


HEAVY SNOWSTORM IN PARIS GIVES TRACTOR WORK



Following a heavy snowstorm in Paris a new snow plow drawn by a Renault tractor was put into commission to clear the walks, with great success.

Crop Estimating Gigantic Task

Government Bureau Collects and Publishes Much Important Information.

REPORTS COVER WHOLE COUNTRY

More Than 4,000,000 Pieces of Mail Handled by Division of Crop Reports During Past Year—Reports Are Issued Monthly.

During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1919, the bureau of crop estimates of the United States department of agriculture issued the regular monthly crop reports, showing estimated acreages planted, growing conditions, yields per acre, and total production, farm prices of different crops in each state and the United States, and the total number of live stock of different classes on farms and ranches, their condition, and losses from diseases and other causes. Commercial estimates of the apple and peach crops were made, and the truck-crop news service which has previously been in force, was continued and extended, according to the annual report of the chief of the bureau, an extract from which is given below.

Many special inquiries were made during the year, including: Quantity of commercial fertilizers used per acre of cotton and proportion of fields upon which used. Percentage of various crops to which commercial fertilizer and manure was applied and quantity used. Fodder requirements for the winter crops of 1918 for the use of the live stock corporation.

Emergency live stock survey, to determine the number on farms July 1, 1919.

Survey made of wheat crop, for the United States food administration. Quantities of various crops fed to different classes of live stock.

Stock survey of January, 1919. Fertilizer inquiry of January, 1919, to ascertain quantity of commercial fertilizers and manure used for crops. Survey of farm help.

Survey of farm labor requirements, machinery, and supplies. Percentage of farm labor requirements available.

Agents Gather Facts. Field agents prepared estimates of acreage, yield, production, and stocks of wheat and corn by county for the United States Grain corporation, and they also prepared estimates of the value of agricultural production by counties in each of the principal states for the use of the treasury department. Field agents co-

operated with officials of the department of agriculture, the treasury department, and the state extension services in the states where seed-grain loans were made to farmers in the drought-stricken regions of the northwest and the southwest in the fall of 1918 and spring of 1919.

The bureau compiled innumerable statements showing the production, consumption, surplus and deficiency, exports and imports, and prices of important agricultural products for all the principal countries before the war, and of production and requirements during the war, for the information of administrative officials of the department of agriculture, of other federal departments, and various war-emergency organizations. Many of these statements were for the use of the department committee on crop production and were used as a basis for the crop-production programs which were recommended. Other compilations were made for the confidential use of the war trade board and for the committees on agriculture in congress.

Much Information Compiled. Summaries of weekly reports of the state field agents of the bureau were furnished for the confidential information

of the secretary and chiefs of bureaus of the department of agriculture, and after the signing of the armistice the mailing list for these summaries was extended to include other government officials and senators and members of the house of representatives. Bimonthly foreign crop reports were issued in the spring of 1919 and will be continued.

A vast amount of information was compiled and furnished in response to inquiries received by telephone, telegraph, letter, or personal call of representatives of the food administration, the war trade board, the war industries board, the military intelligence office of the war department, the tariff commission, the federal trade commission, the council of national defense, other departments of the federal and state governments, congress, and private individuals.

More than 4,000,000 pieces of mail were handled by the division of crop reports during the year, as compared with 3,200,000 by the same division for the preceding fiscal year, an increase of 25 per cent. About the same relative increase was noted in all other branches of the bureau at Washington.

In the state offices of field agents the work more than doubled in the fiscal year 1919 as compared with the preceding year. The issuance by field agents of monthly state crop reports bearing their names which are generally reproduced in all the state papers has made them widely known throughout their states and has resulted in a heavy volume of correspondence.

Several weeks before the coal strike began on November 1 its coming was plainly apparent, and therefore the director general of railroads, Walker D. Hines, consulted with all the regional directors of railroads and the principal members of his staff, and decided that if the strike came it would be the job of the railroad administration to make the coal produced go as far as possible. After thorough discussion the plan was adopted of allowing all coal mined up to the time of the strike proceed as billed to consignees on the idea that once the strike actually began the railroads could look after their own and the emergency needs of the country by taking over coal actually on the rails at that time. Through this method foresighted consumers were placed in a position to store up. The alternative method would have been for the railroads to have begun to buy coal early in preparation for the strike, thus keeping such coal out of normal channels.

Prior to the strike a very careful survey of stocks on hand, both of railroads, industries and individuals (as far as possible) was conducted so that the railroad administration went into the strike with as accurate knowledge of the coal situation throughout the country as was obtainable. The administration's original survey on November 1 showed 22,000,000 tons of bituminous coal on wheels and in railroad storage subject to distribution under the administration's supervision. To this was added the daily production which totaled 18,800,000 tons in November, and of the aggregate the stocks still available for the country's protection on December 1, 12,300,000 tons and on December 8, 11,475,000 tons.

Prior to the strike orders were issued by the railroad administration to give preference to coal loading, and this naturally resulted in hardship on some industries. The result was however, that in the week ended October 25 a total of 13,200,000 tons of coal was produced and moved in the United States, this constituting a record for the country. It took hard work by everyone concerned to distribute this enormous amount of coal. Once the strike was on, the production never reached 50 per cent of normal, with the result shown above, viz., that in addition to using the production every day, the stored coal in possession of the railroads was depleted in the six

HOW COAL SUPPLY WAS CARED FOR DURING STRIKE OF MINERS

Uncle Sam Set Up His Own Coal Pile as Soon as Strike Began and Kept Replenishing It From Mines Which Continued to Work — Nation Able to Last Out the Six Weeks Through Efficiency of Government Control.

By BRUCE CLAGETT, Assistant to Director General of Railroads.

I have the thought that the people of the United States would like to know how their coal supply was handled during the six weeks' strike of bituminous coal miners, which has just come to an end. This was the first nation-wide coal strike the country ever experienced, and therefore the problems arising were novel. Necessarily, during the continuance of the strike, the exact stocks on hand could not be made public at all times, although as to all vital facts, the public seems to have been kept fully informed day by day. Uncle Sam set up his own coal pile as soon as the strike began and kept replenishing it from the mines which continued to work, but meanwhile the pile was being diminished more rapidly than new supplies were coming in, and before long it became a question of keeping people warm rather than what industries should be continued. Had the strike continued much longer many industries would have had to shut down and people thrown out of work, but on the restricted basis to which the country finally came and with the part-time production obtained undoubtedly the nation could have "carried on" for weeks longer, if not months.

Strike Anticipated.

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weeks of the strike from 22,000,000 tons to 11,375,000 tons.

Pile Saved Country.

At times during the strike some complaints were made regarding the holding of this coal in storage and on wheels by the railroads. Without such a storage, however, the country would have suffered much more than it did, and it would have been impossible to have looked after the emergency requirements of the parts of the country in greatest need. Throughout the strike practically all of the coal moved was produced in West Virginia and Pennsylvania, although some coal was produced in Kentucky, Alabama and Wyoming and a few other states. The great central competitive fields, however, closed down completely and outside of the stocks on hand the people in that territory had to depend entirely on the coal from the East and upon the coal in the hands of the railroads to meet just this emergency.

At the beginning of the strike coal was delivered freely to all of the ten classes on the fuel administrator's priority list, but soon afterward it was necessary to restrict deliveries to the first five classes, which included railroads, army and navy, together with other departments of the government, state and county departments and institutions, public utilities, and retail dealers, and toward the end of the strike it was difficult in some parts of the country to meet even these requirements, due to the fact that principally in the middle West the stocks became almost exhausted and it was necessary to depend practically entirely upon the coal produced in the East. The amount which could be shipped West was limited, not by car supply, but by transportation facilities and the necessity for moving this coal West was one of the reasons for the curtailment of passenger service in all parts of the country, which naturally led to some hardships and some complaints.

With regard to these complaints, a careful survey shows that, taken as a whole, the country has stood remarkably well the restrictions which had to be placed.

The action of the government during the strike which caused the greatest comment was the placing of restrictions in connection with the use of bituminous coal and coke in supplying light, heat and power to stores, office buildings, manufacturing establishments, etc. These regulations were put into effect by the railroad administration on the advice of the central coal committee and under authority of the fuel administrator. They were put into effect primarily as a coal conservation measure and because prior to their issuance local regulations, sometimes more stringent than these regulations, had already been laid down in many sections of the country. Prior to the issuance of these regulations the fuel administrator had issued a request that coal for light, heat and power be conserved as much as possible. Just as soon as the Indianapolis settlement was reached the attorney general, following out a prior arrangement, immediately notified the railroad administration, and plans were at once begun to modify restrictions, with the result that within two days after the strike was formally ended, instructions were issued to regional directors permitting them to remove the restrictions as to the furnishing of light, heat and power, and also permitting them to restore passenger trains which had been taken off as a coal conservation measure.

The receipt of the word from Indianapolis was also the signal for the releasing of instructions already prepared for the turning of empty coal cars towards mines which were expected to begin operation in order to transport the maximum production of all such mines at once.

Probably there was never a more unique organization ever set up in the United States than the central coal committee of the United States railroad administration at Washington, which throughout the strike had complete control over the distribution of coal mined and over supplies of coal in storage and on wheels on the railroads when the miners stopped work. The committee had back of it all the power of the fuel administration under the Lever act. There was no precedent to go by. Being bound by no precedents, it could go ahead in a common-sense way and that is exactly what it did.

Harry B. Spencer, director of division of purchases of the railroad administration, formerly vice president of the Southern railroad, and a man of long experience in dealing with coal questions, was given the unenviable job of handling the situation as chairman of the central coal committee. Before the strike actually began, he had his assistants all picked, his plans all made, his orders written and everything prepared to take charge. Therefore, the evening of October 31 Dr. Harry A. Garfield, the fuel administrator, who had tendered his resignation months before, but whose resignation had not been accepted and whose powers had only been suspended, not annulled, was called back into service and issued an order re-establishing control over the distribution of coal, making the director general of railroads his agent, and re-establishing the priority orders in effect during the war. At the same time, and to prevent profiteering, the fuel administrator issued orders re-establishing the government maximum prices on bituminous coal. The day the strike began Mr. Spencer put his organization into effect throughout the country, and from then on the problem was one of distributing coal and looking after the constantly decreasing stock of the country.

On the Job Every Day.

The committee remained in practically continuous session every day of the strike, including Sundays, and as rapidly as telegrams and letters came in, took immediate action.

Back of this committee and co-operating closely with it have been regional and district local coal committees, picked in advance of the strike and established immediately after the strike began. On these regional and local coal committees has fallen a very large share of the burden of handling the coal distribution problems from day to day, and it is to the credit of these committees that they have had a minimum of clashes with state or local authorities when it is appreciated that on these committees fell many of the duties exercised by the fuel administration through the war and when it is appreciated that these committees always were limited in what they could do by the stocks of coal on hand, it will be realized that their work was of the most difficult character.

One of the chief difficulties in the situation was the fact that conditions throughout the United States were so widely different that it was apparent that it would be impossible to deal with all sections of the country alike. Therefore a great deal of responsibility was left with the regional directors of railroads and with the regional and local coal committees. However, some general principles were laid down immediately which were followed in a general way throughout the coal strike. The preliminary rule was laid down that no coal should be given to any consumer who had a reserve supply, and that coal should only be given to meet emergency needs.

Get Reports Daily.

In order to avoid long distance communication, the rule was set up that persons desiring coal should make application on the road ordinarily supplying them with coal and in order that the central coal committee should be kept constantly supplied with information machinery was set up under which each railroad should promptly report to the central coal committee and to the regional coal committee the name, title, location and telephone address of the representative of that railroad in whom the whole coal question would be centered for that railroad.

Summed up, the result of the handling of the coal supply of the nation by the government has been that with a mobile supply at the beginning of the strike of 22,000,000 tons of coal at the disposal of the entire country, and a production which never reached 50 per cent of normal, with cold weather existing in most parts of the country during part of the strike, and blizzards in some parts of the country throughout most of the strike, the nation was able to last out six weeks with very little actual lack of coal by householders, with practically all public utilities supplied with sufficient coal to meet emergency needs, with very few industries actually closed down, although many would have had to close down had the strike continued much longer and with a reserve stock in the hands of the railroads at the end of the strike of more than 11,000,000 tons of coal which was available for emergency railroad needs and for the emergency needs of governmental institutions, of public utilities and retailers supplying coal to domestic consumers.

More Energy and Zip in Germany

Writer Says There Is Less Laziness Than in Any Other European Country.

LOW EXCHANGE IS BIG AID

Gives Germany Advantage in Laying Her Commercial Lines in Little Nations About Her—Bitter at United States.

By HAROLD E. BECHTOL. (In Chicago Post.)

Berlin.—I have been traveling in central Europe for months. I have visited farms and factories and stores and banks and government offices. A marked difference is noticeable as soon as the German frontier is crossed.

There is more energy and zip in Germany; there is less laziness; trains move regularly; clerks in stores are well staffed; wagons and cars and freight trains (one of the rarest sights in Europe) move briskly; smoke comes from the stacks of at least some of the factories.

German factory owners say "Made in Germany" goods can never again depend on cheapness for sale abroad. They point out that her sources of material are cut and that the old long hours and cheap labor are gone.

Yet Germany bids far lower than anybody else on a contract for metal uniform buttons for the Czecho-Slovak army recently. I could cite several other cases.

Germany has a big advantage in laying her commercial lines in the little nations about her (sentiment aside of course) because of the fact that her exchange is very low, like theirs.

From Germany alone, among the big nations, can the new nations get values approximating what their money represents to them.

Germany's Bright Side.

That is, for Germany, the bright side of a bad situation. Her mark is worth under a nickel, about a sixth of par. She has got to have a credit before she can buy cotton and copper from America. She can't buy with marks.

Government officials urge a credit for the hope it would give the German people as they enter on a hard winter.

The same people, of course, are made by the other nations of central Europe, some of whom helped the allies to win the war.

American observers here say the

it can, but the attitude of the Prussians in the business world is:

"You have to give us credit before we can pay France and Belgium and England! You're delaying to give France and England a further head start!"

They hold Uncle Sam personally responsible; he's hated for declining to rush humbly across with open money bags.

There are several reasons why the south of Germany is leading the north.

The Prussian worker had less freedom in the old days than the south German worker. Now that he holds the whip hand, he hasn't as sane an idea of what to do with his liberty.

Prussian capitalists, too, are slower. They hate to "get to work for France and England," as they put it.

British officers in the occupied area tell me the big dye works in the northern Rhine district are kept closed by the Germans. The Germans know the allies cannot yet equal their dyes—especially a "fixed" blue—and they do not propose to start these plants and let the allies learn the secrets if they can avoid it.

What She Can Export.

Germany can export some glass, china, potash, cutlery, optical instruments, surgical and scientific instruments and toys, without importing raw materials. She needs from America principally cotton and copper.

French and British chocolate, soap, toilet articles, etc., are on sale in the stores everywhere in Germany. The only American goods found generally are prewar stocks.

The French and British occupied zones are now commercial fronts. Military officers there and military missions in Germany give the French and British commercial travelers and bankers every assistance. All of the American commercial men and bankers I met in Germany told me they had fought their way through in spite of the American government, rather than with its assistance.

The Germans realize their overseas trade will be absolutely dependent on the allies for years to come. Germany now owns only 3 1/4 per cent of her prewar shipping.

Catch Two-Legged Whale.

Victoria, B. C.—A female humpback whale having two hind legs 50 inches in length has been caught at the Kyngot whaling station. Manager Ruck of the Consolidated Whaling company says that in his 20 years of whaling experience he has never heard of

ONE OF THE THINGS WILHELM COVETED



This is the great terminal in Constantinople of the Bagdad railway which is the scheme of the Kaiser for domination of the East.