started the War Disproved by German Ambassador.

It has come at last. After protesting innocence and brazenly denying guilt for nearly four years, Germany has admitted her crime against civilization.

She has done it through her former ambassador in England, Prince Lichnowsky. He has been corroborated by a former director of the great Krupp gun factory, a Dr. Muhlon, and the truth of their testimony has been substantially admitted by the man who was Germany's foreign minister when Prince Lichnowsky was German ambassador in London, namely, Herr von Jagow.

The documents in the case have been obtained by the State Department at Washington and translated. They are complete and convincing.

After setting forth all the damning evidence against Germany, Prince Lichnowsky sums it up:

"First, we encouraged Count Berchtold (the Austrian foreign minister) to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved and the danger of a world war must have been known to us. Whether or not we knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia make no difference whatever.

"Second, we rejected Great Britain's plan of mediation in the days between the 23rd and 30th of July, 1914. We did this after Mr. Sazanof (the Russian foreign minister) had emphatically declared he could not tolerate an attack on Serbia; after Serbia, upon pressure from Russia and England, had accepted nearly the whole of the ultimatum, all but two points, in themselves not hard to adjust; and even after Count Berchtold (the Austrian foreign minister) was ready to be satisfied with the Serbian answer.

"Third, on the 30th of July, with Count Berchtold willing to listen to reason; before Austria was touched, on the mere mobilization of Russia, we sent our ultimatum to Austria and on the 31st of July we declared war on Russia, although the Czar had pledged his word that as long as negotiations were going on not one man would be sent on the march. We thus deliberately destroyed every chance of a peaceful settlement.

"It is no wonder that in the presence of these indisputable facts the whole civilized world outside of Germany lays the entire blame for the world war at our door. It is not natural that our foes declare they will not rest until they have destroyed a system which is a perpetual menace to its neighbors? Must they not otherwise fear that in a few years they will again be compelled to take up arms and see their provinces overrun, their cities and villages laid waste?"

Dr. Muhlon's Evidence.

Dr. Muhlon, of the board of Krupp directors, does not make a summing up. He merely gives evidence that in the middle of July, 1914, he had a business conversation with a director of the Deutsche Bank in Berlin, who advised him that the bank would not assist Krupps in "certain large transactions in Bulgaria and Turkey" because the political situation had "become very menacing" and the Deutsche Bank would have to wait "before entering into any further engagements abroad." This director of the Deutsche Bank was Dr. Hilferich, since vice chancellor of Germany. He explained: "The Austrians have just been with the kaiser. In a week's time Vienna will send a very severe ultimatum to Serbia, with a very short interval for an answer. . . . A whole series of definite satisfaction will be demanded at once; otherwise Austria-Hungary will declare war on Serbia."

This is the ultimatum about which the German authorities have insisted that they were not consulted.

Dr. Muhlon continues: "Dr. Hilferich added that the kaiser had expressed his decided approval of this procedure on the part of Austria-Hungary. He had said that he regarded a conflict with Serbia as an internal affair between those two countries, in which he would permit no other state to interfere. If Russia mobilized he would mobilize also. But in his case mobilization meant immediate war."

"This uncanny communication," Dr. Muhlon, says, "convinced my fears of a world war, which were already strong, into absolute certainty." He consulted with Herr Krupp von Bohlen himself, in Berlin. And Krupp confirmed the news. He said "that the kaiser had told him (Krupp) that he would declare war immediately if Russia mobilized, and that this time people would see that he did not turn about. The kaiser's repeated insistence that this time nobody would be able to accuse him of indecision had, he said, been almost comic in its effect."

On the day when the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was delivered the kaiser was on a yachting trip to the North Sea. That fact has often been advanced as a proof of German innocence. But when Dr. Muhlon read the ultimatum to Serbia, he had another interview with Hilferich, and he testifies that "Hilferich said to me that

the kaiser had gone on his northern cruise only as a blind; he had not arranged the cruise on the usual extensive scale, but was remaining close at hand and keeping in constant touch."

Von Jagow's Admission.

And finally Herr von Jagow, Germany's foreign minister at the outbreak of the war, in replying to Prince Lichnowsky's evidence, makes this startling admission among others: "I by no means share the opinion prevalent among us today that England laid all the mines for the outbreak of the war; on the contrary, I believe in Sir Edward Grey's love of peace and in his earnest wish to arrive at an agreement with us. . . . Neither was the war popular with the English people. Belgium had to serve as a battle field." Von Jagow even admits that war might have been averted by an international conference on the Serbian situation. "We could not agree," he says, "to the English proposal of a conference of ambassadors, for it would doubtless have led to a serious diplomatic defeat. For Italy too was pro-Serb, and, with her Balkan interests, stood rather opposed to Austria." That is to say, Von Jagow admits that war was chosen by Germany as an alternative to an international conference, which would have declared the Austrian demands on Serbia, unjust even in the eyes of Italy, the ally of Austria and of Germany.

How did these conferences come to be made?

Dr. Muhlon's Conscience.

With Dr. Muhlon it was evidently a case of conscience. When the war began he resigned his position as a director of Krupp's Works, at Essen, and retired to his estate in Switzerland, near Bern. There he lived a retired life. After a time reports began to circulate of statements which he had made to visitors, and he was put under the surveillance of spies from the German embassy at Bern. Later members from the Socialist Party in the Reichstag visited him, and the German press reported that a retired Krupp official living in Switzerland "claimed to be in possession of certain secrets, seriously compromising the honor of the German Government in the matter of the responsibility for the war." The newspapers began to hint that this official was out of his mind. Dr. Muhlon's statements were then published either as a vindication of him or as an exposure which should aid the democratic revolution in Germany.

With Prince Lichnowsky it is a different matter. He is a nobleman of semi-royal lineage, "the sixth prince of the principedom of Gratz in Austria and Kuchelna in Prussia." His grand father was one of Beethoven's patrons. Beethoven wrote many of his works in the Lichnowsky castle at Gratz, where the piano that he used is still preserved; and the present prince Karl Max Lichnowsky, has carried on the tradition of culture and liberalism which he inherited from his family. He was a brother officer of the present kaiser in the Life Guard Hussars of Postdam, but after a brief army career he entered the diplomatic service, and held important posts in Stockholm, Constantinople, Bucharest and Vienna. He retired in 1904, being out of sympathy with the Junker atmosphere of the court. He was not a Prussian, nor even a German. His family was Bohemian, and his mind has never been militaristic.

To his "great surprise" as he says, he was offered the post of German ambassador to London in October, 1912, after he had passed eight years "among flax and turnips, on horse back and in my meadows," amusing his leisure with reading and with writing occasional political articles.

"I do not know," he says, to whom my appointment was due—at all events, not to his immediate set, although he was always gracious to me. I believed that they agreed on me because no other candidate was available."

Lichnowsky Made a Scapegoat.

When, in spite of his efforts to prevent it, England was involved in war against Germany, he returned to Berlin and saw, as he says, that he was "to be made the scapegoat for the catastrophe which our government had brought down on us, despite my advice and warning. It was deliberately given out, from official quarters that I had let Sir Edward Grey hoodwink me." He retired to Gratz, smarting with this injustice, and there he prepared a memoir, called "My Mission in London," for the private information of his kinsmen and his intimate political friends.

Of this memoir he had five or six typewritten copies made. One he sent to Herr Ballin, the head of the Hamburg-American line; a second to Herr Gwinner, the head of the Deutsche Bank; and a third to Herr Theodor Wolff, editor of the Radical-Democratic newspaper, the Berliner Tageblatt. A fourth copy went to a friend, an officer attached to the political department of the German General Staff. This officer appears to have

modified it on his own responsibility and sent copies to various state officials and politicians. He did that, Herr Theodor Wolff says, because "he felt the longing to serve the dictates of peace with complete devotion and he surrendered himself to a pacifism which is absolutely incompatible with a military uniform." He confessed to Herr Wolff what he had done. "It was impossible," the editor says, "to convince him by any logic or on any grounds of reason that his action was wrong, senseless, or harmful. He was a Marquis Posa, or, still more, a Horatius Caelus, who, out of love for Rome or for mankind, sprang into the abyss."

One of his copies of the memoir reached the Socialist paper Politiken in Stockholm and was published piecemeal. The German press took it up. The Reichstag debated it. Lichnowsky was deprived of his diplomatic rank, forbidden to write for publications, and virtually imprisoned on his estates. The newspapers demanded that he be court-martialed. A typical letter, printed in the semi-official Cologne Gazette, demanded that he "be held up to public contempt ruthlessly." The writer argued: "What will our thousands of war cripples say when this affair is brought to their outraged notice? Have these men joyfully sacrificed their health only to be told at this stage of the war by a Prince Lichnowsky that it was not necessary?"

England's Guilt a Fiction.

Von Jagow's reply to the Prince only served to make matters worse. His admission that England had not brought on the war enraged the Pan-German press. It was seized upon triumphantly by the Socialists. The Socialist organ, Vorwaerts, says: "Let us establish the fact: . . . The war was not popular in England; it was also not popular in Russia and France. But it has become popular. The whole world—right away across the Atlantic and Pacific—is united in hatred against us. We, however, have for almost four years been inoculated with the view that 'England laid all the mines which caused the war'—a view which the Secretary of State (Von Jagow), in accordance with the evidence of the ambassador (Prince Lichnowsky), has now declared to be false! It is, however, by this false view that the whole war policy of the German Empire has been directed—the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, which brought us war with America, down to the chancellor's speeches which say that Belgium must not again become England's area of military concentration. If all the parties concerned were convinced that the belief in England's guilt of a fiction, why did they persist in this belief, and why did they pursue a policy which was based upon it?"

And the paper concluded: "The German people cannot be satisfied with the methods of governing exercised before and during the war. . . . The German people can only endure after the war as a peace-loving nation that governs itself."

Germany's Plea in the Sun.

But to the American reader, the most important part of Prince Lichnowsky's exposure is not his declaration that Germany forced a declaration of war. We have long believed that our German sympathizers have largely admitted it. But they have pleaded that the kaiser declared war only because war was inevitable; that Germany was denied her "place in the sun"; that a conspiracy of France, Russia, and Great Britain prevented her from obtaining colonies and extending her trade; and that, consequently, Germany had either to take up arms or to be throttled to death by Great Britain's trade enemy. Many of us have been persuaded that these excuses are true excuses; that the British policy compelled Germany's appeal to the sword, and that Britain's allies are merely "pulling Britain's chestnuts out of the fire," as the German propagandists are continually charging.

Of those procured lies, Prince Lichnowsky's memoirs gave a very happy disproof.

It has been pleaded that the policy of France and England in Morocco was anti-German. Prince Lichnowsky writes: "Our obscure policy in Morocco had repeatedly caused distrust of our peaceful intentions, or at least, had raised doubts as to whether we knew what we wanted, or whether our intention was to keep Europe in a state of suspense, and, on occasion, to humiliate the French. An Austrian colleague, who was a long time in Paris, said to me: 'The French had begun to forget "la ravanche" (their desire to avenge Alsace-Lorraine). You have regularly reminded them of it by trampling on their toes.' After we had declined Deleasse's (the French minister's) offer to come to an agreement regarding Morocco and then solemnly declared that we had no political interest there, we suddenly discovered in Abdul Aziz a second Kruger. To him also, as to the Boers, we promised the protection of the mighty German Empire, and with the same result. Both manifestations concluded, as they were bound to conclude, with a retraction, if we were not prepared to start a world war. . . . Our attitude furthered the Russian-Japanese and the Russian-British alliances. In the face of the German peril all other considerations faded into the background. The possibility of another war between France and Germany had been evident, and such a war could not leave out Russia or England, as in 1870. . . . Before Deleasse's fall, and before the Algeiras conference, we could have obtained harbors and bases on the west coast of Africa, but that was no

longer possible."

In other words, according to Germany's ambassador, it was Germany's threat of war that united the European nations against her in Africa. It was not their union that led to the German threat.

England's Attempts at Friendship.

Nevertheless, Lichnowsky goes on to say, London "quitted down on the Morocco affair." The Haldane mission had gone to Berlin to come to an understanding with Germany, and that mission failed, Lichnowsky confessed, "because we demanded a promise of neutrality" from Great Britain in the event of a European war, "instead of being satisfied with a treaty which secured us against British attack or against any attack with British support." He continues: "However, Sir Edward Grey had not given up the idea of coming to an understanding with us, what he aimed at was not to isolate us, but rather to have us, as much as possible, take a share in the existing partnerships. Having succeeded in bridging over the differences which existed between England and France and between England and Russia, he also wanted to remove, as well as might be, the differences between England and Germany, and to insure the peace of the world by means of a network of treaties which should ultimately also include a settlement of the miserable naval question; whereas the consequences of our own foreign policy up to then had been the formation of the entente partnership in which these nations pledged themselves to render mutual support in case of war. As he himself expressed it, Grey's policy was this: 'Without infringing on the existing friendly relations with France and Russia, which in themselves contained no aggressive elements and no binding obligations for England, to seek to achieve a more friendly rapprochement with Germany, and to bring the two groups nearer together.'"

British Concessions in Balkans.

That this statement of England's policy was not a mere pretense, Prince Lichnowsky proves in his long account of the negotiations arising out of the Balkan War and the establishment of Albania. "At the outbreak of the war," he says, "we (Germany) had unfortunately declined the proposal of the French government to join in a declaration of disinterestedness and impartiality on the part of the powers." On the other hand, he says to Lord Grey: "From the beginning, the British statesmen took the stand that England had no interest in Albania and was therefore unwilling to be involved in a war over this question. He wished honestly as an honest broker to mediate between the two groups and settle difficulties. Thus he in no wise placed himself on the side of the entente (his allies) and during the negotiations, which lasted about eight months, by virtue of his good will and weighty influence, he contributed not a little toward bringing about concord and agreement. Instead of taking a position similar to that of the English, we invariably assumed the attitude prescribed to us from Vienna. . . . On every point, including Albania, the Serbian harbors, in the Adriatic, Scutaria, and the definition of the Albanian frontiers, we were on the side of Austria and Italy, whilst Sir Edward Grey hardly ever took the French or Russian point of view. On the contrary, he nearly always took our part in order to give no pretext for war. It was with his help that King Nicholas was induced to leave Scutaria. Otherwise there would have been war over this matter as we would never have dared to ask our allies to make concessions."

British not Jealous.

The English felt "uncomfortable," Prince Lichnowsky says, about the great increase in the German fleet. He admits, however, that "England would have no more drawn the sword solely on account of our navy than on account of our commerce, which is supposed to have aroused her envy and in the end brought the war to a head. . . . The talk of English commercial jealousy, of which one hears so much among us, is based upon a wrong judgment of conditions, Germany's rise as a commercial power after the war of the seventies and in the following decades was certainly a menace to British commerce, whose industries and export houses enjoyed a sort of monopoly. But the increasing trade with Germany, which ranked as England's best customer, made it desirable for England to remain on good terms with her best customer and business friend, and gradually supplanted all other considerations. The Briton is matter of fact; he reconciles himself to facts and does not tilt against windmills. It was precisely in commercial circles that I met with the most friendly reception and observed an effort to promote economic interests common to both countries. . . . I became convinced soon after my arrival in England that we did not in the least have to fear an English attack or English support of a foreign attack, but that England under all circumstances would protect France. . . . I never ceased to point out that as a commercial nation England would suffer enormously in any war between the great European powers, and would therefore seek by every means to prevent it, but that in the interest of the European balance of power she would not tolerate the weakening or destruction of France. Lord Haldane had told me this soon after my arrival. Every person in authority expressed himself to the same effect."

British Concessions in Africa.

Similarly, when Germany sought concessions in the Portuguese colonies in Africa, England as the protector of Portuguese interests in Africa, assisted Germany in obtaining all she wished. "Thanks to the obliging attitude of the British Government," Prince Lichnowsky writes, "I succeeded in giving the new treaty a form which fully coincided with our wishes and interests. All of Angola up to the twentieth degree of longitude was assigned to us, so that we reached the Congo region from the south; and we received the valuable islands of San Thome and Principe, which lie north of the Equator and therefore really belong to the French sphere of interest—a fact which led my French colleague to lively though fruitless counter representations. Furthermore, we received the northern part of Mozambique, the Likungo forming the boundary."

The British government showed

the greatest obligeness in behalf of our interests. Grey wanted to manifest his good will toward us, but he was also interested in furthering our colonial expansion, it being the English idea to divert the developing German strength away from the North Sea and western Europe out into the open ocean and Africa. 'We

do not begrudge Germany her colonial expansion," said a member of the cabinet to me. Great Britain originally proposed to include the Congo in the treaty as well. This would have given us a right of preemption and an opportunity for economic penetration. However, we denied this offer, ostensibly out of regard for Belgian susceptibilities in its efforts to respect our rights was shown by the fact that Grey, even before the treaty was completed or signed, referred to us certain English promoters seeking investments of capital in the territories assigned to us by the new treaty and desired British backing in the matter. He did this with the remark that the enterprise contemplated belonged within our sphere of interest."

British Concessions in Asia Minor.

Prince Lichnowsky continues: "At the same time I was carrying on in London negotiations regarding the so called Belgian treaty. . . . The real purpose of this treaty was to divide Asia Minor into spheres of interest, although this expression was carefully avoided out of regard for the rights of the Sultan. Sir Edward Grey repeatedly declared, however, that there existed no agreements with France and Russia for the purpose of partitioning Asia Minor."

After enlisting the aid of a Turkish

representative, in the person of Hakkı Pasha, all economic questions connected with the German enterprises were adjusted essentially in accordance with the wishes of the Deutsche Bank. The most important concession that Sir Edward Grey made to me personally was the prolongation of the railroad to Basra, for this point had been given up by us in favor of the connection to Alexandretta. Bagdad had hitherto constituted the terminal point of the road. An international commission was to attend to the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab. We also had a share in the harbor connections at Basra and obtained rights in the navigation of the Tigris which had hitherto been a monopoly of the firm of Lynch. Under this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia as far as Basra came into our sphere of interest in so far as this did not encroach upon prior British rights, as in the case of the Tigris navigation and the Wilcox irrigation plant, and the whole territory of the Bagdad & Anatolian Railroad."

British not Jealous.

The English felt "uncomfortable," Prince Lichnowsky says, about the great increase in the German fleet. He admits, however, that "England would have no more drawn the sword solely on account of our navy than on account of our commerce, which is supposed to have aroused her envy and in the end brought the war to a head. . . . The talk of English commercial jealousy, of which one hears so much among us, is based upon a wrong judgment of conditions, Germany's rise as a commercial power after the war of the seventies and in the following decades was certainly a menace to British commerce, whose industries and export houses enjoyed a sort of monopoly. But the increasing trade with Germany, which ranked as England's best customer, made it desirable for England to remain on good terms with her best customer and business friend, and gradually supplanted all other considerations. The Briton is matter of fact; he reconciles himself to facts and does not tilt against windmills. It was precisely in commercial circles that I met with the most friendly reception and observed an effort to promote economic interests common to both countries. . . . I became convinced soon after my arrival in England that we did not in the least have to fear an English attack or English support of a foreign attack, but that England under all circumstances would protect France. . . . I never ceased to point out that as a commercial nation England would suffer enormously in any war between the great European powers, and would therefore seek by every means to prevent it, but that in the interest of the European balance of power she would not tolerate the weakening or destruction of France. Lord Haldane had told me this soon after my arrival. Every person in authority expressed himself to the same effect."

Late in June of the fatal summer of

1914, Prince Lichnowsky was summoned to Kiel by the kaiser and he was on board the imperial yacht Meteor, when word was received of the murder of the Austrian Archduke. "Being unacquainted with the Vienna view point and what was going on there," he says, "I attached no very far reaching significance to the event; but, looking back, I could feel sure that in the Austrian aristocracy a feeling of relief outweighed all others." As for the kaiser, "His Majesty regretted that his efforts to win over the Archduke to his ideas had been thus frustrated" by the Archduke's assassination.

Lichnowsky went on to Berlin and saw the Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg. "I told him that I regarded our foreign situation as very satisfactory as it was a long time indeed since we had stood so well with England. And in France there was a pacific cabinet. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg did not seem to share my optimism. He complained of the Russian armaments. I tried to tranquillize him with the argument that it was not to Russia's interests to attack us, and that such an attack would never have English or French support, as both countries wanted peace."

"I went from him to Dr. Zimmermann (the under secretary) who was acting for Herr von Jagow (the Foreign Secretary) and learned from him that Russia was about to call up

nine hundred thousand new troops. His words unmistakably denoted in humor against Russia, who he said stood everywhere in our way. In addition, there were questions of commercial policy that had to be settled. That General von Moltke was urging war was, of course, not told to me. I learned, however, that Herr von Tschirschy (the German Ambassador in Vienna) had been reproved because he said that he had advised Vienna to show moderation toward Serbia."

Prince Lichnowsky went to his summer home in Silesia, quite unaware of the impending crisis. "When I returned from Silesia on my way to London," he says, "I stopped only a few hours in Berlin, when I heard that Austria intended to proceed against Serbia so as to bring to an end an unbearable state of affairs. Unfortunately I failed at the moment to gauge the significance of the news. I thought that once more it would come to nothing; that even if Russia acted threateningly, the matter could soon be settled. I now regret that I did not stay in Berlin and declare there and then that I would have no hand in such a policy."

And here he interpolates some most significant sentences. The world has heard various reports of a meeting in Postdam, as early as July 5, between the German and Austrian authorities, at which meeting war was decided on. Prince Lichnowsky says: "I learned afterward that at the decisive decision at Postdam on July 5th the Austrian demand had met with unconditional approval of all the personages in authority; it was even added that no harm would be done if war with Russia did not come out of it. It was so stated at least in the Austrian report received at London by Count Mensdorff (the Austrian Ambassador to England)."

He continues: "At this point I received instructions to endeavor to bring the English press to a friendly attitude in case Austria should deal the death-blow to 'Greater-Serbia' hopes. I was to use all my influence to prevent public opinion in England from taking a stand against Austria. I remembered England's attitude during the Bosnian annexation crisis, when public opinion showed itself in sympathy with the Serbia claims to Bosnia; I recalled also the benevolent promotion of nationalist hopes that went on in the days of Lord Byron and Garibaldi; and on these and other grounds I thought it extremely unlikely that English public opinion would support a punitive expedition against the Archduke's murderers. I thus felt it my duty to enter an urgent warning against the whole project, which I characterized as venturesome and dangerous. I recommended that councils of moderation be given Austria, as I did not believe that the conflict could be localized"—(that is to say, it could not be limited to a war between Austria and Serbia).

"Herr von Jagow answered me that Russia was not prepared; that there would be more or less of a rumpus; but that the more firmly we stood by Austria the more surely would Russia give way. Austria was already blaming us for flabbiness and we could not flinch. On the other hand Russian sentiment was growing more unfriendly all the time, and we must simply take the risk. I subsequently learned that this attitude was based on advices from Count Pourtales (the German ambassador to Petrograd,) that Russia would not stir under any circumstances, information which prompted us to spur Count Berchtold on in his course. On learning the attitude of the German government I looked for salvation through English mediation, knowing that Sir Edward Grey's influence in Petrograd could be used in the cause of peace. I therefore, availed myself of my friendly relations with the Minister to ask him confidentially to advise moderation in Russia in case Austria demanded satisfaction from the Serbians, as it seemed likely she would."

England Friendly in July 1914.

The English press was quiet at first and friendly to Austria, the assassination being generally condemned. By degrees, however, more and more voices made themselves heard, in the sense that, however necessary it might be to take cognizance of the crime, any exploitation of it for political ends was unjustifiable. Moderation was enjoined upon Austria. When the ultimatum came out, all the papers, with the exception of the Standard, were unanimous in condemning it. The whole world, outside of Berlin and Vienna, realized that it meant war, and a world war too. The English fleet, which happened to have been holding a naval review, was not demobilized."

"The British government labored to make the Serbian reply conciliatory, and 'the Serbian answer was in keeping with the British efforts.' Sir Edward Grey then proposed his plan of mediation upon the two points which Serbia had not wholly conceded. Prince Lichnowsky writes: 'Mr. Cambon (for France) Marquis Imperiali (for Italy) and I were to meet, with Sir Edward Grey in the chair, and it would have been easy to work out a formula for the debated points, which had to do with the co-operation of imperial and royal officials in the inquiries to be conducted at Belgrade. By the exercise of good will everything could have been settled in one or two settings, and the mere acceptance of the British proposal would have relieved the strain and further improved our relations with England. I seconded this plan with all my energies. In vain, I was told (by Berlin) that it would be against the dignity of Austria. Of course, all that was