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Russia's premier started his Chinese
comrades making H-bombs; only too late,
says this noted military analyst,
did he realize that the U.S.S.R.
might be their target some day
by GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT
Accompanied by Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung, Khrushchev inspects honor guard on Peiping visit.
Wtosti 'KHRUSHCHEV Feairs
When Russia's Premier Nikita
Khrushchev was touring our
country singing the praises of peace,
few Americans believed he had come
here to do us any good. He seemed
anxious to quiet war talk all right,
but most of us suspected he was only
trying to win a breathing spell to deal
with other worries.
One of these worries was and is
Red China. It gives Khrushchev
nightmares to think about the not-too-distant
day when his Communist
comrades in Peiping will have a mod
est stockpile of H-bombs. Khrush
chev has already discovered for
himself that the H-bomb is an ideal
weapon for Communist blackmail
and extortion.
The Chinese Communists may find
it even more attractive for such pur
poses, since they can't be hurt by it
nearly as much as they can hurt a
rich neighbor. And their nearest and
richest neighbor is the U.S.S.R. a
neighbor from whom Peiping can ex
tort far fatter payoffs than from any
one else.
The Communist bosses of the
U.S.S.R., starting back in Stalin's
time, have set themselves up for what
could be a nasty fall. They deliber
ately located new industrial centers
"Pittsburghs" like Novosibirsk and
Stalinsk in Siberia and Central
Asia. Included are most of the key
centers of their nuclear production,
their missile and space programs. All
these were stowed away deep in the
heart of the Asian continent to make
them hard to reach for American
planes and missiles operating from
Western Europe, from North Amer
ica across the polar ice, or from float
ing bases at sea.
But look at the map and you'll see
that in backing away from possible
U. S. attack, the Soviet planners
backed right up against the Chinese
frontier within easy reach of even
medium-range missiles fired from
Chinese launching pads.
The best way to deal with a nuclear
blackmailer is to keep him convinced
that he can't attack you without be
ing destroyed himself. That's
how America has to deal with Rus
sia, as I pointed out in a recent issue
of FAMILY WEEKLY. But Russia
can't rely on nuclear counterthreats
against Red Chinese blackmail. The
U.S.S.R. is much more vulnerable
to H-bombs than China because it has
so many attractive targets.
If the heavy industrial concentra
tions in Soviet Asia were wiped out,
the Soviet economy might never re
cover. As yet, Red China has only a
few industrial concentrations. Most
concentrated targets in China are
cities full of people. China has plenty
of people 3 times as many as the
Soviet Union, 650 million against 200
million. Not long ago, Chinese stu
dents told a foreign visitor with
laughter that even if the entire So
viet H-bomb stockpile were expended
against China's cities, there still
would be 300 million Chinese alive.
It's ironic that the Soviet leaders
including Khrushchev have done
so much to help the Chinese qualify
for membership in the H-bomb club.
Soviet technical advisers helped build
China's two big nuclear reactors, sup
posed to produce power for Chinese
industry. Those plants are now train
ing nuclear scientists to work on
weapons research. The uranium
mines in North China and Sinkiang
were discovered by Soviet engineers,
and the ore is being extracted by a
joint Soviet-Chinese stock company
with the Soviets putting up most
of the cash, and the Chinese taking
most of the ore. Khrushchev's intel
ligence analysts must be able to fore
cast with painful accuracy just when
Peiping will be ready to explode its
first test shot.
Meanwhile, Khrushchev is being
squeezed by relentless Chinese pres
sure for more and more Soviet eco
nomic aid. The Reds in Peiping are
in a hurry. They're in desperate need
of a solid industrial base for their
revolution and, meantime, there are
650 million mouths to be fed. Two
years ago, Chinese boss Mao Tse
tung went to Moscow to pay his re
spects to the 40th anniversary of the
Russian revolution. When Khrush
chev went to Peiping, right after his
recent visit to America, the occasion
was the 10th anniversary of the Chi
nese revolution. Those 30-odd years
make all the difference.
Chinese Red leaders must continue
driving their people under the lash
of terror for a long time. Russian
leaders have reached the point where
they have to depend on leadership
and persuasion rather than terror.
To build their industrial base, they
had to educate a whole generation
of scientists, engineers, teachers, and
technicians. This generation of Rus
sians can neither be lied to nor ter
rorized as easily as the last one. Also,
they know what nuclear war would
be like, and they're affaid of it.
Khrushchev is far from ready to risk
it, either, so he's compelled to go
through the motions of cooling off
war tensions and reducing the non
nuclear parts of his arms budget. He
really does need that breathing spell
to let his people have a chance to
appreciate the "great blessings" of
Communism.
But Peiping's men-in-a-hurry
need the specter of a foreign foe to
keep their grip on their people. For
Khrushchev to start buddying up
with the "bloody American imperial
ists" is embarrassing indeed. There's
been no relaxation in the eternal
scream of "Hate America" over the
Chinese radio. No American tourists
stroll the sidewalks of Chinese cities
as they do in Moscow and Leningrad.
Between America and China, there's
no exchange of fairs, exhibits, agri
cultural missions, or ballet troupes.
American military prisoners still eat
their hearts out in Chinese dungeons.
It's significant that the men in the
Kremlin who still admire Stalin and
distrust some of Khrushchev's "prac
tical politics" are maintaining close
relations with the Chinese Reds.
Mikhail A. Suslov, who has Stalin's
old job as Party secretary, is a leader
of this group. Khrushchev is no all
powerful dictator like Stalin; he has
to consult, to make concessions. So
he has to go on giving the Chinese
Reds a certain amount of help. But
he can't meet their insatiable de
mands without loading up his own
people with fresh economic burdens
just as he's trying to ease, for a time,
some of the heavy arms load they've
carried so long.
This is problem enough, but some
of Khrushchev's military advisers
surely are asking him what hap
pens 20 years from now when there
1 0 Family Weekly, January 31. 1960