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Flight o' Time

Medford and Jackson County History from the files of The Mail Tribune—10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 years ago.

10 YEARS AGO

Dec. 9, 1946 (Monday)

Christmas Seal Sale by Jackson County Health Association is progressing in a gratifying manner, according to Mrs. Glenn A. Gibbons, county chairman.

From Arthur Perry's "Ye Smudge Pot" column: Since the official condemnation of jay walking, there has been a notable increase in same hereabouts, a survey shows.

20 YEARS AGO

Dec. 9, 1936 (Wednesday)

A. H. Snow, president of the Oregon Transportation League, will be in Crescent City tomorrow to attend a hearing on plans for harbor development.

Vernon Hopkins of the Dead Indian district, trapper and woodsman, collects \$210 in bounty from Jackson county for the hides of 50 coyotes and 17 bobcats.

30 YEARS AGO

Dec. 9, 1926 (Thursday)

Saturday to mark the opening of the first Skaggs store in Medford under the management of C. E. Lyon.

The third floor addition to the Masonic building, Main and Holly sts., is completed at a cost of \$38,000.

40 YEARS AGO

Dec. 9, 1916 (Saturday)

The difficulty which seemingly has held back payment of subscribers to the stock of Applegate Lumber company has been cleared.

50 YEARS AGO

Dec. 9, 1906 (Sunday)

Hearst's Independence League, which was designed to boost its founder into the president's chair, is on the rocks.

Applegate Valley will soon have its first brewery, now being built at Provoit, and is expected to be in operation by the first of February.

What's Your I.Q.?

Nine or ten correct is superior; seven or eight is excellent; five or six is good.

1. Was the place name "Pimlico" originally named after a bird, a tavernkeeper, or a race track?

2. Shakespeare refers to the word "whoobub." Is it an obsolete word for "hubbub" or "whoopee"?

3. "By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yes, we wept—Psalm 137."

4. Who is the author of the famous novel "The Wandering Jew"?

5. Does a liquid quart contain two pints or eight gills?

6. Is "Old Glory" a nickname for the flag of the United Kingdom or the United States?

7. Was Delany Madison the wife or sister of President Madison?

8. Is Ulster the capital of Northern Ireland?

9. Cats when falling land on their feet. Are the reflexes of man such that with practice he can also do so?

10. Was the English "rule of the road," that keeping vehicles to the left (not the right, as in the U.S.), adopted since the advent of the automobile?

Answers: 1. Tavern-keeper, Ben Pimlico, near Chelsea, London, England. 2. Hubbub. 3. Wept. 4. Eugene Sue. 5. Yes, both. 6. United States. 7. Wife. 8. No. Belfast is. 9. Yes. 10. No.

How About World War III?

David Lawrence, editor of "U.S. News and World Report," is also a prosperous newspaper columnist, in both capacities being somewhat to the right of Louis XVI politically.

We therefore seldom agree with him. His recent column in the Oregon Journal headed "history proves bomb fear not war deterrent" is no exception.

AS USUAL, however, Editor Lawrence makes a plausible if not entirely a convincing case.

In this particular argument, his chief witness was a New York taxi driver, a type often relied upon by newspaper men, not only for transportation but conversation—for they often have a native shrewdness and uncanny reliability in accurately reflecting a cross section of "the-man-in-the-street" mind—in the metropolis area at least—that is valuable to anyone seeking facts.

Here is a portion of the conversation, quote:

"What do you think of the world situation?"

"Pretty bad, I'd say. I feel sorry for those poor Hungarians."

"Well, what can we do about it?"

"I don't know, but I don't like it."

"Would you have America go to war about it?"

"I just don't like to see us get pushed around."

"Would you favor sending our American boys into war in this situation?"

"Well, I was in the second world war and in Korea, and there comes a time when you got to do something."

"Have you any sons?"

"Yes, two in the navy and one in the army."

"Aren't you worried about the big bomb—the one they say will destroy us all on both sides if it's used in war?"

"No—then we'll all be dead anyway—so what?"

So-o-o the atomic and hydrogen bombs form no deterrent to war because if such a war did occur we would all be dead anyway.

"SO what?"

PUNDIT Lawrence did not answer the latter inquiry, but went on to the conclusion that history proves terror has not prevented war in the past and it will presumably not in the future.

PERHAPS this extremely philosophical and courageous taxi driver would agree?

But before we accept his verdict as final we would like to ask his wife.

After all where public opinion is such a factor the women—who so outnumber the men today—must be consulted.

We would doubt very much if "Mrs. Taxi Driver" with three sons in the service would be willing to accept the prospect of World War III with the resigned equanimity of her hubby.

But that's as it may be.

THE question is not whether nuclear fission implementations of destruction will entirely prevent war, but whether they will and do prove a deterrent to war, particularly war on a world-wide scale.

WE BELIEVE the answer is an emphatic "YES." In fact we believe World War III would have been on in full blast before Generalissimo Stalin's death, if the atomic bomb had never been discovered and perfected.

Another point should not be overlooked. Important as the "man in the street" is when it comes to waging a war and supporting it, he has little to say about a war declaration, that is up to Congress, assisted by the government and the diplomats.

And while the prospect of "all being dead" might not impose restraint upon this particular New York taxi driver—conversationally at least—we are quite sure it would give his wife, family and friends pause, and that also, we believe, it would induce a "chain reaction" that would eventually reach the White House and the U.S. Congress with an impact that would make the recent Eisenhower landslide look like a summer zephyr across a millpond.

NO, AS we see it, that final remark of the "cabby" alone is sufficient to refute the claim the fear of atomic bombs does not provide a strong war deterrent, and might very well render any war on a world-wide scale in the future, as unlikely as the resurrection of Rameses the Second.

For so long as the "man-in-the-street," the people as a whole, realize what another world war today would mean, namely: mutual destruction, the likelihood of such a war occurring will be, to say the least, EXTREMELY remote.—R.W.R.

World Peace and the Olympics

Speaking of war, when they were soliciting contributions to the 1956 Olympic games, several of our favorite sports commentators, claimed that these international competitions would contribute materially to peace and the elimination of animosities that conceivably would result in war.

The claim is debatable. We have only attended one Olympiad, that was in London many years ago, but we will never forget the international tensions created particularly as a result of the "Marathon" and the half mile (800 meter) run.

AN ITALIAN won the former but had to be helped over the finish line by track attendants, so he was disqualified and a Boston lad by the name of Hayes was declared the winner. The U.S. star in the half mile was disqualified for elbowing the pride of the British Isles, who won.

We can't recall just how many fist fights resulted in the grandstand, but there were several and we do recall that a fellow-American remarked as we de-

Matter of Fact

By Joe and Stewart Alsop

WHERE WAR MIGHT START

Washington—A serious study of Soviet Premier Bulganin's November 20th letter to President Eisenhower, and of a possible American response to it, is now going on at the highest levels of government.

The study could conceivably lead to an absolutely basic change in American policy and indeed in the whole world situation.

When the Bulganin letter was received, the first instinct in the White House and the State Department was to dismiss it out of hand as propaganda designed to divert attention from the Hungarian bloodbath then still in progress.

The letter was certainly full of the usual propaganda.

But the letter also contained what seemed to be a serious proposal for a mutual 500-mile withdrawal of all armed forces from a demilitarized zone in central Europe.

This zone, Bulganin proposed, was to be subject to both ground and air inspection by both sides, in accordance with the President's "open skies" proposal.

A 500 mile withdrawal would mean pulling American forces right out of Germany, and there is no place for them elsewhere in Western Europe. But it would also mean pulling the Red Army right out of East Germany, and indeed out of most of Poland.

There is not a single expert on the German situation who doubts for a moment that the East German Communist government would almost instantly cease to exist if the Red Army were withdrawn.

IT WAS the President himself, after a hurried briefing, who caught the significance of the Bulganin proposal, and ordered that it should not be waved aside as propaganda, and that a high level study of it should be made.

The significance of this Presidential decision is underlined by the fact that there is a growing body of responsible opinion that a third world war is inevitable unless there is some basic change in the German situation.

When the Hungarian rebellion was at its height, East Germany very nearly went the way of Hungary—far more nearly than is generally recognized here. An East German rebellion was probably only averted because the West German government (with the full knowledge and approval of the American government) averted it.

The danger was greatest when thousands of Germans in West Berlin demonstrated against the Soviet bloodbath in Hungary, and then made for the Brandenburg Gate to cross into Communist East Berlin on orders from the Adenauer government, the West Berlin police used very tough measures indeed to prevent the crossing. The whole West German secret service apparatus was also used to hold down the seething ferment in East Germany.

Thus the explosion was averted—but quite possibly only for the time being, according to competent judges. Winter is not a good time for rebellions, but a Hungary-style uprising in East Germany in the spring is not to be ruled out. And if one considers the possible consequences, it is easy to see why the West German and American govern-

ments (shades of "liberation") are almost as anxious as the Kremlin to avoid an explosion.

GERMANY is the only place in the world where the armed forces of the two main antagonists are in close contact. There is no international border between the two Germanies, as between Hungary and Austria. There is only an artificial line, even now regularly crossed by Germans in both directions.

In such circumstances, there would be no way on earth to isolate the explosion; as in Hungary, West Germans—and probably units of the heavily armed West German police—would flood across the line to help their compatriots. The two Germanies would melt together, and somehow, somewhere—most probably in Berlin—the fatal first shots of the Third World War would be exchanged between the American and Soviet forces.

There are responsible officials who believe—or perhaps hope is a better word—that this nightmare prospect is now as vivid to the Kremlin as to the American government, and that the Kremlin may really be searching for a way out. There are other equally responsible officials who contend that the Soviets will never, under any circumstances, withdraw the Red Army from East Germany, just because they know that the Communist Pankov government could not survive without it. But in view of the terrible dangers inherent in an East German explosion, the President is surely right in asking for a good hard look at the Kremlin's real intentions.

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