

the duties of each may be performed.—The one of government for the United States being fixed, it is the legal place for Congress to make laws, the Supreme Court to judge them, and the Executive to execute them, and so on their enforcement; and yet by law, in certain cases, such as the punishment of contagious diseases, and the like, these several departments may go to, and perform their respective duties at, another place altogether, or to different places respectively. It is by no means unusual that the same Congress may be convened in any one or more places, as in the case of the late Congress; for, there is no law which places in the Republic and that in Washington City. Once more; my brethren say, that what they consider the "Seat of Government" for the Territory, to wit, Oregon City, must be so from the very necessity of things—otherwise the wants of government were liable to get out of order and cease to revolve, and require as to be again set in motion, further Congressional action. This proposition that the Legislative Assembly may sit through the session at any place, to wit, the Seat of Government at all, or that it assemble by common consent, in the same time, at any place whatever, for the discharge of their legislative duties. All that needs to be said to this is simply that arguments to establish a favorite construction, drawn from supposed circumstances, which are mere suppositions, that the people their duty, and the Legislature, have nothing else but a common consent of popular sense, virtue and integrity. As well might we suppose that men will not eat when hungry as to suppose that a majority of the people's representatives would fail, previous to establishing the Seat of Government, to assemble at some suitable place or other, to make laws necessary and useful for, and demanded by, their constituents. It might be well enough to talk about such things, if any such disastrous results had followed this law of Congress; but, even then, it would have nothing to do with this matter of sitting to hold the Supreme Court at Oregon City, when it is not pretended that any law has passed the Legislative Assembly making it the Seat of Government. That question remains equally unaffected by all laws which are supposed to be laws of Congress. If these views be correct, it then follows that Oregon City is not the Seat of Government, but it has been at all, in any proper sense of that term, at any time since the organization of the regular Territorial government. As a consequence of it, the Supreme Court undertaken to be held there on the first instant, never had any legal existence nor any legal power. The provision in the Organic law, that the Supreme Court shall sit at the Seat of Government, and the location of it having been left to the Legislative Assembly, contemplates some subsequent action by that body; and until such happens, no court can be held. The Judges have no power to shorten the period in which the exercise of their functions may be suspended, by an omission to establish the Seat of Government; but they must wait the action of the Legislative Assembly. These general principles are well stated in 20 Bar. 339, 6th Conn. 345 and 9th Conn. 641. "Where the constitution designates in express and explicit terms the manner, time, and place, in and at which power may be exercised, and in silence as to its performance at any other time or place, it cannot be done otherwise, or had in any other way by implication."—5th Sup. 468. "The constitution, for the purpose of acquiring so mighty a thing as the power to sit in judgment upon private and public rights and the constitutionality of laws, may confer in a constitutional system, but forms no part of a free government acting only by express and delegated authority."—2d Sup. 170. The want of jurisdiction is utterly void and unavailable for any purpose.—15th J. R. 141; 19th Conn. 33 and 9th Conn. 297. The proceedings of any court not having jurisdiction of what it pretends to hold, are void.—5th Harr. and 7th Conn. 9; 18th Conn. 9; 19th Conn. 24. No can constitute of parties confer jurisdiction on a court where it does not possess it by law. 2d Conn. 93; 14 Yerg. 441; 1st Barb. 263 and 34 Calves 189. Courts are bound to know where their terms are to be held as declared by public law, and if they are not held at such place, their proceedings are void.—4th Dev. 407. At no other place than the Seat of Government, in Oregon, can the Judges convene and sit as a Supreme Court; and, if that has not been located by the Legislative Assembly, in whom alone was vested the power to do it, (as is contended by my fellow judges) it necessarily follows that no Supreme Court has been held at Oregon City, because none can be. Hence the absurdity, as it appears to me, (taking their view that the "location law" is void,) of the assumption to hold for the present a court of that kind at all. With these facts, then, and they are beyond common dispute; and the principles herein stated, the soundness of which is commended to the judgment of all candid men; as well as the law referred to, so often and solemnly adjudged by courts, the distinguished ability of which it would be idle to question, I unhesitatingly answer your third enquiry by expressing an opinion that there is no law in force in this Territory authorizing a session of the Supreme Court at Oregon City.

Now am I able to find the slightest error, either in principle or authority, for attempting the exercise of such powers there?—Most assuredly, no. "Declarations" is loudly pronounced and promulgated there and ought to be enforced in the name of judicial authority, will be as harmful as the idle wind; and, like that expression element which in its wild fury prostrates unstable structures and other lightness things, blowing down everything and building up nothing; so, with all such idle efforts, equally incapable and powerless of any good, and only harmful as far as its personal influence and example of its example may extend, in bearing down and bringing into contempt such that otherwise, under a different form, and uttered in a different spirit, would have been hailed as a blessing.

To your first enquiry, "Whether by any law now in force, the Legislative Assembly is legally authorized to assemble at any place in Marion County for the discharge of the public duties." I reply, and say, that no such law is in force. It is an error of the Legislative Assembly passed on February 1st, 1853, the location of the Seat of Government was established at Sa-

lem. That act is unrepelled; it has not been disapproved by Congress, a power constitutionally reserved by that body over all Territorial laws; nor has it been adjudged invalid, as is conceived, by any legal or binding authority. The two former positions are undisputed; the latter; but by what power and reasoning we have previously answered. This location law is the only one ever passed on that subject, since the organization of the territorial government. It is plain in its terms, and the Legislative intention is so clear, that no uncertainty whatever exists as to its meaning. No one doubts the exclusive power of the Legislative Assembly to locate and establish the Seat of Government; for, its jurisdiction and that without interference or veto, is expressly conferred by the act of Congress. At first view then, and on general principles of legislation and construction of statutes, the law in question is not open to controversy, as to the obligation it creates or the duties enjoined by it. Resistance to performing the duties it demands, however, is seen to be openly offered by certain public officers; and, while all obligations sought to be created by it are not only stoutly denied, but in addition, and what at least seems unnatural, obedience to it by the people and certain of their public servants and representatives, is unobscuredly proclaimed in high quarters as tending to the revolution! This alone may well create surprise, and such doubts sound strongly to the great bodies of our law-abiding and order loving inhabitants. It cannot be doubted that, the mass of the people of Oregon and your their Representatives, can have any other motive in such obedience than to faithfully discharge what is honestly conceived to be all right and just duties towards the Territory and its laws. It is not wonderful, then, that great confusion has followed in the public councils and much emination and recrimination have taken place as to the motives and conduct of those who have made such charges, as well as those against whom they are directed. It is proper now to look at the reasons publicly assigned, as well as the sufficiency of them, for this unnatural and unyielding defiance manifested to the location law. This we propose to do, unmoved by the non-concurrence in opinion of our fellow Judges, and without alarm of losing our temper, even if it comes to be in raising a "reasonable doubt" of the soundness of the doctrines of others, and thus bring ourselves within the penalty of the (extra) judicial law pronounced upon certain people who have been described "by authority" as not possessing "an ordinary allowance of common sense or a disposition to use it fairly and honestly." It is said that the law locating the Seat of Government at Salem, is absolutely null and void, not for want of power as to the subject matter of the law or clearness of expression in declaring the Legislature will, but because it embraces more subjects than one, and comes in conflict with that direction in the law of Congress organizing the Territory which prescribes to the Legislative Assembly in the enactment of laws, that "every law shall have but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title." The act then assumed to be valid, is entitled "An act to provide for the selection of places for location and erection of the public buildings of the Territory of Oregon." The first section selects Salem and provides for the erection of the Capitol building, and declares that place to be the Seat of Government; the second section selects Portland, and provides for the erection of the Territorial Penitentiary at that place; and the third section selects Marysville for the location of the Territorial University, &c. The remaining sections have reference to the details only of carrying out and making effective the object set forth in the title to the Act. The erection of these several public buildings had all been previously provided for by Acts of Congress. The Capitol building, by a small appropriation of \$5000, contained in the Act of 14th August, 1819, and the sum of \$15,000, in the Act of 10th Feb. 1850; the Penitentiary, the sum of \$82,000 by an Act of the same date as the last; and the University by a donation of lands contained in the Act of 11th August, 1818, and 27th September, 1852. These buildings, designed for the use of the whole Territory, and constituting, as they do, the common good, were greatly needed, and the Legislature feeling the necessity of their early establishment, selected places for them, and provided means by joint action of the Government and their own agents, for their erection. The selection of the places for the Seat of Government and the University, they had the exclusive power over; but that for the Penitentiary, by the wording of the Act making an appropriation for it, they only had co-ordinate power with the Governor in selecting the site for it.

This was an anomaly, and most likely never contemplated by Congress, as will be apparent from an examination of the act making the appropriation, and an comparison of the fundamental law of Minnesota with that of Oregon. The law making that appropriation is part of a similar appropriation to Minnesota and connected with it in the same act; and while the wording of that part relating to Minnesota is properly adapted, in carrying out its provisions, to the fundamental law of that Territory, on the other hand, the wording of the part relating to Oregon being the same, is incongruous and not compatible with our fundamental law, since, in the one the Governor has a qualified veto upon all laws passed by the Legislative Assembly, which means in the other, which is sure, he has none at all. This incongruity will appear obvious enough when it is seen that a literal carrying out of the meaning of Congress, as stated in the words of that joint appropriation act, leaves the Governor in the possession of an absolute veto power in Oregon on that single subject without any whatever on all others. In Minnesota the Governor has a qualified veto on that as on all other laws. In Oregon it would be impossible, with such construction for the Penitentiary ever to be located without his assent as to the place, and although passed over his head by a vote of the entire Legislative Assembly, it would still not become a law without his approval; for by the words of the act as it passed, without reference to our peculiar condition, the Governor has practically an absolute veto on this one subject, while by the fundamental law he has none whatever! The only help for this evident mistake would be to apply the doctrine of construing statutes in *pari materia*, to determine its true meaning. If so, the most reasonable construction of the law in question would be to place on an equal footing with the Government of Minnesota in the exercise of a qualified veto on so much of the "location law" as relates to the selection of the place for the Penitentiary. It is true he desired the Legislative Assembly, in his message, to select the place for the Penitentiary, but it is equally true he never approved the bill by which it was located, and it may as a consequence be doubted whether the Penitentiary has been located by the proper power, and therefore that part of the act may be admitted to be void for want of jurisdiction in its enactment. Laws are void in the absence of jurisdiction to enact them; also such parts of laws as are tainted by the exercise of an excess of power in their enactment. This however does not affect such parts of a statute as are not subject to this imputation. This is a principle long and well settled. Statutes may be good in part and bad in part; good for so much as the law-maker had authority over the subject matter, and bad for so much as relates to that where such power is wanting.—2d Peter's 266, 3d Blackford 8, and 3d March 73. When certain portions of a statute conflict with the constitution, while other parts do not, the latter will be sustained and enforced, if they can be separated from that which is unconstitutional.—6th How. 325. From this principle it is plain enough that although the section of the location law relating to the Penitentiary may be bad for want of exclusive power in the Legislative Assembly to enact it, the balance, or that which relates to the Seat of Government and the University may nevertheless be good and allowed to stand unless unconstitutional for other causes.

As to the Legislature is but the means of executing a power. It is not the power itself; and if the method of its enactment is thought to have been not sufficiently heedful, the law may be avoided by the judgment of a competent court determining the fact when properly brought before it. But, it is not enough that class of laws deemed absolutely void or want of power to enact them—the character of those laws involves approval by the Legislature. See Passenger cases, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. U. S. Hov. vol. 7.

Statutes, like judgments of courts, in the obligations they impose and the duties they enforce, may be divided into three classes, valid, voidable and void. The first are such as are not subject to objection either as to their power or mode of enactment; the second consists of that class where there is a defect as to the authority over the subject matter of the law maker who enacted them, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which are not subject to objection, as to the power or mode of enactment, or to the subject matter of the law, but where some legitimate method or manner of enactment has been disregarded. This class is called *voidable*, because when objected to at the proper time and place, they may be legally avoided by the decree or judgment of a competent court. This class, like the first, is in legal parlance, *presumptively valid*, and will continue so until it is avoided by legal proceedings; to which a submission may be made to determine the question. The last class consists of statutes which are absolutely void for want of jurisdiction or authority to pass them; such kind nobody, nor does the presumption of validity obtain, even for a moment, in their favor. They are void, *ab initio*; create neither obligation nor duties, and may with propriety and should be utterly overlooked by all. The first class are those which