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THE SUNDAY OREGOXIAN, PORTLAND, DECE3IBER 28, 1919.
Victory At Sea
HOW THE GONVOYS SAILED
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By Admiral William Sowden Sims J
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A CONVOY AT SEA.
This system of sallfns; skips la groups, protected by de stroyers, was the chief method of conquering the sub
marine. Kventually, between 91 and BS per cent of all merchant ships sailed la convoys. The losses of con
voyed ships were less than one-half of 1 per cent.
THIS SHIP WAS SPLIT IN TWO PARTS BY A TORPEDO.
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A WARSHIP COMING INTO A HARBOR PROM THE OPEN SEA.
This harbor, like all in the war zone, was protected by net; this picture shows the gateway In the net through
which ships made their way to the ocean.
(Copyright, 1910, "World's Work. Pub
lished by Arrangement.)
THE admiralty in London was the
central nervous system of a
complicated but perfectly work
ing organization which reached the
remotest corners of the world. Wher
ever there was a port, whether in
South America, Australia, or in the
most inaccessible parts of India or
China, from which merchantmen
sailed to any of the other countries
involved in the war, representatives
of the British navy and the British
government were stationed, all work
ing harmoniously with shipping men
to get their cargoes safely through
the danger zones. These danger zones
occupied a comparatively small area
surrounding, the belligerent countries,
but the safeguarding of the ships was
an elaborate process "which began far
back in. the countries from, which the
commerce started. Until about July,
1917, the. world's shipping for the
most part had been unregulated; now
for the .first time it was arranged
in hard and fast routes and dispatched
in accordanoe with schedules as fixed
as those of a great railroad. The
whole management of convoys, . indeed,-bore
many resemblances to the
methods' of handling freight cars on
the American system of transconti
nental lines. In the United States
there are several great headquarters
of freight, sometimes known as "gate
ways," places, that is, at which
freight - cars are assembled from
thousand places, and from which the
great accumulations are routed to
their destinations. Such places are
Pittsburg, Buffalo,, St. Louis, Chicago
Minneapolis, Denver. San Francisco
to mention only a few. Shipping des
tined for the belligerent nations was
similarly assembled, in the years 1917
and 1918, at six or eight great ocean
"gateways," and there formed into
convoys for "through routing" to the
British Isles, Frence and the Mediter
ranean. Only a few of the ships that
were exceptionally fast speed in it
self being a particularly efficacious
protection against submarines were
permitted to ignore this routine sys
tem, and dash unprotected through
the infested area. This was a some
what dangerous procedure even 'for
such ships, however, and they were
escorted ; whenever destroyers were
available. All other vessels, from
whatever parts of the world they
came, were' required to sail first for
one of these. great assembling points,
or "gateways"; at which places they
were, added to one of the constantly
forming convoys.
Thus all shipping which normally
ailed to Europe around the' Cape of
Good"; Hope .proceeded, up the vest
coast of Africa until it reached the
port of Dakar or Sierra Leone, where
it joined the convoy. Shipping from
the east coast of South America
ports like Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Bue
nos Aires and Montevideo instead of
sailing directly to Europe, joined the
convoy at this same African town.
Vessels which came to Britain and
France by way of Suez and Mediter
ranean ports found their great stop-
ping place at Gibraltar a headquar-
of traffic which, in the huge amount
of freight which it "created," became
almost the Pittsburg of this mam
moth transportation system. The four
gateways" for North America and
the west coast of South America were
Sydney (Cape Breton), Halifax, New
York and Hampton Roads. The grain
laden merchantmen from the St. Law
rence valley rendezvoused at Sydney
and Halifax. Vessels from Portland.
Boston, New York, Philadelphia and
other Atlantic points found their as
sembling headquarters at New York,
while ships from Baltimore, Norfolk,
the Gulf of Mexico and the west coast
of South America proceeded to the
great convoy center which had been
established at Hampton Roads.
Convoy Sailings on Time-Table
Schedules.
In the convoy room of the admir
alty these aggregations of ships were
always referred to as the "Dakar con
voy," the "Halifax convoy," the
Hamton Roads convoy," and the like
When the system was completely es
tablished the convoys sailed from
their appointed headquarters on reg
ular schedules, like railroad trains
From New York one convoy departed
every 16 days for the west coast of
England and one left every 16 days
for the east coast. From Hampton
Roads one sailed every eight days to
the .west coast and one every eight
nays 10 me east coast, and convoys
from all' the other convoy points
maintained a similarly rigid schedule.
The dates upon which these sailings
took place were fixed, like the ar
rivals and departures of trains upon
a railroad timetable, except when it
became necessary to delay the sail
ing of a convoy to avoid congestion
of arrivals. According to this pro
gramme, the first convoy to the west
coast left New York on August 14
1917, and its successors thereafter
sailed at intervals of about 16 days
The instructions sent to shipmasters
all over the world, by way of the
British consulates, gave explicit de
tails.
Here, for example, was a ship at
New York, all loaded and ready to
sail for the war zone. The master
visited tba port all icer. At the British
SILENT WARRIORS AGAINST THE SUBMARINE.
These stokers in the merchantmen's fire rooms ran almost the greatest risks of all men engaged in submarine
warfare. The torpedo was always aimed at the ship's engine and boiler-room, and these men were thus
constantly facing death under particularly terrible circumstances. They are among the greatest heroes
of the war.
consulate, who directed him to pro
ceed to Gravesend bay. anchor his
essel and report to the convoy offi
cers for further instructions. The mer
chant captain, reaching this indicated
spot, usually found several other ves-
els on hand, all of them, like his ship.
waiting for the sailing date. The
commander of the gathering convoy,
under whose instructions all the mer
chantmen were to operate, was a na
val officer, usually of the rank of
commodore or captain, who main
tained constant cable communication
with the convoy room of the admir
alty and usually used one of the com
mercial vessels as his flagship.
When the sailing day arrived there
were usually from 20 to 30 merchant
men assembled; the commander sum
moned all their masters, gave each a
blue book containing instructions on
the management of convoyed ships.
and frequently delivered something in
the nature of a lecture. Before the
aggregation sailed it was joined by a
cruiser or pre-dreadnought battleship
of the American navy or by a British
or French cruiser. This ship was to
accompany the convoy across the At
lantic as far as the danger zone; its
mission was not, as most people mis
takenly believed, to protect the con
voy from submarines, but to protect
it from any surface German raider
that might have escaped into the high
seas. The allied navies constantly
had before their minds the exploits
of the Emden. The opportunity to
break up a convoy in mid-ocean by
dare-devil enterprises of this kind
was so tempting that it stimed alto
gether likely that Germany might
take advantage of it. To send 20 or
30 merchant ships across the-Atlantic
with no ,protection against such as
saults would have been to invite a
possible disaster. As a matter of
fact the last German raider that even
attempted to gain the high seas was
sunk in the North sea by the British
patrol squadron in February, 1917
Slipping to Sea.
On the appointed day the whole
convoy weighed anchor and silently
slipped out to sea. To such specta
tors as observed its . movements it
seemed a rather limping, halting pro
cession. The speed of a convoy was
the speed of the slowest ship, and ves
sels that could easily make 12 or 14
knots were obliged to put on the
brake, much to the disgust of their
masters, in order to keep formation
with a ship that made only 8 or 10
though whenever possible vessels of
nearly equal speed sailed together.
Little in the newly formed group
suggested the majesty of the sea. The
ships formed a miscellaneous and ill
assorted company, rusty tramps
shamefacedly sailing alongside of
spick-and-span liners; miserable lit
tle 2000 or 3000-ton ships attempting
to hold up their heads in the same
company with sister ships ' of 10,000
or 12,000. The whole mass was
sprawled over the sea in most un
gainly fashion; 20 or 30 ships, with
spaces of SW ar .3,000 j;ards stretching
out between them, took up not far
from ten square miles of the ocean
surface. Neither at this stage of the
voyage did the aggregation give the
idea of efficiency. It presented about
as desirable a target as the subma
rine could have desired. But the
period taken in crossing the ocean
was entirely devoted to education.
Under the tutorship of the convoy
commander, the men composing the
20 or 30 crews went every day to
school. For 15 or 20 days, upon the
broad Atlantic, they were trained in
li the evolutions which were neces
sary for coping with the submarine.
Kvery possible situation that could
arise in the danger zone was antici
pated and the fficers and the crews
were trained In meeting it. They per
fected themselves in- the signal code;
they learned the art of making , the
sudden maneuvers which were instan
taneously necessary when a subma
rine was sighted; they acquired a
mastery in the art of zigzagging; and
they became accustomed to sailing at
night without lights. The crews were
put through all the drills which pre
pared them to meet such crises as the
landing of a torpedo in their engine
room or the sinking of the ship; ana
tney were thoroughly schooled in get
ting all hands safely into the boats.
Possibly an occasional scare on the
way over may have introduced the
element of reality 'into these exer
cises; though no convoys actually met
submarines In the open ocean, the
likelihood that they might do so was
never absent. especially after the
Germans began sending out their huge
unaer-water cruisers.
The convoy commander left his port
with sealed orders, which he was in
structed not to open until he was a
hundred miles at sea. These orders,
when the seal was broken, gave him
the rendezvous assigned by the con
voy board in London. The great chart
in the convoy room at the admrialty
indicated the point to which the con
voy was to proceed and at which it
would be met by the destroyer escorts
and taken through the danger zone.
This particular New York convoy
commander was now perhaps in
structed to cross the 30th meridian at
the o2d parallel of latitude, where he
would be met by his escort. He laid
his course for that pornt and regu
lated his speed so as to reach. it at
the appointed time. But he well
knew that these Instructions were
only temporary. The precise point to
which he would finally be directed to
sail depended upon the movement
and location of the German sub
marines at the time of his arrival. If
the enemy became particularly active
in the region of this tentative rendez
vous, then, as the convoy approached
it. a wireless from London would in
struct the commander to steer
abruptly to another point, perhaps a
hundred miles to north or south.
"Getting; Your Convoy."
"Getting your convoy" was a
searching test of destroyer seaman
ship, particularly in heavy or thick
weather. It was not the simplest
thing to navigate a group of destroy
ers through the tempestuous waters
of the North Atlantic, with no other
objective than the Junction point of
meridians and parallels, and reach the
designated point at a certain hour.
Such a feat demanded navigation abil
ity of a high order; and the skill
which our American naval officers dis
played in this direction aroused great
admiration, especially oa. the part. of
the merchant skippers; In particular
it aroused the astonishment of the
average doughboy.
Many destroyer escorts that went
out to meet an incoming convoy also
took out one which was westward
bound. A few mishaps in the course
of the war, such as the sinking of
the Justicia, sailing from Europe to
America, created the false notion that
outward bound convoys were not es
corted. It was Just as desirable, of
course, to escort the ships going out
as to escort those which were coming
In. The mere fact that the Inbound
ships carried troops and supplies gave
stronger reasons, from the humane
standpoint, for heavier escorts, but
not from the standpoint of the gen
eral war situation. The Germans
were not einking our ships because
they were carrying men and supplies;
they were sinking them simply be
cause they were ships. They were
not seeking to destroy American
troops exclusively; they, were seeking
to destroy tonnage. They were aim
ing to reduce the world's supply of
ships to a point that the allies would
be compelled to abandon the conflict
for lack of communications.
It was therefore necessary that they
hould sink the empty ships, which
were going out, as well as the crowd
ed and loaded ships, which were
coming in. For the same reason It
was necessary that we should protect
them, and we did as far as prac
ticable without causing undue delays
in forming outward bound convoys.
The Justicia. though most people still
think that she was torpedoed because
she was unescorted, was, in fact, pro
tected by a destroyer escort of con
siderable- size. Escorting outward
bound ships, increased considerably
the strain on' our destroyer force.
The difficulty was that the Inbound
convoy arrived In a body, but that
the ships could not be unloaded and
sent back in a body without detain
ing a number of them an undue length
of time and time was such an Im
portant factor in this war that it was
necessary to make tne turn-arouna
of each important transport as
quickly as possible. The consequence
was that returning ships were
often despatched in small convoys as
fast as they were unloaded, 'ine es
corts which we were able to supply
for such groups were thus much
weaker than absolute safety required,
and sometimes we were even forced
to send vessels across the submarine
zone with few. if any. escorting war
shiDs. This explains why certain
homeward bound transports were tor
pedoed. This was particularly true
of troop and munition convoys to the
western ports of France. Only when
we could assemble a large out-going
convoy and dispatch it at such a time
that it could meet an incoming one
at the western edge of the submarine
zone, could we give these vessels the
same destroyer escort as that wnicn
we always gave for the loaded con
voys bound for European ports.
American Escorts Returned.
As soon as the destroyers made con
tact with an inward bound convoy
the ocean escort, the cruiser or pre-
dreadnought. If an American, aban
doned it and started back home, some
times with a westbound convoy if one
had been assembled in time. British
escorts went ahead full speed into
British port, usually escorted by one
or more destroyers. This abandon
ment sometimes aroused the wrath ot
the passengers on the inbound con
voy. Their protector had dropped
them Just as they had entered the
submarine zone, the very moment its
services were really needed! These
passengers did not understand, any
more than did the people at home,
that the purpose of the ocean escort
was not to protect them from sub
marines but from possible raiders. In
side the danger tone this ocean escort
would become part of the convoy
Itself and require protection from
submarines, so that its rather sum
mary departure really made the mer
chantmen more secure.
As the convoy approached the dan
ger zone, after being drilled all the
way across the ocean, its very ap
pearance was more taut and business-like.
The ships were closed up,
keeping only such distances apart
were essential for quick man
euvering, and for a more compact
formation. Generally the convoy
was formed in a long parallelogram,
the distance across the front of which
was much longer than the depth or
distance along the sides. Usually the
formation was a number of groups of
four vessels each. In column or "In
dian file," at a distance of about 600
yards from ship to ship, and all
groups abreast of each other and
about one-half mile apart. Thus a
convoy of 24 vessels, or six groups
of four. would have a width of about
five miles and a depth of one. Most
of the destroyers were stationed on
the narrow sides, for it was only on
the side, or the beam, that the sub
marines could attack with much
chance of success. It was usually
necessary for a destroyer to be sta
tioned in the rear of a convoy, for.
though the speed of nearly ail con
voys was faster than that of a sub
marine when submerged, the latter
while running on the surface could
follow a convoy at night with a fair
chance of torpedoing a vessel at
early daylight and escaping to the
rear ;f unhampered by the presence
of a' rear guard destroyer. It was
generally Impracticable WnA danger
ous for the submarine to wait ahead.
submerge, and launch its torpedoes
as the convoy passed over it.
Mechanical Helps.
The extent to which merely median
ical details protected merchant ships
is not understood, and this inability
to attack successfully from the front
illustrates this point. The submarine
launches Its torpedoes from tubes In
the bow or stern; it has no tubes on
the beam. If it did possess such side
tubes, it could lie in wait ahead and
shoot its broadsides at the convoy as
It passed over the spot where it was
concealed. Its length in that case
would be parallel to that of the mer
chant ships, and thus it would have
a comparatively small part of its area
exposed to the danger of ramming
The mere fact that its torpedo tubes
are placed in the bow and stern makes
It necessary for the submarine, if it
wishes to attack in the fashion de
scribed, to turn almost at right angles
to the course of the convoy, and to
maneuver Into a favorable position
from which to discharge its missll
a procedure so altogether hazardous
that it almost never attempts it. With
certain reservations, which it is hard
ly necessary to explain in detail a
this point, it may be taken at least as
a general rule that the sides of the
convoy not only furnish the U-boats
much, the best chance to torpedo ships
but also subject them to the least
danger; and this Is the reason why.
In the recent war the destroyers were
usually concentrated at these points.
I have already compared the convoy
system to a great aggregation of rail
roads. This comparison holds good on
Its operation after if had entered the
Infested zone. Indeed, the very termi
nology of our railroad men was used.
Every convoy nearly followed one of
two main routes, known to convoy
headquarters as the two "trunk lines."
The trunk line which reached the west
coast of Kngland usually passed north
of Ireland through the North Channel
and down the Irish sea to Liverpool.
Under certain conditions these con
voys passed south of Ireland and
thence up the Irish sea. The con
voys to the east coast took a" trunk
line that passed up the English chan
nel. Practically all shipping from
the United States to Great Britain
and France took one of these trunk
lines. But. like our railroad sys
tems, each of these main routes had
branch lines. Thus, shipping des
tined for French ports took the south
ern route until off the entrance to the
English channel: here It abandoned
the main line and took a branch route
to Brest, Bordeaux, Nantes and other'
French ports. In the channel likewise
several "single track" branches went
to various English ports, such as
Plymouth. Portsmouth. Southampton,
and the like. The whole gigantic en
terprise flowed with' precision and a
regularity which I think it is hard
ly likely that any other transporta
tion system has ever achieved.
A description of a few actual con
voys, and the experiences of our de
stroyers with them, will perhaps best
make clear the nature of the mechan
ism which protected the world's ship
ping. For this purpose I have selected
typical instances which illustrate the
every-day routine experiences of es
corting destroyers, and other experi
ences in which their work was more
spectacular.
One day late In OctoDer, 1917, a di
vision of American destroyers at
Queenstown received detailed Instruc
tions from Admiral Bayly to leave at
a certain hour and escort the out
ward convoy "OQ 17" and bring into
port the inbound convoy "HS 14."
These detailed instructions were based
upon general instructions issued from
the Admiralty, where my staff was In
constant attendance and co-operation.
The Bymbols by which these two
groups of ships were designated- can
be easily interpreted. The OQ sim
ply meant that convoy "No. 17" the
seventeenth which had left that port
was outward bound from Queens
town, and the HS signified that con
voy "No. 14" was homeward bound
from Sydney, Cape Breton. Queens
town during the first few months,
was one of those places at which
ships, having discharged their car
goes, assembled In groups for dis
patching back to the United States.
Later Milford Haven, Liverpool, and
other ports were more often used
for this purpose. Vessels had been
arriving here for several days from
ports of the Irish Sea and the east
coast of England. These had now
been formed into convoy "OQ 17";
they were ready for a destroyer
escort to take them through the sub
marine zone and start them on the
westward voyage to American ports.
This escort consisted of eight Amer
ican destroyers and one British "spe
cial service ship"; the latter was one
of that famous company of decoy ves
sels, or "mystery ships," which,
though to all outward appearances
they were unprotected merchantmen.
really carried concealed armament of
sufficient power to destroy any sub
marine that came within range. This
special service ship, the Aubrietia, was
hardly a member of the protective es
cort. Her mission was to sail about
30 miles ahead of the convoy; when
observed from the periscope or the
conning tower of a submarine, the
Aubrietia seemed to be merely a
helpless merchantman sailing alone,
and as such she presented a particu
larly tempting target to the U-boat
But her real purpose in life was to be
torpedoed. After landing its missile
in a vessel's side, the submarine
usually remained submerged for a
period, while the crew of Its victim
was getttng off in boats; it then came
to the surface, and the men prepared
to board the disabled ship and search
her for valuables and delicacies, par
ticularly for information which would
ssist them in their campaign, such
as secret codes, sailing instructions .
and the like. The mystery ship has
been preparing for this moment and.
as soon as the submarine broke water
the gun ports of the disguised mer
chantman dropped and her hitherto
concealed guns began blazing away
at the German. By October, 1917, these
special service ships had already ac
counted for several submarines; and
it had now become a frequent prac
tice to attach one or more to a con
voy, either ahead, where she might
dispose of the submarine lying in
wait for the approaching aggregation.
or In the rear, where a U-boat might
easily mistake her for one of those
stragglers whiph were an almost In
evitable part of every convoy.
Trawlers and mine sweepers, as was
the invariable custom, spent several
hours sweeping the Queenstown chan
nel before the sailing of convoy "OQ
17" and its escort. Promptly at the
appointed time the eight American
ships sailed out in "Indian file," pass
ing through the net which was always
kept In place at the entrance to the
harbor. Their first duty was to patrol
the waters outside for a radius of
12 miles; it was not improbable that
the Germans, having learned that this
convoy was to sail, had stationed a
submarine not far from the harbor
entrance. Having finally satisfied
himself that there were no lurking
enemies in the neighborhood, the
commander of the destroyer flag
ship signalled to the merchant, ships,
which promptly left the harbor and
entered the open sea. The weather
was stormy; the wind was blowing
something of a gale and head seas
were traeking over the destroyers'
decks. But the convoy quickly
maneuvered into three columns, the
destroyers rapidly closed around
them, and the whole group started for
"Rendezvous A" this being the des
ignation of that spot on the ocean's
surface where the 14th meridian of
longitude crossed the 49th parallel of
latitude a point In the Atlantic
about 300 miles southwest of Queens
town, regarded at that time as safely
beyond the operating zone of the
submarine. Meanwhile the "mystery
ship," sailing far ahead, disappeared
beneath the horizon.
(Another article by Admiral Sima
next Sunday.).