6
THE SUNDAY OREGONIAX. PORTLAND, SEPTE3IBER 21, 1913
iter .( - -W. W k-to u IB, r 7?M
' 11 J.l j
!T would be Instructive to remember.
If only we were willing' to do so,
the fairly comic panlo which swept
in waves over our seacoast, first when
it became evident that war was about
to be declared, and then when it was
declared. The public waked up to the
sufficiently obvious fact that the Gov
ernment was in its usual state peren
nial unreadiness for war. Thereupon
the people of the seaboard district
passed at one bound from unreasoning
confidence that war never could come
to unreasoning fear as to what mlgb
happen now that it had come. That
acute philosopher, Mr. Dooley, pro
claimed that In the Spanish War we
were in a dream, but that the Spaniards
were In a trance. This Just about
summed up the facts. Our people had
for decades scoffed at the thought of
making ready for possible war. Now,
when It was too late, they not only
backed every measure, wise and un
wise, that offered a chance of supply
ing a need that ought to have been
met before, but they also fell into a
condition of panic apprehension as to
what the foe might do.
For years we had been saying, just
as any number of our people now say,
that no nation would venture to at
tack us. Then when we did go to wa
with an exceedingly feeble nation we,
for the time being, rushed to the other
extreme of feeling, and attributed to
this feeble nation plans of offensive
warfare which it never dreamed of
making, and which. If made, it would
have been wholly unable to execute.
Some of my readers doubtless remem
ber the sinister intentions and unlim
ited potentialities for destruction with
which the fertile imagination of the
yellow press endowed the armored
cruiser Viscaya when she appeared in
American waters Just before war was
declared. The state of nervousness
along much of the seacoast was funny
in view of the lack of foundation for
it: but it offered food for serious
thought as to what would happen if
we ever became engaged with a seri
ous foe.
The Governor of one state actually
announced that he would not permit
the National Guard, of that state to
leave its borders, the idea being to re
tain it against a possible invasion. So
many of the business men of the City
of Boston took their securities Inland
to Worcester that the safety deposit
companies of u orcester proved un
able to take care of them. In my own
neighborhood on Long Island clauses
were gravely put Into leases to the ef
feet that in case the property were
destroyed by the Spaniards the lease
should lapse. As Assistant Secretary
of the Navy I had every conceivable
impossible request made to me.
Members of Congress who had actively
opposed building any navy came clam
orously around to ask each for a ship
for some special purpose of protection
connected with his district. It seems
incredible, but it is true that not only
these Congressmen, but the Chambers
of Commerce and Boards of Trade of
different coast cities all lost their
heads for the time being and raised a
deafening clamor and brought every
species of pressure to bear on the Ad
ministration to get it to adopt the one
most fatal course that is. to dis
tribute the Navy, ship by ship, at all
kinds of points'' and In all kinds of
ports, with the idea of protecting every
thing everywhere and thereby render
ing it absolutely certain that even the
Spanish fleet, poor though it was,
would be able to pick up our own Navy
ship by ship in detail. One Congress
man besought me for a ship to protect
Jekyll Island, off the coast of Georgia,
an island which derived its sole conse
quence because it contained the Win
ter homes of certain millionaires. A
lady whose husband occupied a very In
fluential position and who was normal,
ljr a most admirable and sensible
woman, came to insist that a ship
should be anchored off a huge seaside
hotel because she had a house In the
neighborhood.
Smooth-Bore Defense.
There were many such instances.
One stood out above the others. A
certain seaboard state contained in its
Congressional delegation one of the
most Influential men in the Senate and
one of the most influential men In the
lower house. These two men had been
worse than lukewarm about building
up the Navy and had 'scoffed at the idea
of there ever being any danger from
any foreign power. With the advent
of war the feelings of their con
stituents, and therefore ieir own feel
ings, suffered an immediate change
and they demanded that a ship be an
chored in the harobr of their city as a
protection. -Getting no comfort from
me, they went "higher up" and became
a kind of permanent committee in at
tendance upon the President. They
were very influential men in the houses,
with whom it was important for the
Administration to keep on good terms
and, moreover, they possessed a per
tinacity as great as the widow who
won her case from the unjust Judge.
Finally the President gave in and no
titled me to gee that a ship was sent to
the city in question. I was bound
that, as long as a ship had to be sen
it should not be a ship worth anything.
Accordingly a Civil War monitor, with
one smooth-bore gun, manned by
crew of about 21 naval militia, was
sent to the city in question, under
convoy of a tug. It was a hazardous
trip for the unfortunate naval militia
men, but n was safely accomplished
ana joy and peace descended upon th
Senator and Congressman and upon th
President whom they had Jointly har
rassed. Incidentally, the fact that
the protecting war vessel would not
have been a formidable foe to any an
tagonists of much more modern con'
struction than the gallays of Alcl
biades seemed to disturb nobody.
The Call to Anna.
This was one side of the picture. The
otner side was that the crisis at one
brought to the front any amount
latent fighting strength. There were
plenty of Congressmen who showed
cool-headed wisdom and resolution. The
plain people, the men and women back
of the persons who lost their heads,
set seriously to work to see that we
did whatever was necessary, and made
the Job a thorough one. The young
men swarmed to enlist. In time of
peace it had been difficult to fill the
scanty regular Army and Navy, end
there were innumerable desertions; now
the ships and regiments were over-en
listed, and so many deserters returned
in order to fight that it became diffi
cult to decide what to do with them.
England, and to a less degree Japan
were friendly. The great powers of
continental Europe were all unfriendly.
They Jeered at our ships and men. and
with fatuous partisanship Insisted that
the Spaniards would prove too much
for our "mercenaries'" because we were
a commercial people of low ideals who
could not fight, while the men whom
we attempted to hire for that purpose
were certain to run on the day of bat
tle.
Leonard Wood,
Among my friends was the then Army
Surgeon Leonard Wood. He was a sur
geon. Not having- an income, he had to
earn nis own living. He had gone
through the Harvard Medical School,
and had then Joined the Army in the
Southwest as a contract doctor. He had
every physical, moral and mental qual.
ity which fitted him for a soldier's
life and for the exercise of command.
In the Inconceivably wearing and har
assing campaigns against the Apaches
he had served nominally as a surgeon,
really in command of troops, on more
than one expedition. He was as anxious
I was that if there were war we
hould both have our part in it. I had
always felt that If there were a serious
war I wished to be in a position to ex
plain to my children why I did take
part in it, and not why I did not take
part in it. Moreover, I had very deeply
felt that It was our duty to free Cuba,
and I had publicly expressed this feel
ing, and when a man takes such a posi
tion, he ought to be willing to make his
words good by his deeds unless there
s some very strong reason to the con
trary. He should pay with his body.
The Rough Riders.
As soon as war was upon us. Wood
and I began to try for a chance to go
the front. Congress had authorized the
raising of three National Volunteer
Cavalry regiments, wholly apart from
the state contingents. Secretary Alger,
of the War Department, was fond of
me personally, and Wood was his
family doctor. Alger had been a gal
lant soldier in the Civil War, and was
almost the only member of the Ad
ministration who felt all along that we
would have to go to war with Spain
over Cuba. He liked my attitude in
the matter, and because of his remem
brance of his own experiences he
sympathized with my desire to go to
the front. Accordingly he offered me
the command of one of the regiments.
I told him that after six weeks' service
'in the field I would feel competent to
handle the regiment, but that I would
not know how to equip it or how to get
it into the first action, but that Wood
was entirely competent at once to. take
command, and that if he would mak
Wood Colonel I would accept the Lieu
tenant - Colonelcy. General Alger
thought this an act of foolish self-
abnegation on my. part Instead of its
be In sr. what it was. the wisest act
could have performed. He told me l
accept the Colonecy and that he would
make Wood Lieutenant-Colonel, ana
that Wood would do the work anyway,
but I answered that I did not wish
to rise on any man's ehouldes; that
hoped to-be given every chance that
my deeds and abilities warranted: oat
that I did not wish what I did not earn.
and that, above all. I did not wish to
hold any position where anyone else
did the work. He laughed at me'
little and said I was foolish, but I do
not think he really minded, ana n
promised to do as I wished. True to
his word, he secured the appointmer-t
of Wood as Colonel and of myself as
Lieutenant-Colonel of the First United
States Volunteer Cavalry. This was
soon nicknamed, both by the pub
and by the rest of the Army the Rough
Riders, doubtless because the bulk of
the men were from the Southwestern
ranch country and were skilled in the
wild horsemanship of the great plains.
Raising; the Regiment.
Wood Instantly began the work of
raising the regiment. He first assem
bled several old non-commissioned of
fleers of experience, put them in of
fice and gave them blanks for requl
tions for the full equipment of a cav
alry regiment. He selected San An
tonio as the gathering-place, as it was
in a good horse country, near the Gulf,
from some port on which we would
have to embark, and near an old ar
senal and an old Army post from
which we got a good deal of stuff-
some of it practically condemned, but
which we found serviceable at a pinch,
and much better than nothing. He or
ganized a horse board in Texas and
began purchasing all horses that were
not too big and were sound. A day
or two after he was commissioned he
wrote out in the office of the Secre
tary of War, telegrams to the Govern
ors of Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma
and Indian Territory in substance as
follows:
The President desires to raise vol
unteers in your Territory to form part
of a regiment of mounted rifleman to
be commanded by Leonard Wood. Colo
nei; rneoaore noosevelt, Lieutenant-
Colonel. He desires that the men se
lected should be young, sound, good
hots and good riders, and that you ex
pedite by all means In your power the
enrollment or these men.
(Signed)
R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War.
as soon as ne naa attended to a
few more odds and ends he left Wash
ington. and the day after his arrival
n San Antonio the troops began to Ar
rive,
The Valne of Black Top Boots.
For several weeks before I Joined
the regiment, to which Wood went
ahead of me, I continued as Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, trying to net
some conerence 01 plan between the
War Department and the Navy Depart
ment; and also being used by Wood to
finish getting the equipment for the
regiment. As regards finding out what
the plans of the War Department were.
the task was simple. They had no
plans. Even during the final months
before the outbreak of hostilities very
little was done In the way of efficient
preparation. On one occasion, when
every one knew that the declaration
of war was sure to come in a few days.
went on military business to the of
fice of one of the- highest line generals
of the Army, a roan who at that mo
ment ought to have been working 18
ours out of the 24 on the vital prob
lems ahead of him. What he was act
ually doing was trying on a new type
of smart-looking uniform on certain
enlisted men; and he called me in to
ask my advice as to the position of
the pockets in the blouse with a view
to making it look attractive. An aide
of this general funnily enough a good
fighting man in actual service when I
consulted him as to what my uniform
for the campaign should be, laid special
stress upon my purchasing a pair of
black top-boots for full dress, explain
ing that they were very effective on
hotel piazzas and in parlors. I did not
intend to be in any hotel if it could
possibly be avoided; and as things
turned out. I had no full-dress uniform,
nothing but my service uniform, during
my brief experience in the army.
Mercenary Patriotism. '
I suppose that war always does bring
out what is highest and lowest in hu
man nature. The contractors who fur
nish poor materials to the Army or
the. Navy in time of war stand on a
level of infamy only one degree above
that of the participants in the white
slave traffic themselves. But there is
conduct far short of this which yet
seems Inexplicable to any man who has
in him any spirit of disinterested pat
rlotlsm combined with any power of im.
agination. Respectable men. who
suppose lack the imagination thorough
ly to realize what they are doing, try
to make money out of the Nation s ne
cessities in war at the very time that
other men are making every sacrifice
financial and personal, for the cause.
In the closing weeks of my service as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy we
were collecting ships for auxiliary pur
poses. Some men. at cost to their own
purses, helped us freely and with ef
ficiency; others treated the affair as
an ordinary business transaction; and
yet others endeavored, at some given
crisis when our need was great, to sell
us inferior vessels at exorbitant prices,
and used every pressure, through Sen
ators and Congressmen, to accomplish
their ends. In one or two cases they
did accomplish them, too, until we got
a really first-class board established to
superintend such purchases. A more
curious experience was in connection
with the point chosen for the starting
of the expedition against Cuba. I had
not supposed that any human being
could consider this matter save from
the standpoint of military need. But
one morning a very wealthy and lnflu
entlal man, & respectable and upright
man according to his own lights, called
on me to protest against our choice of
Tampa, and to put in a plea for a cer
tain other port, on the ground that his
railroad was entitled to its share of
the profit for hauling the Army and
equipment! I happened to know that
at this time this very man had kins
folk with the Army, who served gal
lantly, and the olrcumstances of his
coming to me were such as to show
that he was not acting secretly, and
had no Idea that there was anything out
of the way in his proposal. I think the
facts were merely that he had been
trained to regard business as the sole
object In life, and that he lacked the
imagination to enable him to under-
tand the real nature of the request
that he was making; and, moreover, he
had good reason to believe that one of
his business competitors had been un
duly favored.
Army Stagnation.
The War Department was in far
worse shape than the Navy Depart
ment. The young officers turned out
from West Point are precisely as good
s the young- officers turned out from
Annapolis, and this always has been
true. But at that time (something has
been done to remedy the worst condl
tions since), and ever since the close
of the Civil War, the conditions were
such that after a few years the army
officer stagnated so far as his profes
ion was concerned. When the Spanish
War broke out the navy really was
largely on a war footing, as any navy
which Is even- respectably cared for in
time of peace must be. The admirals.
captains and lieutenants were contln-
ally practicing their profession in al.
most precisely the way that it has to
be practised in time of war. Except
actually shooting at a foe, most of the
men on board ship went through in
time of peace practically all that they
would have to go through, in time of
ar. The heads of bureaus in the
Navy Department were for the most
part men who had seen sea service.
who expected to return to sea service,
and who were preparing for needs
which they themselves knew by ex
perience. Moreover, the civilian head
of the navy had to provide for keeping
the ships in a state of reasonable ef
ficiency, and Congress could not hope
lessly misbehave Itself about the navy
without the fact at once becoming evi
dent. .
How High to Shave a Mule's Tall.
All this was changed so far as the
army was. concerned. Not only was it
upon his devoted head. He was made
the scapegoat for our National short
comings. The fault was not his; the
fault and responsIbiHty lay with us,
the people, who for 33 years had per
mitted our representatives in Congress
and in National executive office to bear
themselves so that it was absolutely
Impossible to avoid the great bulk of
all the trouble that occurred, and of
all the shortcomings of which our peo
ple complained, during1 the Spanish
War. The chief immediate cause was
crossbows and mangonels. We sno-
ceeded, thanks to Wood, in getting the
same cavalry carbines that were used
by the regulars. We were determined
to do this, not only because the wea-
Dons were (rood, but because this would
In all probability mean that we should
be brigaded with the regular cavalry,
which it was certain would be sent Im
mediately to the front for the fighting.
Bureaucracy and Red Tape.
There was one worthy bureau chief
who was continually refusing applica
tions of mine as irregular. In each
the condition of red-taDe bureaucracy
possible to decrease the efficiency of j which existed in the War Department i case j wouid appeal to Secretary Alger
the army without being called to ac- at Washington, which had prevented . whn halnaH mA In vrv WAV ftnd
count for it, but the only way in which I any good organization or the prepara- got an order from him countenancing
the Secretary of War could gain credit I tion of any good plan of operation for I tne irregularity. For instance, I found
for nimseir or tne Administration was using our men and supplies. The re-out that as we were nearer the July
by economy, and the easiest way to currence of these conditions, even date than the January date for the
reonumiao wae in uouuevuu.i y uu i tnougn in somewnar. less aggravated issuance of clothing, and as It had long
something that would not be felt unless form, in any future emergency is as I been customary to issue the Winter
war should arise. The people took no I certain as sunrise unless we bring I clothing in July, so as to give ample
lnieresi wnaiever in me army; uein- aDOut tne principle ot a rour years leisure for getting it to all the various
agogues clamored against it, and, in- detail In the staff corps a principle posts, it was therefore solemnly pro
adequate though It was in size, insisted which Congress has now for years stub- posed to issue this same Winter cloth
that It should be still further reduced, bornly refused to grant. ing to us who were about to start for
Popular orators always appealed to the ,. .. , Summer campaign In the tropics. This
volunteers; the regulars had no votis .,., aj tn would seem incredible to those who
ana there was no point in politicians - "" , ,' , " ' " have never dealt with an inert official
thinking of them. The chief activity have peaceful ideals Inculcated, and to dom a red.tape bureaucracy, but such
shown by Congressmen about the army whom militarism is a curse and a mis- ja tne fact. I rectified this and got an
was in getting special army posts built fortune. There are other nations, like order for khaki clothing. We wefe
in places where there was no need for I our own, so happily situated that the I then told we would have to advertise
them. Even the work of the army in I thought of war is never present to 30 days for horses. This meant that
Its campaigns against the Indians was their minds. They .are wholly free wa would have missed the Santiago ex-
of such a character that- it was gen-I from any tendency improperly to exalt pedltion. 60 I made another success-
erany perrormea Dy sman ooaies ot ou 1 or to practice militarism. inese na- fUi appeal to the Secretary, utner air
or 100 men. Until a man ceased being I tions should never forget that there ficulties came ud about wagons, and
a Lieutenant he usually had plenty of I must be military ideals no less than I various articles, and in each case the
professional work to attend to and was I peaceful ideals. The exaltation of No- same result followed. On the last oc-
employed in the field, and. in short, had I gi's career, set forth so strikingly in I caslon, when I came up n triumph with
the same kind of practice that his Stanley Washburn s little volume on the needed order, the worried office
brother in the navy had, and he did his I the great Japanese warrior, contains I head, who bore me no animosity, but
work as well. But once past this starfe much that is especially needed for us who did feel that fate had been very
he had almost no opportunity to per- I of America, prone as we are to regard unkind, threw himself back In his chair
form any work corresponding to bis I the exigencies of a purely commercial and exclaimed with a sigh: "Oh. dear!
rank, and but little opportunity to do and industrial civilization as excusing I had this office running In such good
any military work whatsoever. The I us from the need of admiring and I shape and then along came the war
very best men, men like Lawton, I practicing the heroic and warlike vir-and upset everything! His feeling was
Chaffee, Hawkins and Sumner, to men- I tues. that war was an illegitimate interrup
tion only men under or beside whom II Our people are not military, we need I tion to the work of the war JPepart
served. remained good soldiers, soldiers I normally only a small standlnsr armv: I ment.
of the best stamp, in spite of the dis- j but there should be behind it a reserve I There were of course department
heartening conditions. But it was not I of instructed men big enough to fill It I heads and bureau chiefs and assistants
to be expected that the average man up to full war strength, which Is over who, in spite of the worthlessness or
could continue to grow when every in- I twice the peace strength. Moreover, I the system, and of the paralyzing con
fluence was against him. Accordingly, the young men of the country should Iditlons that had prevailed, remained
when the Spanish War suddenly burst realize that it is the duty of every one first-class men. An example' of these
uDon us. a number of inert elderly I of them to oreDare himself so that In was Commissary-General v eston. rus
Captains and field officers were, much I time of need he may speedily become energy, activity, administrative eifl
agalnst their own wishes, suddenly j an efficient soldier- a duty now gener- I ciency, and common sense were supple
nitchforked into the command of recri- allv fnr-nttsn. but which xhmilri ha mentert bv an eager desire to help ev-
mnntft. hrte-ndes. And even divisions and I rpnncnieH n one of th vlfollv ab. I p.rvbodv do the best that could be done.
army corps. Often these men failed I sentlal parts of every man s training. I Both in Wasnington ana again uuwn m
painfully. This was not their fault; ..d bi.pj.. Santiago we owed mm very jnucn.
it was the fault of the Nation, that is, , Lnrlat ana mac FoTroer. Wnen j wa(J President, it was my good
the fault of all of us. of you. my read- n s -usn fortune to repay him in part our aeDt.
t nvz. ... Riders" equipped I met with some ex- ,hioh mans the debt of the Deople of
because we had permitted conditions to M""'"'"-" "" "'" the country, Dy malting mm a major-
v ,,h . to rnHr th mon unfit structive. There were not enough arms Ueneral.
i t.i, . . and other necessaries to go round, and in. nxt Installment of Mr. Roose-
an out-of-the-way two-company post, h,e,"e was ke rl,vaIry among the. in- veU.a -chapters of a Possible Autobl
where nothing in the world ever oc- telligent and zealous commanders of 0graphy" Is entitled "The Rough Riders
curred even resembing military action, th volunteer organizations as to who ,n Cuba." It will appear in The Ore-
and where the only military problem ""u'" cl "'"V 'r, """""- gonian nexi ounaay.j
,. .n i. .t It ence was what enabled us to equip
. . . , , . . 1 ourselves in short order. There was
foundations was lii o quarrel uclw'-c n mL- r - rlw
h rf.tn nrf th ortrm..t, another cavalry organization whose The Lure of the City.
to how high a mule's tail ought to be
shaved (I am speaking of an actual ln-
commander was at the War Department
about this time, and we had been eye-
Atlantic.
People flock to the cities for the ad-
clkVnT) WhaTTouid oe "exed 'of "1""? V,. plans vaaTes Vhe TJ1 TnT
tore h.mhadeVbeenthaUrgal anf Second wer-bout vantages Parents sell their wholesome
JI?..-.-,t,i . troons. who were of precisely the type country homes on account of their ohil-
r h. of our own men. He answered that he aren an-d B where there are granu
- expected "to give each of the boys two churches, superior schools, and attnu.-
revolvers and a lariat, and then Just tlv" libraries, to find themselves close
turn them loose." I reported the con- to drinking saloons, galmbling dens,
T.lontonanr in th Civil War. it. after I troops. Who W
hl IntoriMilnr lin-nnthlnr nnrlnri ho I Of Our Own men
was suddenly put In command of
troops in a mid-Summer campalg
the tropics? w"nfl Hth th dancehalls and indescribable allure-
IncomnetencT and War. I .1- . i v, . ?AAi A,e.iu.a I ments to vice. Is that better for their
The bureau chiefs were for the most riir in that Quarter: and f w boy. and girls, or is the new atmosr
.IH.rlv InTtmntttAnta vYtnmm M.a 1 nherA tlPHVV with influences IDAl &ri
was to do their routine duties in such In tryjng to get the equipment I met a peril? There are 50 churches in a
way as to escape tne censure or, routine I with checks ana reDuris, and in return cly anu iuuuii- -.
bureaucratic superiors and to avoid a I was the cause of worry and concern to churches are open one day; and two or
Congressional Investigation. They had various bureau chiefs who were un-1 three evenings in earn . """V
rtnt thA allchteittconcentlan of nrnnr. L.aH,nohlv AurlmahlA mn i. tiai. AAloonq are OD6D ever week day, all
Ing the army for war. It was impos-I private and domestic relations, and I day long and far into the night Boys
sible that they could have any such j who doubtless had been good officers 30 I and young men are not attracted to
conception. The people ana tne Con- years before, but who were as unfit for the cnurcnes. me "
gress did not wish the army prepared modern war as if they were so many sorts of attractions to beguile them
.for war; and those editors and philan- smooth-bores. One fine pld fellow did within their doors. What wonder that
thropists and peace advocates who felt his best to persuade us to take black so many city boys grow up with dls-
vaguely that if the army were incom- powder rifles, explaining with pater- ordered appetites and depraved tastes!
petent their principles were safe, al- nal Indulgence that no one yet really A gentleman was recently hea-rd to
ways Inveighed against any proposal knew Just what smokeless powder say: "As I go along the street the
to make It efficient, on the ground that might do, and that there was a good sight of cigars in the store windows
this showed a natural bloodthlrstlness deal to be said in favor of having make me want to smoke and I step In
In the proposer. When such were the smoke to conceal us from the enemy. I and buy when otherwise I should not
conditions, it was aDsoiuteiy lmpos-I saw tnis pleasing theory actually I think or it- xms gcuueman is an em
sible that either the War Department! worked out in practice later on, for the! Inent scholar, a principal of a boys'
or the army could do well in the event National Guard regiments with us at I school, an advocate ot retorms, and In
of war. Secretary Alger happened to Santiago had black powder muskets, I fluential in church and society. If the
be Secretary when war broke out, and and the regular artillery black powder I temptation of the store windows was
all the responsibility for the short- guns, and they , really might almost as I too much for him, can we expect his
comings of the department was visited well have replaced these weapons by I pupils to be proof against It?