- . - ,
v magazine section
PICTORIMSUPPLBIENTI
5
! -' h
PORTLAND, OREGON, SUNDAY MORNING," 1 NOVEMBER ) 22, 1914.
THE CASE OF
VS.
IN
THE
SUPREME
COURT
The
Double
Alliance
The Triole En1:elielli I
IF THE evidWe submitted by the official ''White,' "Orang? tad "Gray
Books' , of the warring nations wero analyzed as a lawyer analyzes the.
. evidence in bis cases, wbo would bo found responsible for the European
war T This evidence Was submitted to James M. Beck, formerly assistant
attorney general of tbo United States and a leader of the New York bar, wbo
baa argued many of the most important cases before tbe supreme court,
notably the Northern Securities ease, the Lotteries case, the D anbury Hat
ters' case and the Paper .Trust case. . ' ,
. Mr. Beck's argument of this, the greatest of the world's cases, that of
the Double Alliance ts. the Triple Entente before the Supreme Court of
Civilization, is presented here, and is one of the most interesting articles
written about this widely discussed question of the responsibility for the;
European conflict.
?y J ante M. Beck.
KT us suppose that in. this year
of dls-Grace, Nineteen Hundred
and Fourteen, there had existed,
as let us priy will one day exist.
a supreme court of civilization, before
which the sovereign nations could liti
gate their differences without resort
to the iniquitous ana less effective ap
, peal to the arbitrament of arras.
j Let us further suppose that each of
the contending nations had a suffi
cient leaven of Christianity to have
Its grievances adjudged not by the
ethics of the cannon or- the rifle, but
' by the eternal criterion of justice. .
What would be the judgment of that
aurust tribunal?
Any discussion of trie ethical merits
of this great controversy must start .
with the assumption that there is
uch a thing as International moral
ity. This fundamental axiom, upon which
the entire basis of civilisation neces
sarily rests, Is challenged by a small
;; class of Intellectual perverts.
V Boms of these hold that moral con
siderations must be - subordinated
either to military necessity or so-
called manifest destiny. This Is the
JkBemhardl doctrine. .
" leu-1 i" war is a ueiieiiconi
- fatality, and that all nations engaged
On this theory, all of the now contend,
lng nations are but victims of an irre
sistible current of events, and the
V nunni auiy ox me W( ia a prepaua
Itself .for the .systematic extermina
tion, when necessary, of Its neighbors.
- Notwithstanding the clever plat i-
, tudes under which both these doctrines :
are veiled, all morally sane mlndtfTar,."
agreed that this war is a great crime
f against civilization, and, the. only open
''. question Is, which of the two contend-,
lng groups of powers Is morally re
"!. sponsible for tat crime?
Was Austria justified in declaring
' war against Servla?
- ' Was Germany justified In declaring
'war against Russia and France?
Was England Justified In declaring .
r- war against Germany?
As the last of these questions is the
: most easily disposed of it may be con
sidered first.
, England's Justification.
1 England's justification rests upon
the column treaty of 1839, whereby
Prussia, France. England. Austria and
Russia "became the guarantors," of
the perpetual neutrality" of Belgium,
; as reaffirmed by Count Bismarck, then
chancellor of the. German empire, on
I July 22, 1870, and as even more recent
ly reaffirmed in the striking fact dls-'-I
closed In the Belgian "Gray Book."
In the spring of 1913. a debate was
' in progress in the, budget committee
. of the relchstag with reference to the
mllitafy budget. In tbe course of the
debate the German secretary of state
: said: :
. "The neutrality of Belgium Is d
, termlned by lnternattonal conventions,
land Germany is resolved to respect
.these conventions."
V ' To confirm this solemn assurance,
.'the minister of war added in the same
debate: ' ,
"BeLgium does not play any part in
' ' the Justification of the German scheme
of military reorganization. The scheme
is justified by the position of matters
in the east. Germany will not lose
. sight of the fact that Belgian neu
trality Is guaranteed .by international
treaUea." . :
, A year later, on July 31. 1914, Herr
' von Below, the German minister at
- Brussels, assured the Belgian depart- '.
. ment of state that he knew of a dec- .
laratlon which the German chancellor
t had made in 1811, to the effect "that
Germany had no Intention of violating
', our neutrality." and . "that ho was cer-
taln that the sentiments to Which ex-:
. presslon was given at that time had not
v changed.". (See Belgian "Gray Book,"
Noa. ll and IS.)
' It seems unnecessary to discuss the
t wanton disregard of these solemn ob
; ligations and . protestations, when . the
present chancellor of - the German em
pire. In hie speech to the Reichstag and
to theworld on August 4. 1914, frank
. far admitted that tbe action of the Ger
f man military machine In invading Bel .
glum was a wrong. He said:
' "W are nowln a state of necessity.
and necessity . knows no law. Our
f -troops have occupied Luxemburg ami
perhaps are already on Belgian soil.
, , Gentlemen, that Is contrary to Xhe die
1 tates of International law. It is true
that the French government has de-
elared at Brussels that' France is will
' lng to respect the neutrality of Bel-
frlum, so long as her opponent respects
t. : We Knew, however, that - France
$ stood ready for invasion. France could
wait, but we could not wait. A French
movement upon our flank upon the
- lower Rhine might have been dlsas-
; trous. So we were compelled to over-1
t and Belgian governments. The wrong
I speag openiy tnat we are commit
t ting we will endeavor to make good as
soon - as our military goal has been
; reached. Anybody who Is threatened
as we are threatened, and Is fighting
for his highest possessions, can only
have one thought how he is to hack
his way through." -
, This defense is not even a plea of
.."confession and avoidance. It is a plea
of "Guilty" at the bar of the world.
; It has one merit, that it does not add
f to the crime -the aggravation of hy
pocrisy. It virtually rests the case et
Gennsny upon tho gospetol Traltachk
and Bernhardi, that each nation Is
justified In exerting its physical power ;
to the utmost in defense of its Selfish
interests. There Is no novelty in this
gospel. Its only surprising feature Is
Its revival n the twentieth century.
It was taught far more effectively by
Machlavelll In his treayse, "The
Prince," wherein he glorified the' pol
icy of Cesare Borgia in tramping the
weaker states of Italy under foot by
ruthless terrorism, unbridled ferocity,
and the basest deception.. Indeed, the
wanton destruction of Belgium is sim
ply Borgiaism amplified ten-thousandfold
by the mechanical resources
of modern war.
Unless our boasted civilization is the
thinnest veneering of barbarism; un
, less the law. of the world is in fact
only the ethics of the rifle and the
conscience of the cannon; unless man
kind after uncounted centuries has
made no 1 real advance in political
morality beyond that of the cave
dweller, then this answer of Germany
cannot satisfy the "decent respect to
the opinions of mankind." Germany's
contention that a treaty of peace Is
"a scrap of paper,", to be disre
garded at will when required by the
selfish interests of one contracting
party, is the negation of all that civi
lization stands for.
Belgium, has been crucified In the
face of the world. Its innocence of any.
offense, until It was attacked, is too
clear for argument. Its voluntary im
molation to preserve Its solemn guar
antee of neutrality will "plead like
angels, trumpet tongued, against the
deep damnation of Its taking off." On '
that Issue the supreme court ' could
have no ground for doubt or hesitation. -Its
judgment would be speedy and In
exorable.'; . .
The remaining two issues, above re
ferred to, are not so simple. Primarily
and perhaps exclusively, r the ethical
question turns upon the Issues raised
by ' the Communications which passe J
between the various ' chancellories of
Europe In the? last week of July, for
it Is the amazing feature of this great
est of all wars that It was precipi
tated by diplomats and assuming tha.
all the diplomats sincerely desired a
peaceful solution of the questions
raised by the Austrian ultimatum
(which is by no means clear), it was
the result of ineffective diplomacy and
clumsy diplomacy at that.
I quite appreciate the distinction be
tween the immediate causes of a war
and the anterior and more fundamen
tal causes; nevertheless, with the
world in a State of summer peace on
July 28, 1914, an issue, gravely affect
ing the integrity of nations and the
balance of power in Europe, is sud-.
Oenly precipitated by the Austrian ulti
matum, and thereafter and for the
space of about a Week a series of diplo
matic communications passed between
the chancellories of Europe, designed
on their face to prevent a war and yet
so ineffective' that theywar is precipi
tated and the fearful Rubicon crossed
before the world knew, except Imper-.
fectly, the nature of the differences
between the overnments Involved. The
ethical' aspects of this" great conflict
must' largely depend upon the record
that has been made up by the official
communications which can, therefor,
be treated as documentary evidence. In
a litigated case. - " .
A substantial part of that record is
already . before the court of public
opinion in the British and German
?White Papers" and the Russian "Or
ange Paper," and the purpose of this
article is to discuss what judgment an
impartial and dispassionate court would
render upon the issues thus raised and
- the evidence thus submitted.
The Suppression by Germany
and Austria of Vitally Im
portant Documents. .
Primarily such a court would be
deeply Impressed not only by what the
record as thus made up . discloses, but
also by , the significant omissions of
documents known to be in existence. '
-The official defense of England and
Russia does not apparently show any
failure on the part of either to sub
mit all of the documents in their pos
session, but the German "White Pa
per" on its face discloses the suppres
,.. sion of documents of vital Importance,
. while Austria has as yet failed to sub
mit any, of the documentary evidence
In ita possession.
We know .from ' the German "White
Paper even if we did not conclude
as. a matter of Irresistible Inference
that many, important communications
passed in this crisis between (Germany
and Austria, and it is probable that
some communications must also . have
passed between those : two countries
and Italy. Italy, despite its embar
rassing position, owes to the world
the ? duty of a full disclosure, i What
such disclosure would probably show
is indicated by her deliberate conclu
sion that her allies had commenced an
aggressive - war, which released j- her
from . any .obligation under -the triple
alliance. ' , V
The fact that communications nasfli
between .Berlin and Vienna the text
of which has never been disclosed. is
not a matter of conjecture. ." Germany
ami is ana asserts as part or her de -
. fense that she faithfully exercised her
mediatory influence with Austria. vim
, not only is such mediatory Influence
not disclosed by any practical results
of such mediation, but the text of
those Tltat winTnnntrtatUms..sia .gt'U
Argued By JAMES M. BECK, .
Former Assistant LAttomev General of the United States
kept in the secret archives of Berlin
and Vienna.
Thus In the official apology for Ger
many it is stated that, in spite of the
refusal of Austria to accept the propo- .
sltion of Sir Edward Grey to treat the
Servian reply "as a basis for further
conservations," '
"we (Germany) continued our me
diatory efforts to the utmost and ad
vised Vienna, to 'make 'any possible
compromise consistent with the dig
nity of the monarchy.
(German "White Paper.")
This would be more convincing If
the German foreign office in giving
other diplomatic documents had only
added the text of the advice which It
thus gave Vienna.
The Same significant omission will
be found when the same official -defense
states that on July 29 the Ger
man government advised Austria "to
begin v the conversations with Mr.
Saxonof." But here again the text is
not found among the documents which
the German foreign office has given
to- the world. The communications
which passed between that office and
its ambassadors In St. Petersburg,
Paris, . and London, are f given in
ex ten so. but among the 27" communica
tions appended to the German official
defense it is most significant that not
a single communication is given of
the many whicj passed f rom Berlin' to
Vienna and only one that passed from
Vienna to Berlin. This cannot be an
accident. . Germany has seen fit to
throw the veil of secrecy over the text
of its communications to Vienna, al
though professing to give the purport
of a few of them.
Until Germany is willing to put the
most Important documents in its pos
session In evidence, it must not be sur
prised that i the world, ? remembering
Bismarck's garbling - of the Ems dis
patch, which : precipitated the Franco
'" Prussian war, will be incredulous as to
the sincerity of Germany's mediatory
efforts.
Austria's Case Against Servia.
To discuss thev justice of Austria's
' grievances against Servla would take
us outside the documentary record and
' into the realm of disputed facts and
would expand this discussion far be-'
iyond reasonable length.
1 - JLet- us therefore suppose ' arguendo,
that our. Imaginary- court - would com
mence its consideration - with the as
sumption that Austria had - a just
grievance against Servla, and that the
. murderof fthe archduke on June 29,
- 1914, while in fact committed by Aus
trian citizens of Servian sympathies
; : on Austrian - soil,; had Its Inspiration
and encouragement in- the political ac
tivities .either of the . Servian govern-
V ment or of political organizations of
? i that : country.-
The ouestlon f or' decision would then '
be not whether Austria had a just
grievance against Servla, but wbetVr
having regard to tbe obligations which
I Austria, as well as every other coun-
- tiyowegvto- cxslfl-iwdou, she arnose U -
ed in the right manner to redrias her'
grievance.
The Secrecy of the Plan of
the Double Alliance.
On June 28, 1914, the Austrian crown
prince was murdered at Serajevo. Far
nearly a month there was no action
by Austria, and no public statement
whatever of Its Intentions. Tha, world
profoundly sympathized with Austria
In its new trouble, and especially with
its aged monarch, who like King Lear
was "as full of grief r.s years and
wretched In both."
The Servian government had form
erly disclaimed any. complicity jK'ith
the assassination. and had iledg.d
itself to punish any Servian citizen
implicated therein. . . x
From time to time, from Juee 28 to
July 23, there came semi-i.ispirel in
timations from Vienna tht that coun
try intended to act with great stlf
restralnt.and In the most pacific man
ner. Never was it wen hintei that ;
Germany and Austria were about to '
apply in; a tim.e of profound peaco a
match to the powder magazine of Eu
rope. ' .
This Is strikingly shown by the first
letter in " the English "White Paper"
from Sir Edward Grey to lr H. Rum
bold, dated July 29, 1914. It Is one of
the most significant documents in the
; entire correspondence. At tha time this
letter was written it is altogether prob
able, that Austria's arrogant and most
unreasonable ultimatum had , already
been framed and approved n Vienna,
and possibly In Berlin and yet Sir
Edward Grey, the foreign minister of
a great and friendly country, hnd so
little,' knowledge of Austria's policy
that he ' " .
"asked the German ambassado- today
(July 29) If he had any news of what
was KDing on in Vienna with regard
to Servia." The German ambassador
replied "that he had not, but Austria
was certainly going to take' some
step.". - - -
Sir Edward Grey adds that he told
the . German ambassador that he had
learned that Count Bercbtold, the Aus
trian foreign minister, -"In
speaking to the Italian ambassador
- in Vienna, had deprecated the sugges-'
tion that ' the ' situation was grave, but
"had said that it should be cleared up."
The German, minister then replied
that it would be desirable "if Russia
could act as a mediator with regard to
Servia," ; so) ; that : the first suggestion .
' of Russia playing the part of the peace
maker came, from the German ambas
sador In London. Sir Edward Grey :
then adds that he told the German am
bassador that he - ' T
"assumed that the Austrian govern
ment would not do anything until they
had first disclosed to the public their
case against Servla,- founded presum-.
ably upon what they had discovered at
the trial." : .
and the German ambassador ' assented',
to this assumption, .v '
(English "White Paper" Ho. 1) '
"
3
then deceiving Sir Edward Grey, on
the theory that the true function of an
ambassador is "to lie for his country,"
or the thunderbolt was being launched
with such secrecy that even the Ger-
man ambassador in England did not
know what was then in progress.
" The British ambassador at Vienna
reports to Sir Edward Grey;
"The delivery at Belgrade on July
23 of the note to Servia was preceded
by a period of absolute silence at the
Ball plafz." . '
He proceeds to say that with the
exception of the German ambassador at
Vlenna--note the significance"'' of the
exception not a-single member Of the
diplomatic corps knew anything of the
Austrian "ultlmati.m and that the
French ambassador when he visited the
Austrian foreign office on July 23, was
not only kept in ignorance that the ul
timatum had actually been Issued, but
was given the impression that its tone
was moderate. Even the Italian am
bassador was not taken Into Count
Berchtolds confidence.
! Dispatch from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir
Edward Grey, dated Sept. 1, 1914J
Did Germany Know Of or In
spire the Ultimatum?
. The interesting; and Important ques
tion here, suggests itself "whether Ger
: many had knowledge of and approved v
in advance the-Austrian, ultimatum.
If It 'did. It was guilty of duplicity, for
the German 'Ambassador at St. Peters- .
burg gave the Russian minister of for
eign affairs an express assurance that
"the German : government had no
knowledge of the text of the Austrian -note
before It was handed in and had
not exercised any influence on Its con
tents. It is a mistake to attribute to
Germany a threatening attitude." , -Russian
"Orange Paper,? JNo.. 18.1'
This statement Is inherently improb
: able. Austria was the weaker of the
two allies, and it was Germany's saber
It was rattling, in the face of Europe.'
Obviously Austria could noc have pro
! ceeded to extreme measures, iwhlch It
was recognized from the rirst would
antagonize Russia, unless she nad the
support of Gerniany, and there is a
probability, amounting to a moral cer
tainty, that she would' not have eom-
i mitted herself and Germany to the pos
- sibllity of a European war without first
consulting Germany, " ? v r
t -' Moreover we.' have the terttmofty of
Sir M. de Bunsen,' the English ambas
1 sador ln :Vlenna,who advised Sir Ed
1 ward Grey "that 1 he had "private io
' formation - that !4he' German ambas
r sador (at Vienna) knew the' text of
the Austrian ultimatum to Servi be
' fore it was dispatched . and tele
graphed If to the -German mperor,"
; and that the Germau ambassador hfm
self indorse every line, of It." ;rEng-
Ush "White Papeir,JNo.95.r!A-he
does not disclose the . source of his
"private Information," this - testimony
would not by Itself be convincing,' but
. wbea- we eramlne ' eGrmany s official
- drfanee t& the. German. Mte 2&u?. ,
we find that the German foreign of
flee admits that It was consulted by
Austria previous to the ultimatum and
not only approved of -Austria's course
but literally gave her a carte blanche
to proceed. .;. ; .'.-;" ';..".''"" :' ":-' vv
' . This point seems so important. In de
termining " the sincerity; of Germany's
attitude and pacific protestations that
we quote In extenso. "After referring t;
to the previous fritdon between Au:;,
trla and Servla, the German "White
Paper" says: .- ' .-
"In . view of these fclrcumstancBS"!
Austria had to admit that it would not
he consistent either with the dignity
or self preservation of tbe monarchy
to look on longer at the operations on
the other side of the border without
taking atcion. The Austro-Hungarian -government
advised us of this view of
the situation and asked our opinion
in the matter. We were able to assure -our
ally most heartily of our agree
ment with her view of the situation '
and to assure her that any action that
she might consider it necessary to
take In order to put . an end to the
movement in - Servla directed against
the existence of the Austro-Hungarian
monarchy would receive our approval.
We were fully aware in this connec
tion, that warlike moves on ' the part
of Austro-Hungary against Servla
would bring Russia into the question
and might draw us into a war in ac
cordance with our duties as an any."
Sir M. de Bunsen's credible testl
"mony is further confirmed by the fact
that the British ambassador at Berlin .
in his letter of July 22, to Sir Edward
Grey, states that on the preceding -night
(July 21) he had met the Ger
man secretary of state for foreign af- .
fairs, and an allusion was made to a
possible action by Austria.
"His excellency was evidently of
opinion that this step on. Austria's
part would have been made ere this.
He Insisted that the question at Issue
was one for settlement between Servla
and Austria alone, and that there
should be no interference from outside
in the discussions between those two
countries.' . ,
He adds that while he had regarded
It as advisable that bis country
should approach Austria-Hungary in
the matter, he had
"ion several . occasions' In conversation
with the Servian minister emphasized
the extreme Importance that Austro
Servlan relations should be put on a
proper footing." .
. (English. "White Paper," No.' 2.) .
litre, we have the first statement of
Germany's position In the matter, a " po
sition which subsequent events showed
to be entirely untenable, but to which
' Germany tenaciously adhered to the
very end, and which did much to pre
cipitate the war. Forgetful . of the
solidarity of European civilization, and
the fact that by policy and diplomatic
intercourse continuing through 'many
centuries a United European States
exists, even though its organization be
as yet Inchoate, he took the ground
that Austria should be permitted to
proceed to aggressive measures
against Servla without interference
from any other power, even though, as
was Inevitable, the humiliation of
Servia would destroy the status of the
Balkan states and even threaten the
European, balance of power. . ,
No space need be taken in convinc
ing any reasonable man that this
Austrian ultimatum to Servla was
brutal In its tone and unreasonable in
Its demands. It would be difficult to
find in history a- more offensive docu
ment, and its Iniquity was enhanced .
by the short shriving time which it
gave either Servla or Europe. Servla
. had 48' hours to- answer whether It
would compromise Its sovereignty, and
virtually admit Its complicity in a
crime which It had steadily disavowed.
As the full text of the ultimatum first
reached the foreign chancelleries near
ly 24 hours after Its service upon
Servia, the other European nations
had barely a day to consider what
could be done to preserve the peace of
Europe before that peace was fatally
compromised.
(English "White Paper," No. 5; Ru-
; sian "Orange Paper," No.' 3.)
Further confirmation that the German-foreign
office did have advance .
knowledge of at least the substance of
the ultimatum is shown by the fact
-that on- the day the ultimatum was is
sued the chancellor of the German em
- plre instructed the German amlmesa
dors ip Paris, London and St Peters-,
burg to advise the English. French and
Russian governments that -
"the sets as well as the demands of
the ' " Anstro - Hungarian government
cannot , but be looked upon as justi
fied " - -(German
"White Paper," Annex 1 B.)
How could Germany thus indorse
the "demands of the ultimatum? -The
hour when these Instructions
; were sent Is not given, so that it does
not follow that these significant In
structions were necessarily . prior to
the service of the ultimatum at Bel
grade at 6 p.-m. Nevertheless as the
ultimatum did not reach tbe other
capitals of Europe until tbe following
day, as the diplomatic correspondence
clearly shows, it seems improbable
that the German foreign office would ,
have Issued this very carefully pre
pared and formal warning to ' the
other powers on July the 23d unless it
had not only knowledge of Austria's
intention to serve the ultimatum but
also at least of the substance thereof.
While it may be that Germany, while
indorsing in blank the policy. of Aus
tria, purposely refrained trim "exam
ining the text of the communication,
mo that it could thereafter claim that
it was not" responsible for Austria's
action a policy which would not les
sen the discreditable character of the
whole business yet the mote reason
able assumption is that the simultane
ous Issuance of Austria's ultimatum at
Belgrade and - Germany's warning to
the powers were the result of a con
certed action snd had a common pur
pose. No court or. jury,-; reasoning
along the ordinary" inferences of hu
man life, would question this conclu
sion for a moment' 1 ' !
The communication from the Ger
man foreign office last referred to an
ticipates; that Servla "wlll refuse to
comply with these demands" why. If
they were Justified? and V Germany
suggests to France. England and Rus-.
sia that If, as a result of such non
compliance, Austria has "recourse to
military measures,1.' that "the chelee'
of moans -mztst-PO left-o-lt" ' 4
' The German ambassadors In
three capitals were Instructed
u i1 Particular stress on the view
that the above question is one the -settlement
of which -devolves solely
upon Austria-Hungary and Servia, and
ope which the powers should earnestly
strive to. confine to the two countries
concerned." - - ' - -
and he added that Germany strongly
desired - -'-;" x.;- -
"that the dlsDuU be localUed, alncs
any intervention- of another power, on
account of the various alliance obli
gations, would brine consequences Un
posible to measure."
This is one of the-most significant
documents1 in ; the 'whole : correspond-
ence. i If Germany were as Ignorant
as her ambassador at Ixmdon affected
to be of the Austrian policy and ulti
matum, and it Germany was not then
Instigating ana supporting Austria In '
its perilous course, why should the'- :
German 'Chancellor ; have served - this
threatening t notice upon England. -France
and Russia, that Austria must
be left free to make war upon Servia,
and' that any: attempt to intervene In
behalf of the weaker nation would
"bring consequences 4mposslbl to
messure?" - . - . .
(German White Paper,'1 Annex. 1 B.
. A few days later the imperial. chan- '
eellor sent to the confederated govern
ments of Germany a confidential com- ,:
munica'tion in which he recognised the
possibility that Russia might feel it a
duty "to take the part of Servia in
her dispute with ' Austria - Hungary."
Why, again. If Austria's case was .-so
clearly justifiable? The imperial chan
cellor added that . .
"if Russia feels constrained to take
sides with Servla in this conflict; she
certainly has a right to do it."
but added that If Russia did this if
would In effect challenge the integ
rity of the Austro-Hungarian mon
archy, and thatRussia would therefore
alone
"bear the responsibility If a European
war arises from the Austro-Servian ,
question, which all the rest of the
fzr"S EurPen powers wish to local; .
In this significant confidential com
munication the German chancellor de
clares the strong interest which Ger
many had In the punishment of Ser
via by Austria. - He ssys "our closest
interests therefore summon us to-the
side of Austria-Hungary," and he adds
that " .
Jlf contrary to hope, the trouble should
spread, owing to the Intervention of
fl" .-thtn J"? to our luty as an
"' we should have tb support the
nelghborlnrf monsrchy. wlth the entire
might of the German . emplreJS- "n?
(Germane '-White Paper." Annex J)
j It Is a rather curious and signifi
cant fact that while eyery other docu- '
ment Jnth German "Wttt Papers'
has a date, this very Important docu
ment. in which the German chancellor
asks the confederated, governments of
Germany to gird on their swords In
preparation for 4 European wat' bears
no date. As - the documents are ar
ranged; chronologically and as ' this
document is placed. between the. com,
munlcation above ' ref erred fo of July
23 and a telegram from Vienna -of
July 24 the - inference would' b
that it was sent between those, dates.'
If so, it staggers ordinary credulity to
believe that this portentous warning
to the constituents of the German em
pire to prepare for "the day" should
not have been written with full -V
knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum, '.
which had only been Issued on y July
23 and only reached the other capital
Of Europe on July 24. Nevertheless.
(the document Itself would indicate that
, It was written after Servla's reply on
the 25th; but as Germany expected on -Its
own admission - a -. negative- reply
from Servla, it is still possible, . al
though not probable, that this eonfi
dtntial warning was written either on
the 23d or the 24th. The probability
is that this undated document wan
written shortly after , July 2S, and 1t "
certainly discloses.no expectation- of .
and possibly no desire for a peaceful -solution
of the problem. Why should
the date of this important document .
have been omitted? , ; , ? , ; .
Efforts to Maintain Peace. -
p reaching its conclusion our im-;
aginary court would pay little atten
tion to mere professions of a desire 'V
for peace. A nation, like an indlyidoal, '
can covertly stab the peace of another
while saying, "Art thou in health, my
brother?' and even the peace of civi
lization can be betrayed by a Judas
kiss. Professions of-peace belong to
the cant of diplomacy and have always
characterized the : most bellicose of
nations. ... , - , - , t . , ..
Nq war in modern times has been
begun without the aggressor pretend- .
lng that his nation wished nothing but -peace,
and invoking Divine aid for fts
murderous policy. .- To paraphrase the
words of Lady Teazle on a noted' oc
casion when Sir Joseph Surface talked
much ot "honor." it might be as well
in such instances to ieave the 'name,
of God out of the questlon.-
If the kaiser' were sinc-re.'and he
'may have been, his attitude was not -that
of rhls fdrelgn officer tUpon the
face of the record we have only his
. own assurance- that he .was doing ;
everything to preserve peace, hut the
steps that he took or the communica
tions 'he made ' to influence Austria
are not found, in the formal defense
; which the German government has
given to the world. The' kaiser can
only convince the world of his', inno- -.
cence of he crime of,; his- Potsdam
camarilla by giving the .world tbe text '
of any advice he. gave the Austrian
e'ficlals. ; He ; has produced his lele-
i grams to the czar Where are 'those he"
presumably -sent to -Francis Joseph or
Count Herch told ? .. Wbere are the ln-'
. structions he gav his ambassadors ot
forien minister? ' '
foreign minister?
Mobilization of the Uatoisx.
Tho excuse of Germany thai the i f
mobilization of Russia: compelled It to -
:, mobilize does not Justify ,vthe war. J S v
- Mobilization does not necessarily mesn '
aggression,- but ? simply preparation.
- If. RussU. had the right to mobilize
because Austria mobilized, Germany. .
equally had the right to mobilize whr , .
Russia mobilized,. but it does not'fol
; low' that either of i the three nation i :
could Justify a' war to compel the other I -
parties to demobUlze. Mobilization lv. '
only ,a. preparation against; ereatuaU- v
Concladd'o rFac Xlahaa
the - 3
y, '
-.i
V
3-