

FINISHING OF VERSAILLES TREATY WAS ACTUAL RACE WITH ANARCHY

'SIGN HERE,' WORD TOLD VANQUISHED

Appearance of Enemy Delegates Before Conference Made Under Dramatic Circumstances.

Brockdorff Rantau Displays Amazing Lack of Tact and Clemenceau Speaks Abruptly.

CHAPTER I
The Sunday Journal herewith presents the finish of the peace of Paris, which is an authoritative narrative of how the peace of Paris was concluded. The Honorable Woodrow Wilson gave Mr. Baker access to all his personal, unpublished papers, and the only reliable and unimpeachable reports of the facts, and which therefore have never been made public. The special feature will be published in the Journal serially throughout the year. (Copyright, 1922, Doubleday Page & Co., Published by Special Arrangement with the McClure Newspaper Syndicate.)

By Ray Stannard Baker

The treaty was finished at last. Six months had elapsed since the close of the great war. For four of these months the representatives of the allied powers, there at Paris, had been toiling desperately to get it ready. It had been truly a race with anarchy; for while Paris talked, European civilization was literally disintegrating in chaos. Most of the difficulties and every one of the serious crises had arisen, not so much out of any differences of view of the sternly conquered Germany, but out of deep-seated and bitter disagreements among the allies themselves. The center and focus of this conflict had been between President Wilson demanding a settlement upon broad principles—which every one had indeed accepted—and the other allied powers demanding various immediate material reparations and territorial and other advantages.

But here, at length, through many vicissitudes, much darkened counsel, had emerged a bulky white book, of over 200 pages, bearing upon its cover in two languages, the concise information that these were the "Conditions of Peace." The document was packed and crammed with meaning for the whole of humanity, the provisions of which were still for the most part secret, were being read down, with ceremony, before the vanquished enemy. Here were the names of representatives of all the nations and at the head of them all was the President of the United States of America.

The Honorable Woodrow Wilson, president of the United States, acting in his own name and by his own authority.

And following the names of the American delegation were the British: His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, by the Right Honorable David Lloyd George, M. P., Premier of His Majesty's Government and Prime Minister.

And after the Anglo-Saxon world so represented, came France and the other allied nations, great and small, and at last, not the empire, nor yet the republic, nor yet the commonwealth, but the president of Germany.

"Count Brockdorff-Rantau, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Empire."

"SIGN THEM!"

After the names of this distinguished array came the bulky book, the Treaty itself, 440 articles, and then the signatures of 70 allied leaders, to which would later be attached the great seal of the colored ribbons to symbolize, with a kind of romantic fragility, the new harmonies. This document was aimed to bring about, in the great world that had of it all, was the place at which the world was soon to point with a determined and yet somehow curiously uncertain finger, and say to Germany:

"Sign there."


"Done at Versailles, in a single copy which will remain deposited in the archives of the French republic, and of which authenticated copies will be transmitted to each of the signatory powers."

Such was the treaty of Versailles, as presented to the Germans on May 7 in the old Trianon palace. It was secularly and completely the work of the allied powers, for Germany, as already pointed out, was excluded from the start from any participation in framing the terms of the peace. There had been a complete unanimity of opinion in the allied world that by her course in the war, by the intent, clearly revealed in the peace of Brest-Litovsk, that she was entitled to have nothing whatever to say about the terms of the settlement. It was clear, understood that she would be given no choice but to accept associated powers agreed upon among themselves.

Desperately as the leaders dodged the term, the peace was thus to be imposed peace, drawn up with no consideration of what Germany thought about it. It is futile to speculate on the possibility of any other method; the fact is that this is the way the thing was done about.

Scene of Great Treaty's Birth

GALERIE DES GLACES, or gallery of mirrors, in the palace of Versailles, where was signed the treaty which ended the World war. Above, seated, are David Lloyd George and M. Briand at the conference. First came the names of the United States and England, the two Anglo-Saxon nations, then France and those of the other allies, and finally the signature of the enemy nation, which was given no choice except to "sign here."



instability of conditions within Germany. The old government had been swept away and the new republic was not yet fairly upon its legs. Economic chaos, even starvation, threatened the very life of the people; and behind that lurked the red spectre of Bolshevism. Would there be any Germany to sign when the treaty was complete?

THE THREE TESTS

These modifications in the attitude of the conference toward Germany, however, had to do only with questions of immediate interest—with keeping Germany going while the treaty of peace was being prepared. There was no modification of the fundamental principle that Germany should have no say in determining what that treaty should contain.

These thoughtful leaders perceived clearly that there was grave danger of ruining the whole work of peace if the conference should produce a treaty against which the mass of German opinion would at once revolt. For there might easily ensue a refusal to sign, or a collapse of organized government, or a submission accompanied by a determination to overturn the settlement as soon as a chance came—perhaps all three. And men capable of perceiving these possibilities were also clear-sighted enough to realize that a peace

acceptance and observance could never be anything but a curse to the world. There had been delays; the German delegation had been sitting impatiently on April 14 to come to Versailles, the fascinating puzzle, "Will they sign? Won't they sign?" still occupied much time in the council of four and indeed among all the delegates. There was to be no rest from it henceforward until the end of June. Every day or so one of the Big Three would bring in reports from his observers on the state of opinion among the Germans, the attitude and prospects of continuance in power of the existing government. This increasing concern and consideration for the effect of the council's work on Germany led to a continuous run of suggestions for making the treaty more acceptable.

As the terms of the treaty began to leak out there were more and more evidences of the reality of the problem. On April 24, Wilson reported to the Big Three what he believed to be the view from his observers on the state of opinion among the Germans, the attitude and prospects of continuance in power of the existing government. This increasing concern and consideration for the effect of the council's work on Germany led to a continuous run of suggestions for making the treaty more acceptable.

"The immediate test of the treaty, therefore—the whole treaty, both the terms and the league—would be its practicability: Would it work out? If justice were not possible in every one of the terms there still remained what was, in President Wilson's view, the great instrument of practicability, the League of Nations. If this were genuinely and whole-heartedly accepted by the Germans it would make the world emerge from the shell-shock of the war and recover its senses, modify unjust provisions and make the whole settlement more acceptable to the Germans. Everything, therefore, depended upon the league and the good will with which it was used.

THE FASCINATING PUZZLE
Even after the Germans were invited on April 14 to come to Versailles, the fascinating puzzle, "Will they sign? Won't they sign?" still occupied much time in the council of four and indeed among all the delegates. There was to be no rest from it henceforward until the end of June. Every day or so one of the Big Three would bring in reports from his observers on the state of opinion among the Germans, the attitude and prospects of continuance in power of the existing government. This increasing concern and consideration for the effect of the council's work on Germany led to a continuous run of suggestions for making the treaty more acceptable.

President Wilson interpreted this telegram to mean that Brockdorff-Rantau typified the extreme point of view of the peace. "The president believed there was a more submissive body of opinion. His informant had suggested that the German people ought to know that a certain amount of discussion would be permitted. He himself was inclined to agree in the proposal that the discussion should take place in written form."

"This was a decided advance upon the original ideal of imposing the treaty without any discussion at all. It was finally agreed that the German delegation after receiving the treaty on May 7 should be given 15 days within which to make observations and put questions, and that the allied and associated powers would make written replies to these before obliging the Germans to make their final decision. Lloyd George opposed publication of the treaty on the ground that this would make changes more difficult. Clemenceau was strongly for the publication, and for the same reason.

AMERICANS DUE TO AGT EUROPE

Edward A. Filene Urges Economic Conference Under Auspices of President Harding.

Points Out Several Grave Factors That Retard Peace and Prosperity in Hemispheres.

In the accompanying article Edward A. Filene of Boston, merchant and economist, offers his analysis of European problems and suggests solution.

By Edward A. Filene
There will be no surfeit of steady work, no surfeit of steady profits, no surfeit of steady good business in America until France is given guarantees against possible attack by Germany. This is the conclusion which intensive study of the European situation has forced upon me. I have chosen the theme on which I speak today because it gives me an opportunity to marshal facts which I believe will show both the necessity and possibility of obtaining these guarantees and that through our country we can, without pledging ourselves to send a single soldier overseas, secure the necessary pledges of help to France in case of attack, which will, in turn, open the only immediately practical road to prosperity for the world.

CONDITIONS WORSE

Conditions in Europe have, for several years past, steadily been going from bad to worse until they have become extremely dangerous. The situation has been closely approximated that was foretold by Ambassador Page in a letter to President Wilson in the United States in 1917, when he predicted that "The world will be divided into two hemispheres, one of them, our own, will have the money and the other, Great Britain and Europe, will need these commodities, but will have no money with which to pay for them."

BUSINESS ENDANGERED

Any improvement in American business, under present conditions, can be secured only by steadily increasing surpluses, which normally average about 20 per cent of the products of farm, mine and factory, will keep the American workingmen, the bread of life, from the cost of production and lead to super-competition among manufacturers and merchants that will reduce the living standards of the workers, compel the lowering of wages and lead to strikes and lock-outs, and to a general brood of social and political troubles.

WEAT FRANCE NEEDS

As I came through Paris at the end of September, the editor of the daily L'Ouvrier asked me for a statement of the European situation as I saw it, and in response, I gave him an interview which was printed with strong editorial support, and the statement that, according to their official computation of finance, the French budget for the present year would have a deficit of 18,000,000,000 francs. The main part of the interview was a categorical statement as follows:

1. France must obtain a large loan.
2. Germany must obtain a large loan.
3. France will not get a loan unless Germany gets one at the same time.
4. France can obtain money only from bankers and private subscribers and these will not lend unless the investment is safe.

Pleaded Cause of France

GEORGES CLEMENCEAU, whose recent mission to America was to acquaint her people with current conditions in France and immediate needs of the French people.



arations sufficient to enable her to pay the loan.

8. Germany cannot provide these reparations unless she produces effectively.

7. Germany cannot produce effectively unless her money is stabilized.

8. German money cannot be stabilized unless Germany obtains a foreign loan.

9. Therefore, France cannot obtain a loan unless Germany obtains one at the same time.

10. Neither France nor Germany will obtain the necessary loans unless political dangers—that is to say, the dangers of war during the period covered by the loan are averted. Investors will not invest their money in countries which are likely soon to go to war, or in countries which are likely to have their ability to pay interest and loan lessened or destroyed by the application of economic sanctions.

11. The danger can be averted only if France receives guarantees of help in case of being attacked by Germany, guarantees which must satisfy the French people and make impossible an appeal by the political opposition to the fears of Germany, which would induce the Grand Old Man of France to leave his quiet retreat by the sea and come over here for a heart-to-heart talk with America.

12. If France obtained these guarantees, she could save 3,000,000,000 francs a year on her military budget, and by reducing expenses connected with it, balance her budget and avoid too heavy taxation.

13. France, then, saved financially, would be able to follow the advice of her bankers, who in agreement with the principal foreign bankers, and in order to establish the basis of loan, would be obliged to solve the question of reparations, which can be solved only by agreeing upon an indemnity from Germany as large as is practically possible but not beyond her power to pay.

14. The danger of financial collapse and the necessity for unrepayable taxation being thus averted, France could then produce freely, and her money being stabilized, she could compete commensally in the world markets.

15. It is impossible, however, to carry out this program of reconstruction unless France receives guarantees which will give her people every security.

In the absence of such guarantees, I should, if I were a Frenchman, hold on to my advantage, even though the resulting discomfort were great, while I sought for allies.

tax was unbearable. I should see that, already handicapped because of the thousands of her factories wantonly destroyed in war, such a tax would result in a still greater handicap on industry that would prevent France from competing in the markets of the world on an equality with countries where taxation was lighter, would reduce wages in France, make profits small, and bring widespread unemployment and labor troubles that would lead to social unrest and possibly to revolutions.

SIGNIFICANCE TO AMERICA

It is a feeling of grave concern over the future of the world and of our own land, and of personal responsibility toward the world, that is causing Americans to know the facts to sound the tocsin of alarm in the ears of their countrymen.

It is such a feeling of concern and alarm that is causing Americans to know the facts to sound the tocsin of alarm in the ears of their countrymen.

Without attempting to criticize our own country for not having taken its proper share of responsibility for stabilizing Europe and controlling the Near East, a consideration of the facts forces me to the conclusion that if the United States had made it possible for France to get the necessary guarantees, the Turk would not today be forcing his demands on a distracted Europe. Treaty readjustments would have been agreed upon, trade would be resuming its normal proportions, and conditions at home would not present the grave outlook that they now bear.

There are two realities in the situation, two potent facts to be faced in determining what America can and should do in the performance of today's duty.

1. In view of our traditional policy of isolation and noninterference, it is not probable that the United States will immediately agree, in advance, to send troops to Europe under given contingencies.

2. On account of the extraordinary need of the industrial nations of Europe for markets they will quite certainly be ready to give the military guarantee France seeks if we help to provide a reasonable basis on which they can proceed. England at this time has 1,500,000 unemployed for whom she cannot find work on account of the collapse in European markets. Italy is on the verge of ruin for the same reason. Switzerland and Czecho-Slovakia, in spite of good currencies, are experiencing a stagnation in business. Conditions in the Scandinavian countries and Holland are far from satisfactory. All these would certainly be ready to join in any practicable plan for remedying conditions which have resulted in distress to their people and which, unrelieved, threaten continued and deepening distress.

TWO SUGGESTIONS

Under the limitations and in view of these two obvious facts, there are, it seems to me, two practical steps that our government can take.

A. The president can immediately

ENGLAND'S LABOR IDEA

Gompers Gives Hot Reply to Criticism of American Policies by Foreign Labor Leader.

U. S. Plan of Routing Reactionaries Termed Better Than British Political Party Method

Labor in both America and Britain grows increased in political strength in the present election. The British workers through their support of the party succeeded in electing such a strong group in the house of commons that the party has become its majority's opposition.

In an exclusive interview with the United Press, Ramsay MacDonald, leader of the British Labor party, says American labor cannot become a political party until it has a definite political party. He says, Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, is a man of great political vision and backing of his friends, whether they be Republicans or Democrats, labor in this country "has control of congress in the case of progress."

By Lyle C. Wilson, United Press Staff Correspondent. (Copyright, 1922, by United Press)

London, Dec. 16.—Organized labor must change its tactics before it can ever expect a real power in American politics. Ramsay MacDonald, leader of the powerful Labor party in the British parliament, told the United Press in an exclusive interview.

"Parliamentary authority, comparable to that in the hands of British labor today, can only be gained by breaking way from the present policies of the American Federation of Labor," MacDonald said.

The system so long followed by labor in the United States by which the influence of labor was thrown to this or that candidate, depending upon the concessions that could be obtained, is not MacDonald's idea of getting results.

"Knit closely into the political fabric of the labor party, the industrialists on one hand and the intellectuals on the other, go out after political power by putting avowed labor candidates in the field. Keep repeating this process until success comes." That is MacDonald's advice to American labor.

MacDonald is a firm believer in the destiny of labor. Despite a natural caution in the matter of political prophecies, he says that the present government less than the average life of a British parliament. As to its successor he points out that labor is now the official opposition to the majority government, as represented by Premier Bonar Law.

Capital levy is a permanent plank of the British Labor party. MacDonald was emphatic on that point. It is capital levy that has put labor in the position of becoming the official opposition, he says. In this policy, which has been challenged at times as communistic, MacDonald sees relief for many of the ills of the present day economic situation.

MacDonald points to the comparative polls of the two major parties and draws a broad Scotch conclusion. If he reasoned with the British labor party, he would seriously challenge the polling power of the established Conservative party with its years of parliamentary leadership to bolster its prestige. He would vigorously seize of its opportunity to gain prestige as the official opposition, will soon turn the scale.

VETERAN AMERICAN LEADER VOICES CONTRARY VIEW

By Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor. (Written for the United Press) (Copyright, 1922, by United Press)

Washington, Dec. 16.—I dare say that American labor is not so well informed as to the political situation as British labor, but whether or not that is the case, the fact is that the latter must, and does, suit its conduct to the conditions which surround British labor and to the psychology of British labor.

American workers must suit their actions to the conditions which surround them, and to what they find, is the dominant psychology among American workers.

When it comes to shaping the course and determining the policies of American labor, whether industrial or professional, all we can say to Mr. MacDonald is that we wish him well in England, but so far as our affairs are concerned, we trust he will confine his advice to England. We are convinced that the course of American labor has been and is the right course.

The report of the non-partisan political campaign committee of the American Federation of Labor on the recent political campaign shows an American labor as applied to America have proved their correctness and their effectiveness beyond question. Their policy in accord with the farmers of our country, labor has broken down the reactionary control of our political life and campaign just closed. It has permitted the cause of progress. Every outstanding reactionary leader has been retired, with perhaps one notable exception.

I know no political achievement in any country that surpasses the accomplishment of American labor in the campaign just closed. It has permitted the cause of progress. Every outstanding reactionary leader has been retired, with perhaps one notable exception.

Knowing Mr. MacDonald as I do, a reciprocal piece of advice to him may not be amiss. He has a big job of his own, and it would be better for him to concentrate on his own business and permit American labor to attend to its own business.

SEATTLE FLOWERS BURN

Seattle, Dec. 15.—(U. P.)—Nearly a score of burglaries in which the loot totaled between \$200 and \$400, were