Women, Churches, Books,
Schools and Features
SECTION FIVE
VOL. XL PORTLAyP, OKEGOX, SUNDAY 31011X1X0, NOVEMBER 21, 1921 'Q. 48
NO COALITION CABINET, SAYS WILSON, ON ENTERING THE WAR
Drive for Bi-partisan Government Disregarded by President; Washington's Troubles and Lincoln's Embarrassments Weil-Known Facts of History; Chance for Division in Official Family Not to Be Taken.
BY JOSEPH TUMULTY.
kCnpyrlaht. 1921 by Doubleday, Page
Jo. All rig ni reeervea. i-uoiisneu oj
Arrangement. )
CHAPTER XXIX.
JTIHE critics of the president will
I ask the questions: What was the
I- r.,..M.n Ar. ,.... th.
IHE critics of the president will
...
ountry for war, which to him seemed
nevltable? From the inside, and
Hthout the blare of trumpet, he was
luletly engaged in conferring1 with
he heads of the army and navy de-
bartments. Indeed, from the minute
he third Lusitanla note was dls-
batched, actual preparations for war
ivere begun. Immediately upon the
Hlspatch of the note, the following
statement was Issued from the "White
louse, under date of July 31, 1916:
"Wh'te House. Washington.
July 21. 1916.
"The president in association with
he heads of departments, regardless
bf present-day conditions or contro-
ersles. has long been giving a great
eal of consideration to the preara
ion of a reasonable and adequate
tiaval programme, which he Intends
o propose to congress at the proper
Ime.
"That Is one of the th'ngs he Is now
onsldering In the quiet of Cornish,
le feels, now that the note has been
Ispatched, that It Is beat, for the
Ime being, to drop the discussion of
It as far as he is concerned, and is
urnlng to questions of permanent
atlonal policy.
Of course he realizes that he must
ave the best practical advice obtain-
Ible In this matter and is seeking for
from every available source. In
act. It is known that the best minds
f the various departments of the tion cabinet. He also knew human
overnment, both of the army and the nature: knew that with the best ln
avy, are now and have been at work tentlons, men eometimes find it difft-
n these Important matters for some
ime; that Is. he is seeking advice
rom the men In those departments
V'ho have been directly In touch with
he new conditions of defense that
ave been evolved out of modern ex-
erlence. He not only wished advice
rom those who have a knowledge of
ctual modern conditions of warfare,
ut he is seeking light from those
ho are able to understand and com-
rehend the altered conditions of land
nd naval warfare. He wishes the
avy to stand upon an equality with
ne most efficient and serviceable.
Army Development Begun.
As to the army. It is known here
mat he Is preparing to Incorporate in
is next message to congress a pro
ramme In regard to the development
nd equipment of the army and a
roper training of the citizens of the
very way consistent with American
radltions and national policy, will be
f such a character as to commend it-
elf to every patriotic and practical
hind. In this matter he Is working
Ith the secretary of war and his
rofesslonal associates, who, 1 is un
erstood, have reached some very
eflnlte conclusions on these exceed-
ngly Important matters He is anx-
frtus to have a programme that will
e definite and positive, and wishes
Jo nave me information in hand be-
pre laying the matter before the
i . .... . , . . . . ,,
ommlttees of the senate and house."
Contemporaneously with this state-
tent was issued the following state-
lient which was prepared by the
resident, but issued over my name
th nil Biffnif!n.nA. , . , ,
the full significance of which was
ot apparent at the time:
The note (third Lusitanla note! having
een dispatched, the president felt that
was best to drop further discussion of
"ne matter for the present, as far as he
as concerned. He will be free now to
evote his time to a full consideration of
matter that the country has for a long
Ime been thoughtful of that Is, a rea
dable programme of national defense.
f course, this programme will be enn-
idered regardless ot present day condi-
ons. i
It Is known that the president has been
onsldering this Important matter In all
aspecta. and has been In touch with
ne secretary of war and the secretary of
navy regarding It. It is also known
fri official circle hero that the president
a taken steps before leaving for Cor
ish to Instruct the army and navy de
artments to make ready for his consid
ratlon a careful programme of national
erenae In preparation for the prescnta-
on of his views to congress at the proper
rlm.
He desires to have the programme bawd
i the most practical lines obtainable
rom the departments, and It Is said that iican friends had so cleverly "adver
he best minds In the departments are at ... . . .
resent at work on the subject. He hopes
hat the programme will express the best
fadS?;.0,.ili!,U!?iry IT? ,not '"I"
r modern experience. He Is anxious to
ave a programme that will be definite
nd positive, and wishes to have the In-
ormatlon in hand before laying the matter
l.fore the committees of the senate and
the house.
On July 21, 1915. he addressed the
ollowlng letters to the secretary of
ivar and the secretary of the navy.
espectlvely :
The White House. Washington. July 21
113. My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have
eon giving scarcely less thought than you
ouraelf have, to the question of adequate
m anxious, as vnu know to lnrnrnnr,f
fx my next message to congress a pro-
ramme regarding the development and
qulpment of the army and a proper train-
4ig of our cltlxens to arms which, while
i every way consistent with our tradi-
ons and our national policy, will be of
very patriotic and practical mind.
I know that you have been much In
onferences with your professional aaso-
latea In the department and that you
ava yourself come to some very definite
oncluslons on these exceedingly impor-
ant matters. 1 ahall be away from
Vaahlngton for a few day, but 1 would
very much obliged If you would be kind
"uU" M I""? 'Zrm' pi0?Rmhm:
'-Ith estimates, of what you and the best
Informed soldiers In your counsels think
ne country ought to undertake to do. I
riouid like to discuss this programme with
ou at as early a time as It can be made
oady. Whether we can reasonably pro-
f.'i.'t.Tv'ornot .'fn d!tl;Tnr."hm; and transact all other American busi
ledlateiy or not we can determine when
have studied It. The important thing ness of importance. But doubtless
ow Is to know and know fully w-hat we
.ea. congress win certainly welcome
uch advice and follow It to the limit of
m opportunity.
Cordially ana faithfully yours,
WOOD ROW WILSON.
Hon. Llndley M. Garrison,
Secretary of War.
The White House, Washington, July 21,
W3. My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have been
Vivinf. aa X am sure you have alax, a great
&l of thought to tne matter of a wise
nd adequate naval programme to be pro
naed to the congress at Its next seselon.
nd I would like to discuss the whole
object with yoj at the earliest possible
,
But first we must have professional ad-
Ice. I would be very much obliged to
t... i ... ... . V. . 1 . .V-
p.U .1 , M nUU.U ......... ... V...
epartment to work on the subject. I
the men who have been moat dl-
etly In contact with actual modern con-
ltlona. who nave most thorousniy com-
rabended what the navy must be la the
future In order to tnl upon an equality
with the moet efficient and mort prac
tically aerviceable. I want their advice, a
programme by them formulated In the
most definite way. Whether we can rea
sonably propose the whole of It to the con
areaa Immediately or not we can deter-
mine when we have studied It. The lm-
portant thing now Is to know fully what
need. Conares. will certainly welcome
,ucn aivlce and follow it to the limit or
its opportunity.
It should be a programme planned for
"h7. V.,.iTv. . f ,h.
as to commend Itself to every patriotic and
pr,ctliya' man- r
-,,. ., ..,,,. . t.u. .hi. im.
portant matter up with you at your early
convenience.
Cordially and faithfully yours.
WOODBOW W1LSOJT.
Hon. Josephus Daniels.
Secretary of the Navy.
Coalition Cabinet I'rged.
Immediately after the war message
there arose an insistent demand for
a coalition cabinet. It was the be
ginning of the republican, drive for
what was called a bi-partisan govern
ment.. Republicans chose to forget the
experiences of England and France
under their coalition ' cabinets, and
when the president refused to act
upon the suggestion the impression
was subtly conveyed to the unthink
ing that the president's refusal arose
from his dislike of counsel and co
operation, and his unwillingness to
share the responsibilities and glories
of the war with the people outsida his
own party.
As an historian, the president knew
the troubles of Washington with a
coalition cabinet, Lincoln s embar-
rassmente from cabinet members not
of his own party, McKinley s saga-
clous refusal in 1898 to form a coall-
cult to work whole-heartedly with a
leader of a political party not their
own. He could not risk a chance of
division in his own official family in
the face of the common enemy.
The president looked upon the agi
tation for a coalition cabinet as a
partisan effort to hamper and em
barrass his administration, and so he
coldly turned away from every sug
gestion that looked toward the estab
lishment of a cabinet of the kind
suggested by his too solicitous repub
lican friends.
Embarrassment Held Aim.
The following note which I ad
dressed to the president, and his re
ply, bear upon the subject: ,
The White House, Washington. Dear
Governor: The newspaper men aked me
this morning what the attitude of the
administration was toward the proposed
s:jper-caoinei. i neagea as mucn as i
ftniM hut I nKkrl If It w.u nnr the
same proposition that came up some
months ago, advocated by Senator Weeks,
in a new uisguie 11 11 was not (ne bbiiiq
kind of a commission that had harassed
Mr. Lincoln. 1 think we ought to let our
attitude be known unofficially for the
guidance of men who wish to help
II we do nothing at this time to let it be
known it would seem that our opposition
to this kind of legislation had been si
lenced over the furore of the fuel order,
lit other words, we ought to show by our
ttltude that the tantrums on the hill
ore m"ln no impression on us whatever.
Dear Tumulty: Of course I am opposed
to the idea of a super-cabinet," and re-
sard it as nothing more nor less than a
renewal oi me perpetual eriorc or me .re-
hlln.n. In fore. nnt.Hon l th.
administration. Republicans of the finest
"IT.ZLX X
hands and there Is no need whatever for
change at the head of the administering
aepartments. i am uneny opposea to
anythlng of ,he ,ort and K'M nTver con-
sent to It. You will know now to create
the Impression on the minds of the news-
paper men that I regard It as merely a
partisan effort to hampr and embarrass
tl,e administration. THE PRESIDENT.
There were many misgivings In the
minds of the people when war was
declared In April, 1917, and the na
tion embarked upon the most gi
gantic of all Its wars, under the lead
ership of a college professor, a doc
trinaire, who did not believe in war
as a method of solving International
problems, and a secretary t war who
was an avowed pacifist. There was
another matter which greatly dis
turbed the peace of mind of the av
erage American. The political party
that was conducting the struggle
was the democratic party the party
.i n. .i
"l """ ""1' l" "
and women of America. Our repub-
u8ea lnelr conduct or tne tjivu war
and the SDanish-Amerlcan war that
many people in the country felt that
. . ,
lne repuDiican party, Decause or us
Icadina - minds and the business ere-
.. ,. th.
nius of lts masters, waa the only po-
litical organization that could be de-
pended upon successfully to carry on
a great war.
Interesting; Comment Cited.
Colonel Roosevelt's diary.
first
1921,
made public on September 28,
throws interesting light on
throws interesting: lieht nn renub
llcan claims of efficient management
Dy repuDllcans of the panish-Ameii-
r war TTnHa. rfau nf vrQ .. n isoc
. . , ... :
lne coionei, men a ueuienani-cotonei.
recorded In his diary: "The delay
-j .miiv nr th. r ...t.
ment surpass belief. The quarter
master's department Is better, but
bad. The commissary department is
good. There is no management
whatever In. the war department.
Against a good natlo'n we would be
helpless," and these animadversions
"" reiterated in subsequent entries.
Interesting comments from the
greatest of contemporary republicans
. . . . . . . , ...
h the divine right of the republican
party to conduct all American wars
tha' colonel had fura-otten all thlo In
.H . ,h
cans had also forgotten what was Yet the expected did not happen, to
notorious in 1898. the ineptitude of the amazement and chagrin of the
the republican war department, republican enemies of the president,
which, as Lieiitenant-Colonel Roose- No other war was attended with so
velt sa!d under date ot May 21, 1898. little scandal and with greater expe
had "no head, no energy, no lntelll- dition. The cause was plain. It was
gence." But the old myth sedulously the magnificent and aggressive lead
cultivated by republicans continued ership of.Woodrow Wilson exerting
In 1917, that only republicans are fit itself all along the line and that
to govern, no matter how badiy they
rifi '
r. ' ." 1 . V . U . . UUIJH.Il O Ollll ,I (J
dictions of disaster to the country by
reason of the democratic auspices
L,.. .V.-
u"ucr wuiua i" n iu ue con-
ducted were freely made.
Tt .,..., fsLC.t th.t
,
of the leading republicans in the) sen
la,e.wwtiMwMiip.ieqBpa( w )ii'i'iewe'
ate harbored for the president a. par-
tlsan
and personal hatred which
th. ol.h f.th.r n ik. thnnM
leadership waa based upon certain
fundamental reaolutions 'which had
...
been taking form in the president's
mind for many months previous to
his appearance before congress ask
ing for the passage of a war declara
tion.
They; were) s lollowo: 1) There,
I-
V
Woodrow Wilson As President
was to be no "politics" In ithe con
duct of the war; (2) no political gen
erals would be selected; (3) every
ounce of energy and force In the na
tion was to be put back of the heads
of the army and navy in a supreme
effort to make our influence, moral
and physical, quickly felt. Every
effort was made to cut out scandal
and to put an absolute embargo on
the activities of army speculators,
contractors and profiteers.
Speaking to me one day about the
conduct of the war, shortly after the
delivery of his war mes.sa.ge. he said:
"We must not in our conduct of this
war repeat the scandals of the civil
and Spanish-American wars. The
politics of generals and admirals
must be tabooed. We must find the
n
7
best-trained minds we can get and
we must back them up at every turn,
Our policy must bo the best man for
every job. regardless of his political
affiliations. This must be 'the only
test, for. arter all, we are the trus-
tees of the boys whose lives will be
spent in this enterprise of war.'
This was not an easy policy to pur
sue. Every kind of harassing de
mand came from democratic senators
and representatives to Induce the
president to recognize political con
siderations in the conduct of the war,
the argument being that after all the
responsibility for- it9 conduct resting
with the democrats, the adminlstra-
tion of the war ought to be under gard to party, faction, blood strain
demooratio tutelage throughout. But or creed, and the result wa a com
the president waa firm, la his resolve posits organization In which demo
to see the war through to the end
without political considerations. The
political predilections of generals, ad-
mirals and war workers of every
kind were Ignored.
Mr. Creel, by furnishing a list of
republicans appointed by the presi
dent to conspicuous office, has dis
proved the charge against the presi-
dent of niggard partisanship. Al
though the president would not toler
ate a coalition cabinet, he gave the
republicans all manner of opportuni
ties to share in the conduct and the
credit of the war. I quote Mr. Creel:
"The search for the best man for
the place' was instituted without re-
crats, republicans and Independents
worked side by side, partisanship for-
gotten and service the one consldera-
Un- Repnblleau, l.d. Ar.
. ,
: It stood recognised as a matter of
course that the soldier selected to
command our forces In France might
we develop into a presidential pos-
slbility yet this high place w given
without question to Genera John J
Pershing, a Hfe-long republican and
son-in-law of Senator Warren, one of
chlne,
"Admiral William S. Sims, a vocl-
f erous "Publican, was sent to Engl Ish
waters In high command, and while
Secretary Daniels was warned at the
!LmehJat.,?r,S Prt"'anBnlp 7"
' ' , ' ,
obligations of loyalty or patriotism,
Tio waved th. objection aside out of
. . . t .
ms Deuei liial csiuib was luo ueoi mini
for the Job.'
"For the head of the aircraft board.
with 1U, task: of launching America'. reached Pranc) an(, on , th-
great aviation programme, Howard E of four of tPRn rt lan(led
Coffin, a republican, waa seelcted and Amerlcan Khtlnff men in th. horn, of
at hi. right hand Mr. Coffin placed Lafay,tt. and Rochambeau. On Octo
Colonel Edward A. Deeds, also a re- ber 10 our aoUien went on the tM
publican of vigor and regularity. It jne
is to be remembered alo that when Tralnlrifr oampa for offtcer1, BtIlrtkI
failure and corruption were charged , June and , Au(CUBt tnre were
against the aircraft board, the man .radllate(, :7 S41 Bxlcce89tul aspirants,
appointed by the president to conduct ready to aMume the ta8ks of l6aler.
tne nigniy lmporrani investigation
Charles E. Hughes.'
Republican Leads Army.
"It stood recognized as a matter of
course that the soldier selected to
command our forces In Franco might
well develop Into a presidential pos
sibility, yet this high place was given
without question to General John J.
Pershing, a life-long republican and
the eon-ln-law of Senator Warren,
one c-f the masters of the republican
machine.
"Admiral William S. Sims, a vocif
erous republican, waa sent to English
waters in h-tgh command, and, while
Secretary Daniels was warned at the
time that Sims' partisanship was of
the kind that would not recognise
the obligations of loyalty or patriot
ism, he waved the objection) aside out
of his belief that Sims was 'the best what Mr. I.lnyd George was quoted as
man for the Job. having said the other day, that the
"For the head of the aircraft board, Americans have a great surprise In
with Its task of launching America's store for Germany. I don't know In
great aviation programme, Howard what sense he meant that, hut there
E. Coffin, a republican, was selected is no surprise in store. I want you
and at his right hand Mr. Coffin to know the sequence of resolves
placed Colonel Edward A. Deedis, also and of actions concerning our part In
a republican of vigor and regularity, the war. Pome time ago It was pro
It Is to be remembered also that posed to us that we. if I may use the
when failure and corruption were expression, feed our men Into the
charged against the aircraft board. French and English armies In any
the man appointed by the president units that might be ready companies
to conduct the highly important in- or regiments or brigades and not
vestigaWon was Charles E. Hughes."
Three assistant secretaries of war
were appointed by Mr. Bakei Bene
dict Crowell. a Cleveland contrac
tor; Dr. F. E. Kappel. dean of Co
lumbia university, and Emmet J.
Scott, formerly Booker Washington's ardent Interest In the war If their
secretary and all three were repub- men were fighting under their own
llcans. E. R. Stetir.ius of the J. I. flng and under their own general
Morgan firm, a republipan. was marie officers, but at that time, which was
special assistant to the secretary of some months ago, I Instructed Gen
war and placed In charge of supplies, era I'ershlng that he had full au
a duty that ho had been discharging thoHty whenever any exigency that
for the allies. Major-Oeneral George
W. Goethalsi. after his unfortunate
experience in shipbuilding, was given
a second chance and put In the war
department aa an assistant chief of
staff. The chief of staff himself,
General Payton C. Marsh, was a re-
publican no less definite and regular
than General Goethals. Samuel Mc-
Roberts, president of the National
City bank and one of the pillars of
the republican party, was brought to
Washington as chief of the procure
ment section in the ordnance section,
with the rank of brigadier-general;
Major-General E. H. Crowder was ap
pointed provost marshal-general, al
though his republicanism was well
known, and no objection of any kind
was made when General Crowder put
Charles E. Warren, the republican
national committeeman from Michi
gan, in charge of appeal cases, a po
sition of rare power.
Others Ala. Appointed.
The emergency fleet corporation
was virtually turned over to repub
licans under Charles M. Schwab and
Charles Plez. Vance McCormlck, a
chairman of the democratic national
committee, was made chairman of the
-war. trade board, but of the eight
members the following five were re
publicans: Albert Straus, of New
York. Alonzo E. Taylor of Pennsyl
vania, John Beaver White of New
York, Frank C. Munson of New York
and Clarence M. Woolley of Chicago.
The same conditions obtained in th.
Red Cross. A very eminent repub
lican, H. P. Davison, was put in su
preme authorltv. and on the Red Cross
war council were placed ex-President
Taft; Charles D. Norton. Mr. Taft's
sccretary while president, and Corne-
llus N. Bliss, former treasurer of the
republican national committee. Not
only was Mr. Taft thus honored, but
upon the creation of a national war
labor board the ex-prealdont was
mad. Its chairman and virtually em
powered to act as the administration's
representative in Its contact with in-
dustry.
Frank A. Vanderlip, a republican of
iron regularity, waa placed In charge
of the war savings stamps campaign,
and when Mr. McAdoo had occasion to
name asistant secretaries of the
treasury he selected Professor 'L. S.
Row. of the University of Pennsyl-
vanla and H. C. Leffingwell of New
York.
Harry A. Garfield, son of the re-
publican president, was made fuel ad-
minlstrator and Herbert Hoover, later
a candidate for president on a plat
form of unadulterated republicanism,
was nominated aa bead of the food
administration.
The council of national defense was
an organization of high importance been Inevitably choked. Now we
and one of tremendous Influence from believe that. Inasmuch as the impedl
a partisan standpoint, yet its execu- ments on the other ld. are being
:ive body was divided as follows: Re- largely removen. we can go ahead
publicans, Howard E. Coffin, Julius with the original programme and
Rosenwald, Dr. Hollis Godfrey, Dr. ad to It In proportion bs the British
Franklin Martin, Walter a. Glfford. Concluded ou 1'age J.)
director; democrats, Daniel Wlllax4
and Bernard M. Baruch; Independent,
Bamnel Gompers.
v W f6U f'
No sooner had the war begun than
th9 preliminary war work of th. pres-
1(Jent befran to Wp fru,t
WIthln a montn from declar.
tlon of war tradItlonai po!lcT of
tne natlon w revenBej the enact.
ment of th, Belectlv8 Berv,c8 ct A
vag(f machlnery of TgttKrAtion w
create(1 that ran vthout a hitch and
on June 5 more than 10,000,000 men
were registered quickly and effl-
ciRntiv
ThIrty.two encapments virtual
clUeSf 8lnce each ha(, tQ houso
nenern bulu , 90 dav8 from the
driving of th. first nail, complet. In
every municipal detail, a feat declared
impossible and which will stand for
. . . , ,
all time as a building miracle.
In June, scarcely two months after
the president's appearance before con-
BTTPMfl- riAnnral Prhlnv an f ... e
8np
In a notable speech, confidential In
character, the president on the 8th
A&y of April. 1918, addressed th. for-
eign correspondents at the Whit.
House concerning "our resolution."
and "actions in th. war." Th. speech
wan an follows:
"I am very glad to hav. this op
portunity to meet you. Some of you
I have met before, but not all. In
what I am going to say I would pre
fer that you take it In this way, as
for the private Information of your
minds and not for transmission to
anybody, tifoauiw I Just want. If I
may. In a few words to create a back
ground for you which may be serv
iceable to you. I speak In confidence.
rer.hln- Folly Trusted.
'I was rendered a little uneasy by
wait to train and co-ordinate the
larger units of our armies before
putting them into action. My In
stinctive Judgment in the face of that
proposition was that the American
people would feel a very much more
mnde such a thing necessary should
orcur to put the men In any units
"r in any numbers or In any way
that was necessary Just as he Is
doing. What I wanted you to know
was that that was not a new action,
that General Pershing was fully ln-
structed about that all along.
Then, similarly with regard to the
Impression that we are now going to
rush troops to Europe Of course,
you cannot rush any faster than there
is means of rushing, and what I have
said recently Is what I have said all
along: that we are getting men over
there Just as fast as we can get them
ready and as quickly as we can find
the ships to transport them. We are
doing that now and we have been do
ing It all along. Let me point out
some of the circumstances: Our first
programme was to send over 90,000
men a month, but for several months
we were sending over only 30,000,
one-third of the programme. Why?
Not because we didn't have the men
ready; not even because we didn't
have the means of transportation, but
because and there Is no criticism of
the French government Involved In
this because the ports assigned to
us for landing couldn't take care of
the supplies we had to send over. We
had to send materials and engineers,
and workmen, even, over to build the
docks and the piers that would be
adequate to handle the number of
men we sent over, because this was
happening:
Hard Advice researy.
"We began with the 90.000 pro
gramme and the result was that car-
T0 ships that we needed were lying
In those ports for several weeks to-
gather without being unloaded, as
there was no means of unloading
them. It was bad economy and bad
practice from every point of view to
have those ships lying there during
a period when they could have made
two or three voyages. There is still
this difficulty, which I am afraid
there Is no means of overcoming rap-
ldly, that the railroad communica
tion between those ports and the
front is Inadequate to handle very
large bodies of men. You may notice
that General Pershing recommended
that Christmas boxes should not be
sent to the men. That sounded like a
pretty hard piece of advice, but If you
could go to these ports nnd see thlse
Christmas boxes which are still thero
you would know why he didn't want
them sent. There was no means of
getting them to the front. Vast ac-
cumulations of these gifts were piled
up there with no means of storing
them adequately even.
"I Just wanted to create for you
this picture, that the channels have