TIIE SUNDAY OREGONIAN, PORTLAND, NOVEMBER 9, 1919.
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By Admiral William Sowden Sims
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DEVELOPING THE CONVOY IDEA
T v'' '"V S ' s n ) . '7 x-x -. " ... . . .... . . - , .. J - T
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HAVitj constantly oeioro my bjjui. liiis iiicib bowwa 1.110.1, tig-
eyes a picture of the grand zasgringr in itself was one of the best
fleet immune from torcedo at- I methods of avoiding destruction. Be-
A.VIXG constantly before my
eyes a picture of the grand
fleet immune from torpedo at
tack, naturally the first question I
ased when discussing- the situation
with Admiral Jellicoe and others was
this: "Why not apply this same prin
ciple to merchant ships?"
If destroyers could keep the sub
marines away from battleships, they
could certainly keen them away from
merchantmen. It is clear, from the
description already given, precisely
how the battleships had been made
safe from submarines; they had pro
ceeded, as usual, in a close formation
or "convoy," and their "destroyer
screen had proved . effective. Thus
logic apparently indicated that the
convoy system .was the "answer" to
the submarine.
Yet the convoy, as used in previous
wars, differed materially from any
application of the idea which could
possibly ba made to the present pon
test. This scheme of sailing vessels
In groups, and escorting them by
warships, is almost as .old as iiaval
warfare itself. As early as the 13th
century, the merchants of the Han
seatic league were compelled to sail
their ships in convoy as a protection
against the pirates who were then
constantly lurking in the Baltic sea.
The government of Venice used this
same device to protect its enormous
commerce. In the 15th century the
large trade in wool and wine between
England and the Moorish ports of
Spain was safeguarded by convoys,
and in the 16th century Spain herself
regularly depended upon massing its
ships to defend its commerce with
the West Indies against the piratical
attacks of English and French adven
turers. The escorts provided for these
"flotas" really laid the foundation of
the mighty Spanish fleet which
threatened England's existence for
more than a hundred years." By the
time of Queen Elizabeth, the convoy
bad thus become the all prevailing
method of safeguarding merchant
shipping, but it was in the Napoleonic
wars that it reached its greatest use
fulness. The convoys of that period
were managed with some military
precision; there were carefully stipu
lated methods of collecting the ships,
of meeting the cruiser escorts at the
appointed rendezvous, and of dispers
ing them when the danger zone was
passed; and naval officers were sys
tematically put In charge. The con
voys of this period were very large;
from 200 to 300 ships were not an
tmusual gathering, and sometimes
BOO or more would get together at
certain important places, such as the
entrance, to the Baltic. But these
ships, of course, were very small
compared with those of the present
time. It was only necessary to sup
ply such aggregations of vessels with
enough protecting cruisers to over
whelm any raiders which the enemy
might send against them. The mer
chantmen were not required to sail
in any particular formation, nor were
they required to maneuver against
unseen mysterious foes. Neither was
it absolutely essential that they
should keep constantly together; they
could even spread themselves some
what loosely over the ocean. If an
enemy raider appeared on the horizon
the escorting cruiser or cruisers left
the convoy and began chase; a battle
ensued, the convoy meanwhile pass
Ine on its voyage unharmed. When
its protecting vessels had disposed o
the attackers, they rejoined the mer
chantmen. No unusual seamanship
was demanded of the merchant cap
tains, for the whole responsibility
for their safety rested with the es
cortlng cruisers.
Tievw Problem
Beatinn off an occasional surface
paider, which necessarily fights in th
ODen. is quite a different procedur
from protecting an aggregation
vessels from enemies that discharge
tnmedoes under the water. As part
protection against such insidious at
tacks both the merchant snips
tiiA Aacortiner men-of-war Of today
' bad in this war to keep up a per
netual zigzagging. This zigzaggin
irio.,i was in itself an efficacious
method of protection. As already
said, the submarine had to attain an
. Hontapnna position before dis
its torpedo, it naa to ap
fore it became the general practice
the task of torpedoing a vessel was
comparatively easy. All the sub
marine hod to do was to bring the
vessel's masts in line, that is, get
directly ahead of her, submerge with
the small periscope showing only
occasionally, and fire her torpedo at
short range as the ship passed by.
Except in the case of very slow ves
sels, she could of course do this only
when she was not far from the course
of her advancing prey when she first
sighted her. If, however, the vessel
was zigzagging, this pretty game
was usually defeated; the submarine
never knew in what direction to go
In order to get within torpedoing dis
tance, and she could not go very far
because her speed under water is so
slow. The same conditions apply to
a zigzagging convoy. This explained
why, as soon as the merchant vessel
or convoy entered the submarine zone,
or as soon as a submarine was sighted,
it began zigzagging, first on one side
and then on the other, and always
irregularly, its course comprising a
disjointed line, which made it a mere
chance whether thei submarine could
get into a position from which to
fire with any certainty of obtaining
results. A vessel sailing alone could
maneuver in this way without much
difficulty, but it is apparent that 20
30 vessels, sailing in close forma
tion, would not find the operation a
imple one. And it was necessary for
them to sail in close and regular for
mation in order to make it possible
to maneuver them and screen them
by destroyers; it is evident that the
closer the formation the fewer the
estroyers that would be needed to
rotect it. These circumstances make
the modern convoy quite a different
affair from the happy-go-lucky pro
ceeding of the Napoleonic era.
Merchant Captains Did Not Like
Convoy.
of
Charging
It Is perhaps not surprising that
the greatest hostility to the convoys
has always come from the captains
themselves. In old days they chafed
at the time consumed in assembling
the ships, at the necessity for slower
speed to enable the less speedy ves-
els to keep up with the procession,
and at the delay in getting their car
goes into port. In all wars in which
convoys have been used it has been
very difficult to keep the merchant
captains in line. In Nelson's day
these fine old salts were constantly
breaking away from their convoys
and taking their chances of running
into port unescartedl If the mer
chant master of a century ago re
belled at the comparatively simply
managed convoys of those days it
is not strange that their descendants
of the present time should not have
looked with favor upon the relative
ly complicated and difficult arrange
ment required of them In this war,
and in the earlier discussions with
these men at the admiralty it is not
surprising that they were almost un
animously opposed to the convoy.
The merchantmen themselves are
the chief obstacles to the convoy,'
said Admiral Jellicoe "We have dis
cussed it with them many times and
they declare that it is impossible.
It is all right for war vessels to man
euver . in .close formation, they say,
for we spend our time practicing in
these formations, and so they think
that it is second nature to us. But
they say that they cannot do it. They
practically reject the idea that when
in formation they can maneuver their
ships in the fog or at night without
lights. They believe that they would
lose more ships through collisions
than the submarine would sink."
I was told ,that the whole subject
had been completely threshed out at
a meeting which had been held at the
Admirality on February 23, 1917,
about six weeks before America had
entered the war. At that time ten
masters of merchant ships met Ad
miral Jellicoe and other members of
the admiralty and has discussed the
convoy proposition at length. In lay
ing the matter before these experi
enced seamen. Admiral Jellicoe em
phasized the necessity of good station-keeping,
and he described, the
close formation which the vessels
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allied destroyer fleet was so pitifully 1
small that it was impossible to cover
it effectively. Under these conditions
there were very few encounters be
tween destroyers and submarines, at
least in the waters south and west of
Ireland, for the submarines took all
precautions against getting close
enough to be sighted by the destroy
ers. Yet the British and French navies
were not the only ones which at this
time were depending upon the patrol
as a protection against the subsur
face boat. The American navy was
committing precisely the same error
on our Atlantic coast. As soon as
congress declared war against Ger
many we expected that at least a
few of the U-boats would cross the
Atlantic and' attack American ship
ping; indeed, many believed that
Bomj some bad already crossed in an
ticipation of war; the papers were
filled with silly stories about "sub
marine bases" in Mexican waters, on
the New England coast and else
where; submarines were even re
ported entering LonV Island sound;
nets were stretched across the Nar
I rows to keep them out of New York
harbor; and our coasting vessels saw
periscopes and the wakes of torpe
does everywhere from Maine to Flor
ida. So prevalent was this appre
hension that, in the early days of the
war, American destroyers regularly
patrolled our coast looking for these
far-flung submarines. Yet the idea
of seeking them in this way was ab
surd. Even had we known where the
submarine was located there would
have been little likelihood that we
could ever have sighted it, to say
nothing of getting near it. Suppose
that we had learned that a German
U-boat was operating off Cape Cod;
we might have had the exact latitude
and longitude where she was ex
pected to be at a particular moment.
At the time the message was sent the
submarine might have been lying on
the surface teady to attack a passing
merchantman, but even under these
conditions the destroyer could never
have reached her quarry, for, as soon
as the U-boat saw the enemy ap
proaching, she would simply have
ducked under the water and remained
there in perfect safety. When all
danger was passed she would have
bobbed up to the surface as serenely
as you please, and gone ahead with
her appointed task of sinking mer
chant ships. One of the astonishing
things about this war was that many
of the naval officers of all countries
did not seem to understand, until a
very late date, how utterly futile it
was to send anti-submarine surface
craft out into the wide ocean to at
tack or chase away submarines. The
thing to do, of course, was to make
the submarines come to the anti-sub
marine craft and fight in order to
get merchantmen.
I have made this point before, and
I now repeat the explanation to em
phasize that the patrol system was
necessarily unsuccessful, because it
made almost impossible any combats
with submarines and afforded very
little protection to shipping. The ad
vantage of the convoy syBtcm, as its
advocates now urged, was precisely
that it made such combats Inevitable.
In other words. It meant offensive
warfare. It was proposed to sur
round each convoy with a protecting
screen of destroyers, precisely as in
the case of the battle fleet. Any sub
marine which attempted to torpedo a
convoyed ship could therefore do so
only in waters that were infested
with destroyers. In order to get into
position to discharge its missile the
submarine would Jiave to creep up
close to the rim that marked the cir
cle of these destroyers. Just as soon
as the torpedo started on its course
and the telltale wake appeared on the
surface the protecting ships would .
immediately begin sowing the waters
with their depth charges. Thus the
Germans would have to fight for
every ship which they attempted to
sink, instead of sinking them con
veniently in waters that were free of
destroyers, as had hitherto been their'
privilege. The great advantage of
sailing ships through waters that
were completely protected by destroy
ers had been shown in the immune
zone which had been established
across the channel from Dover to
Calais and from Folkestone to Bou
logne. By arranging ships in com
pact convoys and protecting them
with destroyers we would really
create another immune zone of this
kind, only it would be a movable one.
We should establish, say, a square
mile of the surface of the ocean in
which submarines could not operate
without great danger, and then we
would move that square mile along
until port was reached.
(Another article by Admiral Sims
i next Sunday.)
UNIQUE PHOTOGRAPHIC DEVICE RECORDS
WIRELESS MESSAGES ON PRINTED TAPE
Jtfarvelous Electrical Invention Makes Great Advance Over Present Practice Greater Speed, Accuracy and
4 a Permanent Record of Each Message Features of New York Engineer's Discovery.
proach to within a few hundred yards would have to maintain. It would be
in oraer w . .. . . ,.,ual i neceesary lor me amps to Keep to
gether, he explained, otherwise the
submarines could pick off the strag
glers. He asked the masters whether
it would be possible for eight mer
chant ships, with a speed which varied
perhaps two knots, to keep station in
line ahead (that Is, ln single file or
column) 600 yards apart, and sail in
two columns down the Channel.
It would be absolutely impossible,"
the ten masters replied, almost in a
chorus.
Lack of Trained Merchant Captains.
discouraging fact, they said, was
that many of the ablest merchant
captains had gone into the navy and
that many of those who had replaced
them could not be depended on to
handle their ships in such a formation.
"We have so few competent deck
officers that the captain would have
to be on the bridge the whole twenty
four hours," they said, and the diffi
culty was not only with the bridge.
but with the engine room. In order
to keep the ships constantly the same
distance apart it would be necessary
accurately to regulate their speed;
the battleships could do this because
they had certain elaborate devices
for timing the revolutions of the en
gines which the merchant vessels
lacked. The poor quality of the coal
which they were obtaining would also
make It difficult to maintain a regu
lar speed.
Admiral Jellicoe then asked the
masters whether they could sail in
twos or three and keep station.
."Two might do it, but three would
be too many," was the discouraging
verdict. But fne masters were posi
tive that even two merchantmen
could, not safely keep station abreast
in the night time without lights; two
such vessels would have to sail in
single file, the leading ship showing
.a stern light. The masters empha
sized their conviction that they pre
ferred to sail alone, each ship- for
Itself, and ' to let each one take Its
chances of getting into port.
Difficulty ln Overcoming; Opposition.
And there the matter rested. I had
the opportunity of discussing the con
voy system with several merchant
captains, and in these discussions
they- simply echoed the views which
had been expressed at this formal
conference. I do not believe . that
British naval officers came in con
tact with a single merchant master
who favored the convoy at that time.
They were not doubtful about th
idea; they were openly hostile. Ths
British merchant captains are a mag
nificent body of seamen; their first
thought was to serve their country
and the allied cause; their attitude
In this matter was not obstinacy; it
simply resulted from their sincere
conviction that the convoy system
would entail greater-shipping losses
than were then being inflicted by the
German submarines.
Many naval officers at that time
shared this same view. They opposed
the convoy not only on these grounds;
its introduction would mean immedi
ately cutting down the tonnage 15 or
20 per cent, because of the time which
would be consumed ln assembling the
ships and awaiting escorts and ln the
slower average speed which they
could make; many ship owners and
directors of steamship companies ex
pressed the same opinions. They also
objected to the convoy on the ground
that it would cause considerable delay
and hence loss of earnings. Yet the
attitude of the merchant marine had
not entirely eliminated the convoy
from consideration: At the time I ar
rived the proposal was still being dis
cussed; the rate at which the Germans
were sinking merchantmen made this
inevitable. And there seemed to be
two schools among allied naval men
one .opposed to. the convoy, and the
other insisting that it should be given
a trial. , The convoy had one Irresist
ible '-attraction for the officer expert
which seemed to counterbalance all
the objections which, were urged
against it. Its adoption would mean
faking the offensive against the Ger
man submarines. The essential de
fect of the. patrol system, as It was
then conducted, was that it was pri
marily a defensive, measure. . Each de
stroyer cruised around ln an assigned
area, , ready , to assist vessels, in dis
tress, escort ships through her own
"square" and,... Incidentally, attack
submarine when opportunity offered.
But .the mere fact that a destroyer
was patrolling a particular area, meant
only, as already explained, that the
submarine had occasionally to Bink
out of sight until she had passed by.
Consequently. the submarine proceeded
to operate whenever a destroyer was
not in sight, and. this was necessarily
most .of .the time, for the submarine
zone was. ouch a . big. place . and the
A
NEW marvel in connection with
wireless has come about and
photography plays a big part
in It. By this method, invented by
A. Hoxie. an electrical engineer of
Schenectady, N. Y.. wireless messages
can be received and recorded at a far
greater speed and with further as
surance of accuracy than has hereto
fore been possible.
For some time Uncle Sam's naval
engineers at Otter Cliffs receiving
station near Bar Harbor, Me., as a
matter of dally routine, have been
receiving and recording wireless mes
sages by this new photographic meth
od with perfect success.
The Invention permits the eye to
either supplement or replace the ear
n reading wireless messages. In fact.
a totally deaf man could be a wireless
receiving operator in a station so
equipped.
Other results are: Greater speed ln
receiving, greater accuracy ln de
ciphering, and a permanent record of
every dot and dash in every message
so received. Because of the very deli
cate tuning that can be obtained, and
the resulting high degree of "selec
tivity," it has been found practicable
to receive messages despite many in
ductive noises and interfering signals
which ordinarily have rendered recep
tion impossible. Although the Instru
ment Is not immune from the effects
of "static strays," it has successfully
recorded messages at high speed re
gardless of strong static interferences
that, without Its aid, would have baf
fled the receiving operator.
It is stated that messages have
been deciphered with Its assistance
when operators were unable to get a
single word of it by ear alone. Thus,
the outstanding obstacles to accuracy
in wireless receiving have been elim
inated, except for severe static inter
ference.
The photographic receiver and its
permanent record is a guard against
error, and will settle disputes, for its
visual record of a message in dots
and dashes distinctly shows to the
eye what was received. A photo
graphic print of this type Is of un
questionable accuracy.
As to speed in receiving, this ma
chine has frequently recorded at the
rate of 400 words per minute, as fast
as a machine, gun shoots, and recent
ly, in a test made by Mr. Hoxie, the
machine recorded a low power mes
sage at COO words per minute. Up
to this time the most rapid method
of recording radio signals has been
by the phonograph, but this must
etill be transcribed by the ear and
not the eye. Moreover, no permanent
visual record is made. The phono
graphic method has never yet ap
proached the rate of 600 wortls per
minute, so the new instrument has
hung up a new speed record. An in
teresting sidelight on this feature of
the invention is that high speed mes
sages are secret messages to all who
are not equipped with this device.
A commercial phase of the speed
question is peculiarly linked up with
the atmospheric-electric phenomena
of the northern temperate zone
For years it has been found that the
best time for transmitting all wire
less messages between here and Eu
rope was from 4 A- M. to 10 A. M.
Speedy sending and receiving can
c.ol dense the traffic into this most
favorable period,' or a greater volume
can be sent with a minimum number
of stations. When it is remembered
that a pair of stations one ln Eu
rope and one here can easily cost
J2.000. 000 the item of keeping down
overhead charges by rapid sending
will be easily appreciated.
Expert, operators have been known
to receive 35 words per minute for a
short time under perfect conditions.
but average reception up to this time
has been 15 to 20 words per minute,
or 1000 words per hour.
It has been a race between send
ing and receiving speeds. Prior , to
this invention, it has been possible
to send faster than it could be re-
csivfcd. but now the situation has
been reversed.
Photographic recorder in daily oper
ation at Bar Harbor has (repeatedly
recorded regular traffic schedules
ranging from 1000 to 7000 words
without Interruption, and at a speed
of 40 to 55 words per minute every
word Is perfect and easily and quickly
read. It is used supplementary to the
ordinary type of receiving set
Not only is the message perma
nently recorded on a tape of special
photographic paper, but a fleeting
visual image of the signals can be
seen cn tha ground glass of the ma
chine at the same Instant that the
electric Impulses arrive Xrom the an
tenna. And even more than this
an audible reception can also be made
simultaneously by the regular tele
phone method. Heretofore there has
been no visible record to refer to in
case any doubt arises as to the ac
curacy of the Interpretation of the
message from distant shores. Some
European stations repeat each wbrd
ln every message.
The mechanism is based on a com
paratively simple electrical engineer
ing principle. A lightweight mirror
"flutters" in electro-magnetic tuns
with the minute electric impulses
coming from the receiving antenna.
The duration and extent of the mir
ror s oscillations vary according to
the dot, dash or silence of the send
ing station. This mirror reflects a
beam of light on the moving sensi
tized tape. This tape, propelled by an
electric motor, progresses up and
down through the vertical pipes
which contain the developing and fix
ing chemicals.
Automatically the tape enters the
developing fluid and then the hypo
fixing bath; then it is washed in run
ning water, and is dried by electrio
heat assisted by forced draft all ia
vitibly effected inside this single ma
chine. Like the tape from a stock
ticker, the message pours out of the
wonderful device and into a basket.
In regard to receiving, there is an
average of one word for every inch
of tape. The receiving operators can
rad the record at a speed of 50 to 100
words per minute.
The time to record, develop, fix,
wash and dry the tape is from two to
f ur minutes. The rolls of tape are
1000 feet long and a continuous mes
sage of 10,000 words can be record
ed without reloading the machine.
Silver Plentiful in Yukon.
DAWSON, Y. T. Silver, "the white
hope of the Yukon," as it has been
called, has been found in such quan
tities in this northern territory that
it is believed sooner or later large
deposits will be found to replace the
decreasing yields of gold and copper.
Silver has been found in several
places In the Yukon territory, partic
ularly at Mayo, Twelve-Mile, Sixty
Mile, up the Hootalinqua river, and in
the southern Yukon valley. All the
reports of silver strikes indicate, it is
said, that the silver is scattered over
an area of thousands of square miles.
i