

The PEACE

By RAY STANNARD BAKER

CHAPTER 33

The Sunday Journal herewith presents the thirty-third installment of Ray Stannard Baker's story, "The Peace," which is an authoritative narrative of how the peace of Paris was concluded. The story is a masterpiece of narrative, and the author's style is clear, concise and powerful. The story is a masterpiece of narrative, and the author's style is clear, concise and powerful.

ON THE day that the Germans were at last summoned to Versailles (April 14) to learn their fate, President Wilson said in a public statement:

"It is hoped that the questions most directly affecting Italy, especially the Adriatic question, can now be brought to a speedy settlement."

This hope was based upon the great fact that the three powers—America, Great Britain and France—after weeks of struggle in the dark period (described in preceding chapters) had finally reached a basis of compromise on the French claims, and could now turn, with some semblance of unity, to meet the importunities of Orlando and Sonnino.

The Italian crisis naturally divides itself into five clearly recognizable periods, and will be so treated in this and two following chapters.

First, the effort to settle the problems upon the basis of the inquiries and advice of experts. This was the basis of the principal methods of the New—and was, throughout the conference, constantly recommended and practiced by President Wilson. Here it was tested to the uttermost—and failed. The reasons for this failure are most instructive.

Second, the brief but stormy attempt at settlement by secret discussion and arrangement in the Council of Four (April 19 to 23). This was according to the approved method of the Old, and might have succeeded if Wilson had not been there. But it failed and led to the explosion and crisis of the third period.

Third, the appeal of Wilson (April 23) to the people of the world in which the controversy suddenly emerged into daylight. This was in the turn a device of the New. Wilson always held in reserve the great weapon of an "appeal to the people." Here he tried it out. It precipitated the withdrawal of Italy from Paris and nearly broke up the Peace Conference. It also failed.

Fourth, a return to the secret discussions of the Council of Three and Four with a furious attempt at settlement according to the most arduous methods of the old diplomacy: first, the attempt to buy Italy out of Fiume with offers of land in Turkey; then, which the donors themselves had no right, followed by an astonishing reversal on the part of Lloyd George and an attempt to buy Italy out of Turkey with the offer of Fiume. This also failed.

Fifth, final negotiations based upon French project, the failure of which led to the general denouement in which Italy, accepting the inevitable formula of Paris that peace and a maintenance of allied unity and world order was more important than any specific settlement, signed the treaty of Versailles, and accepted the League of Nations.

ITALY'S BARGAIN

Italy came into the great war as the direct result of a bargain as to what she was to get. She held aloof for eight months and dickered with both sides. She was animated, as her foreign minister (Signor Salandra) said on October 18, 1914, by the sentiment of "sacro egoismo"—"concentrated selfishness"—and this, as he said, guided her in her negotiations with both sides. Powers. Sonnino told the council of four on April 18 (secret minutes) that "Austria had offered Italy the adage and the islands of the Adriatic, but the allies at London were more generous and Italy came in on the basis of the secret treaty of April 26, 1915.

The specific provisions of the London treaty are set forth in another chapter (XX) on the secret treaties. Suffice it to say here that Italy was promised large concessions of territory, complete naval control and economic domination of the Adriatic, and in Africa and Asiatic Turkey acquisitions at an equal rate with her allies. The claims in Turkey were more fully elaborated in the secret agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne (described in chapter XI).

Italy thus came to the peace conference with her claims nominated in a bond. It was a bond that made both Great Britain and France draw wry grins—now that the war was over; and the United States did not recognize it at all. In fact, it directly contravened

no was much the stronger character; a cold, determined, imperious diplomat of the old school. He was not Italian at all. His father was an Italian Jew, his mother a Scotch woman. A lonely man, with a dark, immobile face, he gave the impression of being saturnine. He was not popular in Italy, but was kept for years in high places; was once premier, because he was universally respected as an honest man. Sonnino possessed, perhaps, the clarity of mind and fixity of purpose to have given Italian policy a unified direction—but he could do nothing when diluted by Orlando. And Orlando, who had much real sympathy for Wilson's ideals, could not lead.

President Wilson summed up the situation admirably when he told a group of experts, on March 29: "I can get along with Orlando, and could quickly arrange matters with him; if he was not scared to death of Sonnino," may come now to the struggle itself.

Up to February 15, when the President sailed home to America, the Italian claims, by some sort of tacit understanding, were kept quiet away out of sight. Yet the Italians were by no means idle. No nation at Paris was more indefatigable with its propaganda than Italy. Several Paris newspapers were common property to be in the pay of Italy and were constantly giving publicity to Italian claims, reporting demonstrations in Italy and in Fiume, and there presently began to be a stream of distinguished visitors from Italy who sought out the American experts or came to the American press bureau to urge their case. They gave the best dinners in Paris. In short, they were preparing the way for the struggle they saw just ahead.

The first real clashes were tactical, and like so many other important problems, were precipitated during the President's absence. Two problems of method arose in the very week that the President sailed away. The first was the struggle of Sonnino to prevent a complete settlement with Germany—under the proposed preliminary treaty—before the Italian question was considered. And he won out; he got a promise that the Austrian and German settlements should go along together, but a promise that the Italian never quite trusted, for they raised the same question again and again.

The other problem was far more vital for it concerned the settlement of dealing with the complicated claims of Italy. Boiled down to its essence it involved the question as to whether the Italian claims should be settled by the old method of secret diplomacy—as Sonnino desired—or by new methods of impartial inquiry by experts.

PRESENTATION OF JUGOSLAV CLAIMS

Two days after the President left (February 17), Pashich, the Serbian premier, plumped the whole problem before the council of ten by proposing to submit all claims conflicting with Italy to the arbitration of the President Wilson—which meant, in effect, to the judgment of the American experts. Here was the new with a vengeance. The Sonnino idea flatly at once. He then went further with the Yugoslavs. Nevertheless, he was decided by the ten to hear the Yugoslav claims, and he made a long and dull presentation of their claims (February 18) through which Sonnino sat like a graven image.

In order to make clear to the president that there was no difference of opinion among the experts specially charged with studying the Adriatic problem, these experts—W. E. Lunt, chief of the Italian division; Charles Seymour, chief of the Austro-Hungarian division; Clive Day, chief of the Balkan division, and Douglas Johnson, chief of the division of boundaries and geography, sent in a memorandum (March 18) reaffirming their former recommendations (of January 21):

"Every memorandum submitted by the above named divisions has been consulted recommends that Fiume and all Dalmatian should go to the Yugoslavs. We are still unanimously of that opinion."

The president was thus confronted with two sets of advice by his own delegation, to say nothing of a wild confusion of claims by the Italian and Yugoslavs. Although he was now under the fearful pressure of the discussions of the Dark Period, which finally broke him down, he felt it necessary to make a thorough examination of all the facts himself. Few Americans have any realization of the effort—the stupendous effort—the president made at Paris not only to understand these complicated problems but to get out of them decisions that would be just. He had absolutely no selfish interest to serve; all he wanted was a decision that would be based on a rightly based, that it could not cause future wars. He, therefore, began a careful study of the maps and reports.

He summoned the group of geographical and economic experts; a series of large relief models showing in great detail not only the complicated and mountainous Trentino and Brenner pass regions, but the entire Adriatic coast was brought to his study; he worked directly with the experts over these models, chalking all the possible frontiers upon them, showing the relationships of Fiume to the Slavic hinterland. Each model had accompanying it a map carrying detailed statistics as to racial, historic, economic and other aspects of the problem. Already the president had, unpractisedly, grasped the situation. He had made the careful study of the subject he was now engaged upon and was due to Orlando's pleading for a strategic frontier. Perhaps he also thought that the Italian claims might mitigate Italian claims in the Adriatic; but the Italians wanted both.

As a result of his careful studies the president said to his Adriatic experts: "I am ready to fight, but the line gentlemen have given me, with one possible exception. It may seem best to make Fiume an independent port."

This foreshadowed the lines of the decision he announced later, and to which he held with slight modification to the end. It will be seen upon what a thorough examination both by the experts and by the president himself it was based.

But this moderating solution regarding Fiume, which was probably suggested by Colonel House, who was all for conciliating the Italians, was considered dangerous by the four chiefs

who had signed the memorandum of March 18. On April 4, therefore, this group, with the exception of the chief of the division of economics, Allyn A. Young, prepared a new memorandum asserting that "it is unwise to make Fiume a free city," for various reasons. The memorandum was signed by Orlando, and it was clear that if such a decision were to be made, the amplest economic rights should be assured to the Yugoslavs.

ORLANDO CAUGHT UNPREPARED

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But upon turning to his advisers the president was astonished to find them divided into two camps—with two quite different programs.

American experts had long been working on the problem. When before the war closed Colonel House's inquiry had studied them and President Wilson had based his ninth point of the 14 upon their report. They were now on the questions involved early in January. Professor Douglas Johnson had made a special study of the problem in part while he was in Italy in 1915. On January 21, the experts presented what was to become the basic American report regarding Italian claims. This did not follow strictly the line of the London treaty, nor did it follow the line of the American Point IX, "a readjustment . . . along clearly recognized lines of nationality." The experts had taken into consideration all the important elements, strategic and political, and after much argument, had arrived at what they considered a just and fair division of territory between the Italian and Yugoslavs. They did not, of course, give Fiume to the Italians, for they believed that justice demanded that the Yugoslavs have an outlet of their own to the Adriatic. Wilson had practically adopted this report and its determinations became known as the "American line" or the "Wilson line."

EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE AMERICA

While this report was not discussed in the councils at the time, the opinion of these American experts was undoubtedly well known to the Italians, who, of course, were wholly unwilling to accept any such decision. They were, therefore, energetically began to try to influence the American experts to change their conclusions. They also approached certain other members of the American delegation who were not charged with handling Italian frontier questions. These men, who were acting with the approval of Colonel House, the president's chief of staff, were given the opportunity to make a contribution to the settlement of these enormously difficult problems. They, therefore, met with the Italian and fully agreed to the proposals which were submitted to the president, favoring far-reaching concessions to Italy regarding Fiume and Dalmatia. This, a little later, was considered by the Italian press as a division of opinion among the president's advisers and it was clearly affirmed that the Italian delegates based great hopes upon this division.

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Town Hall Gossip

Gleaned by the Gossiper

It is not beyond the possibilities, according to rumor current around the city hall, that within a comparatively short time Portland may have a new mayor and a new councilman. The city hall is now a busy place. The city hall is now a busy place. The city hall is now a busy place.

This would mean that he would have to devote all of his time and energies to advancing the interests of the fair and, of necessity, would have to lay down the burdens of the mayoralty. The city charter provides:

"If a vacancy occur in the office of mayor or commissioner the council shall appoint an eligible person to fill such vacancy until the next general municipal election."

It is generally conceded that some member of the council, in such case, would be elevated to the mayoralty and then they would elect some citizen to fill the unexpired term of the councilman thus advanced. It is in the air that several lightning rods are beginning to arise, in view of the possible contingencies and there's more than one city hall employee who would be willing to step into a \$5000 a year salary as a commissioner.

It's a curious state of affairs when one municipal department has to officially notify the city council that it will have to stand as a protestant against another city department.

Carrying on public improvements which the property owners demand. Yet that is exactly the case with the water works department. Recently Commissioner Mann sent written notice to the council that until further notice it would be "absolutely impossible"—these were his words—for the water department to proceed to the improvement of the city streets where it has temporary domestic water supply pipes, as there is no money in sight for laying of permanent mains. Commissioner Mann, in charge of the water department, has been an obstructionist, and Mann says he cannot do the impossible and lay water mains without money. There you are. The result is that it's a p to the tax payers to wait for the water department to allow a big item for water mains in the next budget or a long list of proposed street improvements will have to be deferred indefinitely.

When one has been a city employee as long as Miss Roslyn Joseph, one's circle of friends and acquaintances has become a city circle. Thus it is that many readers of this item will have a personal interest in the news that Miss Joseph is still in San Francisco, where she went hoping to secure relief from eye troubles, and that she may have to submit to an operation.

Joseph was assistant to Clerk Grutz at city council sessions for a long period of time and was an attaché of the city auditor's office for 18 years. She obtained a leave of absence and later was placed on the pension roll.

We've fallen on orange times, seems to me, when a city official who has been forced to swear out a warrant for arrest of a man, who persistently has flouted official authority, and boasted that he would not be made to obey city ordinances, is approached by a stranger and told that he, the stranger, was sent by the "King Kleagle" to decide that the proceedings be dropped forthwith. "I don't know you, nor do I know this 'King Kleagle,'" was the response of said city official, "but you can tell me to go to the moon, to the moon, to the moon."

(Only the city official's language was perhaps a shade more emphatic than this indicates.) The result was that the case was carried through to the municipal court.

If you have any doubt about various offices in the city hall having their own individual atmospheres, you'll soon change your mind after a careful look-see. There's as much difference between the "climate" in certain offices as there is between the balmy breath of a June day and the rigors of old winter. And one wonders, too, whether the powers that be ever observe this condition.

Also, whether the cold and haughty reception the public receives in one city commissioner's office is due to the fact that the receiving employee has forgotten that a city employee in fact is a public servant and is not there simply to serve the convenience of the head of the department. Candidly, a little more cordial treatment of the public could be cultivated to advantage in at least one office I have in mind.

Signel Grutz, chief deputy city auditor, is back from his annual vacation at Yachats, brown as a coffee-berry—yes, I know they are green sometimes, but that wouldn't apply to Signel Grutz. He's ready to enter into his thirty-third year of service for the city. Sign Grutz began at the city hall way back in the time when it was only a right smart village. He's kept close to the municipal affairs that he is the last man to whom all turn when they want information about the municipality. He's been the "steering committee" for many a city council, and has kept

considered the hotbed of the opposition and accusations made against Fire Chief Young—and who was completely exonerated from the charges preferred against him. Naturally, the "Slow Down" sign has caused a lot of comment from city hall frequenters. They wonder if it's a sort of semi-official reminder to attaches of the fire marshal's office that they should be loyal to the fire chief, the real head of the fire department and who, since the recent fracas, has been placed in authority over the fire marshal's bureau—which should have been the case all the time.

Painted on one of the big windows of the first floor, Fourth street frontage, at the city hall are the large, blood-red letters, "Fire Marshal's Office." And for some time past—whether by accident or design I can't say—there has appeared in the lower portion of the window a sign which bears in vivid crimson the words: "Slow Down!" Now it so happens that the fire marshal's office in not unrecent times has been

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| Brunswick, 112, walnut..... | 25 |
| Brunswick, 112, mahogany..... | 25 |
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| Brunswick, 117, mahogany..... | 25 |
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