THE SUNDAY OREGONIAN, PORTLAND, DECEMBER 21, 1910.
The Victory At S ea
By Admiral William Sowden Sims
AMERICAN DESTROYERS INACTION
W.
M1IBMARIME HI SH.
The U-boat, contrary to Krnpral belief, tm rcnlly n wurface boat and ubm
bunting apenUs munt of time with at leant it connlni; turr out of the
rater. If a power to ftuliinericp in chiefly uMetl for protective purpose tr
for getting unaeen Into a position to atfaek. The bualneaa of the eacortlng
destroyera largely to keep it eoatntatatly under writer, for ao long an I
remained eotnpletely submerged, without Ita pcricope above the anrface.
It was harmleaa.
tCopyrteht, 11M9. World s Work. Published
by Arrangement.)
OUR first division of destroyers
reached Queenstown on a Fri
day morning. May 4, 1917; the
following Monday they put to sea on
the business of hunting the subma
rine and protecting commerce. For
the first month or six weeks they
spent practically all their time on
patrol duty in company with British
destroyers, sloops, and other patrol
vessels. Though the convoy system
v.as formally adopted in the latter
part of May, it was not operating
completely and smoothly until August
or September. Many troop and mer
chant convoys were formed in the in
tervening period and many were con
ducted through the submarine -"zone
by American destroyers; but our ships
spent much time sailing singly, hunt
ing for such enemies as might betray
their presence, or escorting individual
cargoes. The early experiments had.
demonstrated the usefulness of the
convoy system, yet a certain number
of pessimists still refused to accept
it as the best solution of the shipping
problem; and to reorganize prac
tically all. the shipping of the world,
scattered everywhere on the seven
seas, necessarily took time.
But this intervening period fur
nished Indispensable training for our
men. They gained an every-day famil
iarity with the waters which were to
form the scene of their operations
and learned many of the tricks of the
German submarines. It was a strange
world ' in which these young Ameri
cans now found themselves. The life
was a hard one, of course, in those
tempestuous Irish waters, with the
little destroyers jumping from wava
to wave, sometimes showing daylight
beneath their keels, their bows fre
quently pointing skyward, or plunged
deep into heavy seas, and their sides
occasionally plowing along under the
foamy waves. For di.ys the men
lived in a world of fog and mist; rain
in those regions seemed to be almost
the normal state of nature. Much has
been written about the hardships of
life aboard the destroyer, and to these
narratives our men could add many
details of their own. Yet these hard
ships did not weigh heavily upon
them, for existence in those waters,
though generally monotonous, pos
sessed at times plenty of interest and
excitement.
The very appearance of the sea
showed that our men were engaging
in a kind of warfare very different
from that for which they had been
trained. The enormous amount of
shipping seemed to give the lie to the
German reports that British com
merce had been practically arrested.
A perpetual stream of all kinds of
vessels liners, tramps, schooners and
fishing boats was passing toward
the Irish ami the English coasts. Vet
here and there other floating objects
on the surface told the story. Now it
was a stray boat filled with the sur
vivors of a torpedoed vessel; now a
raft on which lay the bodies of dead
men; now the derelict hulk of a ship
which the Germans had abandoned
as sunk, but which perished in float
ing aimlessly around, a constant dan
ger to navigation. Loose mines, bob
, blng in the water, hinted at the perils
that were constantly threatening our
forces. In the tense imagination of
the lookouts, floating spars or other
debris easily took the form of ; jri
scopes. Queer-looking sailing ves
sels, at a distance, aroused suspicions
that they might be submarines in dis
guise. A phosphorescent trail in the
water was sometimes mistaken for
the wake of a torpedo. The cover Oi.'
a hatchway floating on the surface, if
seen at a distance of a few hundred
yards, looked much like the conning
tower of a submarine, while the back
of an occasional whale gave a lifelike
representation of a U-boat awash
in fact, so lifelike that on one efc
caslon several of our submarine
chasers on the English coast dropped
than the visible, evidences of warfare
that especially impressed our men.
The air all around them was electric
with life and information. One had
only to put the receiver of the wire
less to his ear to find himself in a
new and animated world. The at
mosphere was constantly sputtering
messages of all kinds coming from
all kinds of places. Sometimes these
were sent by Admiral Bayly from
Queenstown; they would direct our
men to go to an Indicated spot and
escort as especially valuable cargo
ship; they would tell a particular
commander that a submarine was ly
ing at a designated latitude? and lon
gitude and instruct him to go and
"get" it. Running conversations were
frequently necessary between de
stroyers and the ships which they had
been detailed to escort. "Give me
your position," the destroyer would
ask: "What is the name of your as
sistant surgeon, and who is his friend
on board our ship?" the suspicious
vessel would reply such precaution
being necessary to give assurance
that the query had not come from a
German submarine. "Being pursued
by a submarine, latitude 50 north
longitude 15 west" cries of distress
liko this were common.
Another message would tell of a
vessel that was being shelled; an
other would tell of a ship that was
sinking; while other messages would
give the location of life boats filled
with survivors and ask for speedy
help. Our wireless operators not only
received the news of friends, but also
the messages of enemies. Conversa
tions between German submarines
frequently filled the air. They some
times attempted to deceive us by false
"S. O. S." signals, hoping that they
would thus get an opportunity to tor
pedo any vessel that responded to the
call. But these attempts were unsuc.
cessful, for our wireless operators
had no difficulty in recognizing the
"spark" of the German instruments.
At times the surface .of the ocean
might be calm; there would not be a
ship in sight or a sign of human ex
istence anywhere; yet the air itself
would be uninterruptedly filled with
these reminders of war.
Keeping Submarines Under Surface.
The duties of our destroyers in these
earliest days were to hunt for sub
marines, to escort single ships, to
pick up survivors in boats and to go
to the rescue of ships that were being
attacked. For the purpose of patrol
the sea was divided into areas 30
miles square, and to each of these
one destroyer, sloop or other vessel
was assigned. The ship was required
to keep within its allotted area unless
the pursuit of a submarine should
lead it into a neighboring one. This
patrol, as I have described, was not a
satisfactory way of fighting subma
rines. A vessel would occasionally get
a distant glimpse of the enemy, but
that was all. As soon as the U-boat
saw the ship it simply dived to se
curity beneath the waves.
Our destroyers had many chances
to fire at the enemy, but usually
very long ranges. Some of them had
lively scraps, which perhaps involved
the destruction of U-boats, though
this fas always a difficult thing to
prove. Yet the mere fact that sub
marines were seldom sunk by de
stroyers on patrol either by our own
or the allies did not mean that the
latter accomplished nothing. The
work which was chiefly expected of
destroyers on patrol was that they
should keep the U-boats under the
surface as much as possible and pro
tect commerce. Normally the sub
marine sails on top of the water
looking for its prey. As long as it is
beyond the merchantman s range of
vision it uses its high surface speed
of about 14 knots to attain a posi
tion ahead of the advancing vessel
Before the surface vessel reaches i
point where Its lookout can see th
submarine the U-boat dives and
CAPTAIN IIVRIIV A. LOHiG.
The member of Admiral Slm'a atnff aaalgned aa American convoy officer at
the British admiralty in Londun. The convoy room at the admiralty waa
the center from which ahlpa were routed from all parta of the world
preliminary steps if there is a de
stroyer anywhere in the neighbor
hood. The mere presence of a war
ship therefore constitutes a consider
able protection to any merchant ship
that Is within sight. The submarine
normally prefers to use its guns on
merchant ships, for the torpedoes are
expensive and comparatively few in
number. Destroyers constantly in
terfered with these gunning opera
tions. A long-distance shot usually
was sufficient to make the under
water vessel submerge and thus lose
its power for doing harm. The early
xperiences of our destroyers with
ubmarines were of this kind; bur.
hasing U-boats under the water,
scorting a small proportion of the
iany cargo ships and picking up sur
ivor8. important as this work was,
id not really constitute effective
anti-submarine warfare. It gave our
men splendid training, it saved many
erchant ship, it rescued many vic
tims from the extreme dangers ui
German ruthlessness, it sank a small
number of submarines, but it could
never have won the war.
This patrol by destroyers and light'
urface vessels has been criticised as
affording an altogether ineriective
method of protecting shipping, espe
cially when compared with the convoy
system. This criticism is, of course.
ustified. Still, we must understand
that it was the only possible method
until we had enough anti-submarine
craft to make the convoy practicable.
Nor must we forget that this Queens
town patrol was organized systematic
ally and operated with admirable skill
and tireless energy. Most of this duty
fell at this time upon the British de
stroyers, sloops ana oiner pairui ves
sels, which were under the command
of Admiral Bayly, and these ' opera
tions were greatly aided by the gal
lant actions of the British Q-ships, or
mystery ships." Though some of the
admirable exploits of these vessels
will be recorded in due time, it may
h Bniri here that the record which
these ships made was not only in all
respects worthy of the traditions of
their great service, but also that they
exhibited an endurance, a gallantry
and seamanllke skui mat. nas lew
parallels in the history of naval warfare.
Mainspring of System.
The headquarters of the convoy
system was a room in the British ad
miralty; herein was the mainspring
of the elaborate mechanism by which
10,000 ships were routed over the
seven oceans. neic
those who had been charged with the
security of the allies" line of commun
ication reviewed the entire submarine
situation. Vice-Admiral Sir Alexan
der L. buff, R. N.. bore this heavy re
sponsibility, ably assisted by a num
ber of British officers. Captain Byron
A. Long, U. S. N., a member of my
staff, was associated with Admiral
Duff in this important work. It was
Captain Long's duty to co-ordinate
the movements of our convoys with
the much more numerous convoys of
the allies; he performed this task so
efficiently that, once the convoy or
ganization was in successful opera
tion, I eliminated the whole subject
from my anxieties and requested Cap
tain Long not to inform me when
troop convoys sailed from the United
States or when they we.e due to ar
rive in France or England. There
seemed to be no reason why both of
us should lose sleep over the same
cause.
The most conspicuous feature of the
convoy room was a huge chart en
tirely covering the wall on one side of
the office; a jess to this chart was
obtained by ladders not unlike those
which are used in shoe stores. It
depth charges on a wha.e and killed it- (awaits the favorable moment for fir
tJut it ttw invisible, rather ins its torpedo. It cannot take thea
en
on
gave
comprenensive v
of
Atlantic ocean, the British isles, and
a considerable part of Europe and
Africa. The ports which It especially
emphasized were Sydney (Cape Bre
ton), Halifax, New York. Hampton
Roads, Gibraltar, Sierra Leone, and
Dakar, ports on the west coast of Af
rica; Thin threads v stretched
from each one of these seven points
to certain positions in the ocean just
outside the British isles, and on these
threads were little paper io.it.-. each
one of which represented a convoy.
When a particular convoy started
from New York one of these paper
boats was placed at that point; as it
made Its way across the ocean the
boat was moved from day to day in
accordance with the convoy's prog
ress. At any moment, therefore, a
mre glance at this chart with its
multitude of paper boats gave the
spectator the precise location of all
the commerce Ahich was then
route to the scene of war.
"Shadowing;" Submarines.
But there were other exhibits
the chart which were even more con
spicuous than these minute represen
tations of convoys. Little circles were
marked off In the waters surrounding
the British isles, each one of which
was intended to show the locatlo- of
a German submarine. From day to
day each one of these circles was
moved in accordance with the ascer
tained positions of the submarine
which it represented, a straight line
Indicating its course on the chart.
Perhaps the most remarkable fact
about the allied convoy service was
the minute information which it pos
sessed about the movements of Ger
man submarines. A kind of separate
intelligence bureau devoted its entire
attention to this subject. Readers of
detective stories are familiar with
the phenomenon known as "shadow
ing." It is a common practice in the
detective's fascinating profession to
assign a man known as a "shadow" to
the duty of keeping a particular per
son under constant observation. With
auimiauic patience ana skill an ex
perienced "shadow" keeps in view
this object of his attention for 24
hours; he dogs him through crowded
streets, tracks him up and down high
office buildings, accompanies him to
restaurants, trolley cars, theaters and
hotels and unobtrusively chases him
through dense thoroughfares in cabs
and automobiles. "We get him ud in
the morning and we put him to bed
at. night", is the way the "shadow"
describes the assiduous care he be
stows upon his. unsusnectinsr victim
In much the , same fashion did the
aiuea secret service "shadow" German
submarines; it got each submarine
"up in'the morning and put it to bed
at night." That is to say, the Intelli
gence department took charge of
Fritz and u't w as they emerged
from their base and kept an un
wearied eye upon them until they
sailed back home. The great chart
in the convoy room of the admiralty
showed, within the reasonable limits
of human fallibility, where each sub
marine was at a particular moment,
and also kept minute track of its
performances.
Vet it was not so difficult to gather
this information as may at first be
supposed. I have already said that
there were comparatively few sub
marines, perhaps not more than an
average of eight or nine, which were
operating at the same time in the
waters south and west of Ireland, the
region with which we Americans
were most concerned. These boats
betrayed their locations in a multi
tude of ways. Their commanders
were particularly careless in the use
of wireless. The Germanic passion
for conversation could not be sup-
tsBjwiy !..J5aaaaaaaaaSawBy
SURVIVORS in A LIKE BOAT.
l'art of the liuslncs of the destroyers naa to hnut for and rescue survivors
of merchant ahlpa, left adrift on the ocean by the L-boata.
the I pressed even on the U-boats and even
North, and i'Tuth American coast, the' though this. national habit might lead the convoy room and hia methods of
I'HKIMHKIIVKsy OH DKSTJatOYKH. .
At firat, when there were not ii.lt depth charge., the deatroyera kept two at the atera, ready to drop on U-boats.
But tbla aeheme waa presently enlarged upon, until It waa not unuaunl to carry from twenty to thirty. The de
atroyer commander thought nutblns of expending; all theae rbarfra', one after another, on the supposed location
of a iftunmarlnr.
to the most serious consequences.
Possibly also the solitary submarine
felt lonely; at any rate, as soon-as it
reached the channel or the North
sea it started an almost uninterrupt
ed flow of talk. The U-boats com
municated' principally with each oth-
i er and also with the admiralty at
home; and in doing this they gave
away their positions to the assiduous
ly listening allies. The radio-direction
finder, an apparatus by which
we can Instantaneously locate the np
sition from which a wireless message
is sent, was the mechanism which
furnished us much of this infor
mation. Of course, the Germans knew
that their messages revealed their
locations, for they had direction find
ers as well as we, but the fear of dis
covery did not act as a curb upon a
naturally loquacious nature. And
we had other ways of following their
movements. The submarine spends
much the larger part of Its time on
the surface. Sailing thus conspicu
ously, it was constantly being sighted
by merchant or military ships, which
had explicit instructions to report
immediately the elusive vessel, and
to give its exact location. Attain it
is obvious: that a submarine could not
fire at a merchantman or torpedo one,
or even attempt to torpedo one, with
out revealing Its presence.
The wireless operators of all mer
chant vessels were supplied at all
times with the longitude and latitude
of their ships; their instructions . re
quired them immediately to send out
this Information whenever they
sighted a submarine or were attacked
by one. In these several ways we
had little difficulty in "shadowing"
the U-boats. For example, we would
hear that U-53 was talking just out
side of Heligoland; this submarine
would be immediately plotted on the
chart. ' As the submarine made only
about ten knots on the surface, in
order to save fuel oil, and much less
under the surface, we could draw a
circle around this point and rest as
sured that the boast must be some
where within This circle at a given
time. But in a few hours or a day
we would hear from this Same boat
again; perhaps it was using its wire
less or attacking a merchantman; or
perhaps one of our vessels had spot
ted it on the surface. The news of
new location would justify the con
voy officers in -moving this sub
marine on our chart to his new posi
tion. Within a short time the convoy
officers acquired an astonishingly
intimate knowledge of these boats and
the habits of their commanders. In
deed, the personalities of some of
these German officers ultimately
took shape with surprising clearness,
for they betrayed their presence in
the ocean by characteristics that
often furnished a means of identifying
them. Each submarine behaved in
different way from the others, the
difference, of course, being the mani
festation of the human element in
control. One would deliver his at
tacks in rapid succession, boldly and
almost- recklessly: another would ap
proach his task with the utmost cau
tion; ceTtain ones would display the
meanest traits in human nature
while others let us be just were
capable of a certain display of gen
eroslty, possibly even of chivalry. By
studyln' the Individual traits of each
commander we could often tell Just
which' one was operating at a given
time; and this information 'was ex
tremely valuable in the game in which
we were engaged.
"Old Hans is out again," the officers
In the convoy room would remark.
They were speaking of Hans Rose, the
commander of the U-5J; the same
submarine officer who. in the fall of
1916, brought that boat to Newport,
R. I., and torpedoed five or six ships
off Nantucket. They never saw Han
Rose face to face; they had nop the
faintest idea whether he was fat or
lean, whether he was a blonde or a
brunette, yet they knew his military
characteristics intimately. He be
came sucn a iamuiar personality
operation were so individual, that
we came to have almost a certain
liking for the old chap. Other U-boat
commanders -would appear off the
hunting grounds and attack ships in
more or less easy-going fashion. Then
another boat would suddenly appear,
and bang! bang! bang! Torpedo
after torpedo would fly, four or five
ships would sink, and then this dis
turbing person would vanish as un
expectedly as he had arrived. Such
an experience informed the convoy
officers that Hans Rose was once
more at large. We acquired a certain
respect for Hans because he was a
brave man who would take chances
which most of his compatriots avoid
ed; and above all, because he played
his desperate game with a certain de
cency. Sometimes, when he torpedoed
a ship. Rose would wait around until
all the lifeboats were filled; he would
then throw out a tow line, give the
victims food, and keep all the sur
vivors together until the rescuing
destroyer appear on the horizon, when
he would let go and submerge. This
humanity involved considerable risk
to Captain Rose, as a destroyer any
where in his neighborhood, as he well
knew, was a serious matter. It was
he who torpedoed our destroyer, the
Jacob Jones. He took a shot at her
from a distance of two miles a dis
tance from which a hit is a pure
chance. The torpedo struck and sank
the vessel within a few minutes. On
this occasion Rose acted with his
usual decency. The survivors of the
Jacob Jones naturally had no means
of communication, since the wireless
had gone down with their ship; and
now Rosa, at considerable risk to
himself, sent out an "S. O. 3." call,
giving the latitude and longitude, and
informing Queenstown that the men
were floating around in open boats.
It is perhaps not surprising that Rose
is one of the tew German U-boat com
manders with whom allied naval offi
cers would be willing today to . shake
hands. I have heard naval officers
say that they would li'.e to meet him
after the war.
We were able to individualize other
commanders; acquiring this knowl
edge, learning the location of their
submarines and the characteristics of
their boats, and using this vital infor
mation in protecting convoys, was all
part of the game which was being
played in London. It was the greatest
game of "chess" which history has
known a game that exacted not only
the most faithful and studious care,
but in which it was necessary that
all the activities should be centered
in one office. This small group, com
posed of representatives of all the na
tions concerned, exercised a control
which extended throughout '.he en
tire convoy system. It. regulated the
dates when convoys sailed - from
America or other ports and 'when
they arrived; if it had not -.taken
charge of this whole system, conges
tion and confusion would Inevitably
have resulted. We had only a limited
number of destroyers to escort all
troops and other important convoys
arriving in Europe; it was therefore
necessary that they slhould arrive at
regular and predetermined intervals.
It was necessary also that one group
of officers should control the routing
of all convoys, otherwise there would
have been serious danger of collisions
between outward bound and Inward
bound convoys, and no possibility of
routing them clear of the known po
sitions of submarines. The great cen
ter of all this traffic was not New
York or Hampton Roads, but London
It was inevitable, if the convoy sys
tem was to succeed, that it should
have a great central headquarters,
and it was just as inevitable that this
headquarters should be London.
On the huge chart already described
each convoy, indicated by a little boat,
was shown steadily making its prog
ress toward the appointed rendezvous.
Eight or nine submarines, likewise
indicated on the chart, were -always
waiting to intercept it. On that great
board every prospective tragedy of
the seas was unfolding. Here, for
example, was a New York convoy or
20 ships, steaming toward Liverpool,
but steering straight toward the po
sition of a submarine. The thing to
do was perfectly plain. It was a
simple matter to send the convoy a
wireless message to take a course" 50
miles to the south, where, accord in li
the chart, there ere no hidden
to
submarines. In a few hours the little
paper boat representing this group of
ships apparently headed for destruc
tion, would suddenly turn southward,
pass around the entirely unconscious
submarine, and then take an unob
structed course for its destination.
The- admiralty convoy, board knew so
accurately the position of a!I the sub
marines that it could almost always
route the convoys around them. It
was an extremely Interesting expe
rience to watch the paper ships on
this chart deftly turn out - of the
course of U-boats, sometimes - when
they seemed almost on the point of
colliding with them. That we were
able constantly to save the ships by
sailing the convoys around the sub
marines brings out another fact
even had there been no destroyer es
cort, the convoy in itself would have
formed a great protection to merchant
shipping. There were times when we
had no escorting vessels to send with
certain convoys; and in such in
stances we simply routed the ships
in masses, directed them on courses
which we knew were free of subma
rines, and in this way brought them
safely into port.
(Another article by Admiral Sims
. next . Sunday.). . .