Speech of Mr. Benton on the Nebraska Bill.

If any bill to impair the Missouri Compromise line of 1820 had been brought into this House by a member from a Slave State, or under the administration of a President elected from a Slave State, I should have deemed it my duty to leave it at the threshold and to have made the motion which the parliamentary law prescribes [illegible] considered. I should [illegible] question at the first reading [illegible] from a Free State, and under the administration of a President elected from a Free State; and [illegible] that aspect of it I deemed it right to wait and hear what the members of the Free States had to say to it. It was a proposition from their own ranks, to give up their half of the Slavery Compromise of 1820, and if they choose to do so, I did not see how the southern members could refuse to accept it. It was a Free State question, and the members from the Free States were the majority and could do as they pleased; so I stood aloof, waiting to see their lead, but without the slightest intention of becoming governed by it. I had my own convictions of right and duty, and I meant to act upon them. I had come into political life upon that Compromise; I had stood upon it above thirty years and intended to stand upon it to the end solitary and alone, if need be; [Applause and laughter;] but prefering company to solitude, and not doubting for an instant what the result was to be. I have said this bill comes into Congress under the administration of a Free State President, but I do not mean to say or insinuate that the President favors the bill; I know nothing of his disposition towards it, and if I did I should not disclose it here: it would be unparliamentary and a breach of the privilege of this House to do so. The President's opinion can only be made known to us by himself, in a message in writing. In that way it is his right and often his duty, to communicate in that way with us, and in that way there is no room for mistake in citing his opinions; no room for an unauthorized use of his name, no room for the imputation of contradictory opinions to him, and in that way he becomes responsible for the opinions he may deliver. All other modes of communication are forbid to him, as tending to an undue and unconstitutional interference with the freedom of legislation. It is not bribery alone attempted upon a member which constitutes a breach of the privileges of this House; it is any attempt to operate upon a member's vote by any consideration of hope, fear, favor or affection, prospect of reward, or dread of punishment. This is parliamentary law as old as the English Parliament, constantly maintained by the British House of Commons, and lately declared in a most signal manner. It was during the reign of our old master George the Third; and in the famous case of Mr. Fox's East India bill, a report was spread in Parliament by one of the lords of the Bed-Chamber, that the King was opposed to the bill, that he wished it defeated, and had said that he would consider any member his enemy who should vote for it. The House of Commons took fire at this report and immediately resolved, "That to report any opinion or pretended opinion upon any bill depending in either House of Parliament, is a high crime of misdemeanor, derogatory to the honor of the Crown, a breach of the fundamental privileges of Parliament, and subversive of the constitution of the country." This resolve was adopted in a full house by a majority of 73 votes, and was only declaratory of the existing parliamentary law such as it had existed from the time that the English counties and boroughs first sent Knights of the Shire and Burgesses to represent them in the Parliament House. It is old English parliamentary law, and is so recorded by Hatsell and all the writers on that law. It is also American law as old as our American Congress, and as such recorded in Jefferson's Manual. It is honest law, and as such, existent in every honest man's heart. Sir, the President of the United States can send us no opinions, except written messages, and no one can report his opinion to influence the conduct of members upon a bill without becoming obnoxious to the censure which the British House of Commons pronounced upon the [illegible] chamber in the case of the King and Fox's East India bill. Nor can the President's [illegible] clerks, (as Mr. Randolph used to [illegible]) end us their opinions on any subject of legislation [illegible] being before us. They can only report, and that in writing, on the subjects referred to them by law, or by a vote of the Houses. Non-interference [illegible] their duty in relation to our legislation: and if they attempt to intervene in any of our business, I must be allowed for one to repulse the attempt, and to express for it no higher degree of respect than that which Mr. Burke expressed for the opinions of a British Lord Chancellor delivered to the House of Commons in a case in which he had no concern. Sir, I suppose I can be allowed to repeat on this floor any degree of comparison or figure of speech which Mr. Burke could use on the floor of the British House of Commons. He was a classic speaker, and besides that, an author of a treatise on the sublime and beautiful. I do not consider the particular figure which I have to repeat, although just and picturesque in itself, to be a perfect illustration of either branch of his admired treatise. It was in reference to Lord Thurlow, who had intervened in some legislative business contrary to the orator's sense of right and decency. Mr. Burke repulsed the intrinsic opinion, and declared that he did not care three jumps of a louse for it. Sir, I say the same of opinions which may be reported here from our Secretaries on any bill depending before us, and that in any form in which it may come from them—whether as a unit or integers. Still less do I admit the right of intervention in our legislative duties in another class of intermeddlers, and who might not be able to meddle at all with our business, were it not for the ministration of our bounty. I speak of the public printers, who get their daily bread, and that buttered on both sides, by our daily printing, and who require the Democratic members of this House, under the instant penalty of political damnation, to give in their adhesion to every bill which they call Administration, and that in every change it may undergo, although more changeable than the moon. For that class of intermeddlers I have no parliamentary law to administer, nor any quotation from Burke to apply—nothing but a little fable to read, the value of which, as in all good fables, lies in the moral. It is in French, and entitled, "L'ane et son Maitre," which, being done into English, goes like the "Ass and his Master," and runs thus: "An ass took it into his head to scare his master, and put on a lion's skin and went and stood in the path; and when he saw his master coming he commenced roaring, as he thought, but he only brayed, and the master knew it was his ass; so he went up to him with his cudgel and beat him nearly to death."—That is the end of the fable, and the moral of it is a caution to all asses to take care how they undertake to scare their masters. [Excessive laughter. Long continued cries of Not bad; Good, Good, Ha, ha!"] Mr. Chairman, this House will have fallen far below its constitutional mission if it suffers itself to be governed by authority or dragooned by its own hirelings. I am a man of no bargains, but act openly with any man that acts for the public good, and in this spirit I offer the right hand of political friendship to every member of this body that will stand together to vindicate its privileges, protect its respectability and maintain it in the high place for which it was intended—the master brach of the American Government. The question before us is to get rid of the Missouri Compromise line, and to a lawyer, that is an easy question.—That Compromise is in the form of a statute, and one statute is repealable by another; that short view is enough for a lawyer. To a statesman it is something different, and refers the question of its repeal, not to law books, but to reasons of State policy; to the circumstances under which it was enacted, and the consequences which are to flow from its abrogation. This Compromise of 1820 is not a mere statute, to last for a day, it was intended for perpetuity, and so declared itself. It is an enactment to settle a controversy, and did settle it, and cannot be abrogated without reviving that controversy. It has given the country peace for above thirty years; how many years of disturbance will its abrogation bring? That is the Statesman's question; and without assuming to be much of a Statesman, I claim to be enough so, to consider the consequences of breaking a settlement which pacified a continent. I remember the Missouri controversy, and how it destroyed all social feeling, and all capacity for beneficial legislation; and merged all political principle in an angry contest about slavery; dividing the Union into two parts, and drawing up the two halves into opposite and confronting lines, like enemies on the field of battle. I do not wish to see such times again, and therefore I am against reviving them by breaking up the settlement which quieted them. The Missouri Compromise of 1820 was the partitioning between the Free and the Slave States of a great Province, taking the character of a perpetual settlement, and classing with the two great compromises which gave us the Ordinance of July 13, 1787, and the Federal Constitution of September 17, of the same year. There are three Slavery Compromises in our history, which connect themselves with the foundation and preservation of this Union. First, the Territorial Partition Ordinance of 1787, with its clause for the recovery of fugitive slaves; secondly, the contemporaneous Constitutional Recognition of Slavery in the States which chose to keep it, with the fugitive slave recovery clause in the same instrument; third, the Missouri partition line of 1820, with the same clause annexed for the recovery of fugitive slaves—all three of these Compromises are part and parcel of the same policy, and neither of them could have been formed without the other, nor either of them without the Fugitive Slave clause added to it. The Constitution could not have been formed without its recognition of Slavery in the States which chose it, and the guarantee of the right to recover Slaves fleeing into the Free States. The Missouri Compromise could not have been settled without a partition of Louisiana between free and slave soil, and that partition could not have been made without the addition of the same clause for the recovery of fugitive slaves—thus all three Compromises are settlements of existing questions and intended to be perpetual. They are all three of equal moral validity. The Constitutional Compromise is guarded by a higher obligation in consequence of its incorporation in that instrument, but in no way differs from the other two in the circumstances which induced it, the policy which guards it, or the consequences which would flow from its abrogation. A proposition to destroy the Slavery Compromise in the Constitution would be an open proposition to break up the Union; the attempt to abrogate the Compromises of 1787 and 1820 would be a virtual attempt to destroy the harmony of the Union, and prepare it for dissolution, by destroying the confidence and affection in which it is founded. The Missouri Compromise of 1820 is a continuation of the ordinance of 1787—its extension to the since required territory west of the Mississippi, and no way differing from it either in principle or detail. The ordinance of 1787 divided the then territory of the U. S. about equally between the Free and the Slave States. The Missouri Compromise did the same by the additional territory of the U. S. as it stood in 1820, and in both cases it was done by act of Congress, and was the settlement of a difficulty which was to last forever. I consider them, both with their Fugitive Slave recovery clause and the similar clause in the Constitution, as part and parcel of the same transaction, different articles in the same general settlement. The Anti-Slavery clause in the ordinance of 1787 could not have been put in, as was proved by its three years' rejection, without the Fugitive Slave recovery clause added to it. The Constitution could not have been formed without the recognition of slavery in the States which chose it, and the right of recovering slaves fleeing to the Free States. The Missouri controversy could not have been settled except by the prohibition of Slavery in the upper half of the Territory of Louisiana, and that prohibition could not have been obtained without the right to recover the fugitive slaves from the part made free. Thus the three measures are one, and the ordinance of 1787 father to the other two. It led to the adoption of the fugitive slave clause in the Constitution, and we may say to the formation of the Constitution itself, which could not have been adopted without that clause, and the recognition of slave property, in which it was founded. Mr. Benton said this vital fact resulted of itself from the history of the case, which he proceeded to trace, and then remarked, thus five times in the beginning of this century, five [illegible] times, and without any distinction between Northern and Southern members, did Congress refuse to impair the slavery Compromise of 1787, notwithstanding it was five times asked for by the people of the Territory. "Oh, squatter sovereignty, where were you then?" It was a cause for you to have shown your head, to have risen in your might and established your supremacy forever. It was a case of a Convention of the sovereigns themselves, and neither this Convention nor the Congress had a dream of their sovereignty. The Convention petitioned Congress, as a ward would its guardian or children under age would petition their father, and Congress answered like a good guardian or a good father that it would not give them an evil, although they begged for it.—Benighted times those, and infinitely behind the present age—the mare's nest had not then been found, in which has been laid the marvelous golden egg, out of which has been hatched the nondescript fowl yclept squatter sovereignty. [Laughter.] The illustrious principle of non-intervention had not then been invented; the ignoramuses of that day had never heard of it, though it is now to be learned in every thorn book, and I believe in nowhere else but in thorn books. [Renewed merriment.] Five times in the beginning of this century did Congress refuse to impair the Slavery Compromise of '87, and now in the middle of the century and after thirty years of peace under the Missouri Compromise, the offspring and continuation of that of 1787; we are called upon not merely to impair for a season, but to destroy forever a far greater Compromise, extending to far more territory and growing out of necessities far more pressing—and how called upon? Not by the inhabitants, not by any one human being living or expecting to live on the territory to be affected, but upon a motion in Congress, a silent, secret, limping, halting, creeping, squinting, impish motion, conceived in the dark, midwifed in a committee-room, and sprung upon Congress and the country in the style in which Guy Fawkes intended to blow up the Parliament House with his five hundred barrels of gunpowder hid in the cellar under the vault. [Laughter.] My answer to such a motion is to be found in the whole volume of my political life. I have stood upon the Missouri Compromise for about 30 years, and mean to stand upon it to the end of my life, and in doing so shall act not only according to my own cherished convictions of duty, but according to the often declared convictions of the General Assembly of my State. It is said that the measures of 1850 superseded this compromise of 1820; if so why treat it now as still existing, and therefore to be repealed by an exception in order to get rid of it. If it was repealed in 1850, why do it over again in 1854? Why kill the dead? But it was not superseded, but acknowledged and confirmed by every speaker in 1850 that referred to the subject, and by every act that mentioned it. This being a matter of fact, and proven by all sorts of testimony, written and verbal, it had to be given up, though a test of political orthodoxy as long as it stood, and something else put in its place. Thereupon supersision was itself superseded by inconsistency. Out of the frying-pan into the fire.—[Laughter.] Inconsistent signifies inability to stand together two things which cannot stand together, from *con* and *sisto*. Now, what is the fact with respect to the Compromises of 1820 and 1850?—Can they not stand together? And if not, why knock the one down that is already down? It is now four years since this inability to stand together took effect, and how do the two sets of measures make out together at the end of this time? Perfectly well. They are both on their feet, standing bolt upright, and will stand so for ever, unless Congress knocks one or the other of them down. This is a fact known to everybody, and a fact [illegible] by the bill itself—for if the first is inconsistent with the second and unable to stand, why all this trouble to put it down? Why trip up the heels of the man already flat on his back on the ground? Then comes another reason that this compromise of 1820 is inoperative and void. If so, those who are against its operation should be content. It is in the very condition they wish it—useless, powerless, inactive, dead; and no bar to the progress of Slavery to the North. Void is vacant, empty, nothing in it. Now, if the line of 36 deg. 30 min. is inoperative and void, it is in the condition of a fence pulled down, and the rails carried away, and the field left open for the stock to enter; but the fence is not pulled down yet. The line is not yet inoperative and void. It is an existing, substantive line, alive, and operating effectually to bar the progress of Slavery to the north, and will so continue to operate until Congress shall stop its operation. Then comes the final reason that there never was any such line in the world—that it was unconstitutional and void; that it had no existence from the beginning, and that it must not be repealed by a direct act, for that would be to acknowledge its previous existence, and nullify the constitutional argument, and what is more terrible, involve the authors of the doctrine in an inconsistency of their own, and thereby make themselves inoperative and void—and this is the analysis of the reason for the Nebraska bill. That part of it which is to get rid of the Compromise of 1820 is untrue, contradictory, suicidal and preposterous; and why such a farrago of nullities, incongruities and contradictions?—Purely and simply to throw upon others, upon the Congress of 1850 and the innocent Constitution, the blame of what the bill itself is doing, the blame of destroying the Compromise of 1820, and with it destroying all confidence between the North and the South, and arraying one half of the Union against the other in deadly hostility. It is to be able to throw blame; and what is all this botch patch for? It is to establish a principle—they say the principle of non-intervention of squatter sovereignty. Sir, there is no such principle. The territories are the children of the States; they are minors under 21 years of age, and it is the business of the States, through their delegations in Congress, to take care of these minors until they are of age, until they are ripe for State Government; then give them that government and admit them to an equality with their fathers. That is the law and the sense of the case and has been so acknowledged since the first ordinance in 1784, by all authorities, Federal and State, Legislative, Judicial and Executive. The States, in Congress, are the guardians of territories, and are bound to exercise the guardianship, and cannot abdicate it without a breach of trust and a dereliction of duty. Territorial sovereignty is a monstrosity born of timidity and ambition, hatched into existence in the hot incubation of a Presidential canvass, and revolting to the beholders when first presented. After further remarks, he said, I object to this shilly-shally, willy-wonty, donty-canty style of legislation. [Excessive laughter.] It is not legislative, it is not parliamentary, it is not manly—it is not womanly. No woman would talk that way; the same shilly-shally by a woman. Nothing of the female gender was ever born young enough or lived long enough to get befogged in such a quandary as this. [Renewed laughter.] It is one thing or the other with them, and what they say they stick to—no breaking bargains with them. But the end of this stump speech is the best of the whole. Different from good milk, in which the cream rises to the top, it here settles to the bottom, and is in these words: leave it to the people thereof—that is to say, of the States and of the Territories—to regulate Slavery for themselves as they please, only subject to the Constitution of the United States. Certainly this is a new subjection for the States. Heretofore they have been free to regulate Slavery for themselves, admit it or reject it, and that not by virtue of any grant of power in the Constitution, but by virtue of an unsurrendered part of the old sovereignty—it is also new of the Territories. Heretofore they have been held to be wards of Congress, and entitled to nothing under the Constitution but that which Congress extended to them. But this clause is not accidentally here. It is to keep up the dogma of the Constitution in Territories, but only there in relation to Slavery, and that, for its admission, not rejection. Three dogmas now afflict the land—*ridelicit*, squatter sovereignty, non-intervention, and no power in Congress to legislate upon Slavery in Territories—and this bill asserts the whole three, and beautifully illustrates the whole three, by knocking each one on the head with the other, and trampling each under foot in its turn. Sir, the bill does deny squatter sovereignty, and it does intervene, and it does legislate upon Slavery in Territories; and for the proof of that see the bill, and see it, as the lawyers say, "passim"—that is to say, here, and there, and everywhere. It is a bill of assumptions and contradictions—assuming what is unfounded and contradicting what it assumes, and balancing every affirmation by a negation. It is a see-saw bill, but not the innocent see-saw which children play on, which is a plank stuck through a fence, but the up and down game of politicians, played at the expense of the peace and harmony of the Union, and to the sacrifice of all business in Congress. It is an amphibological bill, stuffed with monstrosities, hobbled with contradictions, and Badger with a proviso. [Laughter.]

At this point Mr. Benton's hour expired, and the Chairman's hammer fell, announcing that fact. There was a brisk contest for the floor.

The Chairman, Mr. Chandler, assigned it to Mr. Wentworth, of Illinois.

Mr. Wentworth said—I understand that the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Benton] wishes to speak for a few minutes longer, and I am therefore desirous, with the consent of the Committee, to yield him a portion of my time for that purpose.

Mr. Seward and others objected.

Mr. Benton resumed, saying—Amphibology was the point at which I was stopped. Amphibology is a cause for the rejection of bills, not only by Congress, but by the President, when carried to him for his approval. Gen. Jackson rejected one for that cause, and it was less amphibological than this. It was the last night of the last day of his last Administration, and a quarter before midnight. Congress had sent him a bill to repeal the Specie Circular, and to inaugurate the paper money of thousands of local banks as the Federal Government. It was an object not to be avowed, nor to be done in any direct or palpable manner. Paraphrases, circumlocution, ambi-dexterity and ambiguity, were necessary to cover up the design, and it was piled on until it was unintelligible. The President read it and could make nothing of it—He sent to his Attorney General, who was equally puzzled. He then returned it with a message to the Senate, refusing to sign the bill for amphibology; he should reject the bill for the same cause, if for nothing else. Hard is the fate of party that [illegible]. It has to keep up with the ever changing measures. Often have these bills changed, and under every phase they had to be received as a test of orthodoxy, and have more changes to undergo yet and continue to be a test under all mutations. In the course of his sarcastic remarks upon sovereignty he said its provisions are a burlesque upon sovereignty. It gives to the people, instead of receiving from them an organic act—and what an organic act! One in which they are denied every attribute of sovereignty—denied freedom of elections—denied freedom of voting—denied choice of their own laws—denied the right of fixing the qualifications of voters—subjected to a foreign supervision and controllable by the Federal Government, which they have no hand in electing, and only allowed to admit and not reject Slavery—Their sovereignty only extends to the subject of Slavery, and only to one side of that—the admitting side, the other half of the power being held to be denied by the Constitution, which is extended over them, and which, according to the reading of the supporters of the bill, forbids any law to be made which will prevent any citizen from going there with his slaves. This is squatter sovereignty, non-intervention, and no power to legislate in the Territories upon Slavery; and this is the [illegible] principle—the principle of non-intervention [illegible] ting the people alone to settle the question of Slavery for themselves. How settle it? That can only be done in an organic act, and they have no such act, nor can they have one until they make a constitution for a State Government. All the rest is legislation which settles nothing, and produces agitation at every election.

Sir, this principle of non-intervention is but the principle of contention—a bone given to the people to quarrel and fight over at every election, and at every meeting of their Legislature, until they form a State Government. Then, and then only, can they settle the question. What advantage do the Slave States expect from this bill? Certainly they expect the extension of slave power and slave population. That may prove a fallacious expectation. The question of Slavery in the Territories, if thrown open to Territorial action, will be a question of numbers and a question of the majority against Slavery, and what chance would the slaveholders have in such a contest? No chance at all. The slave emigrants will be outnumbered, and compelled to play at a most unequal game, not only in point of numbers but also in point of stakes. The slaveholder stakes his property, and has to run it off or lose it if outvoted at the polls. I see nothing which slaveholders are to gain under this bill—nothing but an unequal and vexatious contest, in which they are to be the losers. I deprecate such a contest, and did my best to keep it out of the State of Missouri when her Constitution was formed. It is now four months since this movement for the abrogation of the Missouri Compromise commenced in this Congress. It began without a memorial, without a petition, without a request from a human being. It has labored long and hard in these halls, and to this hour there is not a petition for it from the class of States for whose benefit the movement professes to have been made—not a word in its favor from the smallest public meeting or private assemblage of any Slave State. This is the response of the South to that tendered to it by Northern members under a Northern President. It is the response of silence, more emphatic than words and worthy of especial note in this debate. It argues well for the harmony of the Union, and goes to show what in fact has been often seen, that the troubles of the country come from uneasy politicians—its safety from the tranquil masses.

The Committee rose.

The Speaker laid before the House the message from the President communicating the report of the Attorney General, suggestive of modifications for conducting the legal business of the United States. Referred to the Committee of the Judiciary.—Adjourned.

SPECTATOR.

C. L. Goodrich, Editor.

OREGON CITY, OREGON TERRITORY:

Friday Evening, June 23, 1854.

[Public meetings, of all kinds, wishing their proceedings published in this paper, must pass a resolution to that effect.]

[Persons paying money to this establishment on subscription are requested to obtain a receipt from the publisher or authorized agents.]

[When any subscriber wishes to discontinue this paper, it is respectfully suggested that all dues be promptly paid.]

For President of the U. S. in '56

MILLARD FILLMORE,

OF NEW YORK.

For Vice President in '56

JOHN BELL,

OF TENNESSEE.

We are under the necessity of saying that in consequence of the scarcity of money in this vicinity we are compelled to ask the MANY who are owing us to come forward and render us a little pecuniary assistance immediately.

Jno. B. Preston, who was elected county Commissioner in Clackamas county, over Philip Foster, dem., by a majority of 23 votes. We learn that on election day he circulated a large number of tickets headed in large letters, "Democratic Ticket," containing the democratic nominations, with the exception of his own name instead of Philip Foster, for one of the commissioners.—*Salem Statesman.*

"W.," the immortal "we" (No. 2) of the "Statesman" had better "learn" the truth from Clackamas county before he gives his readers a chance to "learn" such outrageous falsehoods. Jno. B. Preston circulated no such tickets! He circulated no fraudulent tickets of any description whatever!! There WERE NO SUCH TICKETS IN CIRCULATION at the late election in Clackamas county!!! There were none printed, headed "Democratic Ticket" that did not contain the name of Philip Foster for county commissioner!! Friend Grover you must have dreamed it; we haven't the least idea you ever "learned" any such thing?

Query: was it popularity or fraud that elected Jno. B. Preston?—*Statesman.*

It's not a "Query" sir. You will find out by taking a little pains to "learn," that the democrats of Clackamas county do not think it was fraud!

A disgraceful wretch calling himself Owen Finns, last Monday night fired the barn of Mr. Wm. Arnpriest, who resides four miles out, consuming the building and every thing adjoining, together with the most of his farming utensils, wagons, &c.—The villain was found on Tuesday, and brought to this city for trial. When questioned as to why he burned the barn he replied:—"When people get so big they cant give a traveler a night's lodging, they sometimes get brought down for it." Truly a cool reason! Why did they not hang him on the first convenient limb, and thus save the county a bill of expense?

Nobody can blame Mr. Arnpriest for not getting up, after retiring at night, to accommodate such a specimen of humanity; knowing, as he did, that the fellow had been [illegible] around among the neighbors for several days, and that he was considered by all a begging vagabond. This is probably the plainest case of vagrancy and crime that has happened hereabout for months.

The steamer "Wallamet" of the upper trade is to be launched over the Falls in a few weeks. Her proprietors have commenced active operations preparatory to this movement. She will probably be put in the U. S. Mail service between Oregon City and Astoria. She is altogether the finest boat in the Territory, and it is hoped will ride over the Falls in safety.

Steamer "Fenix," Capt. Jno. Miller, is making daily trips to and from Champoeg. We had the pleasure of going up on Monday last. They now claim to be the fastest craft in the upper trade.

The new jail building is fairly in course of construction. The foundation is of stone, with thick walls, and is intended to be very substantial.

Mr. Holmes' building on Main st. is progressing. And we notice several improvements going on in different parts of the city. We will yet out-ride the storm of "hard times," no doubt.

Steamer "Portland" is undergoing thorough repairs. She will probably be at her landing in this city this evening. Everybody is anxiously waiting for the commencement of her regular trips again. She will be re-painted here, and about the 4th of July Capt. Murray will again welcome his friends on board this favorite boat.

On Wednesday morning last a solid cast iron mill-wheel, seven feet in diameter, and weighing eleven hundred pounds, was loaded on to a heavy wagon at the Oregon City Foundry and Machine Shop, and started up the Valley on its way to California.—Mr. Smith informs us that he has orders for casting several wheels this summer of still larger dimensions. They are now prepared to make, at that establishment, almost any kind of machinery needed in Oregon or California.

The steamer "Canemah" has "hauled off" for the season.

Geo. Graham Esq., favored us, a few days ago, with sixteen spires of wheat, the product of one grain, just beginning to fill, the longest of which measured SEVEN FEET in length! and the shortest about SIX!! They were not, at this time of the year, done growing by several inches. The heads were of good size. Said specimens were raised on the highest cultivated ground in Oregon, which accounts for their being of rather diminutive size; the uplands not being so well adapted to a monstrous growth as those lower situated. We still challenge the world, and no country dares to accept.

The vote upon the State Government question, according to the Oregonian, has been of the most decided character—the scheme having been defeated by an overwhelming majority. Oregon will therefore remain a Territory for another year, at least.—*San Francisco Sun.*

Hold on, Mr. Sun, till next mail, and then we will have all the returns. The probability is that the State Convention question has carried by a small majority. The idea of your publishing the "overwhelming" guessing of the "Oregonian" for *facts* is all nonsense.

To Correspondents.

Lady contributors are politely requested not to make use of names that are so familiar to all when affixing their fictitious signatures.

"Aurelia" your SPECTATOR will be published next week. Why did you not send us your name, if you really wanted to palm the lines on to us as original? Trying to bother us a little we suppose. Ah! you rogue! We are watching you, occasionally.

"Ed. M. W." wishes to know if we are going to print "The Life and Sufferings of Mrs. Bailey." No sir! we understand she intends to have it done in Portland. You might do well to call on her again; and "sympathize" with her, and while you think of it just advise her to have 'em bound in "yellow kivers," in a style expressive of her "fancy" sentiments. This will enable her "agents" to sell them so much faster. Tell her such literature generally sells high, and she might as well put 'em up to "three bits" as to sell at a "quarter" per copy.

It does seem a little singular that such an intelligent "Batch" as "Batch" appears to be, should "Batch" up such a "Batch" of acrostical phrases in such fine style and then knock it all in the head by refusing to tell us who he is.

HINTS.

What a correct sense of acuteness it requires to so get off hints that they be comprehended and properly adjudged; so that they act not as a provocation or expression of contempt when such is not intended; that their real meaning be readily understood by those to whom they are given.

Hints may be called a kind of delicate wire telegraph, which can be suspended and operated upon between to minds in an instant. They are a sort of peculiar javelin which some public writers throw with dexterity, and are particularly adapted to that class who acquire the name of bold, fearless, &c., and who are nevertheless useful and efficient writers. They are the inert capital of weak and effeminate authors, and are left out of use by them, of course, for the simple reason that they cannot be elevated to the head, where they must invariably be before they can be committed to paper, or verbally thrown forth.

Hints may be divided into three classes, to wit:—The "allusive," "suggestive" and "insinuative." The allusive hint is probably of more use with the generality of people, and yet costs less labor of thought, than the other classes. They many times prove of invaluable worth, and are always characteristic features in any intellectual mind.—The talent for receiving or conveying allusive hints is one that can be cultivated to much advantage; and oftentimes one of a "suggestive" nature may be successfully