THE OREGON SUNDAY JOVRNAL.-T PORTLAND, SUNDAY -MORNING, APRIL 21, 1918.
FUTURE OF GERMANY STAKE OF PRESENT HELLISH
DRIVE
HunMustWiiiBef ore
ericans Can Strike
Am
; War Weary People Have Been Promised That This Gigantic Stroke
Will Break Allies and Secure Indemnities That
'j Stand Between Them and Ruin.
By FRANK H. SIMONDS
'AS WE approach the end of the third week of the German offensive in
' Picardy, when this article is written, there is no mistaking the fact that
, the second Battle of the Somme is 'rapidly taking on the color and character
of tnpther and more gigantic Verdun with all that Verdun means to German
and AHted publics. g
It is well to recall once more the exact circumstances under which the
, present German campaign was undertaken. The Germans did not attack
Picardy in 1918. as the French did in Champagne in 1915, to relieve an
ally and with only a subordinate hope of breaking through. They did not
attack as did the British and the French at the Somme. to save an imperiled
sector of the Western front, as Verdun had to be saved in July, 1916. They
had a far more ambitious objective than had the ill-starred Nivelle one year
ago. at the Aisne. His maximum purpose was to turn the Germans out of
' rrance, and Halg's hope in the Ypres campaign of last summer and fall did
not jo beyond the freeing of the Belgian coast
Now the Germans In their venture
have returned to tbelr own precedents
of the Marne and Verdun campaigns.
Their offensive was a deliberate at
tempt to win the war by one gigantic
thrust, and It was so advertised by the
German "press which In such Instances
always speaks by the book, and at the
dictation of the German army. The
, German set out to Impose a German
, peace upon the world by one more vic
torious campaign. He struck the Brit
ish la 19 IS as he struck the French in
1111. Before Verdun he advertised his
offensive as designed to "break the heart
of France." Before his last attack he
promised to "break the spirit and will
f Britain."
There was no permanent profit for the
- German at this time in the war in a
ga(n of territory without a rupture of
the allied front. Least of all was there
any profit In the reconquest of that
desert he had created between the
Scheldt, the Somme, the Scarps and the
Olse in his great retreat of the previ
ous year. A similar advance anywhere
else on the front would have been in
calculably more disastrous to his foes,
because it would have devastated a new
region of France and thus added one
more to the burdens the war has
brought upon the French nation.
He struck where he did because it was
the one place in the western front
-where he could hope, given a complete
success at the outset, to produce a sltua
tlon out of which he might win a su-
preme triumph and end the war. I
' dwell upon this detail, if it be a detail,
because it is essential now, and in the
next few weeks, to keep in mind the
i German purpose. It is essential be-
cause otherwise there may be an un-
. necessary pessimism which will have a
bad effect. The German is bound to
make new gains, he is almost certain to
! advance his line at points, just as he
4 did at Verdun, but as at Verdun, the
main consideration Is not local gain,
' but the extent to which ne realized his
' main purpose.
Verdun was a failure for the German
after he was checked on the Douaumont
, plateau on February 28, 1918. He had
aimed, in that campaign, to take Ver
dun with his first thrust, Interpose be
- tween the French armies of the central
' and of the eastern groups, separate them
and compel a general French retire
ment with the abandonment of several
thousand square miles of French terrl-
,- tory and an eventual resumption of the
march on Paris. By March 1 there was
not the smallest chance of a separation
of French armies, Verdun become merely
. -a local Issue, French strategy became
purely a problem of holding on until the
British should be ready for their
Comma attack.
Germany Now
Staking All
; French strategy realized Its larger
. - purpose and, by the smallest of margins
also saved Verdun. When the British
attacked at the Somme on July 1, Ver
dun was in extreme danger, and it
would almost certainty have fallen In the
next few months, had there been no di
version xf German reserves and ar
tillery td the Somme battleground. But
even the; taking of Verdun In the sum
mer of 1918 would not have been a com
mensurate return for German casualties
amounting to between 300,000 and 400,
000. Even had Verdun fallenFrench
strategy jwas- to hold the mass of the
German armies in play until Britain
could be fully ready.
Now, Rearing in mind the Verdun
parallel, We can see cne German offen
sive In iljs tiue light In the' present ln
stance. The German had to face cer
tain political conditions at home and
abroad. His own people were terribly
tired of war and were suffering greatly
from hardships incident to war. They
wanted peace, but the victories in the
east and the collapse of Russia had
temporarily raised their spirits and they
were - willing to believe then- military
leaders, who told them that one more
great effort In the west would bring
German peace, and what was even more
Important, would 'enable Germany to
make her enemies pay the costs of the
w.r, for; every German of ordinary. in
telllgenco realizes that Germany is
ruined if she can obtain no indemnities
and does not break down the hostility of
her present foes, which will cripple her
economic! future.
Finally, the German realized that the
United States was beginning to be
military factor. The flow of American
troops to the continent, which several
months ago had amounted, on the state
ment of the French high commissioner.
to nearly a quarter of a million was con
tlnuing and increasing. Granted that
Germany might have a Blight preponder
ance of numbers available for the of
fensives In March and in April, the mar
gin was so small that to postpone action
for two ior three months would wipe it
out as a- result of the increase of Ameri
can troops in France. Time ran against
the German as it did. at the time of
Verdun, when he sought a decision be
fore the British could get ready.
Now allied strategy had certain equal
ly plain lacts to wrestle with. Conceiv
ably the Germans were slightly su
perior both in numbers and in gun
power. An allied offensive would thus
have relatively small chance of great
success. ;because previous allied offen
sives had failed when guns and men
were both available in superior num
bers. But there was arriving and
would continue to arrive a stream of
men and munitions from America,
which would, by 1919, give the allies a
final advantage in both, and provide
them with a reserve which, all things
considered, might be regarded as prac
tically inexhaustible. The supreme pur
pose of the allies, then, was to endure
with as little loss of ground and men
3CaC0GC3ra36 TOUG IT
CV. Cr sC ds )TogL -""XiNANCt
Jm M af "J -
V' " 'f At Serpen 4r,
ca sior f"- j&
on
as possible, until America was ready.
Anything but a major disaster was a
price they must and did consent to pay
for time, and by a major disaster they
understood German victory that would
insure a German peace.
Given these conditions on both sides,
let us see how the game worked out
in the first three weeks of the German
offensive,' The German planned a Na
poleonic blow. He undertook to break
through the British on a front of 50
miles, drive a wedge between the French
and the British, roll the British back
upon Calais and Boulogue, that is north
of the Somme, contain the whole British
force on the now restricted front with
a relatively small fraction of his troops.
who would dig In, and then concentrate
all his resources and not Improbably a
material fraction of the resources of his
allies upon a final blow against the
French.
In his original conception, Hinden
burg expected to break through the al
lied line, throw the French back behind
the Seine and the Olse. contain the
routed British behind the Somme or
even the Canche and then, with his
hands free for the moment, deal the
death blow to the - French. And it is
essential to recognize that if the Brit
ish had been thrown back behind the
Somme or the Canche and penned up in
the narrow area, thus circumscribed,
the peril to France would have been
tremendous. It was the old Napoleonic
conception of the Waterloo campaign,
to divide the British and the Prussians,
drive the Prussians east towards Liege
and contain them with Grouchy and
then smash Wellington. The failure
was the failure of Grouchy to contain
the Prussians, who got back into effec
tive touch with the British and routed
the French.
Gough's Army
Badly Beaten
Now let us follow the working out
of the strategy as far as it had gone
on April 0, which is just short of three
weeks. First of all, there was an im
mediate rupture of the allied line.
Gough's Fifth army was beaten as no
great British. army has ever been beat
en. Not only Was it beaten, but in its
retreat it was so badly handled that the
Germans were able to intervene between
it and the main British armies to the
north and similarly between it and the
French armies to the south. The Fifth
army waa the link in the allied chain
of armies from Switzerland to the sea
and this link was effectually broken by
Friday. March 22. Thus in two days
Hindenburg had accomplished what Fal
kenhayn had failed to achieve at Ver
dun, he had broken a hole, between the
allied armies.
The ultimate German victory.' after
the immediate and enormous local suc
cess west of St. Quentin was prevented
by the French, they saved the British
even more unmistakably than Bluecher
saved Wellington at Waterloo. Had the
French not been able to Intervene, the
Germans would have realized in the
first week the main purpose of their
strategy ; they would have driven the
British in something approaching a
complete rout, so far as the Fifth army
was concerned, north of the Somme and
out of touch with the French.
The French saved the British and the
situation by the rapidity with which they
moved their reserves northward. They
had two things to do. The collapse of
the Fifth British army had not only
opened a gap between the British and
French fronts, .it had also uncovered
through. Just as Victor Hugo and other
French writers Insist that Napoleon
would have won at Waterloo If It had
not rained the night before and delayed
the French attack the next morning. -
But the German was not through. To
the north, in front of Arras, his advance
had been slight and he was still in
touch with bis old good communications.
Accordingly he launched a new thrust
a Arras. The purpose was simple. He
had broken the gate between the French
and British, hinges at La Fere and
Arras at the La Fere hinge; it had
swung back, but the French had come
up and stopped the swing. He might
now wrench it off the northern hinge;
if he did. his purpose would still be ac
complished, because he would open a
new gap between the allies and there
were no more French reserves avail
able.
Unfortunately for him. however, the
Third British army succeeded where the
Fifth had failed. It retired a little, but
In perfect order and upon stronger po
sitions, which It held, exacting so ter
rible a price from the Germans that
they stopped short In the attack upon
the northern hinge, and they have not
resumed their attack up to the present
moment. The rush was over by March
27. By April 1 there waa a general lull
all over the front and the Germans were
digging In on their flanks and getting
up their heavy guns, while the allies
were also digging in and getting up re
serves and artillery.
Allied Situation
Is Still Awkward
Still the allied situation was exceed
lngly awkward, and remains so, in one
important respect. As at Verdun, the
first German rush had carried the as
sailant over most of the good gun po
sitions and naturally defensive lines on
which the French could make a stand
if the most important local - objectives
were to be saved. Verdun city was the
local objective in the earlier campaign
Amiens occupies a similar role in the
later offensive. When the rush stopped
the Germans were within a dozen miles
of the old capital of Picardy, an im
portant Industrial town : but, above
all. the neck of the bottle through which
pass all the main north-and-south rail
roads of this region, the railroads which
connect Paris with Calais and the Brit
ish and Trench front, and. what is more
important, the railroads from Rouen and
Havre, which connect the British in
Picardy, Artols and Flanders with their
main bases on the sea.
It is no longer certain that the Ger
mans, even if they got Ameins, could
separate the British and the French, for
not until it passes Abbeville, 20 miles
west, does the Somme become an Im
passable barrier between the north and
the south, and the British might hang
Allies Can Wait,
s
Hindenburg Cannot
Fact That Teutonic Strategy Has Failed Its Mark Is Reason for
Confidence That the Final Outcome Will Be
in Our Favor.
l.e
the main roads to Paris. Thus the on Mtride the Somme all the way back
French had to rush troops north to
cover Paris, they had 'also to rush troops
up to get in front of the German push
westward, which was rapidly getting to
the point where all restoration of con
tact between the allies would be impossible.
The threat to Paris was stopped short
and never became grave at any time
during the critical period. But it was
not until March 28 that French troops
had gotten around the comer and in
front of the extreme point of the wedge,
and by this time this extreme point had
passed Montdldler and had begun to
climb the narrow plateau between the
Avre and the Noye valleys. And In the
Noye valley runs the main raQroad from
Paris to the north. It waa a breathless
finish to one of the most exciting races
in all military history.
Rain Plays "
Important Part
The Germans did not Immediately ac
cept the fact of defeat. For several
days they continued to assail this nec
essarily thin line which was the life
line of the allied armies, since it bound
the British and the French together.
But the French soldier of blood and
bravery held. By April 1 the German
was forced to abandon his Immediate
efforts to break the new connection.
He had temporarily come to the end
of his strength on this front, where he
was 35 miles from his starting-point
and the hopeless roads behind him were
rendered even more hopeless by the rain
storm that now Intervened. Perhaps If
it had not rained he migtrt have gotten
to the neighborhood of Abbeville: but
If Amiens went, their connections with
Great Britain would at once be threat
ened. Yet. if the line held within 13
miles west of Amiens, new communica
tions could In time be Improvised.
Had Amiens fallen in the first rush,
then the British would have been swept
north of the Somme and there could
have been no further hope of restora
tion of contact between French and
British ; but. once the contact was re
stored a dozen miles in front of Amiens,
there was real hope that It might be
maintained west of Amiens, even if this
town should fall. I say that because
the fall of Amiens, which remains pos
sible, should not be accepted as having
the importance that it might have had
two weeks or more ago. The fa!! of
Verdun in August would have been . a
sad blow to allied morale, but It would
not have been the evidence of immediate
disaster It would have been In Feb
ruary, or even in the first days of
March, 1916, and the same is now true
of Amiens.
After the first week of effort there
was a natural and inevitable lull In
the Amiens sector. The German did
not actually stop, but his operatlonr.
save at Arras, were inconsiderable lor
nearly a week. Then he began on ex
actly the old Verdun lines that Is, by
attacks on either side of the wedge he
had driven In toward his Immediate
local objective. In Lorraine he began
his new operations by attacks upon
Dead Man's hill and Fort du Vaux, on
the flanks of his wedge. He did this
to abolish the evil effect of the artii-
i lery fire concentrated upon his wt!ge
from both sides. Before Ameins
sought to widen his wedge.
Sought to
Widen Wedge
Hlndenburg's problem was a magni
fied reproduction of the Verdun prob
lem. Any further advance at the pvnt
of the wedge toward Amiens would be
smothered by concentrated allied Ar
tillery fire. He must therefore widen
the wedge, and he sought to do this by
attacking the French on the plateau
between the Avre and the ?.oye. south
of Amiens, and the British west of the
Ancre and Somme. Could he advance
n both flanks, he would begin to throw
a. Iood around Amiens, isolating the
town both from the north and from the
south. But, although he gained ground,
his eain was inconsiderable and the
price paid exorbitant. The price was
Increased by the fact that German
heavy artillery was not yet up. and
French and British guns of all cali
ber were in position. By the third
Sunday of the battle the German ef
fort on both flanks had slowed down.
with no real gain on ta north and no
decisive gain on the south, although
the Amiens-Calais railroad was no
longer usable and barely two miles dis
tant from the German front.
In sum. then, toward the end of the
third week the German was still far
from his major end. the separation of
the British and French armies. He had
won a great battle and administered to
one strong British army perhaps tne
heaviest defeat in British military his
tory. He had advanced beyond any ex
Dectatlon of the allies. He was approach
lne Amiens, although at a very slow
pace. But he had paid 300,000 casualties
for a local success; and there was noi
the smallest promise that he could
bring home a new Sedan or Waterloo
discoverable In the face of the sltua
tlon. Rather, there was the growing
likelihood of a second Verdun.
And the German must have not
local victory, but a decisive victory.
military solution of the problem of war
He has confessed that he must have it
at once, by the terms under which he
challenged his foes and enlisted his own
people. If he Is before Amiens a month
from now. he will have lost the cam
palgn, provided he continues the battle
in this field or does not win a major
triumph in some other. If he gets be
yond Amiens without separsting his two
foes, he will have railed, tr tney are sun
able to stand firmly united before him.
He needs another local success as great
as his recent triumph to win what he
sought to win. and nothing el?e will
greatly help him now.
Allied Prospects
Are Improving
Allied Drosoects have greatly Im
proved since there was an eleventh-hour
agreement upon a single command. It
ought to have been agreed upon last win
ter, but It was blocked by unusn mili
tary influence, despite the urglngs of
Lloyd George. America, France, and
even Italy, favored It. but British Influ
ences postponed It until the present re
verse intervened. After the defeat
there could be no more argument by
British military authorities, since It was
the failure of the British which brought
a defeat which was nearly a disaster.
Fooh was preeminently the man for the
place : no other French general and no
British or Italian general, and least of
all n American general, could chal
lenge the achievement of the man who
saved Nancy, won the Marne and
blocked the German drive to the chan
nel with the aid of the British and Bel
gians. It is possible to regret the lateness of
the decision, since the task of the new
general tssimo has been greatly. In
creased thereby ; but all this In the past
and in his own public utterances he has
Ivcn us the best assurance that he did
not come too late.
One word as to American participa
tion. Accepting M. Tardieu's figures of
some time ago, we mu5t now have at
least 300.000 men In France. Of thes,
we are told. 100,000 have started for the
Somme front, and other divisions are
relieving; French troops In four sectors,
at the smallest reckoning. Presumably,
then, we are putting around 200.000 men
t the service of the allies. This Is a
small number, as this war goes, but it
Is equal to a class of French recruits..
It Is half as large as tha .annual incre
ment of the German army, and, since
the men are picked. It Is unquestionably
better In Its human material than either
a French or German class.
. .... Asa SVt AAA
Again, u the antes nave lost iuv, in
the opening phase of the second battle
of the Somme. the gap has been prompt
ly filled by American troops. The Oer-
man, on the other hand, having ioai Be
tween 2&0.000 and J00.000 in the same
operation, must find the troops to re
place wastage out of his own reserves.
He can do it. He probably had upward
of 1.000.000 reserves to replace wastaae
when the campaign began, but the rate
of exhaustion for hlra Is thus far faster
than for his chief opponents, and. hence
forth, under the wise plan to put' our
troops in more promptly, brigaded with
French and British troops, we snan aia
regularly to replace allied wastage,
while the German must still rely exclu
sively upon his own manpower.
We are only beginning, but our start .
Is at a critical moment and our aid is
by no means negligible. On the con
trary. It may enable the British and the
FreneTi to reconstitute an army of ma
neuver If, as eeems possible, a large
part of the original force was drawn
in to fill the Raps created by the de
feat of the Fifth British army. As to
the moral effect, no one can mistake the
admirable Impression made by American
entrance, At a critical moment the
German had failed, first to. separate the
armies of his principal enemies, and
secondly to separate the peoples of his
other enemies. The alliance against
Germany ts stronger today than at any
moment slnceltuasla fell, and we are In
some small way beginning to replace
Russia.
Set this sgalnst the battle lost and
the disaster narrowly escaped by the
allies and it has a real value. Couple
with It the failure to date of the Ger
man strategy to realize its main objec
tive and the reason for confidence - is
clear. France lost Charlerol and won
the Marne. Britain has lost the second
battle of the Somme; but Britain.
France and America are all In line orwe
more and the German advarwe has at
least slowed down on what Is for us
all the right side of his objective. W
have not produced his downfall, but he
hasn't yet come st his world-power. We
can wait, as allied strategy contem
plates. We ran wait, as Petaln waited
at Verdun, until the British were ready.
Hlndenbunr cannot delay, as his strat
egy has Indlcat.d; much less can he
afford another Verdun, toward which his
offensive is rapidly drifting. Hence Uie
new convulsions of the third week.
On the other hand, unless his present
check Is Interrupted, the German will
soon attempt to persuade us that he
never sought a real decisive victory and
parade his local gains just as he did in'
the Verdun time. When he does try
this game, we must keep In mind what
he Is going to do. This Is the real test.
Now, ss at Verdun, this Is the test he
must face, and we should not help him
to avoid it even for a moment.
"CENSOR BAITERS" SOONER OR LATER ALWAYS HIT SAWDUST "TRAIL"
, , i .
Reporter Is Measured
By Tact He Displays
BY WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD
' n . Celebrated War Correspondent
T STARTED my war reporting as a censbr-fighter. Improper censorship
distorts the news, and any inexperienced war reporter considers himself
Justified in censor-baiting. He starts out in his career of war reporting as a
"bad man," belligerent for truth, feeling that there is a certain holiness in
bis attitude.
But there is a "sawdust trail" that, after a time, he will hit. Like sin
' (which a certain evangelist, named after a certain legal holiday, declares "you
can't beat ) the censors rig blue pencil will, in time, bring every war re
porter to repentance. If he doesn't, then his career as a war reporter is ir
revocably ended and he'll probably go back home.
You can't be a war reporter in these days and not be "good."
. My first experience with war was . back to your country. The truth is all
; with little Francisco Madero in Mexico'
In 1910 ; and the first censor that ever
. put blue pencil to my copy was Madero's j
gent in Mexico City.
turing the past four years I have
been continuously under censorship,
' even as to my personal correspondence,
i and when I returned to the United
States recently I greatly missed having
some one to whom I could show the
letters I would write to my mother and
. friends before dropping them in the
mall box. I felt inclined to ask the
nearest policeman or hall boy some
body In uniform to put his O. K. on
them. ,
. I started out. as I have said, a censor
: tighter, and it's on the books that I've
; had my share of luck at the game. But
' IS censorships through which I have
passed (and I have written copy that
has been censored by three European
nations at a time) have taught me a
. setter way. oi wmcn i snaii write later.
After & short experience of a few
rather newsless weeks on the ally side
" early In the war I : went to Germany,
' and there my first experience confirmed
.my belief that censors were .my enemies.
and put me on. the defensive against
them. The experience waa this:
. In the city of Munich I wrote a harm
less but colorful story about war condi
tlona In the town and took It to the of
floe of the censor. He was an elderly
; German colonel, highly decorated, who
spoke Engirsh excellently. He greeted
me effusively as I laid the copy on the
high desk where he stood at work.
- "An American !" he exclaimed. "I'm
verr rlad to meet you. America today
la the conscience of the world; all the
rest of us have gone mad. It will please
that wa Germans ask."
He read over my story, folded it up.
without changing a word, and handed
it to me with the envelope.
Did Not Change
Single Word
"You. may mall It yourself," he said.
I'm sure I can trust you."
I opened the folded manuscript and
started", to write the word "Censored"
on it.
In a! flash his kindness fell away.
Pleaseido not say that your article has
been censored," he said. "Let it go as
it is." ;
I was forced, of course, to yield to
his demand. But there was a lie in that
piece of, manuscript ; the absence of the
word "censored" was a He that warped
the news value of my story. The ob
ject or; omitting that one word was
to carry to the outside word the im
pression; that Germany was not hinder
ing newspaper men In their expression
of opinion.
Censorship, as I understood it at the
time, was intended to cover military
and political contingencies; here it waa
covering a lie which I was being forced
to send to a then neutral country.
After that experience the entire Ger
man system of censorship challenged
me. Its great policies of military and
political safety I could understand; its
petty policy of trying to mold public
opinion in small matters onljf spurred
me on w Deal it u possible.
Therewas a rule of the German cen
bo ram p , wnicn was provoking. I was
not allowed to know what had been cut
from-my dispatches. Indeed, the whole
attitude of the censor was one of dis
trust aod challenge.
.There came suddenly on day the re-
treat from Przemysl, when we were put
on trains and bundled off toward Buda
pest. We were informed that any stories
which pictured our departure from Prze
mysl as a hasty retreat would be held
up ; and there was no way of getting
anything out without submitting It to
the censor. Here was a Btory to beat a
censor with. In a hotel at Budapest I
st me down to a typewriter and drew
forth all my stock of slang. I tried to
think of the fastest thing that runs, and
my mind settled on Kolehmalnen, the
great Finnish marathoner. I began my
story thus : "Beating it- from Przemysl
was one grand Kolehmalnen." I wrote
80 paragraphs of the sheerest slang,
covering the retreat like a baseball
writer covering a world's series game.
Wanted More
Of Same Kind
Our language-loving censor, who was
inordinately proud of his ability to
speak seven tongues, never batted an
eye over that copy; the chances were
that he did not understand one third
of it, but no man with a head shaped
like his ever admitted that there was
anything in the world he didn't know.
1 The story went.
I had fully expected that the United i
Press would decode, or deslang the
story; but It didn't. Out over the wires
went the story of that greweome re
treat, written in baseball slang, and
several editors wrote to the New Tork
office suggesting that I turn out "some
more of that snappy stuff like the
Przemysl retreat.
It did not require many weeks ex
perience In Europe to indicate to me
that a reporter is measured by the tact
which he displays in the presentation of
his" stories to the censor. I discovered
that censor-fighting was the least pro
ductive pastime in which a war reporter
could engage.
A strict watch was kept on the news
papers here in the United States by all
the belligerent - governments before
America, entered I the war. Germany
kept especially sharp eyes on the work
of American corespondents in Berlin.
An American corespondent was once
haled before an outraged German cen
sor who sbowed him a clipping of one
of his stories, taken from an American
country newspaper. The headline of
the story which had .been stolen by
the country newspaper from a metro
politan dally was highly pro-enemy,
and the country editor, in sarcastic vein.
had black typed certain sentences in
such a way as to make it appear that
he considered them preposterous and
unworthy of belief. The corespondent
had to explain, at great length, that he
had not aent the story to the lKtle coun
try newspaper, and that he was not
responsible ' for the headlines and the
blackened type. Fully six weeks passed
before this correspondent was finally
assured that the German war office did
not hold him responsible for the story.
Blx weeks being the time required for
an agent in the United States to look
up the little newspaper in question and
verify the correspondent's explanation.
All War News
Carefully Weighed
Every word of war news which comes
from Europe to the eyes of the Ameri
can public has been weighed by cen
sors as carefully as precious stones are
weighed by diamond merchants. One
tiny word, or arrangement of words
may send to the bottom of the sea a
great ship or may cost the lives of
thousands of "men in the field. It's all
up to the censor.
"Father is dead," ran a cablegram
from Sweden to New York which
passed through the British censorship.
For some Inexplicable reason the cen
sor' didn't like the word "dead." He
changed It to "deceased."
Within a short time this question,
sent from New York to Sweden, passed
through the hands of the same censor:
"Is father dead or deceased?"
What did that word "dead" meant
It might have covered a whole volume
of enemy words ; it might have pro
voked disaster on land or sea. "And yet
the censor had no better reason for
cutting it out than a certain "hunch"
which came over him that the word
ought to be changed.
The more I see of the censor s Job
the more I sympathize with the censor.
and the more I prefer to be the man
who writes the stuff rather than the
one who censors it. The mistakes of a
writing man in war time can hardly be
fatal, but the error of a censor may
flame out in a catastrophe at any time.
With unlimited power, he has the right
to give "himself 'the benefit of the doubt
every time a doubt arises. And .person
ally I don't blame him for doing It,
An excellent illustration of how the
censors are always on the alert comes
to my mind in connection with an inter-!
view that I had with Winston Churchill
when he waa first lord of the British
admiralty In the early war days.
At last the interview waa finished and
written exactly as It was to go. Mr.
Churchill, one evening at 6 o'clock, put
his signature to It. called his secretary
and said :- "Please take Mr. Shepherd
to the censor's office and Introduce him.
Tell the censor that the Interview with
me is all right."
I was led through a maze of gloomy
hallways, lighted in part by gas, to a
doorway which bore the legend. "Naval
Censor." r ... - .
- -This Is 81r So-and-So. the naval cen
sor." said the secretary, presenting roe
to a strong-featured, iron-gray haired
man. "This Is Mr. Shepherd, an Amer
ican Journalist, who is sending an inter
view with the first lord to America to
night." "Very well." said the man of title,
"we'll take care of it." The secretary
departed.
"I want to write Just a few words
to lead the story." I said. I explained
that my manuscript contained only the
Interview, and that it would be neces
sary to write a short Introduction.
Would Stand for
No "Flub-Dub"
When he had finished he looked up
into my face and said : , "You want to
write an introduction to 'this, huh?"
"Yes," I answered. "It starts out too
abruptly far an American newspaper
story." T
He hesitated a minute. Then he said :
"All right. write It here. But listen I
No flubdub." He looked me squarely In
the eye.
I knew what he. meant by that phrase,
"no flubdub." He meant, "These fellows
around here may trust you, but I don't.
I'm the censor and you're a newspaper
man. Every reporter's a wrong un to
me until he proves he's right. I know
you've got an interview with the first
lord of the British admiralty. I know It's
what you call a big newspaper stunt and
that by tomorrow morning you think
it will be read by millions and millions
of human beings in many languages, and
that it will be telling- England's side of
the war to the world. But none of that
Impresses me. I'm not going to give you
the benefit of any doubt. If you are a
wrong un, look out !"
"Write an Introduction yourself." I
suggested.
"Go ahead with yours," he said,
grimly.
I wrote with a lead pencil at the head
of the article these words : "Winston
ChurchUl. first lord of the British ad-
i mlralty, granted me an Interview today,"
and pushed the copy over to him.
"Is that all?" he said, more gently.
"I can't think of any more to say " I
answered.
"Very good." he said, smiling, as I
rose to go. "I was afraid you were go
ing to write something intricate."
He telephoned to the cable office, or
dered that the Interview be given right
of way, and within 45 minutes the story
was In New York.
He -had been protecting England and
himself. As a censor he was a 100 per
center. But he waa not a friend of news
paper men. A good censor and a good
war reporter can never be close frlenai
unless the war reporter la working with
his own army and la moved by pariotlsra.
' Considering the censor's resnonslbUltr.
It Is always a source of wonder to me
that he ever lets anything go through.
In my extensive dealings with the cen.
sors I have been more surprised at
what they have permitted me to send
than at what they have cut out. What
ever success any of the American corre
spondents have had in getting "tough"
war stories past the censor has grown
out of the fact that they have sym
pathized with him and tried to get his
viewpoint.
Rarely Touch
Stuff Now
In the office of a gTeat news asso-'
ciation. before we entered the war,
the editor showed me a pile of type
written copy which had been sent by
mall from a certain capital in Eu
rope. "The signature of a censor was
at the bottom of each patce but not
one word of the several thousand had
been touched with a blue pencil.
"The censors hardly ever touch our
stuff now." explained the editor. "Early
in the war It used to be all chopped up,
but He comes pretty clean these days."
This editor did not mean to say that
the censorship of the European armies
had become lax. He knew as well as I
did that the reason for the untoucneo
pages waa that the correspondents In Eu
rope had learned to take tne European
censor's viewpoint and to see the war
through the censor's eyes, rseutral cor
respondents in any of the European
countries these days know very wen
that it does not pay to try to beat the
censor. This is the one big fact tha
stand's out Just now In the war cor
respondent's life.
Not many months ago an American
correspondent left New York for Lon
don, carrying a code for the use of his
London office. By means of this coae
the New York office hoped to receive
more complete news of the sinking of
ships than the censor had permittee; to
go out. At the risk of a severe penalty,
the New York reporter had got the code
Daat the nort authorities ana ne
slammed It down triumphantly on the
desk of the London manager.
"There's a 'code that'll beat "em all."
said the New Yorker.
The experienced London manager,
with an expression of long suffering
patience on his face (for his New York
office had been clamoring persistently
for "more news"), took the precious
papers, aolwly tore them Into bits and
tossed them Into the glowisg fireplace.
"Nothing like that around here," he
said. "If our papers print more news
about the sinking of ships than the
other papers do our crlme'll stand out
like a sore thumb. The better a code
La the more dangerous it is."
. In a little chateau at Goritxia. on the
Austro-Itallan front, before America
entered the war, tha Austrian staff
officers gave an after dinner, concert
Official Critics More
Powerful Than "75s
officer who s-ted ss censor was not a
music lover and he departed from the
gathering before the program was
ended. The finale was an "Ave Maria."
exquisitely played by piano, cello and
several violins, and the effect was highly
sentimental. The next day one of the
Vorrespondents. writing of the concert,
for - a few correspondents. The staff
told how thoughts of home and lovad
ones had come over the war-bound offi
cers as thev had listened to the strains
of the beautiful old air. He wrote that
"chins dropped to chests and heads
were bowed in contemplation and rev
erie, while the cannon boomed out above
the sad music"
Ban Is Placed
On Sadness
"So chins dropped to chests' In
that crowd." said the non-music loving
censor, as he read the story. "I don't
want the world to think that Austrian
officers ever feel sad." And his blue
pencil cut out every reference to the
sweet spell which the music, amid the
sound of guns, had thrown over the
Austrian leaders.
Cub censors will invariably thrust
forward their personal opinion In their
work. '
"Go to Vienna and discover why the
Austrians will lot permit Emmy Destlnn
to come to the United States." waa an
assignment which an American corres
pondent In Berlin received from his
New York ofrice. The correspondent
compiled and secured a highly Inter
esting story. The Austrian, he ex
plained, felt tat Lestlnn had not shown
as muf h loyalty to the Austrian cause
as might nave oeen expecica oi ner,
and so the permission that had been ,
granted her to come to the United States j
had been revoked. Ti reporter put the i
axory mrougn irw aubu cvihw,
. i n K if tr nrl1n tA tw fnrm&rdM
irom mere dj wiri. .
turned to Berlin two days later be
found that the story was being held up
in the office of the German censor.
"What's the matter with that storyT
he demanded of the censor who had
held it. "The Austrian censors passed
it ail rignt"
"Well. they were wrong In doing it."
said the censor. "You're painting this
woman as a martyr."
"Give me the copy." said ths reporter,
lie took it to ths offloe of Count George
Wedel, the chief .censor, a patron of
music In Germsny, and related his
troubles.
"Why. the fool." said Count Wedel.
"Every person In the United Htatea
ought to know why Ietlnn Isn't sing
ing to them this year." And he per
mitted the story to pas a
Later investigation disclosed that the
man who had stopped the story was
acting as a temporary censor and had
ben on the Job only two daya
The censorship which the twentieth
century war correspondent faces today
Is a new. twentieth century sort.
In all the warring countries corres
pondents now have an opportunity to
appeal axalnst the censor's blue pencil.
The allies also have the same rule.
The correspondents In London and Paris
may go to the censor's office at any
time and learn what changes. If any,
have been made In their dispatcher.
It ought to be a matter of pride to
American army officers that the cen
sonshlp rules of the American army are
followed faithfully in Germany and
Austria and. to some extent. In England
and Franca.
I don't exactly sympathise with the
censor. But I have seen enough of war
to know that the side which dropped
censorship would - be immediately de
feated on land and sea.
I don't sympathize with the eenuor,
but with other American correspondents
In Europe, I have got his viewpoint. We
agree with him that his Mue pencil Is
mlabtler than the 42-centimeter gun and
Just as important.
SmPfgRAYHAIR
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