

WAR MAY WORK FALL OF MILITARISM AND CREATE LASTING PEACE

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS CONTROL EUROPE'S STATUS

Geographical Isolation and Racial Differences Would Preclude the Organization of a Formidable Coalition in the Event of a Victory by The Allies.

GERMAN VICTORY WOULD WORK AN OPPOSITE END

By Guglielmo Ferrero. ARTICLE NO. 4.

NOW, it is to be feared that a defeat would stimulate the national feeling in Germany, kindle the desire of revenge, and thus sow the seeds of a new war?

Or, on the other hand, would victory inflame the aggressive and warlike spirit of France, of England, of Russia, so as simply to move the tyranny of militarism to another place, instead of doing away with it?

These are the questions we asked at the end of the preceding article and which we shall try to answer today.

There is no doubt that an unsuccessful war will leave much rancor in Germany. A people that has been intoxicated for half a century with the delusion of being invincible will not be easily resigned to recognize that it, too, is subject to the ordinary rules of war.

At any rate, as to be imagined, the conditions of peace do not create a German "irredentism"—if they will only take away from the Germans that which she took from the others by injustice and held by force, leaving it its historical and national rights, it is to be hoped that this anger will be calmed down, little by little, without provoking a catastrophe.

In the meantime, for ten years at least, Germany, like the other nations, will be occupied in healing its wounds and repairing the wastes of this horrible war.

Who can think that a war like this one can begin again in a few years? In ten years the natural resentment of a disastrous war should give way little by little, in the old and in the young, to a calmer consideration of the reality.

Unless Germany should have a second spectacular triumph as in 1870, a thing that seems very improbable, we may say impossible, the German people must necessarily become aware that the peace of the world is not only an inspiration of philanthropists and idealists, but also a vital need.

They will realize this and get their own ideas together, to reorganize their aspirations, feelings and their political institutions.

We must not believe that the Germans are such a warlike people that they cannot stand a long peace. They were other peoples, as we know, the Germans, and more warlike, in Europe, and in these last fifty years they have become peaceful. I am alluding precisely to the French.

Nation Learned Notice.

The French during the last two and a half centuries have fought the greatest wars in history, and they were the masters of the art of war in Europe, masters also, of the Germans, who have learned much more from their present enemies than they seem to be able to teach them.

For a long time Europe feared that the French were so agitated inwardly by the demon of war that they never would calm down; that Europe would never have rest from their warlike spirit.

But France lost her aggressive humor after an unfortunate war had made her know that even the most valorous peoples can never be sure of victory; and little by little her political institutions under the republic, and through the republic, assumed a more democratic and popular character.

The republic has made of France, not a faint-hearted nation, as its enemies say, but a peaceful nation. In the present fighting France has shown all her old courage and energy, there is, however, no doubt that she only drew her sword when she was compelled, and saw that every hope and every effort to evade the conflict was useless.

If their governments were so solid before the war that they did not need to make disturbances in the world to hold together, after victory, being more authoritative and more united, they will have even less need of such means to keep in power.

Two Nations Wanted Peace.

It is legitimate, then, to suppose that the same change will occur in Germany, when defeat will bring a party to power, even under the institutions of a parliamentary monarchy, the more numerous classes and parties more of the people having fewer privileges to defend.

These two nations wanted peace and did not think of conquests in Europe, before this war, because their governments, established by the masses, did not need to brag about their military power all the time to stay in office. As always happens, victory will give greater prestige to those governments within or outside the boundaries.

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The populations of these two countries, if they were peace loving before the war, will become more so when they will know they can enjoy peace without the inquietude and enmity that have tormented them these last twenty years.

We must not forget, too, that the English and French are much calmer minded and more "measured" than the Germans. Both of them are therefore immune, as it were, from the excitement of pride or energy that so often carries away the Germans to try the largest and most impossible things.

These two nations wish to enjoy and fortify the high historical position they have attained by centuries of work and struggling.

They both occupy positions high and respected enough to content two



The masses of Europe long for a lasting peace, declares Professor Ferrero. This street scene in Petrograd shows the type of people to whom he refers,—not the members of a privileged officialdom, but the workers who must pay the cost of the war.

wise and moderate peoples. They wanted peace before the war, so they will want it after a war in which they have been victorious.

A victory for them would only consolidate peace—which would be for their own good, of course, but at the same time for the good of the others.

So the peace and war of Europe today are especially questions of political institutions.

Germany has been warlike, and ended by provoking this war because it is governed by a privileged aristocracy, and is under a military monarchy.

The democracy that governs France is, like all the other democracies of the world, pacific. Governed by the classes, to whom war is a misfortune, entirely satisfied with her present situation, the day that France gets back Alsace and Lorraine she will ask nothing better than "to declare peace on all Europe" as Michelet predicted.

England Less Democratic.

Whoever thinks France will again begin to dream of the conquest of Europe deceives himself, as they deceived themselves who thought the French would throw down their arms at the approach of the Germans.

England has a less democratic government than France; the aristocracy and the upper middle class exert a more direct influence upon it; and among the aristocrats and the upper classes imperialistic and military tendencies and desires for privileged government are still very strong in England.

This is also true of the other European countries. But each decade the masses of the people are getting more power and influence in England, too, and the masses of the people are even more pacific in England than in France.

If we consider it in the true sense, the English people have never really gone to war, having always adopted armies of mercenaries or paid soldiers, so they have had no practice and experience of war like the French, who have given their blood in a hundred wars in all the continents of the earth.

So not having the habit of war—they cannot have a profound passion for war. Only people who have fought a great deal can be full of warlike spirit.

Exactly because the warlike spirit is a fruit of political regimes, many people are worried about Russia. They often say: "It's all right about France, and England is fast becoming a democracy, so we can count on the pacific spirit of both of them; but how about Russia? Isn't Russia, like Germany, a military empire? Until a few years ago wasn't it even an absolute military autocracy? Isn't it to be thought that in a semi-absolute military empire, badly controlled by a childish, inexperienced, timid parliament, lacking authority, the proud, audacious, aggressive spirit will awake that we fear in Germany? And then the danger we now see in Berlin passes to Petrograd?"

The statesmen and newspapers of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and the pro-German papers in the neutral countries, have made a great agitation about this "slav danger" ever since the breaking out of the war.

We know that at the beginning the government of Berlin announced to its people that it was to be a war of national defense against "Russian barbarism." We also know that the German and Austrian Socialists answered the criticism of the Socialists of the other countries by protesting that they could not be expected to open the doors of Germany and Austria to the Cossacks.

The future power to which Russia would attain if victorious is another of the arguments most advanced, especially in Italy, by the followers of the Triple Alliance. They picture Russia as arbiter of continental Europe. Saint Sofia, as consecrated again by the czar in the Christian cult; the Russian

warships in the Mediterranean and the Cossacks' horses running down the roads that lead to the Adriatic.

The future lies in the lap of Jove—said the ancients. It is in the hands of God—now say the Christians. So I do not feel the courage to try to predict what will be the future of an empire as enormous as the Moscovite empire. But if we stick to reasoning on what may happen in the near future it does not seem too temerous to place the announced military hegemony of Russia, now the continent of Europe, among the fancies and dreams where it belongs.

Central Position Necessary.

The first reason against it is geographical—the eccentric geographical position of Russia. To dominate so vast a continent as Europe by the force of arms and political prestige it is necessary that a people be placed in a central position so as to be able to act with their military force on different points—to the north, south, east, west. For this reason ancient Italy was able to dominate for centuries the basin of the Mediterranean, Gaul, Spain, Egypt, northern Africa, the Balkan peninsula.

For this reason France and Germany at different times have been able to aspire to the military hegemony of Europe; but neither England nor modern Italy at the extreme sides of the continent have ever been able to hold such aspirations. And for this same reason Russia can never hold them.

After 1895 Russia really very much neglected her Balkan policies, that is such an important part of her European policy, because she was attacked in the far east, so that she would pay less attention to Europe. Germany has even used the personal influence of its emperor for this end. Until the war broke out a very close friendship existed between the emperor of Germany and the emperor of Russia; William, with his go-ahead temperament—a little fantastic—had great authority over Nicholas II, who is much more timid and shut up within himself.

Russia Formidable Power.

That William of Germany took advantage of this I know, because one of the high functionaries of the court in Petrograd, one who is very near the czar, told me that the emperor of Germany never missed an occasion to encourage his imperial cousin of Russia to turn the energies of his lands in the far-away "old world."

With that rich, insinuating ability that the German emperor has even used the personal influence of his emperor for this end. Until the war broke out a very close friendship existed between the emperor of Germany and the emperor of Russia; William, with his go-ahead temperament—a little fantastic—had great authority over Nicholas II, who is much more timid and shut up within himself.

But the very war now being fought proves it. Russia is a formidable military power. It has the largest army in the world; soldiers as valorous as any in the world. Still it is plain that the present war is very hard for Russia and that Russia alone could never resist Germany and Austria, though these two countries taken together have a much smaller population than hers.

Why? Because it is not easy for Russia to concentrate so many troops on an extremity of its vast empire today, as it was not easy for her to concentrate them on the other extreme against Japan. The difficulty that Russia now finds to make her strength felt in Germany and Austria, in spite of or because of her great size, should reassure those who fear for tomorrow

MASSES HOPE FOR PEACE OF PERMANENT DURATION

The People Everywhere, Who Bear the Burdens of War and Who Make the Biggest Sacrifices, Are the Ones to Whom Its Futility Appeals the Stronger.

A NEW CIVILIZATION NECESSARILY WOULD FOLLOW

a military hegemony of victorious Russia. The political force of a power, a time of peace is, always in proportion to the military force it would exert or would be expected to exercise in time of war.

But this is not all. We must take account of another important fact. The immense Russian empire is half European and half Asiatic, bounded by Sweden, Germany, Austria, Rumania, Persia, China and Japan. Each of these frontiers has its special political policy, which may say its special interests and its representative men, in Petrograd.

So Russia has a European policy, a Balkan policy, a Turkish policy, a Caucasus policy and an eastern or oriental policy. But precisely because it has so many frontiers and so many different policies Russia can never concentrate and concentrate all its forces in a European policy alone. Its necessity to pay attention to its other interests will separate it periodically from European doings, weakening its action in the old continent, as has been the case in the past.

The Russian policy could be called a sort of pendulum that periodically swings between Asia and Europe. From 1895 to 1905 Russia occupied itself with its Asiatic policy, not paying much attention to how things were going in Europe, and, thanks to this indifference, relations with Austria and Germany were becoming quite friendly. But the war with Japan turned Russia again toward Europe.

The alliance with France again was taken up, amplified and reinforced. The entente with England was concluded, which was a real revolution in European politics. Russia again concerned herself with the Balkans and the smaller Slav peoples, so neglected during the previous ten years.

A sort of understanding was concluded with Japan, the enemy of Slav peoples, and, thanks to this indifference, relations with Austria and Germany were getting worse. The crisis of Bosnia-Herzegovina came, and Russia was obliged to give in to the German threats. Economic questions grew hard, too—Germany wanted to renew certain commercial treaties, into which Russia, on the other hand, wanted to introduce essential modifications; and for this low threats were made by Germany.

Represents Supreme Crisis.

The Balkan war broke out; and at last the Serbo-Austrian war, beginning of the European conflict.

So, to a certain extent, the European war represents the supreme crisis of the new policy begun by Russia after 1905. So we can expect that another swing of the pendulum will take place toward Asia after this war. Russia will probably in a certain period of time, take less interest in the questions of Europe and again become occupied with her Asiatic policy. Just because Russia is not entirely either a European or an Asiatic power, she can never acquire a hegemony either in Europe or Asia, and will remain a power capable of exercising, at certain times, an action of decisive importance on both continents.

There is still another and last reason why the disastrous effects of an Austro-German victory would not follow the triumph of the Anglo-Franco-Russian coalition. The two German empires gain by being placed side by side geographically. We may add they have the same language and there is much affinity between their political institutions.

In the coalition, although we can consider France and England as being almost side by side (notwithstanding the impediments a small body of water imposes), between Russia and her allies of the west there stands the enormous mass of the two hostile empires. Moreover, the languages and political institutions of these three powers are very different.

It follows that a victory could turn into one block the Austro-German alliance—but not the allies. The geographical distance between these powers, the difference of languages, of traditions, the variety of their political institutions is such that, although in the future as in the past they may form an efficacious alliance to defend themselves, they can never become an alliance for aggrandizement or to make an offensive war.

Masses Want Peace.

The very feebleness of which the Triple Entente has for many years given proof demonstrates this, as it is also demonstrated by the relative unpreparedness in which the present Anglo-Franco-Russian coalition allowed itself to be surprised by the war.

For all these reasons a victory of the Triple Entente seems to legitimize greater and better hopes for those who desire that this war will give place to a long, secure peace. It can be said the masses, who are the ones who really want peace everywhere, have found out these things, little by little, because everywhere in Europe they are partisans of the Anglo-Franco-Russian coalition. Among the upper classes, as in the intellectual world, there are differences of opinion, but not among the masses of the people.

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WHY DO WE BECOME BALD?--HINTS FOR THE HAIRLESS FROM A SCIENTIST--BY DR. WOODS HUTCHINSON

IT IS astonishing how badly our self-conceit is able to deceive us. We are ordinarily proud of some of the highest and weakest things about us, such as our lineage, our pugnacity and our small feet, and have a very low opinion of ourselves when the hair on the slightest reason for it. We are darlings of the gods, we can whip creation, our future is limited only by the amount of the equinoxes and the day of judgment.

But when any prophet of evil rises up to denounce us as decadent from luxury, soft and degenerate from soft indulgence, undermining our constitutions, "bitting the trail for hell so fast that we can't be seen for the dust" stirring up behind us, we are quick to shorten our lives—we sneerly bow our heads before the blast and admit the impeachment.

"We go out of our way to belittle ourselves and declare with humilation that in stamina, endurance and fighting qualities we are inferior not merely to our savage ancestors, but to our own kind, and that the tiger single is little lower than the angels and have been steadily getting lower ever since. And all this in spite of the fact that man is head and shoulders above the bird, toughest and most dangerous animal that lives!"

Can beat any bird, beast or fish at his own game—outrun the deer, tire out the wolf, face the tiger single handed with spear or short-sword, plunge into tropic seas with a knife between his teeth and kill the shark, outface the cold of the Arctic with the moose and the white bear, and the heat of the tropics with the elephant and the rhino.

Man is Finest Animal.

In short, man is the finest all-round athlete the animal kingdom has ever produced. He can maintain life on the food of any animal, and is not only the hottest, strongest, longest lived

animal known, but is becoming more so all the time. It is very hard to say whether our overweening conceit at one extreme or our unnecessary self-depreciation at the other is the more amusing or exasperating, as the case may be.

But there are certain points in which even the most enthusiastic champion of man's superiority must concede that the animals have the better of us, one of those would appear to be their success in hanging on to their hair. No animal, we are triumphantly assured, ever becomes bald, no matter how old and gray and decrepit he may be, and to this there seems at first blush to be no adequate reply.

At the moment we begin to make careful studies and comparisons we have the consolation of discovering at once that no animal has any hair on his head which is worthy worrying over, or the loss of which would draw even a single tear from a human eye.

In fact, paradoxical and even ludicrous as it may sound, that appears to be just the reason why man becomes bald, he chose to have long hair for two-thirds of his life and none at all the remainder.

In sober earnest, human hair, biologically speaking, is a new growth, a neomorph, nothing else like it anywhere in the living world, with the partial exception of the mane of the lion and the shock of bristles on the head and neck of some of the larger apes.

Like all new creations, it is unstable

and erratic, though not nearly so much so as usually supposed. Nor is there any ground for believing that it is losing its vitality or has become any more uncertain of its tenure within the last 20,000 years; in other words, in civilized man than in savages.

Worn as Ornament.

The human hair has been worn as a pure ornament and scrupulously protected from the weather, whether wind, rain or sun, for at least 20,000 years. And it was going to perish for lack of ventilation and exposure we should have been as bald as billiard balls since the days of the pyramids.

The growth of the "hair for hair" sake since in our own species can be clearly traced in still existing savages. In the oldest and most pithecoloid types, such as the Congo dwarfs and the Negroes of the Andaman Islands, it is simply a fuzzy, felt mass of rusty or reddish brown wool.

In the next grade, or negroes proper from the west coast of Africa to Papua and New Guinea, it becomes boldly and unmistakably ornamental, though not according to our northern tastes, and is fringed and pomaded and ornamented into huge, imposing bushes and shakos, which make delight in dusky bosoms.

In the brown races it starts in our modern direction by increasing greatly in length and glossiness. In fact, at this stage, it reaches its climax of "humanness" and picturesque-ness—as illustrated in the famous scalp locks of our American Indians—though it still retains a tendency to kink and curl.

In the Mongolians it remains long and straight as a straight razor, as in the Chinaman's queue; while finally, in the Caucasian, it shortens again somewhat and takes on the final gloriolous touch to our eyes of curliness and waviness, and ranges over half the colors in the rainbow from flaxen and golden to red, brown and black.

Another curious specialization appears for the first time in the white race, and that is a difference in length between men and women, so that it becomes possible to distinguish the sexes by the length of their hair.

Some Need Hair Out.

As to how this solely due to age long habits of wearing and cutting the hair. Most white men could grow hair of moderate length even today simply by neglecting to call in the services of a barber.

But this seldom gets much below the level of the shoulders, and even in hermits or religious devotees of various races, who make it a matter of conscience to let their hair grow out to its full length, it never attains more than half the length which is common in women and girls.

In the intermediate stage of barbarism signs of decay are already beginning to show themselves, and barbarous or semi-civilized man shows a distinct tendency to lose his calvarial tatch, not only at a moderately advanced time of life, but also occasionally, to his distress, at a disconcertingly premature period.

When we reach civilization, certainly in the second or middle stage of it, when hair is no longer valued as an ornament or an asset by the male, it appears to become still more variable, and instances of complete loss of it at 25, 30 and even earlier years, begin to be discovered.

ing and even coloring it. This partly for the reason that they admire it themselves, and partly because they find it a valuable asset in charming and fascinating the opposite sex.

In other words, the hair of the head appears to be one of the so-called secondary sexual characters, and under the laws of sexual selection. This sentimental attachment of man to his hair is by no means confined to savagery, but persists apocryphally through barbarism and semi-civilization, and is even to be found in the lower and some fairly high stages of civilization, as for instance, in the famous picture of the Spartan warriors at Thermopylae, carefully braiding and oiling their long hair while chanting heroic songs as they went going into the immortal battle.

Not Bald Early.

There is, however, another element which must be taken into consideration in contrasting the instability of the hair in civilized man with its luxuriance in the savages, and that is the much shorter life span of the latter.

Our minds have been so crammed with myths about the "noble savage" and his ideal health and superb physique, on account of his perpetual athletic existence in the open air, that it is almost impossible for us to realize how awfully short lived and shipwrecked in constitution he really is.

With all the modern spread of baldness, very few men are seriously bald under 30 years of age, and the data in our possession show that the average man in five savages ever reaches that extreme of senility. The actual figures are in astonishing contrast to the usual conceptions of the primitive man now has an average longevity of 51 years; semi-civilized man, as illustrated by the Hindu and the Chinaman, has an average life span of 21 and 23 years respectively, as shown by the English sanitary reports in India and in Hong-

Such figures as we possess of the longevity of savages show their average life time to be about 15 years. The average of the most robust and their strongest survivors usually die under 40.

All the stories of savage centenarians are made up of the same material as the centenarian myths everywhere else, and that is pure moonshine.

Look to Future.

The most horribly wasted and shrunken and decrepit bag of skin and bones that I ever saw in human shape was an Indian woman who was reported to be 110, and looked as if she might be 510, but could be proved by unimpeachable testimony of middle aged white settlers to be between 50 and 55 years of age.

So that one patent surveyor savages show less baldness than civilized man is that they so seldom survive their hair, or live long enough to develop this shining characteristic.

But the question that interests us most keenly is not what has happened in the past, but what is likely to happen in the future.

Are we becoming a race of bald-headers, or is there still some hope for our locks and curls? So far as we are able to judge, the outlook is distinctly hopeful.

When due allowance has been made for the much greater life endurance and correspondingly advanced age attained by civilized man, it is doubtful where increased baldness over the savage is more than 10 per cent, and over the barbarous, or barbarian, 5 per cent.

And a bodily structure or organ which has lost only 10 per cent of its vigor is certainly in a pretty fairly flourishing and prosperous state. It is perfectly astounding what an utter lack there is of accurate data, upon any of the phases of this question. Nobody has ever taken the trouble

to count, not noses, but bright crowns, among, say, 1000 savages, 1000 barbarians and 1000 civilized men, and see exactly what the percentages of baldness under the age of 60 was in each of the groups.

Our best and most careful anthropologists test a large number of skulls never collected, and we are dealing only with general impressions which may be sound, but are often fallacious. Not only so, but we have never made the count in different groups and classes of civilized man. For instance, as between country dwellers and city dwellers; between day laborers and business men; between sailors and fishermen and professional men.

Yet we nearly all of us feel sure that city dwellers are much more apt to be bald than country dwellers, and that college men, professional men and successful business men have a much higher percentage of bright and shining scalps than have day laborers.

One of the reasons, probably, why no one has ever taken the apparently simple step of counting is that auditors, for the most part, are composed of mixtures of all sorts and classes.

Even city men have, many of them, been born and spent a third of their lives so far in the country, and also that in looking over an audience and counting the ivory tops, we have no knowledge whatever of the ages of the respective individuals.

It should personally be inclined to doubt whether there is much more difference between a group of fishermen and sailors in the country, and agricultural men, than that due to the higher average age of the latter class.

Tramps Are Bald Headed.

Just simply as an illustration, which may or may not be worth noting, one of the baldest headed audiences I ever saw in my life was an assemblage of

about 150 tramps and "casuals" in a municipal lodging house, populated almost entirely by men under 45 years of age.

Certainly there is no rank or class of society in which baldness under 60 is uncommon.

Nor is there anything in the habits of life and methods of covering or caring for the head which should make the hair of the city dweller or of the office man and indoor worker any less vigorous and enduring than that of the farmer and the day laborer. Data obtained from dermatologists and physicians making a special study of diseases of the scalp give us no help.

First, for the reason that only those who are either becoming bald or have fairly good reason to fear that they are threatened with this calamity ever think of consulting a physician about the state of their hair.

Although a doctor may have, say, 500 patients suffering with some degree of baldness within a year, he doesn't know whether these patients represent a population of 5000 or 50,000.

The second reason that makes the figures of physicians and hospital valueless is that while a considerable majority of these patients who go to the doctor are of thinning hair, and baldness are of the so-called higher, city and more successful classes, there is a perfectly good reason for this in the fact that these are the only people who are, in the first place, sufficiently sensitive about their personal appearance, and, in the second place, have the money to pay the high fees involved