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About Illinois Valley news. (Cave City, Or.) 1937-current | View Entire Issue (Jan. 28, 1943)
A INDIA: AXIS MEETING POINT? • (Joetta .Patna AliaUù/ "ïïfcNARES V-* CAicvrr** • NAGPUB f INDIAN OCEAN.— Two long Allied supply routes skirt the fringes of the Indian ocean. The western, and most used, route serves to supply Allied forces in the Near East and North Africa from the United States and Great Britain. Along this route, too, moves much of the Lend Lease equipment into the Persian gulf and thence on by rail and truck to Russia's southern armies. This route was secured by the British seizure of Madagascar, a step or two ahead of the Japs. With complete Allied control of the Medi terranean this route will be abandoned in favor qf the shorter route through the Suez canal. The second and lesser used route is that from Australia to Bombay and the Persian gulf, handling U. S. transhipments from Aus tralia. When and if India is invaded by Japan this route will increase in importance. Unless the Japs can secure and establish further bases on the edge of the Indian ocean this great waterway should remain securely in control of Allied naval power. The great British Indian ocean base is at Trincomalee in Ceylon. During the low of British fortune in the Far East the Japs made one attempt to take this base or knock it out. but the British drove them off. The main Japanese bases for action in this area are Port Blair in the Andaman islands, Akyab and the huge Singapore base captured from the British at the outbreak of war in the Pacific. It is unlikely, how ever. that the Japanese have sufficient naval strength above that required to hold and press their South Pacific gains to attempt an Indian ocean venture in the near future. In the event that Germany is defeated before Japan—and Prime Minister Churchill has publicly hinted of this possibility —the Indian ocean will serve as Britain's path to pour troops and equip ment into India and China in a huge pincers movement designed to throttle Japan. India is naturally the key to the whole Indian ocean situation. Should the Japanese conquer India and establish bases near the entrances to the Persian gulf and Red sea they will constitute a real threat to the Russian supply lines. Such a move by Japan might force Russia, in defense of her vital supply routes, to attack Japan's puppet state of Manchukuo to relieve the danger This in turn would open Russian bases for United States bombers to carry the war to Japan proper. The situation is full of pos sibilities. Japan lodged in West India would be near Moslem Arabia and only a step from Africa. By jumping across the Red sea she could attack the Allied African forces from the rear, forming with Hitler's armies a gigantic pincers movement designed to strangle the Allies. BAY OF BENGAL Banf a kra Maa|akr« ° •< o •» lACCADlVf 1$. • 14KIK4L (HJ .TH INCOM ALEB OCEAN INDIA.— That India should be endangered by a power with its headquarters some 4,000 miles away is one of the wonders and dangers of modern war. But this is the prospect which India faces. The threat is deadly serious if and when Japan can release sufficient naval power from the Pacific. The imminence of Japanese invasion has tended to unify the Indian peoples, but at the same time the Indians have seized this opportune hour to demand independence from the British. From the Japanese advance bases in Thailand (Siam), Burma and the Andaman islands, India's southeast coast is in range of Jap medium range bombers. The rest of India can be reached by long range bombers, and India's flat east coast is ideal terrain for a determined landing force. An overall Axis plan undoubtedly calls for a meeting of Jap and Nazi troops some place in teeming India. When—and if—this occurs it will indeed be a low point in the Allied fortunes of war. Only by a conquest of India can a junction of the two Axis partners be effected, whether it be attained as a result of Japanese subjugation of the whole of Hindustan and possibly penetration even farther westward, or by a joint offensive with a German breakthrough in the Near East. In any case the resulting Axis self-sufficiency in raw materials and manufactured goods that would be the outcome of such a junction would, to say the least, pro long the war for several years. It is primarily to prevent such a catastrophe that the United Nations must hold India at all costs; but there are other scarcely less pressing considerations that serve to emphasize the strategic importance of India. The United Nations forces in the Near East, as a result of the shortage of shipping, will depend more and more on India’s food production and on the many kinds of munitions and equipment that India is able to manufacture. The Allied hope of gathering a strong land force to eventually drive the Jap from China may depend upon the position of strategic India. JAPAN.— This is Japan—the ene CHINA — For five vears the Chinese have been fighting back at the Japanese Recently they have had to fight on a half-dozen different fronts. China is without any railroad to the outside world since the Jap seizure of Indo-China. There is no highway outlet from the north. The 2.500-mile road to Russia is all but useless since Rus sia needs every gun and shell she can get against the Germans. Material aid from the Allies has been slow—but it is coming Yet China fights on with unflinching faith in the defensive strength of her depth. China is the nearest and strongest base available to the United States for direct attack against Japan. If ways tan be found to arm and equip her J.OOC.OOO soldiers and 1.000.000 reserves—send them the planes, the guns and the tanks—China may drive the Jap into the sea. The Chinese soldier is tough—and he has refused to quit. Against ovet whelming odds the Chinese have materially aided the cause of the United Nations. Their resistance to the Japanese has been all the more amazing because of their lack of the modern tools of war. my’s lair. Placed in line against the United States it would stretch rough ly from Seattle to San Diego. Its greatest maximum width is 270 miles, and with an area smaller than Indiana, Oregon. New Jersey and Vermont combined, it supports al most 73,000.000 people. Four islands comprise the main group: Honshu. Hokkaido, Shikoku and Kyushu A country of mountain ranges, fre quent earthquakes, forests and small valleys, Japan depends heavily upon the sea for food and largely upon Korea to keep the rice bowls filled. There are five cities of more than 1.000.000 inhabitants: Tokyo, the capital. Osaka, Kyoto. Nagoya and Kobe. Japan is the poorest of the world’s powers (or was until she stole the riches of the Netherland Indies. Thailand, Burma and Malaya). In her own possessions she has little coal, no iron, an inhospitable climate, few strategic minerals; and a rapidly growing population on 85% non arable land. From conquered lands she secured oil and rubber—but what Japan needs worse is iron. China has an estimated 240 billion tons of reserve iron. In the simplest terms this is why Japan and China are at war. Japanese railroads are narrow gauge, and most are single track, far behind American and European standards in carrying capacity. There are many tunnels and bridges— strategic air targets. The rivers of Japan are short and rapid, not nav igable for ocean-going vessels, but they supply irrigation water and hydro-electric power. Deep snow falls on the Japan sea side of Kyu shu, Honshu and Hokkaido, often reaching a depth of 25 feet, while the Pacific side of the same islands are fair with little snow. All Japan is hot in the summer, «nd Taiwan is unbearably so for most white men. JAPAN
