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EIGHT PAGES EDITORIAL, SPORTS SECOND MAIN NEWS SECTION TWO PORTLAND, :OREGON, SXINDAYf MORNING, JANUARY 15, -1922. X (CHAPTER ) i By S ariidl Freimclh. Fears Clasli at Gownicil .itiiii.iiiiiij.:iwhmi-'.,hi IHSjBiaSflSanTSIISaSawnaa I IIIIIMIIIPBWWTIMBWBTWMTWWlMnBnMnBnTliWMl RAY . " 1 pies TAMNARB Table BAKER The Hamter Joerssl htmtltk prraott the third chapter of Ray Stanaard Baker's Mot? "The ." whirh le an tatlxmutlr narrtie of how the peeee of Paris waa concluded. Wood en Wtleea nn Mr. Baker aceeaa u all of hi penonal and nnpabliabed papers, which are the only r-llakle awl UwiwUmtlblt moHi of the facta which heretofore ham never been mad public. Tate spatial teataiw will he pubUahsa in The Journal aerially tnroeahout tie year. (Ceprrlfht, 123, by Doubleday. Pan 4 Co. PnbUabed by Special Arrangement with the afeClura Ncwepaper Syndicate) "'IlEUB Is a kind of myaterioua potency, a symbolism of action and , power. In a great document. point outlined! Here are the words set down; here the Such a treat document was the president's original draft of the covenant of the League of Nations. I remember the surcharged atmosphere of the Crlllon hotel when the word went round that this docu ment had been at length distributed. Who had it? What was in It?" It had been secretly printed, with the single word "Covenant" a word the president liked upon the cover. In It was set forth, concretely for the first time, what the president meant by the proposed League of Nations, and In certain mysterious "supple mentary articles" he also developed his ideas regarding some of the specific settlements. He had sent this document to various of the leaders in order to get their reactions. It le easy enough to accept general principle all the world pays pious homage to the phrase "disarmament" or "limitation of armament" but th real fight begins with the concrete application of those principles. Kay fttaaaard Baker Ttiua it wwnt blatantly around Paris by a kind of wltalees Ulegrapnr not known to Marconi what the Americana really meant by the reduction of arma ments as eipreaaed In the fourth or the Fourteen Point, "to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." Artlrle IV of the president's mysten eus new covenant contained the terms of ' a program that cut at the very root of rorulnontal cower end safely. Among ether thins, enmpulsory military service was to be abolished, not only in uer manv. but everywhere "all the powers subscribing to the treaty of peace." The manufacture of "munitions and Imple ments of war by private enterprise oi foe nrtvate oroflt" was te be forbidden. "rull and frank publicity as to all na tional armaments" was to disturb the cornerstone of secrecy upon which, un ite the eld BTStem. military preparation had alware reeled. And. above all. there was a new standard of armament proposed ; that of "domestic safety." It was is though Samson bad given a first shake te the pillars of the temple : The storm broke at once ; private con ferences were held by the president nota My en with the alarmed premier of !. Orlando: another In which the whole subject ef the covenant was dls ruseed with Lord Robert Cecil and Gen rat Kmuta and the discussion opened bp aeon afterward both la the Council ef Ten and !n the Important League of . Nation commission . For-Artlcle IV of . the MfMiut -bawd unon Point 4 laid bare what was undoubtedly the funds mental Problem of the peace conference the problem of the safety of nations and by what means It was to be made secure. I It Aft OF TttK NATIONS The areut war had snaken the oW - world Into ruin : old habit and relation military aspects of. French safety, dated January 10 (two days before the first session of the peace conference) and aliened with his curious sprawling "F. f ocn ; so also is the Bourgeois plan for a League of Nations, and certain early memoranda concerning the economic as pects of French safety. Marshal Foch wishes to hold the Rhine i ine common barrier of security necessary to the league of democratic nations," and In order to do thlst he demands that "the powers of the An- tente be organised henceforth on a military basis to render possible the timeiy intervention or the other states which are the defenders of civilisation." L.ls league would. In effect, be a con tinuation of the alliance of the allied powers that won the war. with a strong unified military force holding the Rhine. When M. Bourreol. a asHniT- . ai lomat, long a distinguished leader, and once premier of France, introduced the fTencn plan for a league of nations (In the League of Nations commission, two weeks later), it was found to harmonize completely with Marshal Foch'a military pin. n unea m tne details of the organisation behind the line of defense. It provided for an international army and navy, with a permanent staff to see that this force was kept up to. standard and to prepare plans for its sneedv and effective us. So Tar from forcing the abolition of compulsory mllitarv service. it provided for the possible adoption of that principle "by Uie entire world, for If permitted the international body to re quire a member state to adopt com pulnory service on recommendation of the general staff. Its emphasis was on fixing minimum rather than maximum limits upon arma menu. On February 7 the French economists mentality for permanently limiting the sovereignty of Germany" and this he could not accept, for it meant an "in definite continuation" of the military control of Germany. It also meant con stant Interference, meddling and prying into trade secrets, which would certainly lead again to war. He said, March 17 (Secret minutes) : If the aQled armies were to be maintained forever, in order to con- trol the carrying out of the peace terms; not peace, but allied armed domination would have .been estab lished. His government would never agree to enter such an arrangement, and, were he to enter Into such an agreement, he would be far exceeding his authority under the United States constitution. FRANCE'S DILEMMA This singleness of devotion to the idea of French safety Impaled France unon the horns of a hopeless dilemma, where she still struggles. For, if Germany was cnppiea ana weakened economically, how could she pay the huge bill for reparations? Thus was France buffeted between her fear and her need but the fear was then and has been ever since, the really dominating element. Dis tressing as was French devastation, France desired safety more than recon struction. This was the inevitable logic of the military spirit, which is inspired by fear, and stimulates in a nation a greater concern for the weakning or destruction of her enemy than for her own recovery. For, if Germany was allowed to build herself up economically, in order to pay reparations, she would at the same time reestablish her old pre dominant position as a power greater in population and with a more highly de veloped industrial organization than France, and, therefore, according to mili tary logic, again dangerous to French safety. This dilemma was strikingly illus trated by the controversy over the army of occupation. The French demanded that a great army remain stationed on the Rhine, the cost of maintenance to be borne by Germany. Time and again it was argued that this meant a reduc tion of reparation. In one of his slash ing outbursts Lloyd George said (June 2. Council of Four), that with "the Ger man army reduced to a strength of 100.- 000 men, its was ridiculous to maintain an army of occupation of 200,000 men on the Rhine . It would cost 100,000, 000 (sterling) a year if the burden were placed on the German exchequer and the result of this would be that there would be nothing left'f or compensation." Indeed, the cost of this army of occu pation since the 'armistice has been stu pendous.. Up to April. 1921, according to . figures : officially- Issued by the rep arations commission, the totals are a i Tonowsin goia marks; EXPONENTS OF FRENCH PLAN FOR SECURITY r ahlns bad broken down, snd each nation. ol P5 5" i.,-. . AMttr-r nw I "men r rencn security was to rest, in is . " " . . ., , .was In a report of the disarmament of to arms to protect Itself. A great fear rnmmitM nt ,K Mm prevailed. Kach nation had reverted to prhtmiv reliance upon Its own sword. The swnrd -of France waa Its army, and ill! :- Tv.w ITS' t y , y OoMMarka. .t.276.450,8SS l,ta7.27,830 9i,oie.8r. 104.70a,22 1V.US4.8B1 4 4 X J rl AY " 1 5 h V X-.-JV-J".-. V applied to the enemy, compulsory serv ice abolished, the army reduced 'to a police force of 100.000 men. and the navy to a mere basis of defense. Moreover, as a concession to the French demand for international control which had failed of acceptance as a general propo sition, Germany's armaments are sub ject to investigation at any time by majority vote of the League ef Nations. even after her admission. So much for the struggle over a stand ard of disarmament; we come now to the equally bitter controversy over the terms In the program, and the first and most important of these was the pro posal to abolish compulsory service. Here were the exact terms of the pro gram as President Wilson originally wrote it: As the basis for such a reduction of armaments, all the powers sub scribing to the treaty of peace of which this government constitute a part, agree to abolish conscription and all other forms of compulsory military service, and also agree that their future forces of defense and of International action shall consist of militia or volunteers whose numbers . and methods of training shall be fixed after expert Inquiry, by the agreements referred to in the last preceding paragraph. This proposal cut at the very root of the continental military system: and yet the president was here only giving the commonplace American interpreta tion of the principle of point 4. ask ing that the world accept the traditional American (and British) policy of volun teer armies as contrasted with conscript armies. Germany had been the origi nator of the modern practice of com pulsory service, and It bad become the 1 4 f0 V Germany by a committee of the supreme war council, headed by M. Loucheur M. Loucheur was one of the able flnan Uail.M fif and mraat mmwtlver the army restea upon me inmuuuon i 1 1 r'imnII'. ain . minion ,f rompulsory service. Ttv sword of Brit- reconstruction. This reoort nroceeded atn was ber, navy ana ner power upon upon the assumption that modern war the seas. I rests upon an economic basis. In order, Therefor, the proposal to limit arma-1 therefore, to be absolutely safe, the nntnta struck at the very roots of Ku-alHes must not only Impose military dis- repean safety, when It toucneo lana armament upon Germany with the con armament It set France and Italy a trol of the Rhine frontier, backed by an shiver : when It touched naval armament, I armed League of Nations, but Germany the British Kmplre shook, and every! must also be disarmed or crippled eco- smalt nation In Europe, fearful of Its nomlcaliy. For here the French clearly MlrhhorN. was In deadly fear lest. If It recognized their Inferiority. The Lou b not permitted to keep up a largelcneur report cauea ior supplementing army. Its very existence be endangered. I military disarmament by a control of the f inmU hiM been the wildest IOHV. arms ana muniuuui mtiui ico ui vrei- as the president clearly saw. to propose many to prevent rearming. Allied officers any real disarmament without setting up re thus to supervise German industry Dm new guarantee of salety in place v . ' T , .VT .. .kiv. mii... k. f.. f produced. As a secondary proposal the " -w-.v 1 , i ..1UI f- V "Ko Kurope. restore confidence, lie proposed v " "J" T. 1.. k. m.n. h.hif,.i men d lute control by military occupation only what many thoughtful men had ... i.ii vmnn xi.hiuh. proposed before him and 1 what the - - - - of American coionice n'i kuwy, m v.i- , ....... . ih ,.toiii a ... K..xl ,,nr. rnmmnn " -v .. y.. ''"r-" " inoustrles which depend on tnese - .t,PT. wnnnav In which the nations could trust; in i " v, lart. a strons co-operative League ofl President Wilson was vigorous in his Nations, I expression regarding the findings of M But the president, like most Ameri- Loucheur. which General Bliss had also ran for America nad never oeen t nor-i opposed wnen iney worw u ura tir achry frightened did not fully realise In the supreme war council, m even until ha arrived In Europe how enor- went so rar as to can n a panic pro- atwnniai r tha fears and rram." Here Is his exact comment bw nrecarloas the safety of Europe ; (Secret minutes. Feb. 7) : bow every discussion, for example, where France was concerned, got back to a eweetloa ef French security. It was borne In upon him at every con ference, the press was full of It, the very atmosphere reeked with It As M. Clem ewes an expressed It In the Council of Tenjsecret minute January SO): M. Clemenceau said ' that the Frenrh were the neareet neighbors - ef Oermany. and could be at all times, as Ihey had been In the past, suddenly attacked . France realised that treat Britain had re poneilbllttlM In all parts of the world, and could not keep the whole of ber et re n ft h concentrated at one point. America ws far away and could k eeme at once to the assist ance ef France. If tbeiLeague of Nations and the peace of the world wrerw te be established. It must not ble by plactea France In a perilous position. Amerlna waa protected by (ha whole breadth of the ocean, and Ureat Britain by her fleet. TRAUCI EE5TS HBft CAME At every tarn, also, the concrete evt President Wilson considered the recommendations contained In the loucheur report to be a panto pro gram. The report not only called for the surrender of big guns, which In Ms opinion should be given up. but It also want into details of aircraft and factory production he thought that if Officers were sent there thev would ret into trouble and would have to oe supported by military forces. While the Loucheur program was de feated hv American and British criti cism, yet the basic Idea of crippling Ger many permanently In an economic sense, ea a cuarantee of French security, lay deep underneath the struggle for the permanent control of the coal of the Saare. the permanent control, of the Rhine frontier, and tne weakening oi Germany In the Siiesian districts. It was even directly proposed by tne Tencn during the month while president wu eon waa absent from the peace con ference (on the voyage to America Fob. IS to March IS), that there should be a perpetual supervision by commissions of ..w.. ,ki wee muni i BVa I itermaji armament asa vi uvnwui w Mi at nana: tha vtauat a. I duatry in so far as It might possibly be stratum of their reasons for being lurn TO puuu" afraid t M. iTVenencee I e a But the fact must be faced that during four years ef war the countryside of France bad beef devastated and subjected to the worn Kind or savagery. " " 1 le wianed to repeat wtat he had al ready aald. namely, that the fortune ef war had been such that neither American ner British lerrttortne had xffered, while tne territory of Franc bad beea eo ravaged that It woul I seem as though recovery wattld be Imnosetble. The in dustries of France had been scien tifically destroyed. France had lost aonn.eoe men. either killed or mutilated. . The president clearly revealed In his speeches at that time, that ha. realised lucre singly the gravity at the problem. Among the peeetdent'a papers Is Mar. anal Fork's detailed anerooraada on toe which meant. In effect, the permanent supervision by French, British, American and Italian officers of German chemical. airplane and steel Industries. - We find Clemenceau saying on March I in the council of ten : j He was not content t tell Germany to limit, her forces until the peace terms were fulfilled and to leave the future to the mercy of events Other countries might be content with transitory naval terms. He himself waa not prepared to slam an Invita tion to Germany for another - at- tack by land after an Interval of , three or 10 or even 40 years. He would not be prepared to sign a peac of that character. Two days after the president returned to France, when thes . proposals came up In the council be attacked them vigorously and aecured sweeping modi ftvattona. He -called them "an - lnstru- VVanee United Statea Oreat Britain BelsiBiB . . . . Hal JTet the French consistently preferred these enormous expenditures for safety rather . than for. reconstruction. Of course,, there Is another aspect, of this policy; for, by this method, bitterly and somewhat exaggeratedly described by Lloyd George in the argument, of .June a.- already referred to, "of quartering the French army on Germany and making Germany pay the- cost of It," France gets back part of the cost. In passing It may be noted that Germany Is now being taxed to support the militarism in France from which she has herself been absolved, though by no desire of her own. Thus did the insatiable demand for safety operate in the economic field ; and thus did the economists work to gether with the soldiers and the diplo mats for the French conception of safe ty although at the same time pursuing the irreconcilable aim of reparation.' All these elements -in the French posi tion must be borne: fn mind, in order to understand the struggle over the limita tion of armaments. WHAT STANDARD OF ARMAMENT! We come now to tne detailed items of umi druggie tt.ua uie lire, ui uiqbb con cerns the- vital problem of a future standard of armament. What military force should a nation be permitted to keep? President Wilson's original conception of a standard of disarmament as set forth in point four was a reduction "to the lowest point consistent with domes tic safety" which will no doubt In the j future, when the world is genuinely pre pared to face the problem, be found to be the only safe standard upon which to base the mutual guarantee of an as sociation of nations. , But when this drastic proposal came up for the. first reading in the League, of Nations commission, February C, the' word domestic waa at once pounced upon. France, Italy and Japan were all against that standard of land armament. even when counterbalanced by the guar antee of a League of Nations, and Great Britain was also probably uncertain as to what it meant in its possible appli cation to naval armament. The actual objection in the meeting came from Baron Makino, the Japanese delegate. He suggested that the words "national safety" be substituted for "domestic safety," and this was adopted and so ap pears In the final draft of the treaty. "National safety as against "domes tic safety" represented a weakening of the president's original idea ; but in that tumultuous time, before the league was organised, national safety loomed a an overwhelming problem. But the change In wording let in the whole array of French argument and appeal for 'her own national safety and a hopeless) ef fort to determine what military force waa sufficient for national safety, when each nation was its own judge of what was necessary to its safety. M. Bourgeois was quick to seise upon the change in wording to emphasise his demand that the new standard of "na tional safety" not only demanded strong national armament 'but a League of Na tions with an international control of armament and a general staff. One of the bitterest controversies of the entire conference developed around this difference between the American view and that of the French. President Wilson, strongly supported by Lord Robert Cecil, opposed the French Idea, of international armament. He saw In it, as he aald, a method of "substituting International militarism, for national militarism." and the whole idea of control was repugnant to hlm. WIL803TS ARGUMENT "No nation.- he said, "win consent to control. As for us Americans, we can not consent to control because of our 4- 'JSP i LI I HI ,v " U if nomlo as well as military reu Its, for a." . million or so jroung men will b work tag in Industry In Oermany while a cor responding minion or so are marching ' and learning to shoot at the expense ot the atat in Franc and Italy. ; , . GAINS rom VISAEMAMEXT A real gain was also mad la the mat- , ter tot publicity as a factor la tne Ural- . tation of armaments. Publicity, ta President Wilson's first draft of the covenant, had formed on ot the eomer stones of the program. "There abcQ bef full and frank publicity as te aU na tional armaments aad military and a val programa" Her again French fears presented an obstacle. M. Bourgeois ar gued that so long as certain powers 4b meant Germany) remained outside th league. It would be folly to let thesa . know th military secrets of tboe In side, and even when they came In, on mast not trust them too far. What ha wanted was publicity regarding th German armament, but not th arma ment of th allied nations. Finally, "full and frank publicity" becara "Inter change of Information" among them selves a more limited piopoasl. but aq advanc over anything ta th past. The final clause of th covenant spaa this subject reads as follows: r- The members of th leagu under- take to exchange full aad frank ta- -formation aa to th seal of their ' armaments, their military, naval and air programs and th condition ef such of their Industries as are adapt- ' -able to warlike purpose. In th matter of manufacture ef tnanU Uona of war by private enterprise. though th president did not awour ftua full pro rram. yet there Is highest expression of the military spirit. I over anything in th past. Ta preside at He was proposing a wnouy oirierent i had taken a poedUve stand oa this sub- practice, not theoretical, but the tra-1 tec In his orixtnal eovwnant. "Th oo- dltlonal method of the English speaking I tractlng powers further agre that me races. Later the proposal, aa applied to ejUons and Implements ef war shall wet the smaller states, waa to be knowrn, in l te masafactured by private etrpri th discussions ot the council of four. I f. tot private profit." Tula eocaaioned as the "American-British Proposal." as I oonslderabl discuaaioa ; It would ptac contrasted with the "French-Italian 1 weak Bationa, with UUle Industrial do- Pro posaL" I velopment, at th mercy of great (ta- CONSCRIPTION IS RETAINED I tlona. Th provUlon was cut oot ot i Protests were made at one; en of th earliest by Orlando of Italy, know exactly what Orlando told n resident- for we have it In hi own words, used later, in the council of four (May 15): As then explained to President Wilson, Italy would not be able to raise aa army by voluntary "rvW Such a system would be too diffi cult In. Its application, since ta whole tradition ot tne country w ar&tnst It. Consequently, the Ital ian army , would bav to be orran- isea'on a oasia oi corapviwei j w It appeared also that th French held exactly th same position. Even though th president's proposal looked only to the future., when the V a $Vv ''s$5'h& t draft ot th covenant, restored. la an- or. I other by th president's motion aad It I nnauy" appears ba vd treaty aa iouwu Th members of th leagu agree that th manufactnr by prtval en- -terprts ot mimitlons and tmplantsr of -war tS'opesrto grave ejbsctiatna. Tb council shall advts bow the evil effects attendant upon audi masn- fanctur can b prevented, dvte re- ' gard being bad to th nsrsealtie t ' thass tneenbera ef tb leagu which ' are net abla.to iimxwtaetur the taucltlona-aad mjjlementa at. war . noccasary xor inetr saiety. r Not only are there these gains ta dealing with eotnereto aspects of tb" problem of disarmament but th treaty Is up machinery which baa been used to brine th sub led of limitation f League of Nations should b function- I armaments to th attention of th whole Inc. and provided that the plans rormu- I world. . This ntrevlatoa Is In -Article IX lated should "be binding when and only 1 0f the covenant: which waa orirlnally when unanimously appro vea oy in sov-. presented (oy lxrd Koben tiecti as a. ernments signatory to this covenant" 1 compromise with tb French demand for which might be a long way on yet tne I an International general staff. It pro Italians and French were fearful even I rides that "a permanent coram laaloa of dlscuBslntr the principle as concerning I shall be constituted to advts th con- themselves ; though they later agreeo. i cil on th execution ot Arucie i ana with reluctance, to the application of It I VIII on military, naval aad air awee- to Germany and Austria. I Cons generally. THIS These considerations were brought up I mission waa named ax tn iww meeung in the more formal conference with Lord of th council In May, Itti, and tl first x . r-.ti mnA rteneral Smuta. Both Lwork was not to draw up plans) for th . .h.red the atronK aversion I use of leagu force, aa th French de- of English-speaking races to the Idea of sired, but to set up Inquiries regarding un i rrnt rjout also recoa- i iininii . -...- nixed the practical difficulty oi secunns i '-"'-'-'-- - the support of France ana iiaiy u i ui.i run uisiiuiabji ( rMirj. mowritlan Of the nations Wtm I i..a., Immrt.nl mmhI ! lies la so strong a provision regarding con-pul-l formjli acknowledgment ' by an th sory service. In th reviaea oraii nations signatory to tb treaty, that th ih covenant- therefore, tne provision regarding compulsory service oecarae Article S. and was thus wanuea It (the execuUve council) shall also Inquire Into the feasibility of -Kriihinv cnmoulsorv military erv- If V " ir 'ii in iim Above; M. Clemenceau, ; who contended al Paris conference against any limitation of land armament that would imperil France in future. Below M. Bourgeois, whose plan for a League of Nations would have permitted compulsory military service. constitution. We must do everything that is possible to Insure the safety of' the world. I know what France has suffered and I know that she -wishes to obtain the. best guarantees possible before ehe enters the league, and every thing that' we can do in this direction we shall, do, but we cannot accept pro posals which are in direct contradiction to our constitution. . The only method by which we can achieve this end lies in. our having confidence in the good faith of the nations who belong to the league. There must be between them a cordial agreement and good will." But the formidable Bourgeois, though voted - down in the commission,' never surrendered in' hia main contention and kept bringing-up his proposal for a mil itary league In various forms, directly and indirectly; and when he failed to make his point, final French acceptance of th 'American-British form of the cov enant was. in part, conditioned upon the special guarante by America and Great Britain, in order to quiet French fears, until ,'the league itself affords sufficient protection,' to coma to the support ot France in ease of attack, by Germany. . But if the allies refused to adopt-the president's standard of disarmament aa applying to themselves, U they .whittled down aa much, as they could , the Ameri can program, yet when the problem of disarming. Germany arose, they applied both- the principle and .the program al most, literally for it seemed,, in that case,', perfectly reasonable. - On Febru ary 12. President Wilson thus stated the program as pertaining to uerman ais- armament : '". Disarmament contained two ele ment (1) the maintenance of an adequate force of internal police ; (2) the national contribution to the gen eral force of the future League of Nations. All we need con template was the amount of armed force required by Germany to main tain Internal order and to keep down Bolshevism.- ' In general be felt that until we knew what the German government was going to be -and how the German people were going to behave, the world had a moral right to disarm Germany, and to subject her to a generation of thooxhtiulnesa. - -. So it waa that th ideal atandard was Ice, and tne luraumuuu "-" v -of forces enrolled upon a voluntary basis and into the military and naval equipment which It Is reason able to maintain. But even this device of mere Inquiry was too strong for the French, and when the article came up for the first time In the League ot Nations commission (February ). which met In the evening i rin.i uniw'i larcre office In the Crlllon hotel, we find M. Bourgeois rising quickly to object. Me oia noi wiw. even the possibility of abolishing com- , nHr. to be discussed. This position waa lunner "- a; n-ienrin of Italy and M. Lar naude. the other French delegate, and. n..iw in order to meet this determined opposition even to the mention of com pulsory military service and yet keep a m- -n for future action by the .. . i un. League of Kauons xne -posed the following subsUtute: The executive council shall also determine for te'consideratlonand action of the several government what military equipment arid arma ment is fair and reasonable pro portion to the scale of force. Uld down in the program of disarma ment, and these limits when adopted, shall not be exceeded with out the permission of the body ot delegates. In short, the president here in rows the whole power of initiating action in the matter ot limitation of armament into the hands of the future Leagu of Nations. While this proposal was adopt ed at the moment, it did not, by any means, close the discussion, and the final wording of the proposal was reached only after much controversy and th. introduction of the Idea of "special rik- an vle-orously demanded by the KVeneh Here la the wording as It finally appears in th treaty : Tb council, taking account of the geographical situation and circum stances of each state, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the con sideration and action of the several governments. Such plans shall be. subject to reconsideration and revi sion at least every 10 years. After these plans, shall have been adopted . by the several government, th lim its of arma menu therein fixed ahall not be exceeded without the concur rence 'of the council. But the abolition of compulsory eerv ice was forced upon Germany! And tt mr indited. Drove to be one of the real nine at Paris this destractio ot th practice In the citadel of Its origin. It will undoubtedly bav far-reaching eco- general limitation wf armaments Is on of th conditions of tb peace. This ' originated in a proposal by rreatdert Wilson on April 2t for a preamble to th military, naval and air clause of tb treaty, which now appears oa page TS ot that document. This was th colloquy in the secret minute: President Wilson suggested that It ' would make th naval, military and ' air terms mors acceptable to the', enemx if they were presented aa pre- paring the way for a general limita tion of armaments for all jisUooa ' M. Clemenceau aald be would Ilka . to see the formula before be agreed. , " The president drew op th pre- amble in the following words : In order to render possibl the lnl- i tiatlon of general limitation of th tT armaments of all nations Oermaay undertake strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow. - General Bliss regards this aa eaa ef the most Important provisions la tb treaty. "In all good faith and honor." he said In Ms address at Philadelphia; (17 nationa and Germany) bav pledged themselves to Initial aa soon practicable a general limitation of armaments after Germany has compiled with ber first obligation." But the greatest gain of all. poten- - Ually, waa In securing the adoption of a new instrumentality in. th League of Nations for guaranteeing th safety ot nations, thereby relieving them ot the necessity of keeping up great armaments to preserve their own safety. ; This ta the root of th problem of ns tlona I safety. One accepted aad used this would represent the most fundamental factor of all la reducing armament. Tav bav got th leagu through and to have brought all th allied nations Into tt without admitting th poisonous element of the French armament plan, aad thus ' extending rather than curtailing th military organ I tat Ion and armament, was In Itself a great achievement, aithougu purchased at the sacrifice of part ot th actual disarmament program. . Such are th provisions of th treaty ot Versailles; th basis arrived at In Pari for dealing with th problem f limitation ot armament. Tb anaia problem discussed in this chapter baa been that ot land armament, with which Franc was chiefly concerned aad la which American principle aad program cam most directly Into conflict - with French fears and needs; but there were also other vital problems of disarma ment, notably naval arnmameat Where British. Japanese and America Inter est, appear, disarmament of email na tiona. methods ot dealing with the ew instrumentalities of war. and. finally, th problem of arming negroes, all of which will be treated la th foUowtag chapters. (Te to eo'