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PORTLAND, SUNDAY, MARCH 16, 1919.

OUR DUTY TO CIVILIZATION.

Frank A. Vanderlip is not only president of the biggest bank in the United States; he is a well-informed, broad-minded, far-seeing and patriotic citizen as has proved by dropping his own business to take up management of the war savings campaign. For these reasons the following passages from his statement of the condition of Europe should have the earnest attention of every good citizen:

What we have in Europe is not peace. Production has ceased and unless production can be speedily resumed, one's imagination cannot comprehend the chaos which may ensue.

If production is not resumed, the horrors of war may be repeated. The world after this after-period, which is neither war nor peace, but a breakdown of the machinery of civilization.

In the face of such appalling disaster every person considering, every government, every nation, every individual, every social ambition should be instantly fortified.

Humanity can lead any country to believe, and hunger is what Central Europe is facing.

Alleviating conditions of starvation does not get at the root of the thing. That root must be dug down into the ground and beyond that situation it to be saved, every effort must be best toward solving the problem and not toward creating it.

What can America do? There is certainly one thing that cannot be done, and that is to withdraw from Europe. It is certain that this chaos is remote and that America can avoid playing her part in international responsibility.

We must think in international terms as we never thought before. There is no time for narrow provincial views. The absolutely fundamental necessity of this situation is that the organization of production be restored.

The soundness of those conclusions cannot be successfully disputed. A city is in a perilous position. One of us must help to save the world in order to save our own country; we must help to save our country in order to save ourselves from the fate which at this day befalls millions in Russia.

It is too late to consider anything but the emergency which is before us. The thing to consider now is the situation as it exists and to decide how to save civilization from wreck.

Having gone so far toward organizing a league of nations as the foundation of peace, it is not to be expected that it would avoid delay by going on as it has begun, perfecting the league constitution by removing the defects which criticism has revealed, and establishing certainty as to the future.

There is no room for party animus in considering changes that will neither create nor destroy it. Presidential slight, real or fancied, are inconsequential beside the duty to recognize that the overwhelming opinion of the people favors the league, that the salvation of the republic and the world is bound up with it.

Present talk of what the allies shall do to punish Germany is immature and inopportune. As an organized state, Germany is a corpse in which decomposition has set in. It has become the foreign ground and breeding place of Bolshevism, and threatens to become the bridge over which that disease will cross to all surrounding countries. The thing for the allies to do is to fix the boundaries and the armament of Germany, sell food and raw materials to it, and let it rot and put it to work. It will be time enough, when this has been done, to discuss the question of indemnity for damage done in the war. All agree that Germany is a multi-murderer, but politically and economically the country is a corpse and no man can no more be collected from such a corpse than from a dead murderer. His watch and clothes can be taken, but nothing else. After the allies have supplied the elementary necessities of life and industry and have set Germany to work, they may collect indemnity from anything that remains after the people have fed and clothed themselves.

There are symptoms that the American people imagined their duty done when fighting in Europe. Such is the flagging interest in the fund for relief of the Armenians. We dare not assume that the chaos in Europe is none of our business. It will remain our business until the after war troubles have been completely solved. In any event, it is our duty to look to the column of The Oregonian next to that which contains Mr. Vanderlip's statement. It tells of an anarchist society of Russian peasants which had been organized in New York under the nose of the police. A similar society of other nationalities was raised in Portland, men of the same stripe trained control of the labor unions in Seattle with what results we know, and proof has been presented to a senate committee that other like organizations exist in other cities and that these combinations work together to destroy the republic. The doctrine of these revolutionists was made in Germany, transplanted to Russia and has spread all over the world. It is propagated by the condition of Germany, Russia and all other war-wrecked countries of Europe. To fight it effectively we must fight it at its source, by the means which Mr. Vanderlip suggests. Fighting it in America is only fighting symptoms.

The duty described comes home to every person in Oregon, rich or poor. The highest obligation is on the employers, because of the greater knowledge, ability and means which have made them employers. They can prove the falsity of the outcry against "capitalism" by paying their employees the fair value of labor and by dealing with labor as an organized body on the principle of collective bargaining. Workmen need to re-

member that the first purpose of the reds is to destroy labor unions. This purpose can best be thwarted by aggressive action on the part of those who are loyal to the republic to suppress the radicals and to cast out the bolsheviki who have joined unions only to disrupt them. In these days we can best serve ourselves by serving the community, the nation and the civilized world.

EXALTED JUSTICE.

It will profit those who urge the traditional position of the United States as reason for rejecting the league of nations plan to read in full the new oft quoted farawall address of George Washington. It will interest lovers of exactness in quotation, too, to discover that there is no mention therein against "entangling alliances." Washington's expression is "permanent alliances." The words "entangling alliances" so frequently put in Washington's mouth were uttered by Thomas Jefferson against the French alliance.

One may as readily read into Washington's farawall address a sweeping condemnation in every time, place and circumstance, of political parties as one may read therein an equally sweeping condemnation of foreign alliances. He urges the rejection of party spirit but admits that it is inseparable from our nature. In leading up to his admonition against permanent alliances his long discussion is with marked singularity of particular nations and passionate attachments to others.

Washington recites the obvious reason of an habitual hatred of one foreign country or an habitual fondness for another. Fear that the young nation might be involved in political or commercial relations neither open-handed nor impartial seems to have been the main current of his thought. Thus he uttered a caution against implicating ourselves by artificial ties with the "ordinary vicissitudes of European politics with the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships and enmities." "It is our true policy," he said, "to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the world."

The insistence of nations embraces a permanent alliance, but not a discriminatory one nor one with any single portion of the world. But were one to concede that Washington had included in his thought an impartial and world-embracing alliance for insurance of peace and had warned against it, it will not and it cannot be denied that "our detached and distant situation" upon which he then relied now exists in fact. In the light of recent events there is in truth no departure in the league pact and in fact, it is none from this advice of the first president:

"Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. Cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct. And can good policy do less than equally enjoin it."

"It will be worthy a free, enlightened and at no distant period a great nation to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence."

INDEMNITY FOR ART.

The sense of justice of most persons who are rightly disposed to the proposal, now seriously made in France, that the Germans be compelled to make reparation in kind for the works of French art which they wantonly destroyed during the war, is being completely lost, but that in the depths of Germany a little corner of France, filled with its architecture, its gardens, its furniture, paintings and books. M. Marguillier thinks it is time that this "corner of France" was moved back to France, and he is not alone in this. Our own Ambassador Morgenthau is drawn into the discussion through the statement made to him by Baron Wangenheim at Constantinople that the influence of Great Britain, Russia and Austria in 1871 had saved Paris from being completely looted, but that in this war there would be a different result. "We shall transport to Berlin," he exulted, "all the treasures of art which belong to the state." But still more convincing, from the point of view of created precedent, is the suggestion of a world-wide indemnity for art, which would be completely lost, but that in this war there would be a different result. "We shall transport to Berlin," he exulted, "all the treasures of art which belong to the state." But still more convincing, from the point of view of created precedent, is the suggestion of a world-wide indemnity for art, which would be completely lost, but that in this war there would be a different result.

So the Germans, heedless of the day when they might be hoist by their own petard, are now creating precedents which now rise to confound them. M. Marguillier cites a Berlin magazine which in 1914 began to prepare public opinion for the bountiful reparation—not merely in money—which would be made to the victors from the invasion of Belgium. Liege, Namur, Brussels, Malines and Antwerp already had fallen. The kingdom of Belgium might soon cease to exist. "The descendants of Van Eyck and Rubens have preserved many paintings. . . and upon this part of the national patrimony the hand of the conqueror will fall." The German went so far as to catalogue the expected treasures. It is hard to see how the Germans now will be able to escape from the consequences of their own policy.

French and Belgians are now taking their turn at cataloguing. The "little corner of France" has been considerably expanded. The eighteenth century French school is particularly well represented in imperial palaces of Prussia, where, now that the imperial family has been ejected, it would seem that there would be less sentimental consideration for the art treasures there reposing. Watteau, Lancret, disciple and imitator of Watteau, and Jean Baptiste Joseph Pater, pupil of the master, are represented there in numbers. La Bru, La Tour and David are some of the others. A good many paintings are to be true, were acquired by purchase, but it will be kept in mind that France does not propose to appropriate them in revenge but as compensation for works which, having been destroyed, cannot be paid for in mere money. There are 12 per cent of German titles which are not so

clear. David's "Bonaparte" is one of these. M. Marguillier says that this was stolen from the chateau of St. Cloud by Blucher in 1815. It is not specified whether this and all others of similar category are to be included in the list of works of reparation, or simply appropriated on the ground that they belong to France.

The Prussians seem to have been especially inept in their establishment of precedence in art. It is plain to the French critic recalls that after this war began certain works were taken back to Germany solely for the sake of old times, because they had graced, in some remote day, some of the church or gallery. He ruthlessly and with almost German thoroughness enumerates a long list of paintings and statues which Germany will lose if this rule is followed. The Flemish masters figure prominently. The "Flemish masters" figure prominently. The "Flemish masters" figure prominently.

It will be noted that France is laying no claim to works of German art. These in themselves are not inconsiderable, but the Germans would have to be removed wholly from the influence of chauvinism, a good deal could be said in behalf of a policy of stripping the German galleries of their art treasures. It is plain to no more than the Germans would have done in the case of French art if they had won the war. But France will be content if reparation can be enforced only in French—and Belgian—works.

It remains to be seen whether the present conference, engrossed in matters of greater moment, can be induced to give consideration to claims which are deeply sentimental but at the same time eminently just.

As final and conclusive evidence that the war is over, the old-time hobo has begun his wanderings again. He had disappeared into the ranks of industry for any kind of work, but the work-or-fight order to violate his code.

The professional tramp never did constitute a social problem; he was an individual one. Prosperity or the reverse of it had nothing to do with his existence. He was a hobo, and he was willing to compromise with it by degrading only the satisfaction of exceedingly simple wants.

The true hobo should not be confounded with the "immigrant worker" or any other kind of worker. The present problem of the hobo is how to pass himself for a war hero without subjecting himself to the plans being made to furnish returned soldiers with jobs. He doesn't want a job. All he wants is to eat each meal in a different part of the country.

With infant nonchalance he named the capitals of many states, and located them, as well as many of the principal cities of the world. Several times he was asked to spell a word of today were known to him. That is, he was able to identify them by accurate data other than the mere names. He told his teacher of the discovery of America, named the date and discovered the natives. Columbus found them. The crops of the world were an open book to him—he knew where they were grown and to what purpose they were devoted.

Certainly, in this instance there is evident a marked degree of precocity, at least. It may be that the child is entitled to entry in the prodigy class. But with most observers, unless additionally startling and convincing evidence is offered, the case of the Clatsop county boy will be set aside as a remarkable memory. It will be a year or so, even into high school days, before competent judgment may be passed. In its present phase the case is unusual, but scarcely extraordinary. Mathematically, it is a year or so, even into high school days, before competent judgment may be passed. In its present phase the case is unusual, but scarcely extraordinary. Mathematically, it is a year or so, even into high school days, before competent judgment may be passed.

There have been scores of infant prodigies. In later life, they ran true to form, the great names of history would have been furnished, to a large extent, by these super-children. The facts do not tally. The proof of the matter is that the father had a greater number of lofty perches were gained by studious endeavor, by a constant striving against odds, and by the will to conquer apparent limitations of mind and body.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH TUNNEL PROJECT.

Revival of efforts to put through the Dover-to-Calais tunnel project, as is likely never to be completed, but employment situation in both England and France, recalls some interesting memories. No other projected enterprise of modern times has hung fire so long, or experienced so many ups and downs. It is 117 years since the first engineer, Matthew Piers, proposed the scheme to Napoleon I, eighty-six years since Thome de Gramont dedicated his life to the enterprise and began a series of exhaustive studies of channel geology, and sixty-three years since a diamond-shaped detailed plan and specifications which, together with a scheme for financing the project, were approved by Napoleon III eleven years later. Bills on preliminary measures passed both the French and British parliaments in 1875, and a political protocol was drawn up in 1876.

This was two years before the beginning of preliminary work on the Panama canal, which we used to regard as a monument to rap and delay. But while the Panama canal, which cost nearly four times as much as the estimated cost of the channel tunnel, was passing through various political stages, the Anglo-French project encountered an unexpected storm of opposition. The reasons why the latter was not completed are largely psychological. The British people, who have been taught are a phlegmatic race, developed a striking tendency to "nerves." It was this and this alone which defeated the tunnel project. England became obsessed with the notion of imaginative Nothing could quiet its fears. Even the declaration of the German field marshal, Von Moltke, that a tunnel under the English channel, connecting England with France, "will not be of any use for the invasion of England, because the navy will prevent it," failed to restore the British equilibrium.

It is now seen that if work had been prosecuted with vigor from the time the first test shaft was sunk, near Folkestone in 1856, the recent war might have resulted differently. The vital influence which a two-track tunnel might have had when the first detachments of the British army were making a valiant stand with insufficient equipment against the Germans in 1914, is not to be underestimated. But speculation goes further than that, for it also takes account of the battle of Jutland, and the possibility of a more conclusive outcome if a good share of British naval effort had not been necessarily expended in the maintenance of right of way across the channel.

That existence of the tunnel in the intervening years would have put a different face on the war is also deducible from figures which have recently been prepared by the tunnel advocates. That one track each way would have made it possible to transport 163,000 men and their equipment in one direction every ten days, and on the return could have taken care of 24,000,000 of the 28,000,000 tons of food which England imported annually gives some indication of the great relief which would have been afforded to shipping and the simplification of the war organization which would have been made possible.

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French people, but has been even more greatly influenced by completion of plans for defense of the proposed tunnel. Provision has been made, in abundance, for the future, for flooding a dip in the tunnel by a device to be operated independently from each of two inland forts, for the construction of mines by which the tunnel could be destroyed in emergency, and by control of the operating electric current from either end. These provisions have disposed of the agitation against the tunnel which was waged for more than thirty years, beginning in 1852. News from London that the government is now prepared to go ahead promptly with the work, therefore, is highly credible.

The Panama canal has so surfeited us with gigantic engineering accomplishment that the channel tunnel will give us the thrill which it would have caused even a decade ago. The Panama canal has cost between \$350,000,000 and \$400,000,000. The tunnel may be built for \$100,000,000. The cost of two tubes was estimated in abundance of regard to \$200,000 and \$50,000,000. Cost of labor and material have largely increased since then, and the present project contemplates four tubes instead of two. The outlay, however, seems small by comparison with the billions that have been expended on war. Early estimates were that the tunnel would pay a profit of \$28,735,000 francs a year by 1925, but these were estimated upon a two-track basis. The enterprise presents no engineering obstacles, and financiers regard it as a relatively safe task, say, than amortization of the cost of our own interstate bridge.

The effect of the Dover-to-Calais tunnel upon tunnel-building in general may be momentous. Another tunnel enterprise, which would connect Gibraltar with Morocco, has gone beyond the preliminary stages, and a subway under the Bosphorus is also being seriously considered. To the engineer all these enterprises are simple enough. The outcome depends solely upon ability of the nations concerned to cooperate to the end desired.

INFANT PRODIGES.

Precocity in children has long furnished parents and jocosmiths with material for conversation and photographs. But mere precocity is no more than normal, for every average child is certain to show, at times, flashes of brilliancy that are startling in their luminous insight—an insight that is not all of the intellect, but of the mental vision, so it seems, of one far older in years and experience.

Infant prodigies, however, are of different mental temper than the ordinary child. They are born with a kind of kindergarten. There are substantiated records of many such. Some were gifted, almost from babyhood, with an uncanny, intuitive comprehension of mathematics. While their playthings were stumbling through addition and subtraction, after the manner of the average child, the prodigies were soaring in the bright ether of higher calculus. They will serve for examples of the type.

Clatsop county is said to have reared a child of marked degree of precocity, at least. It may be that the child is entitled to entry in the prodigy class. But with most observers, unless additionally startling and convincing evidence is offered, the case of the Clatsop county boy will be set aside as a remarkable memory. It will be a year or so, even into high school days, before competent judgment may be passed. In its present phase the case is unusual, but scarcely extraordinary. Mathematically, it is a year or so, even into high school days, before competent judgment may be passed.

There have been scores of infant prodigies. In later life, they ran true to form, the great names of history would have been furnished, to a large extent, by these super-children. The facts do not tally. The proof of the matter is that the father had a greater number of lofty perches were gained by studious endeavor, by a constant striving against odds, and by the will to conquer apparent limitations of mind and body.

THE ANGLO-FRENCH TUNNEL PROJECT.

Revival of efforts to put through the Dover-to-Calais tunnel project, as is likely never to be completed, but employment situation in both England and France, recalls some interesting memories. No other projected enterprise of modern times has hung fire so long, or experienced so many ups and downs. It is 117 years since the first engineer, Matthew Piers, proposed the scheme to Napoleon I, eighty-six years since Thome de Gramont dedicated his life to the enterprise and began a series of exhaustive studies of channel geology, and sixty-three years since a diamond-shaped detailed plan and specifications which, together with a scheme for financing the project, were approved by Napoleon III eleven years later. Bills on preliminary measures passed both the French and British parliaments in 1875, and a political protocol was drawn up in 1876.

This was two years before the beginning of preliminary work on the Panama canal, which we used to regard as a monument to rap and delay. But while the Panama canal, which cost nearly four times as much as the estimated cost of the channel tunnel, was passing through various political stages, the Anglo-French project encountered an unexpected storm of opposition. The reasons why the latter was not completed are largely psychological. The British people, who have been taught are a phlegmatic race, developed a striking tendency to "nerves." It was this and this alone which defeated the tunnel project. England became obsessed with the notion of imaginative Nothing could quiet its fears. Even the declaration of the German field marshal, Von Moltke, that a tunnel under the English channel, connecting England with France, "will not be of any use for the invasion of England, because the navy will prevent it," failed to restore the British equilibrium.

It is now seen that if work had been prosecuted with vigor from the time the first test shaft was sunk, near Folkestone in 1856, the recent war might have resulted differently. The vital influence which a two-track tunnel might have had when the first detachments of the British army were making a valiant stand with insufficient equipment against the Germans in 1914, is not to be underestimated. But speculation goes further than that, for it also takes account of the battle of Jutland, and the possibility of a more conclusive outcome if a good share of British naval effort had not been necessarily expended in the maintenance of right of way across the channel.

That existence of the tunnel in the intervening years would have put a different face on the war is also deducible from figures