

Herald and News

Editorial Page

Expediency Doesn't Justify Nonsense

(Eugene Register - Guard)

Some things that are done under the guise of government fiscal necessity, and then defended as "plain good sense," are almost too ludicrous to merit editorial comment. And yet, they must be editorially exposed and berated—else more such inane actions will be undertaken, until the entire fabric of government fiscal policy is one of expediency without a fiber of reason left in it.

A case in point: Oregon had one of the nation's most equitable systems of administering unemployment insurance. It provided that employers who operate enterprises which frequently cause fluctuations in the ranks of the unemployed should pay more into the state government insurance fund. Conversely, it recognized that employers who keep their work forces steadily employed should be favored with reduced insurance rates.

In brief, the Oregon system did just about what all private insurance systems do in assessing the difference in insurance risks and calculating premium rates accordingly.

But the 1959 State Legislature, faced with impending depletion of the state unemployment insurance fund, abandoned this principle. In effect, the Legislature directed that a "good" risk should be charged just as much as a "bad" one. And, to top that off, the Legislature raised the basic rate charged of all employers.

Contentions that Oregon may, in time, be able to restore the differential between rates paid by those who do not and those who do cause the greatest part of our unemployment problems only beg the real question at issue. Certainly, we hope that in time

Oregon's unemployment problems will shrink—that the reserves in the state jobless insurance fund will be increased to permit a reduction of all premium charges.

But, in the interim, there should be no confusion about the mistake that has been made and which is being perpetuated so long as the Legislature fails to restore the principle of charging most of the costs of unemployment insurance to those who are mostly responsible for our need of it.

It is not plain good sense, as the Capital Press is arguing in Salem, to leave the flat-rate unemployment insurance rate schedule in effect. It is plain nonsense, using that word in its most original meaning.

If, in order to keep the unemployment insurance fund solvent, rates for some employers should be further increased, that would be only just. But, it is not just—nor does it set a good pattern for government handling of other public problems—to have the state continue charging penalty premiums against businesses and industries which deserve preferred-risk rates.

In the long run, what Oregon needs is more stable employment sources. And Oregon will be the long-run gainer if industries of this sort are encouraged in every way that is just and equitable. If some unstable industries are pushed to the wall, simply because they cannot afford to pay their rightful shares of jobless insurance costs, it is questionable that they are adding much to the state's overall economy anyway. It is likely, in fact, that they are causing as much drag upon the state's economic development as they are contributing to its progress.

50 Percent Flunked

(St. Louis Post - Dispatch)

The hardest thing about teaching young Americans what Communism and capitalism stand for may turn out to be the long-prevailing attitude that it isn't necessary for them to learn it—that they get it by a kind of osmosis that comes out being Americans. That, at any rate, is a possible conclusion from the results of the first year of a six-week course in the subject required by state law for high school seniors in Florida. Only half the Jacksonville students who took the final test scored a passing grade of more than 70 per cent.

Furthermore, a third of them failed to pick out as false the statement "It is possible to be at the same time a loyal citizen of this country and a true Communist," which was what the State Legislature had been most par-

ticular they should learn. The course says the law, shall lay special emphasis on the false doctrines, evils and dangers of Communism, and ways to fight it.

Some of the seniors had only the most confused notion of what Communists and capitalists are even after taking the course. One said capitalists are "anti-Communists," another that they are "the haves, and the proletariat the have-nots." As for the other system, a graduate of the course described it by saying that "whenever you have a thesis and anti-thesis you always have a synthesis which is Communism."

All of which suggests that teaching the nature of Communism is not going to be very successful when it is based on crash courses hastily flung together.

THESE DAYS . . .

The Embattled Dancers

By JOHN CHAMBERLAIN

As the Bolshoi Ballet packs up in New York to return home to the Soviet Union, two American dance companies, George Balanchine's City Center performers and the Martha Graham troupe come back from a series of stops in Iron Curtain countries and nations just this side of the great political dividing line. Though nobody speaks very openly of "propaganda" in connection with the great competition of the dancers, it is quite obvious that both the Soviets and the United States have been using piousets, entrechats and the more modern techniques

of "contraction-and-release" in the battle for men's minds.

At first inspection it may seem a little silly to suppose that dancing, which is a language of movement, can convey anything of importance in the way of political statement. But there are subtle overtones in this battle of comparative dance techniques, and both the U.S. and Soviet political authorities think they get something of value by sending their dancers abroad.

Just where does the balance actually lie in this esoteric branch of political Cold Warfare? Having watched the Bolshoi Ballet recently in New York, I think the advantage must go to the Americans. The Bolshoi dancers are remarkable, no doubt about it, there is a mighty power to their leaps, and a crisp precision to everything they do. But what do they bring to America beyond their technique?

The answer is that they bring a whiff of old Imperial Russia. They dance the Nineteenth Century fairy tales—the Swan Lake and the Giselles—with all the old magic. But when they try to adapt the mannered elegance of traditional ballet to proletarian themes, the results are comic. So, in the cultural battle for men's minds, Khrushchev's ballerinas prove nothing beyond the fact that the Soviets have to fall back on a creation of the time of the Romanoff dynasty when they want to impress foreigners.

With Balanchine and Martha Graham, however, the Russians, the Serbs and the Poles have been treated to something that continues to be freshly inventive and adaptable to Russian audiences. Balanchine shows that traditional ballet technique can be combined with all the new dis-

coveries in movement that have grown out of the modern dance. As for Martha Graham, she has taken to certain countries of the Old World a number of remarkable modern interpretations of their oldest legends.

In Israel, for example, she recently staged a tremendous group performance of something that had been commissioned by Israel. "Legend of Judith." Then, in a long tour that moved from Ankara to Turkey, to Athens in Greece, to Zagreb and Belgrade in Tito's Yugoslavia, to Poland and Sweden and Finland, she took other dances from her wide and inventive repertoire. In Athens she astonished the Greeks with the intensity of her dance versions of their own ancient drama; the citizens of Athens would not have believed that the values of Aeschylus and Sophocles could be enhanced by filtering them through a choreography born of the American modern dance. Miss Graham's "Clytemnestra" brought down the house in Athens even as it had on Broadway in New York. And when she and her company danced it all over again in Zagreb, in Communist Yugoslavia, they chanted her name in the streets and gave her a salute that is normally reserved for dictator Tito.

It may be fanciful to suppose that any of this is of great moment, propagandistically speaking. But where the Bolshoi Ballet proves to Americans that the Imperial Russia of the Czars could produce something of beauty and hand on its tradition to proletarian usurpers, the travelling American dance companies show that the democratic and capitalist Western world is still busy spinning off new and adventurous things.

So, on this one small sector of the Cold War propaganda front, we are almost certainly getting the best of something that is euphemistically called a "cultural exchange." Would that our "experts" in political warfare could do as well in bigger things.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q—In what two countries does the Gobi Desert lie?
A—China and Outer Mongolia.

"With Friends Like This, Who Needs Enemies?"



IN WASHINGTON . . .

What The Statistics Show

By RALPH de TOLEDANO

According to many economists, the number of telephones in a given country is an indication of its development. For those who look superficially at the statistics, without bothering to determine what they really mean, the Soviet Union must be making real economic time. In the most recent year reported on, the USSR showed an increase of 19 per cent. That put Khrushchevville far ahead of the rest of the world—percentage-wise of course.

But what does this isolated statistic really mean? For those who devote their energies to "proving" that the Soviet Union is outdistanc-

ing us, it is a significant figure. In actual fact, it is meaningless. As of the same year end, the United States had 77.4 million telephones in use—or 32 per cent of the world's total. The Soviet Union had 5.1 million. The percentage increase, exclusively a result of government use, is significant when applied to the USSR's low base. There are, in fact, far fewer telephones in that entire country than in the New York City metropolitan area.

These figures come from a new and fascinating brochure, "The World's Telephones—Jan. 1, 1962," published by the American Telephone & Telegraph Company. The booklet explains far more about the Soviet Union and the United States than any dozen speeches by Administration spokesmen who doom-and-gloom America's economy.

In this country, we take our telephones (and what they mean in ease of communication) very much for granted. That's because 41.8 people out of a hundred had a phone, at the time of the country's latest report. In the Soviet Union, 2.3 people out of a hundred had phones. Incidentally, telephone directories are as secret in Russia as atomic information is in the United States.

On a per capita basis, the Soviet Union appears decades behind every major country in the world, leading for the most part only the underdeveloped new nations of Asia and Africa which still use tom-toms and the grapevine. Even little Christmas Island had more phones per 100 people than the mighty Union of Socialist Soviet Republic.

In the Soviet Union, a phone is a status symbol, indicating that the possessor is an important government official. In the United States, many middle class families with teenagers have several telephones and at least two telephone lines so that 16-year-old Suzie can have a gab-fest with her boyfriend without cutting off incoming calls for the rest of the family.

Numbers of telephones, moreover, are not the only index of mechanical sophistication. In the United States, 97.2 per cent of all phones were automatic, as of the A.T.&T. report. But there are many countries, like Switzerland, which have installed dialing in all their phones. The Soviets, however, lag far behind. Only 21 per cent of their telephones were reported as automatic—and anyone who has spent time in Moscow knows that his dial system is a real adventure. You are never really sure what number you're going to get.

The scarcity of phones in the Soviet Union may account for the cumbersome nature of its bureaucracy and the snail's pace at which business is transacted. In the U.S., if you want an answer to a question or if you want to communicate information, you pick up your telephone. In the Soviet Union, you pick up your hat and trudge to the office of the man you wish to see. If he happens to be out, you wait. Probably no wars or international crises are caused by this practice. But in the everyday life of the world, quick communication means efficiency. It also eliminates misunderstanding. The proof of this can be found in the fact that American businessmen are almost as ready to use the long distance phone as they are to make local calls.

In Khrushchevville, of course, it doesn't matter. If you don't make the decision today, you can make it tomorrow. It isn't really important. If you're ideologically pure. And if some visitor from the sheikdom of Kuwait, which has more phones per capita than the USSR, should complain about the service, there's always that handy statistic—a 19 per cent increase in one year—to satisfy him, even if the only party he can get on the line is the Communist Party.

Democrats put the arm on civil servants to buy \$100 tickets to a party dinner. One young bureaucrat tried to beg off because he was still in his salad days—so they charged him \$180 for the dressing.

Senior statesman's analysis of Kennedy's State-of-the-Union message: The world's going to hell in a handbasket—but at least JFK wants to give the country a cheaper rifle.

FLETCHER KNEIBEL



EDSON IN WASHINGTON . . .

Cuba Issue Remains In Unsettled Stage

By PETER EDSON
Washington Correspondent
Newspaper Enterprise Assn.
WASHINGTON (NEA) — Five times in his major foreign policy speech to the Supreme Soviet on Dec. 12, Chairman Nikita Khrushchev repeats that he ordered the Russian rockets and planes withdrawn from Cuba after "President Kennedy stated unequivocally . . . that the United States would not attack Cuba" and would restrain its allies from any such action.

This is considered an apparent effort to put Kennedy on a world spot where he refuses to stand. Prior to Russia's withdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba, in a letter to Khrushchev dated Oct. 27, Kennedy wrote:

"We on our part would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments (to remove Russian weapons systems from Cuba)—(A) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (B) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba."

On Nov. 3 it was announced that the White House that the President had decided to make on-site verification of base dismantling a precondition for a formal American pledge not to invade Cuba. There is no public record that this position was ever formally communicated to the Soviet Union.

But Fidel Castro, having refused to permit on-site inspection of bases in Cuba by anyone—neither the United Nations nor the Red Cross—the American government position is that this precondition was never met. The formal American pledge not to invade has therefore never been issued, although the blockade was lifted.

It became known later that this original offer by the President not to invade Cuba was made when the National Security Council's expanded, 15-member executive committee of top administration officials was handling the Cuban situation.

When policy-planning staff members were filled in on the operation later, they recognized immediately that the United States was in no position to offer or make a no-invasion pledge.

Any question involving the se-

curity of all Latin America cannot be decided singly by the United States, even under the Monroe Doctrine.

This is a question that can be decided only by all the Western Hemisphere republics, acting through the Organization of American States. This accounts for the Nov. 3 statement.

Still later, in his Dec. 29 speech to the Cuban Bay of Pigs prisoners after their ransom and return to Florida, Kennedy made unmistakably clear that he did not consider there was any no-invasion pledge in effect.

He told the invasion brigade veterans, after the United States had been made custodian of their battle flag:

"I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this brigade in a free Havana."

That really stirred up the Russians and Castro.

But the no-invasion pledge issue has now been shoved farther under the rug by the American-Russian joint statement at the United Nations, ending talks on the Cuba situation. No agreement was possible because the United States did not win its demand for international inspection of base dismantling.

Khrushchev may possibly have foreseen that he could not make a convincing case that a no-invasion pledge had been made, for in his Dec. 12 speech to the Supreme Soviet he declared:

"In the event of these pledges not being respected by the other party, we would be forced to take such actions as would be required from us under the circumstances. It must be clear to all that our country will never leave revolutionary Cuba in trouble."

One other important factor is that the State Department now reports Cuba still has 100 MIG jet fighters, 144 launchers at 24 anti-aircraft sites, 90 helicopters, 18 or 20 transport planes, 350 tanks, 1,300 pieces of field artillery and over 7,500 trucks from Communist bloc countries. So Russia did not exactly demilitarize Cuba and it remains a hemisphere threat.

The doors would therefore still seem to be wide open for a resumption of the Cuba crisis whenever either side starts it.



WASHINGTON REPORT . . .

Morse, Other Solons Crack At Filibuster

By FULTON LEWIS JR.

Called many things during a Senate career that dates back 18 years, Wayne Lyman Morse has yet to be accused of consistency.

The raging debate on Senate rules demonstrates why. The volatile Oregon Democrat is once again among those Senate liberals out to emasculate Rule 22, which permits a filibuster to "obstruct" legislation.

Morse supports the Humphrey-Kuebel proposal to allow a majority of the Senate—51 members—in cut off debate on any issue. Rule 22 now requires two-thirds vote of those present to end debate.

Morse is expected to argue, as he has before, that the filibuster, the "fundamental trick of the obstructionist, is not funny but a disgraceful and contemptible procedure."

He can be expected to say, as he did in 1953:

"Oh, how many times in the last eight years have I stood at my desk in the Senate and pleaded for around-the-clock sessions to break filibusters, which, in my opinion, had the effect of denying human rights to men and women who ought to be free."

That observation, incidentally, was made in the middle of a Morse talkation that began on April 24 and ended up the next day. For 22 hours and 26 minutes Morse rambled on, in an effort to kill the tidelands offshore oil bill.

Morse was, at least, candid, acknowledging that "filibuster tactics are involved in this debate." Tidelands, however, was not the only occasion on which Morse has utilized the filibuster.

One year later, in July, 1954, Morse and fellow "liberals" took over the Senate for 13 days in a vain attempt to kill "give-away" amendments to the Atomic Energy Act. On that occasion, on July 22, Morse admitted, "this is a filibuster."

At the start of the Eighty-Seventh Congress, in January, 1961, Morse and other liberals opened another filibuster. Their aim: to outlaw the filibuster. They were unsuccessful.

The most recent filibuster led by filibuster-ees came last session when ten electronic liberals tried to prevent passage of the Administration's communications satellite bill.

For two months, the liberals tried to talk the bill to death.

Finally, on Aug. 14, the Senate voted 63-27 to cut off debate. The 63 votes were three more than the two-thirds necessary to invoke cloture. That vote alone should convince Morse and others now clamoring for change that cloture can be invoked. But it has not.

Those Senators, Republicans and Democrats, who wish to keep Rule 22 as it is argue that:

1. Minorities have rights which no majorities should override. Obstruction is justifiable as a means of preventing a majority from trampling upon minority rights until a broad political consensus has developed.

2. A Senate majority does not necessarily represent a consensus of the people or even of the states. Frequently popular opinion upon a question has not been formulated, or if it has been, it is often not effectively expressed. Prolonged debate may prevent hasty majority action which would be out of harmony with a genuine popular consensus.

3. Filibusters do not actually prevent needed legislation. Every important measure defeated by a filibuster has been later enacted, with the exception of proposals on civil rights. Thanks to the filibuster, "some vicious proposals" have been permanently rejected.

4. The Senate, without majority cloture advocated by Morse and company, actually passes a large percentage of bills introduced in that body than does the House of Representatives with cloture.

5. Majority cloture in the Senate would destroy its deliberative function and make it a mere annex of the House.

THEY SAY . . .

We call this new man "Opti-man" rather than "Superman." And we think we can make him in the near future. If we don't, the Russians will.

—Space expert Dr. Tody Freeman, on preparing men especially suited for deep space flight.

It is within probability that there will be complete electronic substitutes for worn-out or otherwise useless human organs.

—RCA board chairman David Sarnoff.