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MR. ROOSEVELT ON VOTING
Speaking "as a citizen," President Roosevelt calls on Congress to "stand up and be counted" on proposed federal legislation to permit men and women in service to vote in the presidential elections and denounces as "subterfuge" the arguments that state rights are important.

Congress is not without blame in this matter. It has been quite obvious that on the part of many members from the South, the main concern has been to prevent the negro vote. There are many on the Republican side who are swayed more by their hatred of Mr. Roosevelt than by practical situations.

But the problem is not simple, and Mr. Roosevelt himself is guilty of the cheapest kind of politics when he attempts to put all congressmen "on the spot" indiscriminately, because there are many who are quite sincere in their belief that constitutional provisions cannot be set aside lightly, even for the sake of giving the soldier his vote.

We do not agree with those who fear that men and women in service would be "coerced by their officers" or even by Mr. Roosevelt as their commander-in-chief. We know the army and army people too well to believe that they would lend themselves to any such cheap tactics. If a plan of voting is worked out, you may be sure that it will be administered by the officers of army, navy and marine corps with an honesty and impartiality that party leaders in the home towns might well copy.

Behind all the hubbub over soldier voting lies this one important question:

"How can a practical and efficient plan for a world wide poll of men and women in service be worked out without establishing a long-range federal control of voting which entails grave dangers?"

If Mr. Roosevelt came into this controversy with clean hands, his appeal might be entitled to respect, but his hands are very dirty. During his 12 years in office, he has not only built up the most extravagant bureaucracy in human history, but he has permitted his political leaders to use every known means to convert it into a national political machine, boss-controlled, on the pattern of the worst political gangs that ever were known in American states and cities.

Thousands of American citizens, holding sympathy for Mr. Roosevelt's vast social and war programs, have taken jobs with various New Deal alphabets and "authorities," only to learn that this question comes up whenever any advancement or promotion is in question:

"Have you changed your registration?"

Only yesterday we talked with a professional man who closed his office at the beginning of the war to take an appointment as administrator for the Northwest in one of the most vital war agencies. He relates this experience:

"A month or two ago I got my notice to attend the annual Jackson Day dinner at \$100 per plate—which of course I couldn't afford, even if I were a party man which I am not. I did not make any answer. Came several additional notices. The other day came quite a peremptory notice, inclosing a blank to be 'signed here' and demanding \$25 down and the rest in regular installments. I have thrown that in the waste basket. Now I am waiting to see what they will do to me. I feel I have done a good job and a very necessary one. I resent bitterly this effort to force me into the Roosevelt organization, although I have voted for him twice of my own accord gladly."

If Congress views with suspicion the President's sudden concern for the soldier vote (on the heels of his bungling management of wage and price controls at home) it is because there is at least some reason to fear the motive. We do not believe that even Mr. Roosevelt could debauch the army and navy into a political instrument, but if that happened there could be no greater tragedy for democracy.

WASHINGTON LETTER
By PETER EDSON
Register-Guard Washington Correspondent

TEAMWORK AND THE AIR FORCES

TWO military terms which the civilian may want to get straightened out in his mind as a prelude to the invasion of Europe are "tactical air force" and "strategic air force." It is a strategic U. S. Army air force which is now operating out of Great Britain in the long-range bombing of Germany, first to destroy the enemy's fighter plane strength and second to smash industrial targets vital to the enemy's military strength on the ground.

When the actual invasion of Hitler's fortress in Europe begins, then the tactical air force will begin to be heard from, working in actual battle along with the ground forces.

How this differentiation of strategic and tactical air forces was developed in the North African campaign is related by Gen. Henry H. Arnold's report to the secretary of war, covering operations of the past 25 months.

Many of the principles governing the tactical and strategic uses of airpower in modern warfare were learned, General Arnold reveals, from the mistakes of the Italians. In the summer of 1940 the Italians started their Libyan operation with a large, powerful and modern air force which might have won the campaign for them. The Italian air forces were, however, under the command of ground force officers. Local army commanders broke up this big air force and used it in small units for the support of minor operations.

Against this big Italian air force, the British in Egypt had only a handful of obsolete aircraft. The British used its small force as one mass and as a result was able to destroy 1100 Italian planes. As the British air force in North Africa was strengthened during the next two years it gained control of the air and it was the tactical use of this force which stopped Rommel and kept him from destroying the British army.

From these desert campaign experiences were evolved many of the present ideas about the use of a tactical air force—ideas which will in all probability be put to use in the coming invasion. It is misleading, says General Arnold, to say merely a tactical air force provides support to the ground troops, although that conception appears firmly imbedded in the public mind.

The German conception of this air support for ground forces was adequate in the blitz against France, when there was no opposition, but there is a marked difference between that kind of warfare and the present Allied conception of having an air general run the air war while a ground general runs the ground war—but always working together for the same objective.

"Team" Leaders Now in England

THE same kind of teamwork is of course necessary between the strategic and tactical units of an air force in any theater of operations, General Arnold points out. In Africa, there was a Strategic Air Force under Major General Doolittle, a Coastal Air Force under Vice Marshal Lloyd to attack German and Italian supply lines across the Mediterranean, and a Tactical Air Force under Air Marshal Coningham.

These units were not fixed, but entirely flexible. They borrowed flights and squadrons from each other for various missions as the situation demanded. All were under Lieutenant General Spaatz as commander of the Northwest African Air Forces. Spaatz, in turn, was under Air Marshal Teder, as commander of air forces in the entire Mediterranean theater, and Teder of course was under the supreme command of General Eisenhower.

As Eisenhower, Teder, Spaatz and Doolittle have all been transferred to England to command the invasion of northwestern Europe, it is only reasonable to assume that their same division of tactical and strategic employment of air forces will be employed against Germany, though General Arnold's report makes no mention of this subject.

Report Skips "Separate Air Force" Question

ANOTHER subject which the general does not discuss is the subject of the "independent air command," the "separate air force," outside the Army, outside the Navy, yet absorbing the air forces of both older arms. General