The Sunday Oregonian. (Portland, Ore.) 1881-current, October 17, 1920, Magazine Section, Page 7, Image 101

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    TIIE SUNDAY OREGONTAN, PORTLAND, OCTOBER 17, 1920
Fr oiia -fche Diaries
of Jolm J.Lear$,Jt:
fa
Copjrrlrtit, 1920, John X Uur.)
CLASHES WITH THE KAISEIt.
IT Is not generally known that on
at least three -occasions twice
before the grreat war and once
since Colonel Roosevelt and the
kaiser clashed. The Venezuela Inci
dent is more or less widely known,
largely through Mr. Thayer's excel
lent book. But the clash or wills at
the time of Colonel Roosevelt's visit
to Berlin, and his refusal to take the
kaiser's part in 1914, are not at all
well known.
The colonel told of the clash in Ber
lin en route for Boston one Sunday
In 1916.
"It is," . said hev "not generally
known that I had a little friction
with the kaiser when I visited Ger
many. "When I reached Berlin I found an
Invitation for 'Mr. Roosevelt" to be
the kaiser's guest at Potsdam. Mrs.
Roosevelt was traveling with me. 1
asked at the embassy what the Invi
tation meant if it Included her.
.When I found it did not, I declined,
and said I was stopping at the em
bassy. "The Invitation was repeated. My
answer was that Mrs. Roosevelt and
X were to be the guests of the em
bassy. I was traveling as any Ameri
can gentleman might travel with his
wife and I did not propose to go any
place where she would not be wel
comed or could not go. The next day
Colonel and Mrs. Roosevelt' were in
vited. By maintaining my point I
had made it.
"While I was his guest. Wilhelm, a
delightful host, was very frank in
telling what he thought of other
Americans who had visited him An
. drew Carnegie and others. Later he
sent me photographs he had taken of
some of them with bits of his opin
ions of them written on the backs.
They were not opinions calculated to
please .the subjects of the pictures.
"I suppose he was advised that he
should not have done this, for the re
turn of the photographs was request
ed. I said, 'Oh, no, his majesty the
kaiser gave the photographs to me
and I propose to retain them." I sup
pose I was the one man in the empire
at the time who could refuse to obey
his wishes.
"Anyway, I kept the photographs.
They have been mounted on glass so
one can read the inscriptions.
"I clashed again with the .kaiser
directly the war broke out," the colo
nel went on.
"Then I was called upon by a young
member of the German embassy staff
in Washington a count I cannot re
call his name now.
" '1 am instructed by his majesty
the kaiser,' taid he, 'to present his
compliments to Colonel Roosevelt, to
say to him that he has very pleasant
recollections of his visit to Berlin and
Potsdam and to say that he hopes
Colonel Roosevelt will appreciate
Germany's position and can be relied
upon to see the Justice of it.'
" 'You will please present my com
pliments to his majesty the kaiser,' I
answered; "say to him that I, too,
have very pleasant recollections of
"my stay in Berlin and Potsdam, and
his many courtesies to me, his guest,
but that 1 also have a very lively
recollection of courtesies extended to
me by his majesty the king of Bel
gium, whose guest I also was."
"He clicked his heels together,
saluted and left. I have not heard
from him or the kaiser since.
"I imagine the kaiser also had recol
lections of the Venezuela matter. He
was convinced that I was bluffing
when he was told I would maintain
the Monroe Doctrine. Von Holleben,
then ambassador, told him so; so re
ported to the foreign office. I in
sisted on our rights, and finally told
the ambassador that Admiral Dewey
and his ships would be ordered to
sail for Venezuelan waters within 24
hours if in the meantime I did not
receive definite assurances that Ger
many had abandoned its intentions.
Dewey was then In West Indian
waters.
"Von Holleben then conclud
ed that I was not bluffing
and his cable reversing himself
caused a panic in the German
Xoreign office. Soon after this he
was recalled in disgrace. He was In
bo bad only one German official was
at the ship to see him off. On his re
turn to Germany he dropped out of
aight completely.
"The one man who sized me right
and who put Berlin on the right track
was Carl Buenz, then consul-general
in New Tork. He lived out Long
Island way and had visited me
Saeamora Hill. He was shrewd
enough to size up the situation ac
curately. He told the embassy it was
In error and warned it to beware,
that I was not bluffing.
"Lately, you will recall, Buenz has
been Indicted for plotting to put
bombs on English ships some of
those German war plots.
"Dewey at that time had lnstruc
tlons to be ready to move on a mo
ment's notice."
Subsequent to this conversation
Henry A. Wise-Wood, noting that the
accuracy of some of Colonel Roose
velt's published utterances on the
Venezula matter had been challenged.
wrote to Admiral Dewey. Dewey's
reply, published at the time, corrobo
rated fully all that the Colonel had
eaid about holding his ships in readi
ness for action.
"That, gentlemen," said the Colo
Bel. calling attention to the Dewey
letters, "is another of those instances
where proof of things you know to
be so comes to you when you need
It from unexpected quarters. It i
nassing strange how, somehow or
other, truth will out."
Once, later. Colonel Roosevelt men
tioned Carl Buenz. Buenz. who was
out on bail on the plot charges, was
old and. as it proved, hopelessly ill
He wished permission to return to
Germany' in the hope that he might
there get relief, or, failing that, die
in his old home. To get this per
mission he asked the Colonel's assist
ance. "I surely ehall do all that I can for
him," he said, "but I fear that all
won't be much. He is entitled to con
sideration, not because he plotted, as
I assume he did. but for the really
valuable service he did this country
as well as his own in the Venezula
natter. Whatever else he may have
aone, this should not.be forgotten.
I hope he gets what he asks,
hut I
am afraid he won't."
The Colonel's fears proved' true,
and Buenz, later convicted, died in
the federal penitentiary at Atlanta-
THAT GAR 1 -DINNER,
IT IS not known to many that, in
1915, Colonel Roosevelt threatened,
in the event that certain contingen
cies became facts, to support Presi
dent Wilson for re-election against
the republican nominee.
The threat was made at a luncheon
given at the Harvard club in De
cember of that year by the late Rob
ert J. Collier. Later, in explaining
the famous Gary dinner to me. Colo
nel Roosevelt repeated the threat.
The Gary dinner may well be de
scribed as the mystery of the 1916
campaign. Exactly what it meant
few knew then, and publicly it has
never been authoritatively explained.
The facts are that it was but an
Incident in the Colonel's campaign
for preparedness he attended it that
he might explain so that "big busi
ness men, who have not been my
friends, but who now know that I
ar-i right, might see the situation ex
actly as it is. and be in a position
to help."
There is," said he immediately
after dinner, "no politics In this. We
have come to a situation where all
Americans must stand together big
business men and little business men,
farmer and banker, artisan and long
shoreman. I have not cone tn the
big business men they have come
to me."
That the Gary dinner threw the
politicians into a flutter and sent
such "old guardsmen" as Boies Pen
rose and Murray Crane flying to New
Tork to find out what it was all
about, was entirely due to the fict
that Mrs. Harold Vivian, wife ofi a
political writer on the New Tcirk
World, had an engagement to attend
a concert on the night of the dinrer.
The next morning Vivian, in the
course of breakfast small talk, asied
how she enjoyed the entertainment.
"I did not go," said she. "You see
" (naming the young woman with
whom she was to have gone) "had
to sing at the big dinner Judge Gary
gave Colonel Roosevelt last night."
Vivian lost interest in the grape
fruit then and there. He kntw of
the Colonel's rule about attending
private dinners except In his own
home or in the homes of his Imme
diate friends, as well as the Colonel's
horror of large private dinners any
where. It appealed to him as l story,
and the next day the fact that there
had been such a dinner, together with
the names of the guests, was made I
public. What happened, whit was i
said at the dinner, was not. In con
sequence, political editors and . the
public jumped at the conclusion
that Colonel Roosevelt wis pre
paring to run for the presidency
again. For some days th-re was
considerable speculation as to what
It really meant, until Robert E. Mac
Alarney. then city editor of the New
York Tribune, suggested I lee Colo
nel Roosevelt and end the mystery.
My reception by the Col.nel was
characteristic
"I certainly will not give any In
terview on that dinner," he
"Neither will I authorize a
ment. I will, however, tell
what it means and what
declared.
y state-
K-ou just
lappened
there, and then, if you wish
you can
on your
explain in your own way an
own responsibility.
"It is absolutely nonsensical to as
sume, as some have assus
ed. that
this dinner had anything t
do with
my being a candidate for president.
I am not thinking of anythiag of that
sort now. . )
"All that was discussed at that
dinner was what you night, for
want of a better term, call "be great
er Americanism.' If that .ii politics,
then we talked politics.
"Now, let us sit down atd discuss
this thing, When I a.ui. Uroufb. you
can tell me what you think you want
to do. You can have all the facts;
you need all the facts to write of the
thing . Intelligently. But whatever
you write, it must be understood that
I must not be quoted and it must not
be' made to appear that I am the
source of Information."
"How was it," I asked, "that Judge"
Gary, whom I know to be interested
in, and an advocate of, preparedness,
happened to ask you to meet the peo
ple who were at that dinner?"
"It Is not my practice," said he, "to
cross-examine those who invite me
to dine as 'to their motives for eo
doing. But if I were to guess, I
would cay that one actuating motive
was a feeling of "I told you so.
"Gary, as you probably know, has
always been friendly to me. I do not
know that he voted for me in 1912.
but I would not be surprised to learn
that he did. All but two or three
of his guests that night were antl
Roosevelt men 18 months ago. They
were very much opposed to my work
for preparedness. The few that were
not anti-Roosevelt men were of the
opinion that I was committing po
litical hara-kiri. The others said I
was rocking the boat.
"Now they say that in preaching
preparedness, I was right and am
right. And I think that Mr. Gary
had In a way a' sort of desire to say
to his friends in important business:
" 'Come and have a look at this
fellow you thought eo terrible; no
tice that he does not shoot at the
musicians; that he eats in a normal
way and prefers his food cooked;
that when he talks he talks sanely
as you and I talk, and talks nothing
but the soundest kind .of American
ism." "That is only a guess, however. In
any event it could not have been the
big motive. Behind it all, I believe,
was a desire of these men all
Americans, men who have done
things and are doing big things, men
who have a stake in the country
to take counsel' together on the big
problem of national preparedness.
Under the circumstances, was it not
natural that I should be asked to at
tend and eubmit my views? I was
glad to go, glad that these men were
seeing the light. That's all there was
to that.
"What did I- tell them? Exactly
what I have been telling others for
months past, ever since the war in
Europe began, and what I propose
to tell everybody who will listen to
me the need of preparation.
"But with all of this talk about
the Gary dinner why is the luncheon
Bobby Collier gave at Harvard club
overlooked? There were politics there
ln Plenty- Mr. Collier, I suspect, also
had something of the 'I told you so'
idea in his head when he planned the
luncheon, for ln the movement 'for
preparedness he was In much the
same position as Judge Gary with
me, but lonesome so far as his every
day associates were concerned.
"All but one or two of the men he
had at the luncheon were anti-Roose
velt men three years ago. They were
anti-Roosevelt men when I began
talking preparedness IS months ago.
Then they said, as Judge Gary's
friends bad said. "Roosevelt is rock
ing the boat." Three-fourths of them
most of the party were writer:
agreed with me before they left.
"We did talk politics there the
straightest kind of politics. The po
litical discussion was Btarted by
Frank Simonds referring to an edi
torial in the New York Tribune call
ing attention to the way party lead
ers were dodging the real issue and
asKing, uo tney want Roosevelt?"
meaning, as you know, for president
in 1916. That editorial was strong
meat. It appealed to me immensely.
"In the discussion that followed, I
said that, much as I dislike Mr. Wil
son and despise his policies, in the
event of the republicans nominating
any man on a hyphen platform or on
hyphenated promises. I would sup
port President Wiison for re-election
with all. of the strength at my com
mand. "And, by Godfrey, I mean it! If
there's a mongrel platform adopted
by the republican convention, much
as I dislike Wilson, I'll stump the
country for him from' one end of it
to the other and I won't ask his per
mission to do so either. ...
"No platform and no man who
swerves in the slightest degree from
absolute loyalty to the greater Amer
icanism can have my support.
I will not be neutral if such a
candidate is named or such platform
adopted. There is no such thing as
being neutral between right and
wrong. Neutral! I do not care who
the man Is or who his friends are or
who comes to me in his behalf, if such
a candidate is named, I will fight him
with every weapon at my command.
"But at neither place did I say any
thing to advance either my own can
didacy or that of any other man. I
am not interested in candidates. I am
interested in principles. My sole in
terest at these two affairs was to try
and arouse the American people, to
urge them and ultimately, through
them, compel congress to take tie
proper attitude on the question of
greater Americanism and national
preparedness. If you say that I am
working not for a nomination, but as
every American should work to se
cure the peace and prosperity of the
United States, you will have hit the
nail on the head.
"And don't overlook the fact that
any republican who seeks President
Wilson's place by pandering to the
hyphens will find that he is fighting
Roosevelt as well as Wilson.
"1 dislike Wilson, I dislike his poli
cies almost to the point of hate, but
I am too good an American to stand
idly by and see him beaten by a
mongrel American or by one profess
ing mongrel principles."
THE COLONEL A D jrDGR
HUGHES. .
THROUGH the 1916 campaign Colonel
Roosevelt was careful, even with
his intimates, to say nothing that
would in any way reflect upon Judge
Hughes. Hughes was the candidate
of the party, he preferred him over
Mr. Wilson, but he was not the type
T. R. favored. More than that, in their
personal relations the Colonel felt
that Judge Hughes had not treated
him quite fairly. This was in con
nection with the Barnes libel suit in
which the Colonel had hoped Judge
Hughes would be one of his most im
portant witnesses.
Occasionally during the campaign
a scornful reference to the "bearded
lady" advised whoever - of the inner
circle was addressed that it was Mr.
Hughes who was in the Colonel's
mind. Such occasions' were rare, and
developed only, when the oolonel, who
with all his heart and soul prayed for
iepubllcan success, was piqued by the
lack of "pep" in the Hughes canvass
and the failure of the candidate to
take a definite position on Germany.
He was, moreover, thoroughly famil
iar with the innermost details of the
Hughes campaign, more so, some folks
thought, than the candidate himself.
These details came to him from many
and widely scattered sources. For
example, there was hardly a reporter
on the Hughes train or at the national
headquarters but that was cold
toward the candidate. The more sea
soned of them were of the T. R. "old
guard," as members of the "Roosevelt
newspaper cabinet," and as loyal to
the colonel as the bull pup he some
times referred to as a standard of
loyalty. These did not hesitate to
tell, the Colonel whenever 'they saw
him and they made It their business
to meet him whenever possible the
inside news of the trips.
"Feeling as you do," he remarked
to one of these, "you are going to find
it difficult to vote for Mr. Hughes.1
"Hughes, hell," replied William Hos
ter. the man addressed; "I desire to
save a 'fragment of my self-respect.'
After Hoster had gone, I remarked
that he seemed "to feel rather keenly
on the subject of Hughes.".
J "I am afraid,
said the Colonel
"that there are a great many likj
him. Hughes is not an attractive per
sonality at best. Close contact with
him does not make him more attrac
tive, for. he is a very, selfish, very
self-centered man. Those boys would
j like to be his frinds. but he won't
let them and his namby-pamby policy
or lack of real policy disgusts them.
"They have, as the boys would them
selves say, taken his measure,
"V1
1 i
9 s'V
, ,
"You know as well as I do that some
of the boys on that train and at
Bridgehampton (Hughes' summer
home) are among the shrewdest
judges of politics ln this country. They
see they must see mar.y things on
a trip any candidate will overlook,
however shrewd he is. They know
the psychology of crowds and fhe
newspapers and are valuable advisers
in a campaign. Does Mr. Hughes take
advantage of all this? No, he Just
withdraws Into his whiskers, and their
advice, when they manage to force
it upon him, is ignored.
"What these men hate is his cow
ardice his refusal to say anything,
however right, that might jeopardize
his chances. If he had consulted these
men and taken their advice he would
never have trafficked with Jerry
O'Leary."
With the verdict of the Chicago con
vention Colonel Roosevelt never
quarreled. He accepted it loyally
and whole - heartedly, though, it
should be said, with misgivings as to
the result, and prepared to efface
himself as much as possible, lest by
unduly remaining in the limelight he
Injure the candidate's chances. His
fear was that Hughes would not make
the right sort of a campaign.
"Hughes' danger," he then said, "is
that he will not carry the fight to
Wilson."
The declaration that Hughes would
have to fight to win was made Im
mediately after the convention and
before the public at large knew what
position he would take in the can
vass. He was not at all confident
of the result, not wholly satisfied
with Hughes as a candidate, but
never hesitated about suporting him.
When he made this declaration he
had prepared his letter declining the
progressive nomination and was
awaiting the meeting of the pro
gressive national committee in Chi
cago before making public his posi
tion. Judge Hughes knew this; so
did the leaders of the republican and
what was left of the progressive
party.
His own programme was definite.
It provided for such speeches for
Hughes as might be called for, but
otherwise none of the limelight for
him.
"The truth is." said he, "and a fel
low does not like to speak as I am
going to, I have done my share. Let
someone else carry the load for a
while.
"After tomorrow's meeting ln Chi
cago I hope to be let alone. The
committee will agree with me there
will be nothing more for me to Bay.
I have said it all In my letter. Mr.
Hughes has seen It and is satisfied.
There Is nothing more for me to do
or say.
"Don't you see that as things are
working out I took the only course
open? If Burton or Harding had been
named I would have to support the
nominee against Wilson. Imagine
Hughes at his very possible worst,
and he cannot do worse, than Wilson
has done or Is doing. It is impossible.
Any change is bound to be a good one.
Hughes will develop all right if he is
elected. I can do nothing but support
him. - ,
"Hughes won't come out here. I
don't believe he will. What will prob
ably happen is this: I will meet Mr.
Hughes ln town at dinner; 'speeches
will come later If they come at all-
Whatever I do depends on Mr. Hughes.
"I cannot make his fight for him
or tell him how to fight. He must
do his own battling, make his own
plans. His danger is that he will not
carry the fight to Wilson. If he does
that he is safe. But if he allows
Wilson to get the jump on him he Is
beaten. Wilson will do it with him if
he does not watch out. As matters
stand and if the election were held
tomorrow. Hughes Is beaten.
"Here is the cruelty of this nomi
nation of Hughes: For years he has
been out of touch with real things;
he knows nothing of the great things
the progressive party movement stood
for and did; he is out of touch with
1 f
1ST S
..-ai ".".'if.
Ifr-' A'fs;; ...
i'fc
5 .
1
"J -Ci? J
with national and world politics. He
is nominated at a time when we
needed an advocate not a judge.
"I cannot but support Hughes. You
see that as clearly as I- do. It is the
only thing for me to do because it is
the right thing f do."
A few days later, June 28, to be
exact,. Colonel, Roosevelt nrotored Into
New York to dine with Mr. Hughes
just as the colonel had said some days
before they probably would meet. The
two dined alone with, the colonel
told me, Mr. Hughes doing most of
the talking.
"It was," he told me the next day,
"not my night to talk. When I had
pledged him my support to the limit
there was little for me to say. As I
have said to you and to others, I can
not make his fight or plan it.
"I did tell him, though, that he'd
have to make an aggressive fight of
it, to keep Wilson on the jump every
blessed minute, and not to be any
more afraid of hurting the feelings
of pro-Germans, real Germans and
pacifists than he was of hurting the
feelings of race-track gamblers when
he was governor; that he must hit
and hit hard."
"Will he do it, colonel V I asked.
"I don't know." he replied. "A
term on the bench takes the punch
out of many men; it slows them up.
It may be that way with Hughes; I
don't know. But I do know that he
must fight to win."
At this talk he reiterated a hope,
expressed immediately after Mr.
Hughes was nominated, that the
newspapers allow him to drop out of
the limelight.
"There won't be a thing doing out
here." he said ("here" being Sagamore
Hill). "You see I have simply got to
stay out of the limelight. These
fools who want me to jump into the
middle of the campaign do not know
what they are talking about.
"It would lick Hughes sure.
"It could not help but make him
a tail of the Roosevelt kite. It would
not be fair to him or to me. You see
that. The most I can do Is to make
two or three prepared addresses.
"Furthermore, unless you boys (the
reporters) keep me to the rear, allow
me to go to the rear, you'll beat
Hughes sure as shooting make no
mistake about that."
In the Hughes campaign Colonel
Roosevelt made one trip as far west
as the Rockies, the original pro
gramme of going through California
being amended. This change in the
itinerary ln all probability cost Mr.
Hughes the election. Made by the
national committee, the colonel's in
timates believed the change was due
to a desire that nothing be done
which might help Hiram Johnson in
his campaign for the senate, or of
fend Harrison Gray Otis, W. W.
Crocker and other "old guardsmen"
who were opposed to him.
.. Even then, the trip came danger
ously close to ending at Denver,
where on his arrival the colonel found
a messenger awaiting to ask that he
confine future addresses to the tariff
and Mexico and let Germany and pre
paredness alone. At first the colonel
agreed to this. Then he wired the
national committee canceling all his
engagements east of Denver. This
the committee apparently dared not
do, for he was wired to proceed as he
wished.
From this trip the colonel returned
rather depressed and worried as t
the result. It was to have been his
i
i.,;, ,."- Vie .-" - J"
only trip, but in the last week of the
campaign the republican national
committee called on him to go to Ohip.
There had been many calls for him
from that quarter early in the con
test, but it was not until November 1
when he was started on an admitted
forlorn hope.
That night, speaking of the situa
tion, he declared the Wilson tide was
receding, but he doubted if it was re
ceding fast enough. .
"I doubt It," he said. "I have no
fears for New York, but I am afraid
of the west. If Hughes would only
do something! .
"Hughes lias aot made .WUsou
fight. As matters are, the people do
not know where Hughes does stand -
they look upon him as another Wil
son when they do not look upon him
as a man without a policy.-
"It Is his own fault. I tell you he
would have won even German votes
by preaching straight Americanism.
"The campaign has lacked definite
direction. It has been like Mr.
Hughes speeches it has lacked
the punch. It is a fact that a lot of
the aged reactionaries who have had
so much to say at headquarteps really
think this fight could have been wo
on the tariff." ,
Coming back east after speaking In
Toledo and Cleveland, he returned to
the subject, declaring that Ohio was
gone, that even "poor Herrick is beat
en with the rest a victim of the cow
ardice of others."
"Herrick" was Myron T. Herrick,
our ambassador to France in the early
days of the war, and a prime favorite
of the colonel; he was the candidate
for the United States senate.
"The 'Old Guard' here is not awake
yet," said he; "they have simply
thrown the state away.
"I have been asked tonight why I
did not come out earlier ln the cam
paign when they asked for me Instead
of going into the sagebrush. I told
them L went where I was sent: that
they should ask that question of the
national committee."
Sometime after the campaign was
ended, a visitor at Sagamore Hill re
marked: "Anyway, we haven't Hughes
to worry about."
"Exactly," said the colonel1; "we did,
not elect Hughes and we are not re
sponsible for Mr. Wilson.
"Hughes would have been another
Wilson in many respects, only he
would have surrounded himself with
men of a higher grade than Mr. Wil
son has about him. He could not well
get men Inferior to those about Mr. ,
Wilson. But he would have consid
ered his election an act of God, and,
in the Wilson way, been careless or
contemptuous of the opinions of
others."
Mr. Hughes came up for discussion
again at luncheon at Sagamore Hill
just before Christmas of that year.
The colonel" was, as usual, to play
Santa Claus at .he Cove school, and
the "newspaper cabinet" was down
for the occasion. In the luncheon
party, in addition to Colonel and Mrs.
Roosevelt, were N. A. Jennings, Mrs.
Jennings, William Hoster, Rodney
Bean, S. L. Bate, the then resident
correspondent at Oyster Bay, and my
self. As It was the first time since
election that so many members of the
"cabinet" had .met with the colonel,
there was much discussion of that
event, but more of the statement of
Secretary Lansing a few days previ
ous to the effecfthat "'we are on the
edge of war." followed by the secre
tary's explanation that he did not ex
actly mean what he seemed to say,
the whole matter complicated by ru
mors of "leaks" to Wall Street and
bad breaks in the market.
"The -antics of the last few days,"
said the colonel in this discussion,
"have restored to me what self-respect
I lost supporting Mr. Hughes."
Months later Colonel Roosevelt told
something of his relations with Judge
Hughes prior to 1916 that partly ex
plained the small opinion he held ot
him.
Hughes," said he, "went plumb back
on his words and on me when Barnes
sued me for libel. One of Barnes'
grievances was my charge of biparti
san management of the state of New
York by him and Murphy. Hughes
himself made that charge to me when
the direct primary fight was on.
Later, when I needed him, he denied
all knowledge of it.
"It came about in this way: In his
fight as governor for good govern
ment, Mr. Hughes complained that
Murphy and Barnes were working to
gether to defeat legislation; that
there was evidence of a definite agree
ment and the two machines were
working as one, not only in this, but
in other matters affecting the public
Interest.
"When the Barnes suit came up, I
wanted him as a witness. He declared
that he did not recall the conversa
tion and that he had no recollection
that such a state of affairs had ex
isted. Even when he was shown a
printed statement coming from him,
he had no recollection of the matter.
That is the way Mr. Hughes stands up.
"It was his idea in this campaign
to keep away as much as possible
from all reference to the war in Eu
rope or preparation for our inevitable
part in it. He wanted to make his
fight on war with Mexico, as though
people could be interested in that. The
real subject he dodged whenever he
could. More than that, he tried to
make me dodge it.
"To do this Garfield was sent to
meet me ln Denver and ask that in
my speeches, especially In Chicago,
I omit preparedness and national de
fense. It was feared that I would
alienate the women voters. I agreed
to do so, but after sleeping on the
matter, decided it was not the thing
for me to do. So I wired national
headquarters canceling all of my en
gagements. The answer to this was
advice to proceed as I had been, talk
ing what was in me.
"Results ln Chicago proved that was
the correct course. The honest course
always is. At the stockyards, I had
a most wonderful meeting and the
women were the most enthusiastic
of the lot- The idea of American
manhood, willing and insistent on de
fending its women and .children even
to the point of going to war to avenge
.1 . ,.,,i.Ja,. uraa nnt- at oil i KK...
rent to them. On the contrary, they
took no offense at my treatment of
the Lusitania affair.
"That was Mr. Hughes's work his
idea of the way a candidate should go.
the way the advocates of a candidate
should go, always dodging any real
issue that might cost votes."
Again, ln the Mitchel campaign.
Colonel Roosevelt expressed an .opin
ion of Judge Hughes. It was at a
meeting in Madison Square garden
over which the judge presided. To
make it a go, every device of the po
litical showman was resorted to. Even
the old-fashioned torchlight parade.
ed. Colonl Roosevelt, who had been
speaking in Schuetzen park, Astoria,
came in late. I met him in the Twenty-seventh
street entrance to the hall.
"How's the meeting going?" be
asked, sotto voce.
"It's cold, freezing cold, colonel," I
answered. "You'll need your over
coat." The colonel grinned.
"Hughes." he "replied, "must have
brought his Ice with him."
1