THE SUNDAY OBEGONIAN, PORTLAND. JUNE 13, 1920
HE
1 i
By Admiral William Sowden Sims f
3
Difficulties of. Mine-Laying in North Sea
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Rear-Admlnl Straass (fourth officer from the right), in charge of the
at headquarters in Inverness.
WAS there no more satisfactory
way of destroying submarines
than by pursuing them with
destroyers, sloops, chasers and other
craft in the open seas? It is hardly
surprising that our methods im
pressed certain of our critics as ted
ious and ill-conceived, and that a
mere glance at a small map of the
North Sea suggested a Tar more reas
onable solution of the problem. The
bases from which the German sub
marines found their way to the great
centers of shipping were Ostend and
iJeebrugge on the Belgian coast, Wil
hcmshaven and Cuxhaven on the Ger
man coast, and the harbor of Kiel in
the Baltic sea. From all these points
the voyage to the waters that lay (
west and south of Ireland was a long
and difficult one; in order to reach
these hunting grounds, the German
craft had either to pass through the
Straits of Dover to the south, or
through the wide passage way to the
North eea that stretched between the
Shetland islands end Norway, and
thence sail around the northern coast
of Ireland. We necessarily had little
success in attempting to Interfere
with the U-boata while they were
making these lengthy open-sea
voyages, but concentrated our ef
forts on trying to oppose them efter
they had reached the critical areas.
But a casual glance at the map con
vinced many people that our pro
cedure was a mistake. And most
newspaper readers in these days
were eiven much attention to this
map. Many periodicals published in
Great Britain and the United States
were fond of exhibiting to their read
ers diagrams of the North sea; these
diagrams contained one heavy black
bur drawn across the Straits of Dover
and another drawn across the north
ern passage from Scotland to Norway.
The accompanying printed matter in
formed the public that these pictures
illustrated the one effective "answer"
to the submarine. The black bars of
printers' ink represented barrages of
mines and nets, which, if they were
once laid between the indicated spots
would blow to pieces any submarine
which attempted to force a way
across. Not a single German U-boat
could therefore succeed in getting out
of the North sea. All the trans-Atlan-tcl
ships which contained the food
supplies and war materials so essen
Hal to allied success, would thus be
able to land on the west coast of
England and Frarice; the submarine
menace would automatically disap
pear and the war on the eea would
be won. Unfortunately, it was not
only the pictorial artists employed
on newspapers and magazines who
insisted that this was the royal road
to success. Plenty of naval men. In
the United States and in Europe, were
constantly making the contention,
and statesmen in our own country
and in allied countries were similarly
iascinatea oy mis programme.
When I arrived in London, in April,
1917, the great plan of confining the
submarines to their bases was every
where a lively topic of discussion.
There was not a London club in which
the admiralty was not denounced for
its stupidity in not adopting such
perfectly obvious plan. The way to
destroy a swarm of hornets such
was the favorite simile was to an
nihllate them in their nests, and not
to hunt and attack them, one by
one. after they had escaped into the
open. What the situation needed
was not a long and wearisome cam
paign. Involving unlimited new con
struction, to offset the increasing
losses of life and shipping, and al
together too probable defeat in the
end, but a swift and terrible blow,
which would end the submarine men
ace overnight.
Dig Them Out.
The naval officers who expressed
fears that, under the shipping condi-
tions prevailing in 1917, such a bril
liant performance could not possibly
be carried out in time to avoid defeat,
merely gained a reputation for timid
ity and lack of resourcefulness. When
the first lord of the admiralty, Win
ston Chruchlll. in 1915, declared that
the British fleet would "dig the Ger
mans out of their holes like rats," his
remarks did not greatly impress naval
strategists, but they certainly sound
ed a note which was popular in Eng
land. One fact, not generally known at
that time, demonstrated the futility
of the whole idea. Most newspaper
critics assumed that the barrage from
Dover to Calais was keeping the sub
marines out of the channel. That the
destroyers, aircraft and other patrols
were safely escorting troopships and
other vessels across the channel was
a fact of which the British public
was justly proud. Tet is did not
necessarily follow that the subma
rines could not use the channel as a
passage way from their German bases
to their operating areas in the focus
of allied shipping routes. The mines
and nets in the channel, of which
so much was printed in the first
three years of the war, did not offer
an effective barrier to the subma
rines. This was due to various rea
sons .too complicated for description
in an article of this brief nature.
The unusually strong tides and
rough weather experienced in the
vicinity of the Straits of Dover are
well known. As one British officer
expressed it at the time, "our experi
ence in attempting to close the straits
has involved both blood and tears"
blood because of the men who were
lost in laying the mines and nets,
and tears because the arduous work
of weeks would be swept away in a
storm of a single night. In addi
tion, at this stage of the war, the
British were still experimenting with
mines; they had discovered gradually
that the design which they had used
up to that time the same design
which was used in the American navy
had been defective. But the process
of developing new mines in war time
bad proved slow and difficult; and the
demands of the army on the munition
factories had prevented the admiralty
from obtaining a sufficient number.
The work of the Dover patrols was a
glorious one, as will appear when all
of the facts come to public knowl
edge. But in 1917 this patrol was not
preventing the U-boats from slipping
through the channel. The straits of
Dover, at the point where this so-1
called barrage was supposed to have
existed, is about 20 miles wide. The
passage way between Scotland, and
Norway is 250 miles wide. The water
in the channel has an average depth
of a few fathoms; in the northern ex
panse of the North sea it reaches an
average depth of 600 feet. Mining in
such deep waters had never been un
dertaken or even considered before by
any nation. The English channel is
celebrated for its strong tides and
stormy weather, but ifr is not the scene
of the tempestuous gales which rage
so frequently in the winter months in
these northern waters. If the British
navy had not succeeded in construct
ing an effective mine barrier across
the English channel, what was the
likelihood that success would crown
an effort to build a much greater ob
struction in the far more difficult
waters to the northT
Barrage Most Be Protected.
The point which few understood at
that time was the mere building of
the barrage would not in itself pre
vent the escape of submarines from
the North sea. Besides building such
a barrage, it would be necessary to
protect it with surface vessels. Other
wise German mine sweepers could
visit the scene and sweep up enough
of the obstruction to make a hold
through which their submarines could
pass. It is evident that, in a barrage
extending 250 miles, it would not be
difficult to find some place in which
to conduct such sweeping operations,
it is also clear that it would take a
considerable number of patrolling ves
sels to watch such an extensive bar
rier and to interfere with such op
erations. Moreover. we could not send
our mine layers into the North sea
without destroyer escort; that is, it
would be necessary to detach a con
siderable part of our forces to protect
these ships while they were laying
their mipes. Thole responsible for
aaU-BUbniirine operations btiifived
mlur - lijlns forces, Tilth his staff,
that, in the spring and summer of
1917, it would have been unwise to de
tach these anti-submarine vessels
from the areas in which they were
performing such indispensable service.
The overwhelming fact was that
we needed all the surface craft we
could assemble for the convoy sys
tem. The destroyers which we had
available for this purpose were en
tirely inadequate; to have diverted
any of them for other duties would
at that time have meant destruction
to the allied cause. The object of .
placing the barrage so far north was the Germans from sending their sub
to increase the enemy's difficulty in ( marines to sea. The enemy sweepers
KOSSAK PROMINENT AMONG MODERN PAINTERS
OF HORSES, SOLDIERS AND BATTLE SCENES
Patriotic Pole, Once Court Painter to Kaiser, Quits in Huff When Monarch in Speech to Troops Declares in
. . Favor of War on Poland.
BT ROBERT T. BARRT.
Amoku tne moaern painters of
horses, soldiers and battle
scenes who, like Melssonier.
have a real message for the world, i
one of the most outstanding is
Wojciech Albert) Koesak, the best-
known of the painters of the new
born republic of Poland.
He was court painter to Kaiser
Wilhelm In 1901, when, at the castle
of Marienburg, on the shores of the
Vistula, the then all-powerful war
lord addressed a gathering of Ger
man officers as follows:,
"I call upon you all, Knights of the
Black Cross, to join hands in the
holy war against Polish arrogance
and impertinence."
This was too much for the patriotic
Pole and he forthwith quit his job
an unusual and perhaps unique thing
for an artist to do, as the position
was highly lucrative no less than
"easy," and .he had held it for eight
years.
Fourteen years later, in the fall
of 1915, the painter and his former
patron met again. This time it was
in Cracow. Kossak then was a cap
tain in an Austrian cavalry regiment,
serving under the flag of the Haps
burgs, as did most of the men ' of
what was then Austrian Poland, and
encouraged, like all Poles, with the
glittering promises of independence
for Poland held out by the central
empires an independence to be
granted after the war was comfort
ably won.
"Well, that's the Kossak," cried
the kaiser, spying his former painter
in a crowd of officers in the great
central square of Cracow, before
Rynck. the old cloth-hall. Riding
over, Wilhelm reined in his horse and
for a tail minute looked, down at him
in silence. .
"Yes. yes," he said, finally, speak
log slowly. "Almost 14 years have
passed. . . . Never mind."
His face brightened and with a
shrug of his shoulders and a gesture
he added:
"All that doesn't matter now. It
is enough that we are privileged to
live in such glorjous hours as these.
. . . Just think, our armies are ad
vancing on all fronts." .
It was the day after the breaking
of tne .Russians at urodno.
Then Wilhelm, by now smlliasjsak. So, a few days later, he aeked
Mines ready for the North Sea barrage. This mine field, extending from the Shetland Inlands to Norway,
was the greatest undertaking; of Its kind In the history of warfare. It was made possible by the manu
facture of a new type of mine the work; of American Inventors.
attempting to sweep a passage
through it and facilitate its defense
by our forces. The impossibility of
defending a mine barrier placed too
far south was shown by experience
in that area of the North sea which
was known as the "wet triangle."
By April, 1917. the British had laid
more than 30,000 mines in the Bight
6t Heligoland, and were then in
creasing these obstructions at the
rate of 3000 mines a month. Tet this
vast exdosive field did not nrevent
broadly, leaned from his saddle and
spoke confidentially, almost in a
whisper:
"The map of Europe shall be quite
changed," he declared. "The map of
Poland, also . . . But your coun
trymen must be reasonable."
"That prediction came true, but not
Just as Wilhelm expected,"' said Kos
sak with a grin, as he retold the con
versation. "Certainly the map of
Poland has been changed."
That reference to the necessity of
Poles being reasonable puzzled Kos
rV? fWl iff:
WiM If LIU
, Or
were dragging out channels through
the mine fields almost as rapidly as
the British were putting them down;
we could not prevent this, because
protecting vessels could not remain
so near the German bases without
losses from submarine attacks. More
over, the Germans also laid mines in
the same area in order to trap the
British minelayers; and these opera
tions resulted in very considerable
losses on each side.
These impediments made the egress
of a submarine a difficult and nerve
racking process; it sometimes re
quired two or three days and the
General Mackensen, whom he knew,
what was meant.
"Yes, yes. I know 'all about that,"
Mackensen replied at once.
-"I'll tell you: We feel that yon
Poles may ask for Posen, and. of
course, that would be too much."
That also came true. The Poles
did ask for Posen. Rather, they de
manded it, and got it, too. Today
it -is a part of the reborn republic
of the Vistula. Posen. it will be re
membered, was the portion of the
ancient kingdom which was held by
Germany since he partitions of 1773
snuffed tiut the independence of
Poland.
assistance of a dozen or so surface
vessels to get a few submarines
through the Heligoland Bight into
open waters, several were unques
tionably destroyed in the operation,
yet the activity of submarines in the
Atlantic showed that these mine
fields had by no means succeeded
in proving more than a harassing
measure. It was estimated that the
North sea barrage would require
about 400,000 mines, far more than
existed in the world at that time.
and far more than all our manufac
turing resources could then produce
within a reasonable period.
I have already made the point, and
I cannot make it too frequently, that
time is often the essential element
in war and in this case it was of
vital importance. Whether a pro
gramme is a wise one or not depends
not only upon the feasibility of the
plan itself, but upon the time and
the circumstances in which it is pro
posed. In the spring of 1917 the
situation which we were facing was
that the German submarines were de
itroying allied shipping at the rate
of nearly 800,000 tons a month. The
one things-which was certain was
that, if this destruction should con
tinue for four or five months, the
allies would be obliged to surrender
unconditionally. The pressing prob
lem was to find methods that would
check these depredations and that
would check them in time. The con
voy system was the one naval plan
the point cannot be made too em
pbatically which in April and May
of 1917 held forth the certainty of
Immediately accomplishing this re
sult. Other methods of opposing the
submarines were developed which
magnificently supplemented the con
voy; but the convoy, at least in the
spring and summer of 1917, was the
one sure method of salvation for the
allied cause. To have started the
North sea barrage in the spring and
summer of 1917 would have meant
abandoning the convoy system; th"s
would have been sheer madness.
It Couldn't Be Done.
Thus in 1917 the North sea barrage
was not a ready answer to the popu
lar proposal "to seal the rats up in
their hole." We did not have a mine
which could be laid in such deep wa
ters in sufficient numbers to have
formed any barrier at all; and even
if we had possessed one, the con
struction of the barrage would have
demanded such an enormous number
that they could not have been manu
factured in time to finish the bar
rage until late in the year 1915
Presently, the situation began to
change. The principal fact which
made possible this great enterprise
was the invention of an entirely new
type of mine. The old mine consisted
of a huge steel globe, filled with high
explosive, which could be fired oaly
by eontaet. That is. it was necessary
for tho surface of a ship, such as
submarine, to strike against the sur
face of the mine, to start the mech
anism which ignited the explosive
charge.
The mere fact that this immediate
contact was essential enormously in
creased the difficulty of successfully
mining waters that range in depth
from 400 "to 900 feet. If the mines
were laid anywhere near the surface,
the submarine, merely by diving be
neath them, could avoid all danger
if they were laid any considerable
depth, it could sail - with complete
safety above them. Thus, if such
mine were to be used at all, we
should have had to plant several
layers, one under the other, down to
a depth of about 350 feet, so that
the submarine, at whatever depth it
might be sailing, would be likely to
strike one of these obstructions. This
demanded such an enormous number
of mines as to render the whole pro
ject impossible.
The Browne Mine.
We Americans may take pride in
the fact that it was an American who
Invented an entirely new type of
mine, and therefore solved this dif
ficulty. In the summer of 191T. Mo,
Ralph C. Browns, an electrical en
gineer of Salem, Mass., offered a
submarine gun for the consideration
of Commander S. P. Kullerwlnder, XT.
S. N, who was then in chcrge of the
mining section of the bureau of ord"
nance. As a submarine gun this in
vention did not seem to offer rnsny
chances of success, but Commander
Fullerwinder realized that it com
prised a firing device of excellent
promise. The bureau of ordnance, as
sisted by Mr. Browne, spent the sum
mer and fall experimenting with this
contrivance and perfecting it; the
English mining officers who had been
sent to America to co-operate with
our navy expressed great enthusi
asm over it; and some time about
the beginning of August the bureau
of ordnance came to the conclusion
that it was a demonstrated success.
The details of Mr. Browne's invention
are too Intricate for description in
this place, but its main point Is com
prehensible enough. Its great ad
vantage was that It was not neces
sary for the submarine to strike the
mine in order to produce the desired
explosion. The mine could be located
at any depth and from it a long "an
tenna," a thin copper cable reached
up to within a few feet of the sur
face, where It was supported in that
position by a small metal buoy. Any
metallic substance, such as the hull
of a submarine, simply by striking
this antenna at any point, would pro
duce an electric current, which, in
stantaneously transmitted to the
mine, would cause this mine to ex
plode. The great advantage of this
device is at once apparent. Only
about one-fourth the number required
under the old conditions would now
be necessary. The mining section es
timated that 100,000 mines would
form a barrier that would be ex
tremely dangerous to submarines
passing over it or through it. where
as, under the old conditions, about
400,000 would have been required.
This implies more than a mere sav
ing in manufacturing resources; it
meant that we should need a propor
tionately smaller number of mine
laying ships, crews, officers, bases
and supplies all those things which
are seldom considered by the ama
teur in warfare, but which are as es
sential to its prosecution as the more
spectacular details.
I wish to emphasize the fact that,
in laying such a barrage, our object
was not to make an absolute barrier
to the passage of submarines. To have
done this we should have needed such
an enormous number of mines that
the operation would have been im
possible. Nor would such a dense
barrier have been necessary to suc
cess; a field that could be depended
upon to destroy one-fourth or one
fifth of the submarines that attempt
ed the passage would have represent
ed complete success.
Another circumstance which made
the barrage a feasible enterprise was
that, by the first of the year 1918 it
was realized that the submarine had
ceased to be a decisive factor In the
war. It still remained a serious em
barrassment, and every measure which
could possibly thwart it should be
adopted. But the writings of Ger
man officers, which have been pub
lished since the war, make it appar
ent that they themselves realized
early in 1918 that they would have
to place their hopes of victory on
some-thing else besides the subma
rine. The convoy system and the
other methods of fighting under-wa-ter
craft which I have already de
scribed had caused a great decrease
in sinkings.' In April of 1917 the
losses were nearly 900,000 tons; in
November of the same year the loss-es
were less than 300,000 tons. Mean
while the construction of merchant
shipping, largely a result of the tre
mendous expansion of American ship
building facilities, was increasing at
a tremendous rate. A diagram of
these, the two essential factors in
the submarine campaign, disclosed
such a rapidly rising curve of sink
ings, that the time could be easily
foreseen when the net amount of al
lied shipping after the submarines
had done their worst, would show a
promising increase. But, as' stated
above, the submarines were still a
distinct menace; they were still caus
ing serious losses; and it was, there
fore, very important that we should
leave no stone unturned toward dem
onstrating beyond a shadow of doubt
that warfare as conducted by these
craft could be entirely put down. The
more successfully we demonstrated
this fact and the more energetically
we prosecuted every form of opposi
tion, the earlier would his general
morale break down and victory be as
sured. In war, where human lives, as
well as national interest, are at stake
no thought whatever can be given to
expense. It is impossible to place a
value on human life. Therefore, on
November 2, 1917, the so-called
"Northern Barrage" project was of
ficially adopted by both the American
and the British governments. When
I say that the proposed mine field
was as long as the distance from
Washington to New York, some idea
of its magnitude may be obtained.
Nothing like it had ever been at
tempted before. The combined op
eration involved a mass of detail
which the lay mind can hardly com
prehend. The cost MO, 000, 000 is
perhaps not an astonishing figure in
the statistics of this war, but it gives
some conception of the size of the
undertaking.
Copyright. 1920. by. the World's Work.
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