



Accompanied by Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung, Khrushchev inspects honor guard on Peiping visit.

Russia's premier started his Chinese comrades making H-bombs; only too late, says this noted military analyst, did he realize that the U.S.S.R. might be their target some day

by **GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT**

What KHRUSHCHEV Fears

WHEN RUSSIA'S Premier Nikita Khrushchev was touring our country singing the praises of peace, few Americans believed he had come here to do us any good. He seemed anxious to quiet war talk all right, but most of us suspected he was only trying to win a breathing spell to deal with other worries.

One of these worries was—and is—Red China. It gives Khrushchev nightmares to think about the not-too-distant day when his Communist comrades in Peiping will have a modest stockpile of H-bombs. Khrushchev has already discovered for himself that the H-bomb is an ideal weapon for Communist blackmail and extortion.

The Chinese Communists may find it even more attractive for such purposes, since they can't be hurt by it nearly as much as they can hurt a rich neighbor. And their nearest and richest neighbor is the U.S.S.R.—a neighbor from whom Peiping can extort far fatter payoffs than from anyone else.

The Communist bosses of the U.S.S.R., starting back in Stalin's time, have set themselves up for what could be a nasty fall. They deliberately located new industrial centers—"Pittsburghs" like Novosibirsk and Stalinsk—in Siberia and Central Asia. Included are most of the key centers of their nuclear production, their missile and space programs. All these were stowed away deep in the heart of the Asian continent to make them hard to reach for American planes and missiles operating from Western Europe, from North America across the polar ice, or from floating bases at sea.

But look at the map and you'll see that in backing away from possible U. S. attack, the Soviet planners backed right up against the Chinese frontier within easy reach of even medium-range missiles fired from Chinese launching pads.

The best way to deal with a nuclear blackmailer is to keep him convinced that he can't attack you without being destroyed himself. That's how America has to deal with Russia, as I pointed out in a recent issue of *FAMILY WEEKLY*. But Russia can't rely on nuclear counterthreats against Red Chinese blackmail. The U.S.S.R. is much more vulnerable to H-bombs than China because it has so many attractive targets.

If the heavy industrial concentrations in Soviet Asia were wiped out, the Soviet economy might never recover. As yet, Red China has only a few industrial concentrations. Most concentrated targets in China are cities full of people. China has plenty of people—3½ times as many as the Soviet Union, 650 million against 200 million. Not long ago, Chinese students told a foreign visitor—with laughter—that even if the entire Soviet H-bomb stockpile were expended against China's cities, there still would be 300 million Chinese alive.

IT'S IRONIC that the Soviet leaders—including Khrushchev—have done so much to help the Chinese qualify for membership in the H-bomb club. Soviet technical advisers helped build China's two big nuclear reactors, supposed to produce power for Chinese industry. Those plants are now training nuclear scientists to work on weapons research. The uranium

mines in North China and Sinkiang were discovered by Soviet engineers, and the ore is being extracted by a joint Soviet-Chinese stock company—with the Soviets putting up most of the cash, and the Chinese taking most of the ore. Khrushchev's intelligence analysts must be able to forecast with painful accuracy just when Peiping will be ready to explode its first test shot.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev is being squeezed by relentless Chinese pressure for more and more Soviet economic aid. The Reds in Peiping are in a hurry. They're in desperate need of a solid industrial base for their revolution and, meantime, there are 650 million mouths to be fed. Two years ago, Chinese boss Mao Tse-tung went to Moscow to pay his respects to the 40th anniversary of the Russian revolution. When Khrushchev went to Peiping, right after his recent visit to America, the occasion was the 10th anniversary of the Chinese revolution. Those 30-odd years make all the difference.

Chinese Red leaders must continue driving their people under the lash of terror for a long time. Russian leaders have reached the point where they have to depend on leadership and persuasion rather than terror. To build their industrial base, they had to educate a whole generation of scientists, engineers, teachers, and technicians. This generation of Russians can neither be lied to nor terrorized as easily as the last one. Also, they know what nuclear war would be like, and they're afraid of it. Khrushchev is far from ready to risk it, either, so he's compelled to go through the motions of cooling off

war tensions and reducing the non-nuclear parts of his arms budget. He really does need that breathing spell to let his people have a chance to appreciate the "great blessings" of Communism.

But Peiping's men-in-a-hurry need the specter of a foreign foe to keep their grip on their people. For Khrushchev to start buddying up with the "bloody American imperialists" is embarrassing indeed. There's been no relaxation in the eternal scream of "Hate America" over the Chinese radio. No American tourists stroll the sidewalks of Chinese cities as they do in Moscow and Leningrad. Between America and China, there's no exchange of fairs, exhibits, agricultural missions, or ballet troupes. American military prisoners still eat their hearts out in Chinese dungeons.

IT'S SIGNIFICANT that the men in the Kremlin who still admire Stalin and distrust some of Khrushchev's "practical politics" are maintaining close relations with the Chinese Reds. Mikhail A. Suslov, who has Stalin's old job as Party secretary, is a leader of this group. Khrushchev is no all-powerful dictator like Stalin; he has to consult, to make concessions. So he has to go on giving the Chinese Reds a certain amount of help. But he can't meet their insatiable demands without loading up his own people with fresh economic burdens just as he's trying to ease, for a time, some of the heavy arms load they've carried so long.

This is problem enough, but some of Khrushchev's military advisers surely are asking him what happens 20 years from now when there