

The Sunset Route.

FOREST GROVE TO TILLAMOOK BY THE WILSON RIVER ROAD.

The best mountain road, the most magnificent scenery on the Pacific coast. Cheapest rates of toll in the state.

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| Four horse team, \$2.00 | Round trip, \$3.25 |
| Two " " " " " " | " " " " " " |
| Horse and buggy, 1.00 | " " " " " " |
| " " " " " " | " " " " " " |
| Saddle or pack horse, 1.00 | " " " " " " |
| Loose horse or cow 12 1/2 | " " " " " " |
| sheep or swine 05 | " " " " " " |

Take the Sunset Route for Tillamook. A. W. SEVERANCE, Receiver.

Stage Line.

QUICKEST, CHEAPEST, AND BEST ROUTE TO PORTLAND.

Connects with evening train in Forest Grove so passengers from Tillamook arrive in Portland same day. Only 10 hours on stage.

Leaves Forest Grove 6:30 a. m. Sundays, Tuesdays and Thursdays. Leaves Tillamook, Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. Engage seats at Tillamook hotel or of T. C. McSimer, Forest Grove, who can be reached by telephone from Portland.

New Wagons, New Stock, Safe Driving. Good accommodations en route.

Netarts Beach.

THE MOST POPULAR BEACH RESORT ON THE COAST.

Happy Camp now ready, bath houses will be prepared soon, and stages will connect with the Forest Grove stage.

If you want to see the sea lions, the arched rocks, and the grand scenery in America, come to Netarts. Good accommodations reasonable.

The Mecca of all Coast Tourists. Address D. J. HADLEY, Tillamook.

Best Road, Best Stage, Best Beach.

The Alderman

Leading Hotel of Tillamook

Headquarters for Commercial men and the traveling public. Sample rooms. Electric lights throughout. Stage and boat offices. Rates, \$1.00 to \$2.00 per day, American plan.

NEW MANAGEMENT. Special attention to the cuisine department.

H. A. WOODFORD, Prop'r.



Prices to Suit the Times:

BOOTS and SHOES

Made to order. Repairing done as cheap as the cheapest. Come and be convinced. Advocate Building. P. F. BROWNE.

KNOCKED HIM OUT.

How One Man Felt the Influence of Free Silver Agitation.

A little local story has come to light showing how this free silver agitation has hurt business for one man in the city of Jackson. Some months ago a local life insurance man went to one of the rich men of the city with a view to getting him to insure his life. By dint of frequent visits and much talk the agent got the gentleman to promise to take out a policy in his company, the premiums on which would have been something like \$1,000 per year.

The day was set to close the contract and sign the papers. Now it is well known that this agent is a great free silver man and talks it wherever he goes. When he went to close the bargain, the rich man said to him: "I have been thinking about this free silver business and I dislike to take out such a large policy. I don't know but that this free silver will carry, and then my people will be paid off in cheap money. It is too much of a risk at this time." The agent, who had had visions of a big fat commission looming up before him, began to get uneasy and talked with might and main and told the rich man that this free silver business was all talk and there was not the slightest danger in the world of its ever becoming a law. He put up a mighty pretty talk, and tried all persuasions at his command on the prospective policy holder, but all to no avail. The gentleman was firm and said under the condition of things now existing he could not afford to have his family paid off in depreciated currency and refused to take out the policy. This is only a sample of what the free silver agitation is doing for the country.—Jackson Evening News.

CHEATING THE WORKERS.

How the Silver Men Propose to Fine the Workingmen \$250,000,000.

To the query how unlimited silver coinage would affect the working men and women who make up the great body of depositors in the savings banks, President James MacMahon of the Emigrant Industrial Savings bank of this city has made a plain answer. The loans made by the savings banks for their depositors would be repaid in "silver dollars actually worth 50 cents." They would be compelled to give these to their depositors. In this city alone these loans (not including United States bonds) amount to the enormous sum of \$527,813,790. The loss on them would be \$263,906,895.

This is money lent by the working people of New York. They are to this vast extent members of that hated "creditor class" whom the silver orators denounce. These are their "hoards," and the interest on them is a part of the "cancer" that these cranks say is "eating the heart of industry" in our unhappy land. And the silver men propose, if they can, to fine these workingmen \$250,000,000. Can there be any possible justice in a policy which inflicts such monstrous and irreparable wrong on multitudes of men and women whose only fault is that they work hard and save their money?—New York Times.

Mexico on a Silver Basis.

A prominent professor in one of the big universities of New England writes the Chamber of Commerce regarding the silver question as follows:

"The present free coinage craze is as old as the days of Jack Cade, when his followers hoped to bring on the millennium by making 'the pint measure hold two pints, and the twopenny loaf sell for a penny.' His descendants today want 50 cents' worth of silver to pass for a dollar. The sophistry is all the more apparent when it is remembered that free silver does not mean an unlimited demand for that metal, but only an unlimited supply.

"Mexico has free coinage of silver. Mexico is on a silver basis. The wages in Mexico in mining and agriculture vary from 10 to 30 cents a day in Mexican money, which is from 5 to 15 cents in United States money. The average for farm labor a day in Mexico is 20 cents in Mexican money or 10 cents in United States money. If free silver can raise prices, why does it not raise the prices of wages in Mexico?"

Patient Toil, gathered a large store of food for the winter, was urged by a Slippery Eel to allow the latter to bore a Hole through the Dam which protected the Beaver's supplies. "By doing this," said the Eel, "you will be able to Double the Quantity of your food by the addition to it of a Circulating Medium." The Unfortunate Beaver consented, and his entire Store was ruined by the water.

Moral.—Breaking down our financial standard may flood the country with cheap money, but it will not increase our wealth.

A Mechanic who was trying to invent a Machine which would run without any Motive Power announced one day that he had Solved the Problem. "It is Evident," he said, "that if a Siphon will draw Water out of one Cask into another, it will also draw it back again. All that is Necessary, therefore, is to Utilize this continually flowing water to run a Motor, which will, in turn, drive Machinery.

Moral.—When farmers can make water run up hill, they will be able to add to their wealth by increasing the quantity of the material by which wealth is measured.

The Wise Sage, Har Vee, advertised for Eight Shекels a lesson he would teach Everybody how to get rich. There came to him a young man called El Bankoed, or the Soft One, to whom the Sage said, "The true way to become Wealthy is to Borrow all you can, and then Repudiate one-half of your Debts."

"Alas," said the Soft One, "I have no Debts, nor will men lend to me. He had taught me Nothing." "Not so," replied the Sage. "Have I not Shown thee how to Do a Clump out of Eight Shекels?"

Moral.—Even though the Silverites do nothing to help the people of this country they will at least get offices for themselves.

Confidence, Not Money.

During the panic of 1893, when currency was at a premium, there was practically just as much money in the country as there is now, when banks are complaining of being unable to invest their surplus funds. The real difficulty two years ago was not so much the lack of money as lack of confidence. What the cheap money faddists should do is to agitate for an issue by the government of \$50 worth of confidence per capita.



UNCLE SAM'S GREEDY HOG.

Uncle Sam—Gosh all Hemlock! I'll kill myself totin' s'will for this new hog!

MORTON ON SILVER COINAGE.

When 50 Cent Wheat Makes Dollar Flour, We Can Have Free Silver.

Secretary of Agriculture Morton recently wrote this caustic letter to a business man in New York: "WASHINGTON, June 6, 1896. DEAR SIR—I hasten to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of June 6 and would be pleased to have you explain to me the 'principles of bimetalism' about which you write. It will be gratifying also if you will illustrate to me how the farmer is to be benefited by having 50 cents' worth of silver bullion pass for a dollar in the purchase of his wheat and other farm products. Tell me likewise why the farmer should advocate a monetary system which will compel the gold miner to labor until he produces 100 cents' worth of gold bullion before he may have it coined into a dollar and at the same time will permit the silver miner to stop work and demand the free coinage of every 50 cents' worth of silver bullion which he digs into a dollar.

Inform me at the same time, if you please, why you use the phrase '10 to 1' unless you desire to acknowledge yourself a gold monometalist. Is not the unit 'one' which you mention gold, and by your phraseology do you not declare against two units? When the silver miner and bullion owner shall have established by legislation government grist mills which shall convert every 50 cents' worth of farmers' wheat into a dollar of flour, it will be time enough for the farmer to advocate laws which shall convert every 50 cents' worth of silver bullion into a dollar of coin. Respectfully yours, J. STERLING MORTON.

Not For the South.

The Huntsville Mercury does not believe that the people of the south will commit themselves to the unlimited coinage of silver. It says:

"Our people are honest if not wealthy and want every dollar paid to them to be worth 100 cents. They have no silver to coin and cannot possibly feel an interest in the western silver mines. If the government is to go into the wholesale business of guaranteeing prices, the farmers of the south had far better work for cotton than silver. This government has the same right to say that a pound of cotton shall be worth 10 cents that it has to say that 37 1/4 grains of silver shall be worth \$1."

The press of the south is overwhelmingly against unconditional silver coinage because it would be silver monometalism, and southern newspapers have sense enough to realize the disastrous results that would bring upon us.—Atlanta Journal.

Effect.

Free coinage of silver at the ratio of 16 to 1 would, under existing conditions, put into circulation silver dollars intrinsically worth about 60 cents each, while the gold dollar would continue to be worth here and everywhere else in the markets 100 cents, or the equivalent of 100 cents, in the purchase of property and in effecting foreign exchanges; but here at home the debt paying power of the gold dollar would be no greater than the debt paying power of the depreciated silver dollar, and consequently everybody would pay in silver, and gold would cease to be used as money. This is what has happened in every part of the world when the difference between the intrinsic or commercial values of the two metals and their legal tender values was large enough to make it profitable for bullion brokers and speculators to deal in the undervalued coin as a commodity. A small percentage of difference has always been sufficient for this purpose, as our own experience proves. From 1793 to 1834 the legal ratio between the two metals in this country was 15 to 1, which was an overvaluation of silver, and during all that period the difference between the commercial ratio and the legal ratio never amounted to more than a very few cents on the dollar, and yet all our gold left us, and had practically silver monometalism, but in 1834 Andrew Jackson, John C. Calhoun, Thomas H. Benton and other Democratic statesmen of that day determined that the people of the United States should have gold for use in their business, and congress changed the ratio, making it 16 to 1. This was a very small undervaluation of silver in the coins, and the result was that, although there were times when the commercial and legal ratio were very nearly the same, legal tender silver went out of circulation, and we had practically gold monometalism. If these results followed the establishment of legal ratios, which conformed very nearly to the actual commercial ratio, can there be a shadow of a doubt as to what would be the effect of authorizing the free and unlimited coinage of legal tender silver at the legal ratio, which would overvalue that metal about 100 per cent? In other words, can there be a doubt as to the effect of a law which would enable every holder of gold coins or gold bullion to exchange each dollar's worth of his metal for two legal silver dollars and pay his debts with them?—From Secretary Carlisle's Recent Speech at Louisville.

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PUBLIC INTEREST CENTERS ON THE CURRENCY QUESTION.

Silas Upham Sides With Deacon Griggs. Wants Notes Based on Stones—Squire Crane Explains the True Inwardness of the Free Coinage Humberg.

That the question whether Deacon Abner Griggs is an inspired financial genius or a muddled ignoramus continues to agitate the people of Squantum township, is shown in the latest issue of the North Squantum Gazette. From that paper we copy the following account of a discussion at Hopkins' store at Squantum Center on last Saturday evening:

"Public interest in the interference by Mrs. Abner Griggs with her husband's attempt to put his new financial theories into practice has increased during the past week. The farmers and villagers who were in Hopkins' store on Saturday evening spent most of the time arguing for and against the deacon's financial experiment. Among those who favored the deacon was Silas Upham, who said: 'Pears to me there's a good deal in these new money schemes, and I'm kinder sorry Deacon Griggs won't let go on till we see how the thing would work. There's no use talking, we farmers are in a bad way. Times is mighty hard, wheat a-going down, wool lower than ever, and so many men out of work in the towns and cities that we can't sell half the stuff we raise. What we need is more money. We want free coinage, so that all the silver in the world can be used as money. If that wouldn't give us \$50 per capita, the government ought to print enough greenbacks to make up the difference. Then we want the subtreasury system, so as to let us farmers put our wheat, corn, wool or pork in government warehouses, and get treasury certificates for 75 per cent of their value. And the government ought to lend money to the farmers at 2 per cent on the security of their land. If all that won't give us enough money, I don't see why we mightn't try the deacon's plan and issue notes on labor products, specially stones, which won't rust, and which is abundant round here.

"Some of what you say about hard times may be true," spoke up Squire Crane, "but more money ain't going to help matters. Prices is low, but it's because the cost of producing things has been lessened. Stands to reason that wheat coming from rich prairie farms, which cost about \$1.25 an acre, would be cheaper than that grown on our farms, which cost from \$30 to \$50 an acre to clear. Wheat grown in India and Russia competes with ours in the markets of the world. Then freight rates has gone down, and that helped lower prices. Wool comes now from Australia, and the great states out west, where it can be raised far cheaper than here. The fact is, tain't lack of money which has made prices low, but new ways of making things, new places to get 'em from and handier ways of hauling them than we used to have.

"Besides, this thing's as broad as it's long. Everything we farmers buy has gone down in price, and we can get far more for our money than we did 20 years ago. So if we do get less money for our crops, and while some of them is lower there's a good many which fetches as much as they ever did, we can buy more goods of all kinds with what we sell off our farms.

"Anyhow, making more money out of silver or paper won't help us, but would leave us far worse off. This talk about the need of free coinage is all humberg, stirred up by the owners of silver mines and other people in a few states who want to fool the farmers and the rest of the people into doubling the price of silver. The rag baby plan of the greenbackers is played out long ago. It's the greenbacks we've got now that's making all the trouble about our gold reserve. If it wasn't for them, we wouldn't have to borrow hundreds of millions of gold at 4 per cent, and we wouldn't be threatened with another panic.

"The rest of them cheap money schemes is all alike. They mean trying to make something out of nothing. And Deacon Griggs' idea of getting rich by basing money on stones is just as sensible or as crazy as the rest of them."

"Joe Leffert, the old wheelwright, thought the squire went a little too far in putting the people who wanted free coinage down with the other cheap money faddists. 'Tain't only the farmer who needs more money,' he said. 'My business ain't half what it was 20 years ago. These big factories out in Ohio and Illinois can make buggies, farm wagons and carts and sell them here far cheaper than I can build them. I get enough repairing to keep me going, but I haven't a third of the hands I used to have. Seems to me if we had free coinage the prices of wagons would go up, the farmers would have so much money they could buy more of them, and I would do a bigger business.

"I see this all argued out in a little book called 'Coin's Financial School,' which one of them book agents give me for mending a split whiffletree a few weeks ago. I'll bring the book round to the store next Saturday, and we'll see if you can answer that fellow 'Coin's' arguments."

"Here Storekeeper Hopkins began to blow out the lights, and with a promise to be on hand next Saturday evening the crowd dispersed. A lively time is expected, as Squire Crane and his side will undertake to expose the fallacies and foolishness of 'Coin's Financial School.'"

Convincing Proof.

It's proof positive a silver crank has wheels in his head when he points to the pneumatic tire as evidence of the benefits of inflation.—Philadelphia Times.

Happy Camp

Hotel AND RESTAURANT

First class in every particular, and special attention to coast tourists.

Clams, Fish, and Crabs Served A la Mode.

J. O. CAMPBELL, NETARTS, OR.



ALLEN HOUSE

J. P. ALLEN, Prop'r.

Noted for its Fine Cuisine Department.

NEW HOUSE—NEW FURNITURE

Best Meals in the City.

TILLAMOOK, OREGON

M. H. LARSEN, Proprietor.

Tillamook, Ore.

LARSEN HOUSE

LARGEST HOUSE IN THE CITY—FIRST CLASS IN EVERY RESPECT—RATES VERY REASONABLE—CENTRAL LOCATION.

Headlight and Oregonian \$2.00

L. W. GLASER,

The Barrel Maker.....

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