

GENERAL PERSHING'S OWN STORY OF OPERATIONS OF AMERICAN TROOPS DURING THE WORLD WAR

Commander in Chief of Expeditionary Forces Submits
Special Report to Secretary Baker—Fate of
Central Powers Decided by Work of
the United States Army.

FOCH ADMITTED ALLIES WERE FACING DEFEAT

First and Second Divisions, in Company With French Moroccan
Troops, Attacked on July 18 Without Preliminary Bombard-
ment, Smashed Through the German Lines, Overwhelmed
Both Infantry and Artillery, and Cut the Enemy's Communica-
tions, Compelling a General Retreat From the Marne and
Starting the Military Collapse Which Forced Germany to Sue
for Peace.

(Continued from last week)

When, on March 21, 1918, the German army on the western front began its series of offensives, it was by far the most formidable force the world had ever seen. In fighting men and guns it had a great superiority, but this was of less importance than the advantage in morale, in experience, in training for mobile warfare, and in unity of command. Ever since the collapse of the Russian armies and the crisis on the Italian front in the fall of 1917, German armies were being assembled and trained for the great campaign which was to end the war before America's effort could be brought to bear. Germany's best troops, her most successful generals and all the experience gained in three years of war were mobilized for the supreme effort.

The first blow fell on the right of the British armies, including the junction of the British and French forces. Only the prompt co-operation of the French and British general headquarters stemmed the tide. The reason for this objective was obvious, and strikingly illustrated the necessity for having some one with sufficient authority over all the allied armies to meet such an emergency.

Reserves Were Lacking.

The lack of complete co-operation among the allies on the western front had been appreciated and the question of preparation to meet a crisis had already received attention by the supreme war council. A plan had been adopted by which each of the allies would furnish a certain number of divisions for a general reserve to be under the direction of the military representatives of the supreme war council, of which Gen. Foch was then the senior member. But when the time came to meet the German offensive in March these reserves were not found available and the plan failed.

The situation resulted in a conference for the immediate consideration of the question of having an allied commander in chief. After much discussion, during which my view favoring such action was clearly stated, an agreement was reached and General Foch was selected. His appointment as such was made April 3 and was approved for the United States by the president on April 16.

The grave crisis precipitated by the first German offensive caused me to make a hurried visit to General Foch's headquarters at Bombon, during which all our combatant forces were placed at his disposal. The acceptance of this offer meant the dispersion of our troops along the allied front and a consequent delay in building up a distinctive American force in Lorraine, but the serious situation of the allies demanded this divergence from our plans.

On March 21 approximately 300,000 American troops had reached France. Four combat divisions, equivalent in strength to eight French or British divisions, were available.

Took Cantigny Heights.

On April 25 the First division relieved two French divisions on the front near Mondidier and on May 25 captured the important observation stations on the heights of Cantigny with splendid dash. French artillery, aviation, tanks and flame throwers aided in the attack, but most of this French assistance was withdrawn before the completion of the operation in order to meet the enemy's new offensive launched May 27 to Chateau Thierry. The enemy reaction against our troops at Cantigny was extremely violent, and apparently he was determined at all costs to counteract the most excellent effect the American success had produced. For three days his guns of all calibers were concentrated on our position and counter-attack succeeded counter-attack. The desperate efforts of the Germans gave the fighting at Cantigny a seeming tactical importance entirely out of proportion to the numbers involved.

The third German offensive, on May 27, against the French on the Aisne soon developed a desperate situation for the allies. The Second division was hastily diverted to the vicinity of Meaux on May 31, and early on the

morning of June 1 was deployed across the Chateau-Thierry-Paris road near Montreuil-aux-Lions in a gap in the French line, where it stopped the German advance on Paris. At the same time the partially trained Third division was placed at French disposal to hold the crossings of the Marne, and its motorized machine-gun battalion succeeded in reaching Chateau Thierry in time to assist in successfully defending that river crossing.

The enemy having been halted, the Second division commenced a series

of vigorous attacks on June 4 which resulted in the capture of Belleau woods after very severe fighting. The village of Bouresches was taken soon after, and on July 1 Vaux was captured. In these operations the Second division met with most desperate resistance by Germany's best troops.

Our Second corps, under Maj. Gen. George W. Read, had been organized for the command of the ten divisions with the British, which were held back in training areas or assigned to second-line defenses. After consultation with Field Marshal Haig on June 3 five American divisions were relieved from the British area to support the French.

The Marne salient was inherently weak and offered an opportunity for a counter-offensive that was obvious. If successful such an operation would afford immediate relief to the allied defense, would remove the threat against Paris and free the Paris-Nancy railroad. But, more important than all else, it would restore the morale of the allies and remove the profound depression and fear then existing.

Up to this time our units had been put in here and there at critical points as emergency troops to stop the terrific German advance. In every trial, whether on the defensive or offensive, they had proved themselves equal to any troops in Europe. As early as June 23, and again on July 10 at Bombon I had very strongly urged that our best divisions be concentrated, under American command, if possible, for use as a striking force against the Marne salient. Although the prevailing view among the allies was that American units were suitable only for the defensive, and time at all events they could be used to better advantage under allied command, the suggestion was accepted in principle, and my estimate of their offensive fighting qualities was soon put to the test.

The enemy had encouraged his soldiers to believe that the July 15 at-

(Continued on Page Eight)

REPORT OF THE CONDITION OF THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF SOUTHERN OREGON

at Grants Pass, in the State of Oregon, at the close of business on December 31, 1919.

Resources	
1. a Loans and discounts, including rediscounts	\$570,322.40
*Total loans	\$570,322.40
2. Overdrafts, unsecured, \$801.87	801.87
3. U. S. Government securities owned:	
a Deposited to secure circulation (U. S. bonds par value)	12,500.00
c Pledged to secure postal savings deposits (par value)	9,000.00
d Pledged as collateral for State or other deposits or bills payable	21,000.00
f Owned and unpledged	45,682.00
h War Savings Certificates and Thrift Stamps actually owned	2,437.31
Total U. S. Government securities	90,619.31
6. Other bonds, securities, etc.:	
c Bonds and securities (other than U. S. securities) pledged as collateral for State or other deposits (postal excluded) or bills payable	2,729.84
e Securities, other than U. S. bonds (not including stocks), owned and unpledged	62,361.32
Total bonds, securities, etc., other than U. S.	65,091.16
8. Stock of Federal Reserve Bank (50 per cent of subscription)	2,250.00
9. a Value of banking house, owned and unnumbered	26,000.00
10. Furniture and fixtures	3,133.69
11. Real estate owned other than banking house	10,710.00
12. Lawful reserve with Federal Reserve Bank	39,832.82
14. Cash in vault and net amounts due from national banks	35,900.17
15. Net amounts due from banks, bankers, and trust companies (other than included in items 12, 13, or 14)	2,189.47
16. Exchanges for clearing house	1,474.01
Total of items 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17	39,563.65
18. Checks on banks located outside of city or town of reporting bank and other cash items	2,368.77
19. Redemption fund with U. S. Treasurer and due from U. S. Treasurer	625.00
21. Gold dust	267.88
Total	\$845,586.55

Liabilities	
22. Capital stock paid in	\$ 50,000.00
23. Surplus fund	25,000.00
25. Interest and discount collected or credited in advance of maturity and not earned (approximate)	5,099.59
28. Circulating notes outstanding	12,500.00
31. Net amounts due to banks, bankers, and trust companies (other than included in items 29 or 30)	302.36
32. Certified checks outstanding	165.00
Total of items 29, 31, 32 and 33	467.36
Demand deposits (other than bank deposits) subject to Reserve (deposits payable within 30 days):	
34. Individual deposits subject to check	505,221.35
35. Certificates of deposit due in less than 30 days (other than for money borrowed)	46,742.95
36. State, county, or other municipal deposits secured by pledge of assets of this bank	20,129.16
38. Dividends unpaid	3,000.00
Total of demand deposits (other than bank deposits) subject to Reserve, items 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, and 39	569,093.46
Time deposits subject to Reserve (payable after 30 days, or subject to 30 days or more notice, and postal savings):	
40. Certificates of deposit (other than for money borrowed)	179,360.92
42. Postal savings deposits	2,434.12
43. Other time deposits	1,631.10
Total of time deposits subject to Reserve, items 40, 41, 42, and 43	183,426.14
Total	\$845,586.55


State of Oregon, County of Josephine, ss:
I, Geo. E. Lundburg, Cashier of the above-named bank, do solemnly swear that the above statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

GEO. E. LUNDBURG, Cashier.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of January, 1920.
ISAAC BEST, Notary Public.
(My commission expires Dec. 2, 1923.)

Correct—Attest:
L. B. HALL
FRANK MASHBURN
J. T. FRY

Directors.



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