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fh OREGON STATESMAN. Salem, Oregon. Sunday Morning, January 25. 1942
PAG2 THREE
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Inquiry Board
Say
US Vessel
Board Fixes Blame in Hawaii Debacle
Sank Jap Sub
, Dereliction of Duty
Charged to Kimmel
And Short in Report
(Continued from page 1)
The board which conducted the
inquiry ; was headed by Associate
Justice Owen J. Roberts, on leave
from the supreme court. Its other
members were Admirals William
H. Standley ' and J. M. Reeves,
both retired. Major Gen. Frank R.
McCoy," retired, and Brig. Gen.
Joseph T. - Mcflarney, an active
air corps officer. '
The two officers In question,
- Short and Kimmel, were re
lieved of their commands tea
days after the attack. What Is
now in store for them was a
matter of conjecture. Under
navy and army regulations,
they may be dismissed by the
president for "dereliction of
duty," in which event they have
the right to appeal for a court
martial.
The board took exhaustive tes
- timony, even advertising for wit
nesses who might have some light
to throw upon the incident. In ad
dition, it examined stacks of doc
umentary evidence.
In the latter, it found that as
early as Jan. 24, 1941, Secretary
of the NavyKnox told Secretary
of War Stimpson that the increas
ed gravity of the American-Jap
anese situation required a re-stu
dy of defense plans for the Pa
cific area.
lf war eventuates," Knox
wrote, "It Is believed easily
-possible that hostilities would
be initiated by a surprise attack
upon the fleet or naval base at
Pearl Harbor."
This, he said, 'held "inherent
possibilities of a major disaster
In the order of their importance.
and probability, he listed the
"dangers" as air bombing attack
air torpedo plane attack, sabotage,
submarine attack, mining, bom
bardment. The letter was forwarded to
Short and Kimmel with orders to
cooperate in making suggested
measures effective.
Beginning wtfh Nov. 27, 1941, a
succession of messages was sent
to Kimmel and Short emphasizing
the danger of the situation includ
ing one from Admiral Harold
Stark, the chief of naval opera
tions to Kimmell "which," the
board said, "stated in substance
that the dispatch was considered
a war warning."
It directed a defensive de
ployment of fleet task forces,
and reported a probability of
aggressive Japanese action
. against the Philippines, Thai
land, the Kra peninsula or Bor
neo. Kimmel showed the mes
sage to Short, but at the time
of the -hearing, the latter had
no Independent recollection of
it although he felt sure it had
been shown to him.
On the third, fourth and sixth
of December three messages went
from Washington to Kimmel, stat
ing it was believed certain that
Japanese consulates were destroy
Ing their codes because of the
tense situation and burning secret
documents. Naval forces in the
far Pacific were ordered to do
likewise.
"The foregoing messages did
not create In the minds of the
responsible officers in the Ha
waiian area apprehension as to
probable Immense of air raids,"
- the board said.
"On the contrary, they only
served to emphasize in their
minds the danger from sabotage
and surprise submarine attack.
The necessity for taking a state
of .war readiness would have
been required to avert or meet
an air raid attack was not eon
a sldered."
On Dee." t the director of na
val intelligence Issued a bulle
- tin saying that Japanese fleet
movements "indicated clearly
' that1 extensive preparations are
under way for hostilities."
After telling of the deployment
of other Japanele fleet units, it
' added that the major capital ship
. strength remains in home waters'
as well as the greatest portion of
the carriers.
To this the board appended its
interpretation that: "The naval
intelligence services in Hawaii,
due ' to lack of information indi
eating that the bulk of the Japan
cse carriers were at sea, concluded
they were in home ports."
A last warning was sent from
Washington one hour and 22 min
v:
.
v
V
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This board of Inquiry (above) Saturday fixed the blame for the failure of Hawaii's defenders to be on
the alert when the Japs attacked Dee. 7, In a 10,000-word report to President Roosevelt. (Left to
right), Brig. Gen. Joseph T. McNary, Admiral William H. Standley, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts
of the supreme court. Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves and Maj. Gen. Frank Ross McCoy.
utes before the attack advising The investigating board, which
that an almost "immediate break spent 20 days in Hawaii looking
in relations" was expected. Bvery into the surprise onslaught and
effort was made to expedite it, hut fixing responsibility, noted that
it did not arrive in time "due to on November 27, ten days before
conditions beyond the control of the Japanese attack, the chief of
every one concerned." military intelligence advised army
On Nov. 27, Short ordered one officials in Hawaii that peace ne-
of three forms of alert Into ef
fect. It was "alert number one"
"against "acts of sabotage and
uprisings within the islands,
with no threat from without."
(Alert number two was directed
at defense against attacks by
submarines, surface vessels or
aircraft. Alert number three re
quired the occupation of all po
sitions for maximum defense.)
No "inshore" aerial patrol was
in effect prior to Dec. 7, the board
found, except such as might be
incidental to training and maneu
vers, and that took place only on
gotiations with Japan "had prac
tically ceased, that hostilities
might ensue and that subversive
activity might be expected."
On the same day, the chief of
naval operations, Admiral Harold
R. Stark, messaged KimmeU that
Japan was expected to make an
aggressive move within a few
days.
Stark's warning to Kimmel
said an amphibious expedition
was indicated against the Phil
ippines, Thai, the Kra peninsu
la, or possibly Borneo.
There were subsequent warn-
weekdays, during the hours of ings in the next few days but the
daylight. The same situation ap- board said that these messages
plied to reconnaissances far off "did not create in the minds of
shore. the responsible officers in the
"Means were available," the Hawaiian area apprehension as to
board said, "for distant reconnais- probable imminence of air raids.
sances which would have afforded 11 added:
measure' of security against a "n the contrary they only
surprise air attack.
General Short assumed the minds danger from sabotage
navy was conducting distant re-
! served to emphasize in their
and surprise submarine attack.
The necessity for taking a state of
war readiness which would have
been required to avert or meet an
air raid attack was not consid
ered." f
General Short, Admiral Kim-
mel, the commandant of the
14th naval district. Rear Admir
al C. C. Black, their senior sub
ordinates and f principal staff
officers had considered the pos
sibility of air raids, the Roberts
commission found, but "with
out exception they believed that
the chances of such a raid while
the Pacific fleet was based upon
Pearl Harbor were practically
nil."
The attack on iDecember 7, the
commission said,! "was therefore a
complete surprise to each of
them."
The commission, discussing ac
tivities of Japanese spies and ag
ents, said it was apparent now
that the Japanese had obtained
complete information through
their intelligence service and ap
parently knew that no task force
of the navy was anywhere in the
sector northeast, north and north
west of the Hawaiian islands.
They evidently knew, the re
port said, that no distant airplane
reconnaissance was maintained in
any sector and that pp to Decem
ber 6 no inshore air patrol was
being maintained around Oahu is
land, i
Furthermore, the report said,
the Japanese knew the location of
airfields, hangars, and other struc
tures and where certain impor
tant naval vessels would be
berthed.
"Their fliers had the most de
tailed maps, courses, and bear
ings, so that each could attack
a given .vessel or field," the
commission said. "Each seems
to have been given a specified
mission."
The report gave no added de
tails of the damaged inflicted in
the Japanese attack.
Secretary of the Navy Knox had
reported earlier that one battle-
Ship, the Arizona, was sunk, along
with the target ship Utah, three
destroyers and a mine layer, and
that several other vessels were
damaged, including the battleship
Oklahoma, which capsized. Army
and navy dead were placed at
nearly 3,000 with upwards of 900
wounded. Japanese losses, Knox
said, were three submarines and
41 planes.
The Roberts report, apparent
ly taking note from rumors that
a large portion of the army and
navy personnel in Hawaii had
been on weekend leave as the
attack began, said that officers
and enlisted men of both serv
ices were present in sufficient
number and were In fit condi
tion to perform any duty. It
added that the use of liquor on
the evening before, except for
a negligible number, did not
affect their efficiency.
Among contributory causes to
the success of the attack, the com
mission found were restrictions,
such as those on wire tapping,
which prevented effective coun
ter-espionage. It noted, too, that
warning messages had placed em
phasis on the probability of Jap
anese action in the far east and
on anti-sabotage measures.
The commission also listed as a
contributory cause the failure of
the war department to reply to a
message relating to anti-sabotage
measures taken by General Short
and non receipt by the command
ers in Hawaii, prior to the attack,
of a warning message sent shortly
before hostilities began.
It is true, the report asserted,
that there was a deficiency in
material for the Hawaiian area
because of the enormous de
mand on the nation's munitions
and war supplies. But this de
ficiency, the commission de
clared, "did not affect the crit
ical fact of failure to take ap
propriate measures with (he
means available."
Secretaries Hull, Kno x. and
Stimson, the heads of the state,
navy and war departments, re
spectively, together with Admiral
Stark, , and the army chief of
staff, General George C. Marsh
all, were said to have fulfilled
their obligations.
The responsible commanders in
the Hawaiian area, the report
said, had "prepared plans, which,
if adapted to and used for the ex
isting emergency, would' have
been adequate." ' " ' ,
' "Had orders Issued by the
chief of staff and the chief of
naval operations November 27,
1941, been complied with," the
commission concluded, "the air
craft . warning system should
have been operating; the distant
reconnaissance of the navy and
the Inshore air patrol of the
army should have been main
tained, the anti-aircraft batter
ies of the army and similar
shore batteries of the navy, as
well as additional anti-aircraft
artillery located on vessels of
the fleet in Pearl Harbor,
should have been manned and
supplied with ammunition, and
a high state of readiness of air
craft should have been In effect.
"None of these conditions was
v
inifact inaugurated or maintain
ed, for the reason that the respon
sible commanders failed to con
sult and cooperate as to necessary
action based upon the warnings
and to adopt measures enjoined
by the orders given them by the
chiefs of the army and navy com'
mands in Washington.""
Both officers and men respond
ed immediately when the attack
began, the commission said, and
exhibited "initiative, e f f i ciency
and bravery in meeting the raid."
But the army and navy com
manders, the commission said, had
failed to make "suitable disposi
tions" to meet an attack and had
"failed properly to evaluate the
seriousness of the situation."
77
These errors of judgment,
Roberts and his our associate
declared, were Hhe effective
causes for the success of the at,
tack." i j' i"
As a result of this letter, some
steps were taken toprovide addi
tional ,. measures v for ' protection
against' air attack ini Hawaii, the
report said.; ' . - ' ... -
The report" said it waa believed
the Japanese consulate et Hono
lulu : served as 'the center; of es
pionage aclivrty,' pointing out that
last sammer more than 200 Jap
anese consular egents were acting
under the; Japanese .consul
As ff Jthe attack Itself,1 tfiR
commission said available In
formation Indicated either three '
or four aircraft carriers, sup
porting surface craft,' and a few
small submarines were' em
ployed and ' that these, - except
for the. subs, approached from
the north
The US$ An tares sighted a sus
picious object off Pearl Harbor at
6:30 a. m. the day of the attack,
the report; continued, and this was
identified as a small submarine,
which was sunk by action of a na
val patrol plane and the TJSS
Ward. A report of this action
reached the naval base watch of
ficer at 7:12 a. m. and he notified
his chief of staff, but no alert
warnings were issued, the com
mission asserted. Forty three min
utes later, at 7:55 a! m., the on
slaught on Pear Harbor began.
A second small Japanese sub
marine was sunk in the harbor
after the attack started and a
third. grounded and captured.
Prior to December 7, the com
mission said, an anti-torpedo net
across Pearl Harbor was closed
only during hours of darkness on
the theory that nearby vessels
would detect any submarine ap
proaching in daylight hours. Pro
bably, the report said, a submar
ine entered around 7 a. m. the day
of the attack.
An estimated 150 to 200 fight
ing, b o m b I n g, and torpedo
planes Were used against Pearl
Harbor and nearby army sta
tions, the commission said. It
e r e d it e d ' torpedoes launched
from planes with most of the
damage to ships in the harbor.
Permanent installation of air
craft warning systems had not
been completed on December 7,
the commission said, but some
temporary Installations had been
made and General Short had or
dered them manned daily from 4
to 7 . m.
The system shut down at 7 on
tie ' fateful Sunday but a non
commissioned officer who had
been1.- training was given permis
sion to remain at one station and
at '7.-02, the board said, he discov
ered whatT , he thought was "a
large flight , ef planes" lightly
east and north of Oahu and about
1.30 miles away.'
i This was reported to an army
lieutenant at a central Informa-
tion center 18 minutes later, the
Tfeport went .on.
I Bat It added that the lieu
tenant, who had been detailed
there to familiarise himself with .
the system, assumed the planes
were friendly and took no. ac
tion since he had Information
(hat jMvtalaa ITnlful Ct.t.. w
craft might be in the vicinity at
the time.
! The board said there was suf
ficient partially trained personnel
available on November 27 to op
erate the warning, system 24
hours a day. Admiral Kimmel, it
said, assumed the system was be
ing fully operated by the army,
but had made no inquiry to con
firm it despite receipts of warn-'
ing messages from Washington.
: Under a Joint coastal frontier
defense plan the navy was-to
conduct -air reconnaissance ra
diating 740 to 800 miles from
Oahu, once the plan became ef
fective, the board said. No such
flights were made prior to De
cember 7 however except dur- ..
Ing drills and maneuvers, the
board continued.
General Short, it said, assumed
the navy was carrying out the
plan but he also made no inquiry
about it after seeing-the messages
from Washington.
Portland Bond
Check Complete
PORTLAND, Jan. 24-;p)-Th
house-to-house canvass for de
fense saving bond purchase
pledges was virtually completed
in Multnomah ; county Saturday,
Larry Hilaire, chairman, reported.
Hilaire said district headquar
ters would be open Monday for
voluntary pledges from those
missed in the canvass.
connaissance, but after seeing the
warning messages of October and
November from the war and navy
departments, he made no further
inquiry with respect to the work
being conducted by the navy."
An anti-submarine and anti-
torpedo net guards the entrance
to Pearl Harbor. Customarily it
was closed at night and open in
the day time. On the morning of
Dec. 7, it was opened at 4:58 for
the entrance of two mine sweep
ers, and left open. A small Japan
ese submarine slipped in about 7
o'clock. It was sighted at 7:45 and
sunk. The net was ordered closed
at 8:40 a. m.
The Japanese force which
struck at Pearl Harbor was es
timated at 150 to 200 fighting
planes. No additional alert was
ordered after the submarine
was discovered inside the har
bor, and at 7:55 the planes
s t r u c k. Most damage was
caused by aerial torpedoes
launched from planes.
Immediately upon realizing
that the Japanese were attacking,"
the board said, Short ordered
alert number three.
Under the state of readiness
which had been prescribed for 1
army aircraft prior to the attack,
they were required to be ready
for flight only after four hours
notice.
Moreover, to prevent a sabot
age, they had been closely group
ed on the flying fields, by plan,
instead of being dispersed for
greater ease in taking to the air.
Concentrated, they made an
easy target for the Jap fliers, and
the latter damaged or destroyed
them to such an extent that "very
few fighter planes were able to
take the air" during the attack. A
few, however, did get into the'
fight, with marked success.
At the time of Japan's surprise
raid, Kimmel was both command
er in chief of the United States
fleet and commander of the Pa
cific fleet.
Subsequently, Rear Admiral
Ernest J. King,, who was com
manding the Atlantle fleet, was
named commander in chief of
the entire fleet, and Rear Ad
miral Chester W. Nimltx, at the
time chief of the navy's bureau
of navigation, was appointed
commander of the Pacific fleet.
Short was relieved and in his
place President Roosevelt put
Lieutenant General Delos C. Em
mons, who was then chief of the
air force combat command.
WW.
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