PORTLAND, OREGON, SUNDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 17, ,1922. . V , , , ,v
t s
i -
FINISHING
WAS
Appearance of Enemy Delegates
Before Conference Made Un
' der Dramatic Circumstances.
Brockdorff Rantzau Displays
Amazing Lack-of Tact and
J; Clemenceau Speaks Abruptly.
i - CHAPTER, L ,.t
' Thj Snnda Journal herewith "resents tt
fiftieth installment of Kay Staxraaid Baker'
ctorr. "Th Fraoe." which is am authontatiT
(aairatra of bow the peace of Paris was
aooelnded. Woodrow Wilson Mr. Baker
(ace to an tau personal, nnpublislied papers,
vikirk m' iK rtnlv reliable and inrxm-
Hrerattible report of - the facts, and which
thereto ore have oner been, made pablin. The
jarxxhial feature will- be published in The
(Journal serially t drouth out the year.
tCopyright, 1822. by Doubledajr. Pice Uo.,
1-utilisheil oy especial Arrant emenr. wim
the MaCluro Newspaper. Syndicate.)
Hv W st Ktan nurd ftakrr
haontbs had etapsed since the close of
id rreat war. ror i uui ul mew
months the repre
sentatives1 of the
allied powers, there
at Paris, had been
toiling; desperately
to get- it ready. It
had been trulv
race of peace with
anarchy; for while
fans talked- Rn.
ropean civilization
was Iiterallv din
SOlvtnK in ehana
Most of the diffi
culties, and, every
one or the serious
crises had arisen
not bo much out of
any differences of
iness of the term, 8tern-
... uiaoreemenu among
rotriT8- The center and
ldent WifrfUhad been between
met 1 " emndinK a settle-
vert ? ".Principles-whieh
k7 had indeI accepted ! and
he,r Uied Powers demanding
VJna tomediate material repara
.anta tectorial and other ad-
L'.,1"6' at lenrth. through many
vicissitudes, much darkened counsel.
erBed buly white bookTof
200 pages, bearing- upon its cover.
aon thi8- the cnci8 informa:
zt lwittMe7r toe "Conations
nleilL. Thi momentou'. book,
sacked and rmmni ...;.v. ,
tuu ? humanity, the pro-
Clf whkih were still for the
fiowl eCret was now to be laid
POWIL With rramATiv v.-.-
l- k , . "v,j wivn; jho van
buiehed enemy. Here 'were the names
P . tau ves or 37 allied nations
Kl at the head of them all was
The President t tv...Jj ... .
. M uiuieu QUleS
hf America, by:- . . , v
The HonorahlA trnniinn nrn...
President of h. fT,."?..- """UD-
vt wung
f n Jis own nam an Kv ki.
fct; authority." '
,And following the names of the
merican delegation were the British:
I Ilia Malentv th . t .
w, . - - v. m0 ii i tea
Kingdom of Ofeat Britain and Ire
fand and of the British Dominions be
f. Se8, EPeror of India, by
i . iaui. xionoraoie David Lloyd
t jmma Mimster."
And after th 'AmriruSnrna i.a
T presented, came France and th
her allied nations, great and small.
Hd i at last, not the empire, nor yet
ft-ealth, rbue ' ' ,
Germany, by: ;
C!oTint BmrkHnrff.Pg nto . n:.:.i
- . ixiiiiirLCI
f Foreign Affairs of the Rmr.tr
SIG3T THUKE" ;
After thA nanism nf tm iatini.ioKi
uray came the bulky ; body. f ' the
xeaty Itself.. 44V articles, and then the
tres for- the signature of 70 allied
eaders, to which would later be" at
ched the great seals and the colored
ibbons to symbolize., with a kind of
roiucai xraguiry. the new harmonies
"bis vast document . was aimed Xo
rine about. And ttnaiiv v,
d of it all. was the place at which
woria. was soon to point with a
letermined; and yet somehow curiously
mcertaln finger, and say to Ger-
sany : . u U- - ' ;
? "Sign there."
t Oone at -Versailles, in a single copy
Which Will - remain ilorwxiiinVi . t,
Jtrchives of the French republic, and
uf which authenticated conies win
TansmlttedL to each of the signatory
jowers.
( Such was the treaty of Versailles, to
) presented , to the Germans on May
f in the old Triiinon iuIim t
secaliarry .and: completely -the, work of
as auieu yowersv ior uenuanr, as al
teady pointed out. was ; excluded at
lie start from any " participation in
Vamlnar th. terms tt th tuaio Th.u
wd been a complete uaanimity of
muuon in tne aijiea wona mat by her
urse in the war. by the Intent she
dearly revealed in the peace of Brest
Utovsk. that she was entitled to have
Xltrliinc- vrriifavai r 9 m KAnf
rna of the settlement. It was clear-
7 understood that she would be given
io ; choice ., but to accept associated
lowers agreed upon ' -among- them
clvfts. .- ;
Desperately as the . leaders dodged
ie term, the peace was thus to be an
rn posed peace, drawn up with no con
sideration of what Germany thought
bot It.- It la futile- to speculate em
e possibility f any!; other method i
Jie fact is that . this, is the way the
ShiSg was gone abont. . ;
i In . thus accepting . the complete re
iponslbility for ? the Justice of the
serms, with Germany excluded from
he discussion, - the allies had lso
i r'-cr difficult i.rul ! One of the
'SIGN HERE,
I
OF VERSAILLES TREATY
ACTUAL RACE WITH ANARCHY
. Scene of Great Treaty's Birth
ALARIE DES GLACE5.or gallery of mirrors, in the palace of Versailles, where was
signed the treaty which ended the World war. Above, seated, are David Lloyd George
and M. Briand at the conference. First came the names of the United States arid England,
the two Anglo-Saxon nations, then France and those of the other allies, and finally the sig
nature of the enemy nation, which was given no choice except to "sign here."
8
. .. v.
i-'r-rivir rrrraiiirosai " """r s v
If fM JLj i ; ' J i
a-w, .t r'v?, -v 3- I -AerrMlT irm 4
instability of conditions within Ger
many. The old government has been
swept away and the new republic was
not yet fairly upon its legs. Economic
chaos, even starvation, threatened the
very life of the people ; and behind
that lurked the red spectre of Bol
shevism. Would there be any "Ger
many to sign when the treaty was
complete? .
A certain element In the conference,
notably the French, would have con
tinued to disregard this situation;
would have proceeded to draw up such
terms as were judged .fitting and pre
sent the treaty finally on the points of
some millions of bayonets.1 But the
more liberal arid" far-seeing element
at Paris, as already recounted in- va
rious connections. Insisted upon, the
necessity of keeping, Germafty from
anarchy until the: peace was signed and
the league instituted. - This was done,
though only after bitter struggles, by
arranging to feed the Germans, . and.
even to do so tn a manner contribut
ing to the prestige of the new national
government. ' '. " -
THE THREE TESTS .
These modifications in the attitude
of the conference toward Germany,
however, had to do only with questions
of immediate interest with keeping
Germany going while the treaty of
peace was being prepared. There was
no modification of the fundamental
principle that Germany should have no
say In determining what that freaty
should contain.
So the burden of meeting the three
great problems of the treaty rested
still wholly upon the allies. These
tests were : Was the treaty just?
Would" it be accepted by the Germans,
and. -if accepted and signed, would it
be practically; workable?
There were a few men at Paris cap
able of. thinking beyond the exagger
ated passions ..of the moment: who
from the early days of the conference
had kept in clear sight these more per
manent tests of the treaty as factors
of the peace. The presidents of course,
was the chief of these. He was asking
at every turn ; Is this justt Will the
Germans' eijen Itt pWUt it work'-But
he was not the. only one. General Bliss,
among the Americans, never J lost his
sense - of perspective. ' and - General
Smuts among the British, though one
of his important actions at Paris is
open to sharp criticism, kept a steady
head. . -
These thoughtful leaders perceived
clearly that there was grave danger of
ruining the w hole work f peace if . the
conference should produce a treaty
against which i the mass of German
opinion would at once revolt.-For there
might easily ensue, a refusal to sign,
or collapse- of organised government,
or a submission accompanied by a de
termination to overturn the settlement
as soon as a chance came perhaps all
three. And men capable f perceiv
lnsr these possibilities were also clear
irl-1 -k1 etiougrh to realize that a peace
sww"wwwwa wywwywweow hiihit-t
ui I in, i ii j Li LI mm i l ---f h iimiiimii i iIF 11 l" IV i m l 1 1 in i i nil.
acceptance and 'observance could never
be anything- but a curse to the world.
THE FASCIKATIISG PCZZLE
Kven after the Germans were invited
on April 14 to come to Versailles, tha
fascinating puzzle, "Will they . sign?
Won't they sign?" still occupied much
time in the council of four' and indeed
among all the delegates. There was to
be no rest from it henceforward until
the-end of June. Every day or so one
of the Big Three would bring In reports
from his observers on the state of opin
ion among the Germans, the attitude
and prospects of continuance In power
of the existing government This In
creasing concern and Consideration for
the effect of the council's" work: oh
Germany led to a continuous run of
suggestions' for making the treaty wore
acceptable. - ' ? : '
As the terms of the treaty' began to
leak out' there .were more and more
evidences of . the reality of the prob
lem. On April 24", Wilson reported a
conversation of an American officer
with.. BTockdorff-Rantsau. minister of
foreign affairs, " in . which the latter
pronounced, the terms of peace, so far
as known, "to ampunt to slavery for
Germany," and declared that the gov
ernment "could not' agree to .such
terms." 1 ,
President Wilson interpreted this
telegram to mean that Brockdorff
Rantxau typified the extreme point of
view. In the background he believed
there was a more submissive body of
opinion. His informant had suggested
that the German people ought to know
that a certain amount of discussion
would be permitted. He himself was
inclined to agree in the proposal that
the discussion should take place in
writing. ! a
This was a decided advance. upon the
riginal Ideal of imposing the treaty
without any discussion at all. It was
finally agreed that the German dele
gation after receiving the treaty on
May 7 should be given 15 days within
which, to make observations and put
questions, and that the allied and as
sociated, powers " would make written
replies to these before obliging the
Germans to make their final decision.
Lloyd George opposed publication of
the treaty on the ground that' this
would make changes more difficult.
Clemenceau was strongly for the pub
lication, and for-the same reason. -J
The immediate test of the treaty,
therefore the whole treaty, both the
terms and the league would be 5 its
practicability : L Would It work out? If
justice were not possible in every one
of the terms there still remained what
was, in President Wilson's view, the
great Instrument -of practicability, the
League of Nations. If this, were gen
uinely and whole-heartedly accepted, by
all nations It- would, as soon as the
world ' emerged from the ehell-ehock
of the war and Trecovered- its senses,
modify unjust provisions and make the
whole settlement more acceptable t to
the Germans, s Everything, therefore,
depended upon the league and the good
will with which it was used.
: Vnfier ' such t'T-Hat'o-uF. .in yuch an
ifr'ni 1 r i- n r "thim-" " i
fear, ambition, with such compromises,
the treaty was at length completed.
There had been delays ; the German
delegation had been sitting impatiently
at Versailles, knowing only by rumor
what was in this document and await
ing the -moment of. the presentation.
FACE TO FACE WITH CEBMAJfT
On May , 7 the great meeting .- took
place. For the first time in five years
the representatives of, the allied 'na
tions . and Germany ; met face to face.
Everything had .been done by the
French, .who, beyond, any other people,
possess the genius for staging such an
event, , to. make the occasion truly . not
able." "It was a day -of , great, beauty-:
May at '.Versailles I One looked from
the windows of the oldypalace where
the ceremony was going on Into gar
dens or surpassing loveliness. The com
pany in attendance ' had been scaled
down to the-lowest possible number, for
the room was email. Beyond the ac
tual delegates and the. necessary inter
preters and secretaries there were no
spectators except a small group of
journalists. It was altogether the most
Impressive and, indeed, important and
critical meeting of the entire peace
conference: far more impressive than
the crowded and overstated later cere
mony of the signing in the Palace of
Mirrors.' -The outcome ' of the; latter
occasion. wa ltnown ; only the formali
ties of the ' actual signing - were to be
observed; but her at the Trianon Pal
ace, on this perfect May day, nothing
was known. It was the first tremulous
uncertain contact of bitter enemies.
What would the Germans say ? ' What
would they do? f, t t,-'s . 4
It .was .such a moment as' occurs rare
ly in- history when the representatives
of 27 nations filed in to take their
places around the great table. Here
were the heads of the four most power
ful nations in the, -world,- a ' president
and three prime ministers, and the
leading men of many others. When all
these had been seated the door swung
open and with the words, 'Lea Pleni
potentiares. aUsmands," the Germans
entered , solemnly. the entire assembly
rising to its -feet and standing in silence
while, they took their places.. i The lead
er, a Count i Brcckdorff-R&ntxau, s all.
thin, black-clad, aristocratic appearing;
seemed to every one who saw -iilm un
der great strata. His face was pale,
and hie bow to the head of the table,
where stood Clemenceau, -was awkward
ly formal. :r ,:t"-v
President Wilson sat at Clemenceau
right. Lloyd George .at his, left. , The
doors were dosed.. but.juinshine flooded
tlw room. Fora moment 4he delega
tion of Germans; a group f -eight or
10 men, sat facing hi alienee the array
of the .allied chiefs- about them; Then
Clemenceau.. short, powerful, impres
sive, rose in -hie place to speak. , His
.words were sharp; came'' like bullets'
It is ; 'neither the .time "nor the place
for superfluous words." - - ir: r--
Clemenceau had none.' He ; looked
straight at the German delegates there
at the end of the table. "
"You have before you t1 -s aaccredlted
plenipotentiaries of eil V. -e ifrr.iM r.l
AMERICA IS
DUE TO ACT
Edward A. Filene Urges Eco
nomic Conference Under Aus
pices of President Harding.
Points Out Several Grave Fac
tors That Retard Peace and
. Prosperity in Hemispheres.
In the aecompanyiiMt article ' Kdward A.
Filena of Boston, merchant and economist,
offers his analysis of Kuropean problems ands
sacrests solution.
By Edward A. Filene
There will be no surety of steady
work, no surely of steady profits, no
surety of steady- good business in
America until France is given guar
antees against possible attack by Ger
many. This is the conclusion which in
tensive study of the European situation
has ' forced upon me. I have chosen
the theme on which I speak today be
cause It gives me an opportunity to
marshal facts which I believe will show
both the necessity and possibility of
obtaining these guarantees and that
through our country we can, without
pledging ourselves to send a single sol
dier overseas,, secure the necessary
pledges of help to France in case of at
tack, which will, in turn, open the only
unmeaiaieiy practical road to pros-.
penty ana peace for tr.e world.
For a time after the armistice, the
supplying of the imperative needs of
our own people and of Europe kept
our factories busy and made a market
for our farm products. Just now, the
irresistible demand for more houses
and for the long-delayed rerjalrs of
buildings, railroads and public works,
the replenishing of stocks by our mer
chants and the export of some of our
food products and essential raw ma
terials, that cannot be bought else
where, are again speeding up produc
tion in mines and factories. But. the
productive power of our mines, farms,
and factories greatly exceeds home con
sumption. J ust as the weakness of
the disordered European market re
sulted In 1920 in an inevitable slump in
exports mat tnrew millions of men
out of employment and brought keen
dlstresa to everjt farmer, eo it will' con
tinue to operate. :
CONDITIONS WOBSE 7;
Conditions in Europe have, for sev
eral years, been steadily going from
bad -to' worse until they have become
extremely dangerous. The situation
nas been closely approximated i that
was foretold by Ambassador Page in
a letter to President Wilson in March;
1917, when he predicted that The
world will be divided, into two hemi
epheres, one of them, our own. will
have the gold and the commodities ; the
otner. Great Britain and Europe, will
need these commodities, but will have
no money with which to pa for them."
I, myself, ventured to predict such a
situation more than two years ago
wnen x said, "Unless Europe can re
gain its feet and resume production
on a normal basis, her entire economic
structure is threatened. An unstable
Europe cannot absorb American ex
ports and the results of this continued
instability will b felt in the -United
ta.ies m unemployment, social un
rest and 'hard times'."
BUSINESS E3f DAN GEKED
Any improvement in American busi
ness, under present conditions, can be
only temporary. Inability to export our
surpluses, which normally average
about 20 per cent of the products of
farm, mine and factory, will keep the
prices of our products close to or even
below the cost of production and lead
to super-competition - among manufac
turers and merchants that will reduce
profits to the - vanishing point, compel
the lowering of wages to a degree that
careful employers would not otherwise
attempt, and lead to strikes and lock
outs,, with their inevitable brood of
social and political troubles.
Only reconstruction of the European
market can prevent continued and
growing distress of American farmers
and American working-men. This re
construction cannot come about until
European currencies are stabilized and
European budgets are balanced. It Is
now apparent, even to the uninitiated.
that neither of these can be done with
out foreign leans, the most of which
American investors and bankers must
supply. These loans cannot be made
until troubles arising out of non-payment
of German indemnities are ettled
and the danger of new wars removed.
After three years of European expert
meriting with secondary causes, all
men who have access to the facts of
the situation, no matter how conserv
ative they may be, at last are seeing
and declaring thajt neither indemnities
nor threatened wars -can be dealt with
effectively unless France is given
guaranties against attack guaranties
that will convince the French : people
that they may at last safely turn their
attention from military safeguards
against Germany, reduce their army
and military budgets, give their undi
vided attention , to economic j recoup
struct! on and allow Germany and the
rest of Europe to do the same,
WHAT FEjOrCE NEEDS
' As I came through Paris at the end
of September, the editor of the daily
L'Oeuvre asked me for a statement of
the European situation, as I saw it,
and,' in response, I. gave him I an In
terview which was printed with strong
editorial . support, and. the statement
that; . according to their official com
mission of finance; the French budget
for the present year would have a de
ficit of 18,000,000,000 francs. The main
part of the interview was a "categori
cal statement as follows : , , , :
I. France "must obtain a large loan. .
, ' 2. Germany must obtain a large loan.
r a. France will not get a loan unless
Germany gets one at the same time.
; 4.. Franc can . obtain . money - only
from bankers and private subscribers
N
EUROPE
and these will not lend unless the in
vestment is safe..;. -
5. No loan can be considered f-"ifa un
, i Pleaded Cause of I France .
GEORGES CLEJVlENClUrwhose Vecent rnisswn to
.: America was- to acquaint her fpeople, with airrent condi
tions in France and immediate needs of-the French -people.
f
arations sufficient to enable her to
repay trie loan. : , ,
8. Germany cannot pVovide these ,
reparations unless she produces effec
tively. '
7. Germany cannot produce effec
tively unless her money is stabilized.
8. German money cannot be stabil
ized unless Germany obtains a foreign
loan. ' ' ; - -'..' '-.
9. Therefore, France cannot obtain a
loan unless Germany obtains one at
the same time. - ' ' '
10. Neither France nor Germany will
obtain the. necessary loans unless polit
ical dangers that is to say, the -dangers
of war during the period covered
by the loan are averted. Investors will
not invest their money in countries
which are likely soon to go to war,' or
In countries which, are likely to have
their ability' to pay. Interest and loan
lessened ' or destroyed fey;' the applica
tion of economic sanctions.- v ' '
11. Tbo danger can be averted only if
France receives guaranties of help to
case. of being attacked by Germany,
guaranties which must satisfy : the
French people and. make' impossible
an appeal by the . political ' opposition
to the fears of German, attack which
dominate o many French .. voters.
12. If France obtained these guar
antees., she , could , save . S.OQO.000.000
francs a year on her military budget,
and . by reducing , expenses connected
with, it, ' balanoe her budget and avoid
too heavy .taxation. ; j.
1$. France, then saved financially,
would be able to follow the advice of
her, bankers, who In agreement with
the principal foreign bankers, and in
order to establish. the. basis of a loan,
would be obliged to solve the question
of reparations, ? which can be solved
only by agreeing rupon an indemnity
from. Germany; as large ' as , Is prac
tically ; possible but not beyond ; her
power topay.- fA ?" V ": :t ..-'rT. ;
It The danger of financial collapse
and the necessity- for unbearabal tax
ation being thus averted. Franc could
then S produce freely, and, her money
being stabilized, . she . could compete
commercially in the world markets. -
- IS. i- The question of France's - i-war
debts to America would no longer be
considered as a- question, of financial
life or death for France ; it could then
be treated on Its merits and propa
ganda could be openly undertaken in
America to convince the American peo
ple of the French belief that this debt
Is a part of the expenses of a common
war, and that It shoold.i therefore, be
borne in common and not by. France
alone- ' -1 ,
- 16. - It is Impossible, .however, ' to
carry out. this program of reconjrtmc
tlon unless Franc receives guarantees
which will give her, people every se
curity. - . , - -
In the absence of - such guaranties,
I shonld, If I. were a Frenchman, hold
on. to my 'advantage, even though- the
resultir-g discomfort, were great,?: while
I sought for allies.-." ;,??vi5V Ht ac
x 1 should see that a contrary policy
would involve' the maintenance of a
growing' military establishment for se!f
defense, I . shoy 'A see that it meant tax-
lw&SSttfyt
. ' -s
ws- ote--.y. 1 1 isftn M its.
tax ' was ' unbearable. I should
that, already handicapped . because of
the thousands of her factories wanton
ly destroyed in war," such a tax would
result In a still greater handicap: on
industry, that would prevent France
from competing In the markets of
the world oh an equality with countries
where taxation was lighter, would re
duce wages- in France, make profits
small, and bring; widespread unemploy
ment and labor .trouble that would
lead to . social unrest and possibly to
revolutions. t . . ,
SIGXIFICA2TCE TO AMERICA
. It is a feelUtg of grave concern over
the future of the world and'-ef our 'own
land, and of personal 1 responsibility
therefor, that is causing Americans who
know the facts to sound the, tocsin of
alarm hi the ears Of their countrymen.
It is such a feeling- of concern and
responsibility I - oubt not, that in
duced -the Grand Old Man of France
to : leave his quiet retreat, by the sea
and com over here for a- heart-to-
heart talk' with America."
Without' attempting to criticise our
own country for not having taken Its
proper - share of . responsibility for sta
bilizing "Europe and controlling -the
Near East, a consideration of the facts
forces me to the conclusion that if the
United States had made It possible for
France to get the necessary guaran
ties, the : Turk would not today be
forcing bis . demands on a -distracted
Europe. '-t Treaty- readjustments would
have , been agreed upon, trad would be
resuming Its normal proportions, - and
conditions at home would': not present
the grave outlook, that they now. bear
xThere are two -realities in the situa
tion, two potent facts to be faced in
determinhisr what -America can and
should do ,: In the performance of to
days duty. -s: V;,-1 : c:y. ; ' ; : --:
-1.4 In view of our traditional policy
of isolation and nonintervention, it is
not probable -that - the United States
will Immediately agree.. In advance, to
send troops to Europe under given con
tingencies. ' ' :-:-'-v-V '-:
: S. , Onr account of the extraordinary
need or the industrial nations of .Eu
rope: for . markets they will quit cer
tainly be ready to give, th-military
guaranties France seeks if we help to
provide a reasonable basis on , which
they -can proceed.': England at this
time-has , L200.0OO V unemployed ; for
whom ahe cannot find work on account
of - the collapse in Eropean markets.
Italy Ju on the verge of ruin for th
same reason. Switzerland and Checho
slovakia, la spite of good currencies,
are experiencing . stagnation in busi
ness. , Conditions in the Scandinavian
countries - and Holland 'are far-from
satisfactory.' . AI1-.. these - would ? cer
tainly be ready to join in any nracti
cable - plan for remedying ' conditions
which hair resulted in distress to their
people and -which,, unrelieved, threaten
continued, and, deepening distress,-;
TWOTJGGESTIONS ''"
, TJnder - th - liraltatlons and 1 In view
of these tw obvious facts, there are.
it seems to ine, two practical steps that
our government can take. ,
A. The president can i-i -fMtr-Iy
ENGLAND'S
- , . . . 4 . . .
IN POLITICS
Gompers Gives Hot Reply to
Criticism of American Poli
cies by Foreign Labor Leader.
U. S. Plan of Routing Reaction
' aries Termed Better Than
British Political Party Method
Labor in both America aaol Britain mturv
Increased tta political strength in the recrnt
lacUoo. .Tn Vntua worken tbrauga tlwt
support of the Labor party succeeded In elect
ing each a strong group la the house of coai-..
bob 'that tha partr has become his majesty s '
OppOSltlOB. . . --' .
In an ejolasiTe interrtew with the - United
Press. Kamsar MaoLMuiaM. leader of Uvs Knt.
Ish iAhor partr, says Amwicsa .Mwr camu
bssuui a Teal power In politic until it forms
a definite- political party. Keplytnc, Kmiw4
Uompers, president of the American jraderaUun
of Lhor, asserts by following Ms poucr of
baekmc its friends, wbetber they be Repub
lican or Uemocnsta. labor in this ooaatry "has
eaptared control oC oonsius in the cans vt
, By lyl C. ITnwi,
United Treae SUR Correspondent.
(OorrrJsht, 1B22, by United Prmsl -.
London, Dec 16. Organised . labor .
must change JUs tactics before It can
ever expect a real power in--American
politics. Ramsay MacDonald, leader oC
the powerful Labor party In th ,Brit
ias parliameniv told the United Press
in an exclusive Interview.. ? - ' -
"Parliamentary authority,' compar
able to that in the hands or British
labor today, can only be gained by
breaking way from the present pollctles -f
the American. Federation of Labor,"
MacDonald said. ' - - a..-. ,..
The system so loner followed by labor
in the United States by which the in
fluence of labor was thrown is this
or that candidate, depending upon the
concessions that 'could be obtained, is
not MacDonald's Idea of getting re
sults. - - i . ?-
"Knit closely into the political fabric
of the labor party, the Industrials on .
one hand; and. the Intellectuals on the
other, go out after political power by
putting .vowed labor, candidates la the
field. Keep repeating this process until '
success comes.", . That ta MacDonald 's
advice to American labor. -4.
MacDonald is a firm believer in the .
destiny : of , labor. ; Despite a - natural -
caution in the matter of political
prophesies he - gives - the present gov
ernment less than, th average life of
a British parliament. As to its suc
cessor he points out that labor Is now
the, official opoosiaon to bis. majesty's
government, as represented, by Premier '
Bonar Law. ,' v . .- -
.Capital levy Is a permanent plank of .
th British- Labor party. - MacDonald
was emphatic on that point. ,!
It is capital levy that has put labor
tn the . position of becoming the ffi-
cial opposition, he says. In this policy.
which nas been challenged at times as
communistic, MacDonald sees relief
for many of the Ills of th present day
economic system.
MacDonald points to the compara
tive polls of the two major parties and
draws a broad Scotch conclusion. If.
he reasons. labor has been able to
seriously challenge the polling power of
the established Conservative party with
Hm vmArm nf iur14im.nt.w laoMiiin
to bolster its prestige, then labor by
vigorous seizure of its opportunity t
gain prestige as the official opposi
tion, will soon turn the scale.
VET42BAN AMERICAN LEADER
- i vivas LVflinani iix.n
By Sasaael Gonpers,.
Prmiilist of the Americas reds ration, of lebor.
v , (Wnttm (or ts. Ustted ms .
(Oopyrichs, lSZ..br United Press) , , ,
- Washington, Dec liI dare say that
American labor today is exactly as ef
fective politically as British labor, but
whether or not that is the case, the
material thing is that the latter must,
and does, suit its conduct to the condi-'
tions which surround British labor and
to the psychology of British , labor -American
workers must suit, their ac
tion to conditions with which they are.
surrounded and to what they find, 4s
the dominant psychology among Amer
ican workers. - - ,' .':" ..-. :i X;
W are not advising British labor,
because we are convinced that British,
labor is much more competent to shape
Its own course than any adviser unfamiliar-with
conditions surrounding
it, Ws have for British labor every
g-ood wish. " '?i 4
When it comes to shaping' the course
and determining the policies of Ameri
can labor, whether industrial or pro
fessional, Tl we can say to Mr. Mac
Donald is that we wish 'him well in
England, but so far as our affairs are
concerned, we trust he will confine his
advice to England. We are convinced ;
that the course of American labor has
been and is th right course.
a The report of the non-partisan po
litical . campaign committee, of the
American Federation of Labor on the
recent political campaign . shows an
achievement with which , we challenge
comparison. ' The policies of American
labor as applied , to - America .have
proved their correctness and their ef
fectiveness beyond question. Working
In accord with the farmers of our coun
try, labor has broken down the reac
Uonary control of out political life and -captured
the control of congress tn the
cause of progress. - Every outstanding
reactionary leader - has been - retired,
with perhaps one senatorial exception.
I know of no political achievement i.:
any- country that surpasses the aceam .
plishment of American labor m .. tb
campaign Just closed. - -( - K-
- Knowing Mr. MacDonald as I do, ti
reciprocal piece of advice to him may
not be amiss, .He has a bis; job of hie
own, and it would. be better for him to
mind bis own . business and permit
American labor . to : attend to Its own
business. .5
- ' SEATTLE PROWERS BUSY
Seattle, Dec. IS. (V. P.) Nearly a
score of burglaries, in which thfj loot
totaled fct n f " i n l !""", -- r-