

"The Demoness of the Tennis Courts"

How the Agile Contortions of a Demure Little School Girl Have Been Astounding the European Experts Who Predict Championship Honors and an American Tour. Youthful Expert Wins New Laurels in Every Match in Which She Contends.



Elizabeth Colyer, the 17 Year Old "Demoness" in Repose

BY JEAN SEIVWRIGHT.

ENGLAND has just discovered a new tennis prodigy—a demure, bashful, unassuming schoolgirl of 17 summers. Her name is Elizabeth Colyer, but her school chums call her "Shyboots." Tennis experts, after watching her play, bestowed still another name on her. They christened her "The Demoness of the Tennis Courts."

After her recent remarkable hitting streak at Hurlingham they began preparations for an American tour for this newest English marvel with the intention of matching her against some of the best tennis players in this country. In case the arrangements for the tour are carried out as originally planned some of us may have an opportunity to see how a sedate little English schoolgirl earned the title "Demoness" by her extraordinary leaps and contortions and frantic mid-air plays which are declared to be very much of an innovation to the game of tennis as played in England.

She began by beating Miss Evers, the English champion on the hard courts. Tennis critics immediately sat up and took notice. "Wild speculation ran rife about this wizard of the racquet. Was this the look-alike champion that would vanquish Miss Lenglen? Could she beat that triumphed over the English at their own game?"

Playing at "Demon" Speed.

Discussion was still going strong when the 17-year-old girl gained new laurels. She won a set from Mrs. Wightman at the Hurlingham courts. After the first set, however, her luck

seemed to desert her and Mrs. Wightman again scored.

But her marvelous playing set all England a-talking. Will she really develop into a tennis champion? That's the question that's agitating all tennis enthusiasts. They are wildly excited. And Miss Colyer? Well, she has a charming personality and the twinkle in her smiling blue eyes invites all sorts of speculation about her play. Is she treating it all as a joke or is she going to be a really big player one of these days? Chances at the present are uncertain.

Her speed is demoniacal as she leaps fully three feet high to meet a ball. Agile as a young fawn, she twists, turns, dodges, darts forward—but her racquet always strikes the ball. Overhand, underhand she serves or returns with equal skill, and so swiftly that her wrists seem to be made of elastic.

But despite this dazzling play, she has not yet acquired the cleverly-calculated strokes of Molla Bjurstedt, whose mental play is as fascinating as her physical prowess. When this player hits a ball you know she'll send it to the very point where her opponent least expects it.

Not so Elizabeth Colyer, according to some experts who have watched and studied her playing. Quick action minus calculating thought is her forte, but the Germans doubtless believe that this demonstration of their ability to operate on the American coast would serve as a warning to the American people.

What They Would Have Meant.

We were never at all deceived as to what would be the purpose of such a visit after our entrance into the war. In the early part of 1917 the allies believed that the German U-boats might assault our coast, and I so informed the navy department at Washington. My cables and letters of 1917 explained fully the reasons why Germany might indulge in such a gesture. Strategically, as these dispatches make clear, such attacks would have no great military value. To have sent a sufficient number of submarines to do any considerable damage on the American coast would have been a great mistake. Germany's one chance of winning the war with the submarine weapon was to destroy shipping to such an extent that the communications of the allies with the outside world, and especially with the United States, would be cut. The only places where the submarine warfare could be conducted with some chance of success were the ocean passage routes which lead to European ports, especially in that area south and southeast of Ireland, in which were focused the trade routes for ships sailing from all parts of the world and destined for British and French ports. With the number of submarines available the Germans could keep enough of their U-boats at work in these areas to destroy a large number of merchant ships. Germany thus needed to concentrate all of her available submarines at these points; she had an inadequate number for her purposes; to send any considerable force 3000 miles across the Atlantic would simply weaken her efforts in the real scene of warfare and would make her submarine campaign a failure. The



Photos by Mrs. M. Stoville. Suzanne Lenglen, the French Tennis Champion, Who is Ready to Meet the "Demoness"

The "Demoness" in Action

But in spite of her somewhat erratic play which makes the critics hesitate as to whether they'll christen her the "new champion" or merely a "freak," they are already looking up her school-day triumphs. On one thing they are all agreed, however, and that is that she possesses a delightful personality. Her blue eyes have a look of boyish frankness, while many of her little mannerisms suggest a childhood spent with her brothers. But little sister, always


a good pal in all their sports, has outstripped them all in the game of tennis.

She preferred the world a-field to the world of books. A skilled swimmer and oarswoman, she revels in all outdoor sports. And to their practice from babyhood she owes her marvelous physique.

While her father delighted in the study of dead languages and preferred at all times the bypaths of the scholar, her mother believed in

all kinds of outdoor activities. The laws of the Romans and the literature of Greece did not greatly appeal to her, although she decided when eight years old that Diana, the Goddess of the Chase, was the only one who interested her.

Still at school when the war broke, she found other means to keep herself fit when sports had necessarily to be neglected. During her summer vacations she worked in the fields. Her manner of pitching hay was characteristic and the speed with which she could load a wagon amazed her companions. With the world's re-



Half Her Plays Seem to Be Made When Her Feet are off the Ground.



She Covers the Court in the Most Astounding Leaps and Bounds

turn to normal ways her enthusiasm for tennis revived and her attainments at Hurlingham have now brought her before the world.

The Clothes of a "Demoness."

Of course the "Demoness" has some decided opinions, especially in the matter of clothes. She gives the Greeks credit for good judgment about their attire when they played in the Olympic games. So she has adopted a style that is decidedly individual yet extremely practical. Her loose white dress—somewhat like a modified toga—extends to the knees; for she will not permit anything to interfere with her speed. And garbed in this manner she knows that there's no possibility of tripping on her skirt as she bends or leaps forward to hit a ball. She dispenses entirely with corsets—in fact she has never worn them. Her muscles are so rigidly developed that she needs no artificial support.

When asked if she had any fads in regard to diet she smiled one of her disarming smiles, for while she is not a beauty yet her smile and the ex-

pression of her face are full of charm.

"Oh, dear," she said, "I'm no authority on foods. I haven't studied calories and I don't know how many I should eat or for that matter what any one should eat. I always eat what I need and being out-of-doors so much I always have a splendid appetite."

And that was all she could say about food except that she had always been brought up on simple, wholesome fare.

Regarding the hours she spends in practice; that also evoked a smile.

"Why, I never count them. When you're doing something you're crazy about you just go on whenever you have the chance. Of course some people may have to have certain laws and hours and regulations but I don't think I come of a very systematic family. I'm only a perfectly natural person and never having been interviewed before don't know whether I'm saying what I should or not."

With this exception the spectacular "Demoness" and the old reliable Kingscote, England seems to have very little tennis talent on display just at the present time. In fact, the British were reported to be very much in the doldrums regarding the tennis outlook a few weeks ago when they were called on to meet another American lawn tennis invasion and another Davis cup competition with a lot of veterans whose years of effectiveness were over years ago.

Of all the British tennis players only Kingscote was considered worthy of being regarded as a serious contender in the cup contests. Miss Colyer's game, while spectacular and particularly vicious in the forehand to wear down a less strenuous opponent, was finally adjudged of scarcely championship caliber. Still the "Demoness" in action is worth going miles to see. If only to study her remarkable antics while making almost impossible shots.

A close rival of Miss Colyer, Zeno Schmitzu, the Japanese tennis player, proved the sensation of the world hard court tennis tournament recently held in Paris. Schmitzu holds the championship of Japan and India.

THE VICTORY AT SEA

BY ADMIRAL WILLIAM SOWDEN SINS.

IT WAS in the summer of 1918 that the Germans made their only attempt at what might be called an offensive against their American enemies. Between the beginning of May and the end of October, 1918, five German submarines crossed the Atlantic and torpedoed a few ships on our coast. That submarines could make this long journey had long been known. Singularly enough, however, the impression still prevails in this country that the German U-boats were the first to accomplish the feat. In the early fall of 1916 the U-53, commanded by that submarine officer, Hans Rose, who has been previously mentioned in these articles, crossed the Atlantic, dropped in for a call at Newport, R. I., and on the way back sank a few merchant vessels off Nantucket. A few months previously the so-called merchant submarine Deutschland had made its trip to Newport News. The German press, and even some pro-German sympathizers in this country hailed these achievements as marking a glorious page in the record of the German navy. Doubtless the real purpose was to show the American people how easily these destructive vessels could cross the Atlantic; and to impress upon their minds the fate which awaited them in case they maintained their rights against the Prussian bully. As a matter of fact, it had been proved long before the Deutschland or the U-53 had made their voyages that submarines could cross the Atlantic. In 1915 not one, but ten, submarines had gone from North America to Europe under their own power. Admiral Sir John Fisher tells about this expedition in his recently published memoirs. In 1914 the British admiralty had contracted for submarines with Charles M. Schwab, president of the Bethlehem Steel company. As international law prohibited the construction of war vessels by a neutral in wartime for the use of a belligerent with which it was at peace, the parts of ten submarines were sent to Canada, where they were put together. These submarines then crossed the Atlantic under their own power and were sent from British ports to the

Dardanelles, where they succeeded in driving Turkish and German shipping out of the Sea of Marmora. Thus a crossing of the Atlantic by American submarines had been accomplished before the Germans made their voyages. It was therefore not necessary for the two German submarines to cross the Atlantic to prove that the thing could be done, but the Germans doubtless believed that this demonstration of their ability to operate on the American coast would serve as a warning to the American people.

What They Would Have Meant.

We were never at all deceived as to what would be the purpose of such a visit after our entrance into the war. In the early part of 1917 the allies believed that the German U-boats might assault our coast, and I so informed the navy department at Washington. My cables and letters of 1917 explained fully the reasons why Germany might indulge in such a gesture. Strategically, as these dispatches make clear, such attacks would have no great military value. To have sent a sufficient number of submarines to do any considerable damage on the American coast would have been a great mistake. Germany's one chance of winning the war with the submarine weapon was to destroy shipping to such an extent that the communications of the allies with the outside world, and especially with the United States, would be cut. The only places where the submarine warfare could be conducted with some chance of success were the ocean passage routes which lead to European ports, especially in that area south and southeast of Ireland, in which were focused the trade routes for ships sailing from all parts of the world and destined for British and French ports. With the number of submarines available the Germans could keep enough of their U-boats at work in these areas to destroy a large number of merchant ships. Germany thus needed to concentrate all of her available submarines at these points; she had an inadequate number for her purposes; to send any considerable force 3000 miles across the Atlantic would simply weaken her efforts in the real scene of warfare and would make her submarine campaign a failure. The



ON THE LAUNCHING DECK. The mines moved on little railroad tracks toward the stern, whence they dropped, at about ten-second intervals, into the water. Each mine-laying ship carried about 500 on an average.

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writer has pointed out, they might seize a deserted island off the coast of Maine or in the Caribbean, and cache there a reservoir of fuel and food; unless, however, they could also create at these places adequate facilities for repairing submarines or supplying them with torpedoes and ammunition, such a place would not serve the purpose of a base at all. Comparatively few of the German submarines could have made the cruise to the American coast and operate successfully there so far away from their bases for any considerable time.

Anything resembling an attacking force on American harbors was therefore improbable. Yet it seemed from the first that the Germans would send an occasional submarine into our waters, as a measure of propaganda rather than for the direct military result that would be achieved. American destroyers and other vessels were essential to the success of the whole anti-submarine campaign of the allies. The sooner they could all be sent into the critical European waters the sooner the German scheme of terrorism would end. If these destroyers, or any considerable part of them, could be kept indefinitely in American waters, the Germans might win the

GERMAN U-BOATS IN AMERICAN WATERS

war. Any maneuver which would have as its result the keeping of these American vessels, so indispensable to the allies, out of the field of active warfare would thus be more than justified and, indeed, would indicate the highest wisdom on the part of the German navy. The Napoleonic principle of dividing your enemy's forces is just as valuable in naval as in land warfare. For many years Admiral Mahan had been instructing American naval officers that the first rule in warfare is not to divide your fighting forces, but always to keep them together, so as to bring the whole weight at a given moment against your adversary. Two of the fundamental principles of the science of warfare, on land and sea alike, are contained in the maxims: Keep your own forces concentrated, and always endeavor to divide those of the enemy. Undoubtedly the best method which Germany could use to keep our destroyers in our own waters was to make the American people believe that their lives and property were in danger; they might accomplish this by sending a submarine to attack our shipping off New York and Boston and other Atlantic seaports, and possibly even to bombard our harbors. The Germans doubtless believed that they might create such alarm and arouse such public clamor in the United States that our destroyers and other anti-submarine craft would be kept over here by the navy department, in response to the popular agitation to protect our own coast. This is the reason why American headquarters in London, and the allied admiralties, expected such a visitation. The Germans obviously endeavored to create the impression that such an attack was likely to occur at any time. This was part of their war propaganda. The press was full of reports that such attacks were about to be made. German agents were continually circulating these reports.

Raid for Moral Effect.

Of course it was clear from the first to the heads of the allied navies, and to all naval authorities who were informed as to the actual conditions, that these attacks by German submarines on the American coast would

only be in the nature of raids for moral effect. It was also quite clear from the first, as I pointed out in my dispatches to the navy department, that the best place to defend our coast would indicate the critical submarine areas in the eastern Atlantic, through which the submarines had to pass in setting out for our coast, and in which alone they could have any hope of succeeding in the military object of the submarine campaign. It was not necessary to keep our destroyers in American waters, patrolling the vast expanse of our 3000 miles of coastline, in a futile effort to find and destroy such enemy submarines as might attack the American coast. So long as these attacks were only sporadic and carried out by the type of submarine which used its guns almost exclusively in sinking ships, and which selected for its victims unarmed and unprotected ships, destroyers and other anti-submarine craft would be of no possible use on the Atlantic coast. The submarine could see these craft from a much greater distance than it could itself be seen by them; and by diving and sailing submerged it could easily avoid them and sink its victims without ever being sighted or attacked by our own patrols, however numerous they might have been. Even in the narrow waters of the English channel, up to the very end of the war, submarines were successfully attacking small merchant craft by gunfire, although the density of patrol craft in this area was naturally a thousand times greater than we could ever have provided for the vast expanse of our own coast. Consequently, so long as the submarine attacks on the American coast were only sporadic, it was absolutely futile to maintain patrol craft in those waters, as this could not provide any adequate defense against such scattered demonstrations. If, on the other hand, the Germans had ever decided to commit the military mistake of concentrating a considerable number of submarines off our Atlantic ports, we could always have countered such a step by sending back from the war zone an adequate number of craft to protect convoys in and out of the Atlantic ports, in the same manner that

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