aiLurunu iiidkLi mturunu, uncuun SUNDAY, OCTOBEK 6 1963
Tactics off Guerrilla War Remain Unchanged
nR?nShrvi10tv! us- f-ces Hcult by guerrilla armies root-1 ing 265,000 men armed with.scale battles against Humeri-1 gents in Malaya, the Philip- the countryside. They have his-. Strategic Hamlet. ,
In South Viet Nam are deep
ly embroiled in another in
the series of Communist-inspired
guerrilla wars to erupt
since World War II. In the
following dispatch, a veteran
L'PI Asian correspondent dis
cusses the nature and histori
cal development of these back
woods conflicts.)
By ARTHUR DO.M.MEN
- United Press International
HONG KONG (UPI) Since
- the end of World War II the
; technologies of nuclear war
-have advanced by leaps and
."bounds but the tactics of guer
, rilla war remain virtually what
Mao Tse-tung said they were
"in the 1930s.
' During this period there has
been no war fought with nu
clear weapons. But the other
kind of war has become al
most commonplace the war
fought with hand weapons by
small bands of foot soldiers
entering lonely villages or set
ting ambushes along roads.
Except for a few new tech
niques, such as the introduc
tion of helicopters by the French
in Indochina and Algeria, guer
rilla warfare has changed hard
ly at all in two decades and
more.
The current example is South
Viet Nam, where American men
find materiel are massively
committed.
Pattern Is Set
The pattern for this war was
set in Greece in 1946-49, in
Indochina in 1946-54 and in the
Philippines and Malaya during
the same period. Anyone who
thinks the war in South Viet
Nam should be over "in an
other year or so" should study
the record of these four "brush
fire wars."
All had a lot in, common:
They were protracted (the
emergency in Malaya lasted 12
years) and they involved polit
ical as well as military offen
sives by each side.
They were fought in back
ward areas, where transport
and communications were dif
ed into and fighting on their
own soil the guerilla army was
frequently all the more formid
able thanks to a "sanctuary"
across an international boun
dary. Pit a Small Number
They all pitted a relatively
small number of guerrillas
against a much more numerous
regular army, navy and air
force.
Consider the figures:
In Greece, between 20.000 and
25,000 Communist irregulars,
mainly recruited on the spot,
fought a see - sa-.v struggle
against regular forces number-
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Gels Prison Term
Richard Ralph Bryant, 29,
Marysville, Calif., was sen
tenced to three years in the
Oregon state penitentiary
Thursday in circuit court after
his probation was revoked.
Bryant originally was placed
on probation on a charge of
receiving and concealing stolen
property. He was charged with
violating his probation by "ab
sconding from supervision" of
his probation officer, and failing
to make restitution as directed
by the court.
Imposition of sentence was
suspended for three years and
Anne Belle Brennan, 47, of 3523
Grant rd., Central Point, was
placed on probation on a charge
of uttering and publishing a
forged check. She had pleaded
guilty earlier.
The court directed her to
make restitution, refrain from
drinking and associating with
"persons of ill repute."
Imposition of sentence was
suspended for three years and
Nancy Lee Kime, 19, of 1464
Orchard Home dr., was placed
on probation for attempting to
obtain property by false pre
tenses. She had pleaded guilty
earlier.
artillery and aircraft, and as
sisted by American military ad
visers. In Malaya about 14.000 hard
core guerrillas held off 80,000
British regulars and 130,000 loy
al Malay troops; in the Philip
pines the guerrillas were simi
larly mismatched, numerically.
Army of Irregulars
. When the Indo-China war be
gan in 1946, Hi Chi Minh's mot
ley army consisted of 60,000
irregulars armed with an esti
mated 4,000 rifles, most of them
archaic. In time they had ex
hausted the will to fight off
190,000-man French expedition
ary corps and of the French
Allied 200,000 Vietnamese, 15,
000 Laotians and 10,000 Cambo
dians. In South Viet Nam today, th
hard-core strength of the Viet
Cong rebels is estimated by
American sources as 25,000 at
most, while the South Vietna
mese regular army numbers
170,000 and has attached to it
about 14,000 American military
advisers.
A review of the histories of
these rebel movements shows
that they all started with the
murder of isolated officials
civil servants, local military
officers, the mayors of villages.
The pattern was calculated to
instill the greatest amount of
terror into the civilian popu
lation and to propagate a rebel
image of great influence and
superior force.
Deaths Followed Up
These systematic assassina
tions, beginning in September,
1946, in Greece and in late 1958
in South Viet Nam, were fol
lowed up by attacks on small
government patrols and out
posts. Then came larger raids
on army posts and seizures of
arms from isolated garrisons.
Then came the clandestine es
tablishment of rebel control
over whole areas, protected by
increasingly audacious sabo
tage and requisitioning.
All of them ended up with
tightly knit and disciplined
guerrilla bands fighting full-
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cally superior, but tactically
cumbersome, government forc
es. The importance to the rebels
of having sanctuary across an
onstratcTby the Zmpleof Fie'd "f
... . ..- . . . one rmtlr near nnmmanti ond m.
Viet Minn in North Viet Nam,
pines and Greece.
The most important may have
been dynamic leadership and
imaginative planning.
In Greece, for instance, it was
where the Communist victory
gos took over command and re
organized his troops along lines
next door in China permitted i "VV'1.? 1ir"8'r war
. ... r - i fan that thA halaniv lutaan ii
tne timely supply of
torically depended on a "reser
voir" of sympathetic manpower
in the countryside far larger
than their own combat effec
tives. To combat such guerrillas re
quires special training, includ
ing familiarity with the local
language and customs. Since
arms
against the French in the cru
cial stage of the eight-year war.
Contribute to Defeat
Conversely, the lack of sanc
tuary is believed to have con
tributed heavily to the defeat
of the guerrilla campaigns in
niaiaya, uie rnuippines and
Greece.
The closine of the Yueoslav-
Greek border by Marshal Tito
in July, 1949, cut off at one
blow the Greek Communists'
sanctuary and doomed their
entire movement.
One of the factors worrvine
Ameircan advisers now in
South Viet Nam is that country
has hundreds of miles of bor
der with Communits controlled
areas of neutralist Laos, and
the the Viet Cone have the use
of havens within these borders
whenever they are hard-pressed
by a government offensive.
Unlike the Greek commu
nists, however, the Viet Cong
find plenty of food to eat right
inside South Viet Nam, which
is a rich rice-growing area. This
compounds the difficulty for the
antiCommunist startegists.
Definite Positive Factors
Aside from the factor of sanc
tuary, there were definite posi
tive factors which made for the
defeat of the Communist insur-
fare that the balance began to I the guerrilla leans heavily on
tip. Even American material the peasant, it is necessary to
help on a massive scale, Ameri
can military advisers with
Greek general, units down to
company level and an American
veto over Uie Greek general
staff had been insufficient.
In the Philippines, it was the
foresighted leadership of Presi
dent Ramon Magsaysay which
made all the difference in the
struggle against the Juks. Mag
saysay continually got out
among the peasants, heard out
their complaints, gave them
land and at times risked am
bush to meet the rebels in
their own countryside and out
smart them.
Training Major Factor
Training is a second major
factor in "brushfire" wars.
Guerrillas traditionally operate
in terrain and under conditions
in which a regular army might
face piecemeal disintegration.
In Indo-China, whole French
battalions combed certain areas
in vain attempts to pin down
and destroy a single Viet Minh
company. Success was rarely
commensurate with men and
material expended.
Insurgents operate as indivi
duals, or in small groups, car
rying their own food, using
camouflage, light weapons and
the most weighty knowledge of
win the peasant away from the
guerrilla.
Third Decisive Factor
This leads to the third deci
sive factor in effectively coun
tering Communist guerrillas:
good intelligence.
A reliable intelligence net
work that will inform the se
curity forces where the guerril
las are hiding can only be built
on the confidence of the popu
lation. British military advis
ers in Malaya found that once
they had demonstrated to the
population that they could be
counted on, constantly, for pro
tection and support, the intelli
gence so desperately needed be
gan to filter in. From that point
on, the terrorists were lost be
cause they had no place to hide.
A fourth factor of inestimable
importance is the ability to
starve out the guerrillas. This
was done in Malaya by con
structing fortified villages and
checking who went in and out,
who took his food with him, by
rationing certain staple foods,
and by imposing controls that
went so far as requiring gro
cers to open tin cans of food
when sold to prevent them go
ing into communist caches.
Half a million people were re
settled in Malaya.
In South Viet Nam, the gov
ernment has been following the
same lines by constructing
"strategic hamlets." Already,
however, it reported that many
of these hamlets have been suc
cessfully infiltrated by the Com
munists. U.S. military advisers in
South Viet Nam say the nature
of the guerrilla war there is
that of "buying time" until the
anti-Communist Diem govern
ment can win the support of the
people. The recent bitter dis
pute between the Roman Cath
olic presidential family and the
Buddhists, who constitute HO
per cent of Viet Nam's popula
tion, raises grave questions
about whether that is possible.
Military action against the
Viet Cong insurgents has pro
gressed reasonably well, but the
guerrillas seem to have little
trouble supplying themselves
from the peasant population
and, because of fear or hostil
ity, government forces get pre
cious little intelligence from the
peasants.
Not Won By Might
The protracted, unbalanced
and bloody struggles in Greece,
Malaya, the Philippines, Indo
China and South Vict Nam have
shown that brush-fire wars are
not won by military might
alone or by pqlitical propagan
da alone, but by a judicious
blending of military, political
and social means.
It was Sir Henry Gurney,
British high commissioner for
Malaya, who spoke the now-famous
words, "This is a war for
the hearts and minds of the
people."
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