TIIE SUTAY OREGOXIAX, POItTgAyP, APRIL 30. 1911.
-' ' -
MTOWGXS ADWCE TO BULL RUY
Battles and Lead
ers o the Civil
War No. 2.
bt vuoit-ornnuL jaues r. rnr.
AFTER th firing of th first ra
tipnn Fort Bumter. North fore
bad hutmt4 to Washington upon
t-i a of F-reaudent Lincoln, but prior
C May tbT had bn held rig-
M!y on th north aid of th Potomac
n th Bight of May -. h Confed
erate pickets being than In sight of tb
Capitol, threw column wer thrown
rroan th rlvar and a Una from Alex
andria to tha chain brldg abov Waah-l.-jton
u Intrenched under tha guid
ance of ahl enitlneera. On tha 17th.
ItlcadleT-Ceneml Irvtn M-IVw-;l waa
placed la command aouth of the Poto
tnae. Major Irrln McDowell had been ap
pointed Rrt-radler-Cenrral May 1. Ha
wmt 43 yr of ace. of unexceptionable
Tbibtt and grat physical power. DIs-t!-ia-ulhJ
la th Mexican war. Intense
ly Vnlon In Ha erntlmonta. full of ener
gy and patriotism, outspoken In hla
cptMona. hlcMy eateemed by General
tvou. on vhoM etaff he had ervd. ha
at once eecured the confidence of tha
I'realdeat and the Secretary of War.
tmder whose observation he waa serving
In Washington. Without political ante
cedent or acquaintance, he was choeen
for advancement on account of hla rec
ord, hi ability and hla tIcot.
McDowell waa confronted by hla old
rlanmat. Beauregard, hot from tha
raptur cf Fort Sumter. General Pat
t arson, a Teteran of tha war of 11J and
tha war with Mx!co. waa in command
rear IIarpera Ferry, opposed by Cen
ters! Joseph E. Johnston. The enemy to
t engaged by McDowell occupied what
waa called the 'AJriandrla line. with
readquartrrs at Manassas, tha Junction
cf the Oranc and Alexandria with the
Manaaaaa Gap Railroad. The atreara
a Down aa Cull Run. ani three ratlea In
front of Manaaaaa. waa the Una of de
fence. On Beeureerard'a right. 10 mllea
away, at tha mouth of Aqula Creek,
ther waa a Confederal brigade of 1000
rnea and a!x run under General
Jlolmea. Tha approach to Richmond
from tha low Chesapeake, threatened
by General B. F. Butler, waa guarded
try Confederal under General linger
and Mvuder. On Beauregard's left. M
mne distant, la th lower Shenandoah
Valley and separated from him by the
Filne Rldg Mountains, waa th Confed
erate army of th Shenandoah under
command of General Johnston. Feaur
rard's authority did not extend over th
force of Jobnaton. linger. Magruder. or
Holme, but Holme was with him before
th battl of Bull Run. and so waa
Johns-ton, who Julned at a dectslr mo
de ct-
Publlc Demand Atlvanc.
The) pubtto demand for an advano
became Imperative. On Jun 14. la com
pliance with verbal Instruction from
Oaaaral Scott. MeDowall ubmltted a
"plan of operatlona and th composition
of th fore repaired to carry It Into
effect." II estimated the Confederal
fore at Hit-- t Junction and It de
pan dene tea at 11.004 men, aaaumed that
lit movement could not be kept secret
and that th aemy would call op ad
ditional forces from ail quarters, and
added: "If General J. K- Johnaton
fore la kept engaged by Major-General
Pattarson. and Major-General Butler
occupies th fore now In hla Ttdnlty. I
think they will not be able to brine up
nor than 10. 00 men, ao we may cal
culate upon, having to do with about
IS. 000 men.- And aa It turned out. that
waa about the number he "had to do
with."
For th advance. McDowell asked "a
fore of 10.009 of all arms, with a re
serve of 10404.- II knew that Beaur-a-ard
had batteries In position at sev
eral place In front of Bull Run and
defensive works behind the Run and at
Manassas Junction. Th stream being
fordabl at many place. McDowell pro
pose in hi plan of operations to turn
tb enemy position and fore them
out of It by selxtnaT or threatening hla
communications. Nevertheless, k said
la hts report:
"Believing the chance are greatly in
favor of th enemy accepting battle
between this (Arlington. Va.) and th
Junction and that th consequences of
that beetle will be of th greatest Im
portance to th country, aa eatabllsh
Ing the prtl la till contest. OB th
on aid or th other. I think It of
great consequence that, as for th
moat part our regiments are exceeding
ly raw and th best of them, with few
exception, not over steady In line,
they be organised Into as many small
fixed brigade as th number of regu
lar Colonel wUl admit ao that the
tnea may hav as fair a chance aa th
nature of thing and th comparative
Inexperience of moat will allow."
Tbls remarkably aound report was
approved, and McDowell was directed
to carry his plan Into effect July Ith.
"But the Government machinery worked
lowly, so that th troops to bring his
Army up to th strength agreed upon
did not reach him until th ltth.
h first ball and. that formality dls-
McDowwll marched on th afternoon
of July 1C. th men carrying three
days ratlona la their haversack; pro
vlaion wagon were to follow from
Alexandria th next day. On th morn
ing of th JSta his forces wr con
centrated at Cantre-vlU. a point about
Z3 mil west of th Potomac and six
or van mile east of Manassas Junc
tion. Beauregard's outposts fell back
without resistance.
Bull Run. flowing southeasterly. Is
about half way between Centrevlll and
Minn l T Junction, and. owing to Its
abrupt ban ha th timber with which
! waa fringed and some artificial de
'frnse at th fords, was a formidable
obatacl. Th stream was tordabl. but
all th crossings for eight miles, from
Union Mills on th south to th Stone
brtJg on th north, were defended by
F-eauregardS forcea Th Warren ton
Turnpike, passing through Centrevlll.
kwds nearly do west, crossing Bull
P.un at th Stone bridge- Th direct
roal from Centrevlll to Manaaaaa
crosses Bull Run at Mitchell's Ford.
ta:f a mil or so abov another cross
ing known as Blackburn's Ford. Union
Mills was covered by Ew all's brigade,
supported afier th Uta by Halmr
GENERAL M'DOWELL'S ADVANCE TO. BULL RUN.
i-- :-v;: I' ' . - . l ' -I ; - ' -"
' ' .. - . ' - . -v- '. i .. ! I . i '
- - . r ' -ry-mm im$mmm$$m&
I I 11 nj ;vr I S 4 W tJ' IP
. ii-v v I - : f?S' v - linZZf t!i '-ffmm,a,
- . -V, ' ' ';''- - . s r 'iJewr'aT 'f'V
. . - - - ,i.M.'.' . - Ca,.: . -! ' -w- . - - - a '
"rvkiiTa
a .A iV
. . aa w va n-aMgT. var n w-. n T7 M-nftW fll. P6T ft RT.TSTTIrt TT1S TTR ftTkOTTA Urn
..........1TTT
--
a a a a a a a a a a a a a m m m m . .
brigade; McLean's Ford, next to th
north, was covered by D. It. Jones' brl
gade; Blackburn's Ford was defended
by liongstreefs brigade, supported by
Early's brigade; Mitchell's Ford was
hld by Bonham's brigade, with aa out
post of two gun and an Infantry sup
port at of Bull Run; th stream be
tween Mitchell's Ford and the Eton
bridge was covered by Cocke's brigade;
th Ston brldg on th Confederate
left waa held by Evans.
The First Clash of Arrne.
McDowell waa compelled to wa't at
CentrevlU until hla provision wagon
arrived and he could Issu ratlona His
orders having carried his leading di
vision under Tyler no farther than
Centrevtlle. he wrote that officer on the
ISth. -Obeerv well th roads to Bull
Run and to Warrenton. Do not bring
on aa engagement, but keep up th Im
pression that w ax moving on Manas
laa" Tyler, presumably to "keep up th
Impression that w wer moving on
Manassas. went forward with a squad
ron of cavalry and two companies of
Infantry for the purpose of making a
reconnolssanca of Mitchell's and Black
burn's fords along tb direct road to
Manaaaaa. Reaching th crest of th
rtdg overlooking th valley of Bull
Run and a mil or so from tb stream,
th enemy was seen on th opposite
bank, and Tyler brought up Benjamin'
artillery, two 10-pounder rifled field
guns. Ayre's Held battery of six guns,
and Richardson's brigade of Infantry.
Th 10-pounders opened from th rldg
and a few shots wer exchanged with
th enemy batterlea
Desiring mor Information than the
long-range cannonad afforded. Tyler
ordered Richardson's brigade and a eec
tlon of Ayers battery, supported by a
squadron of cavalry, to more from th
rids across th open bottom of Bull
Run and take position near th stream
and hav skirmishers "scour th thick
woods" which skirted If. Two regi
ments of infantry, two pieces of artil
lery, and a squadron of cavalry moved
down th slope Into th woods and
opened fire, driving Bonham's outposts
to th cover of Intrenchmenta across
tha stream. I
The brlgadea of Bonham and Long
street, th Utter being reinforced for
th occasion by Early's brigade, re
sponded at short rang to th Or of
th Federal reconnotterlng fore and
drov It back In disorder. Tyler re
ported that having satisfied himself
"that th enemy waa In force." and as
certained th "position of his. batterlea"
he withdrew. The Confederates, feeling
that they had repulsed a heavy and
real attack, wer encouraged by th
result. Th Federal troops, on th
other hand, wer greatly depressed.
Th operations of th ltth confirmed
McDowell In his opinion that with tha
raw troops th Confederate position
should be turned Instead of attacked
ln front. On th night of th 18th th
haversacks of his men were empty,
and had to be replenished from th
provision wagons, which wer lata in
getting up. Nor had be yet determined
upon th point or plan of attack. Whll
resting and provisioning his men. he
devoted th ltth and 10th to a care
ful examination by hi engineers of th
enemy's position and th Intervening
country. His men. not soldiers, but
civilians In uniform, unused to march
ing, hot, weary and footsore, dropped
down as they had halted and bivou
acked on th roads about Centervlll.
During these two days. McDowell care
fully examined the Confederate posi
tion, and mad hla plan to maneuver
the enemy out of It.
Beauregard was not Idle within hts
own lines. Tha Confederate President
had authorised Johnston. Beauregard's
senior, to use his discretion ln moving
to the support of Manaaaaa. and Beaure
gard, urging Johnston to do ao. sent
railway transportation for the Shenan
doah forces.
Th campaign which General Scott re
quired McDowell to make was under
taken with tha understanding that
Johnston should be prevented from
joining Beauregard. General Scott, who
controlled both McDowell and Patterson,
assured McDowell that Johnston should
not Join Beauregard without having
"Patterson, on his heels." Tet John
ston's army, nearly 1000 atrong. Joined
Beauregard. Bee's brigade and John
aton In person arriving on th morning
of th 10th. th remainder about noon
of th list. Although th enforced de
lay at CentervlUe enabled McDowell
to provision hla troops and gain Infor
mation upon which to base an ex
cellent plan of attack. It proved fatal
by affording tlm for a Junction of th
opposing forces.
During the 11th and 10th the bivouacs
of McDowell's army at CentervlUe. al
most within car non range of tb enemy,
were thronged by visitors, official and
unofficial, who cam In carriages from
Washington, bringing their own sap
plies. They wer under no military re
straint, and passed to and fro among
tha troopa as they pieasew. giving the
seen the appearance of a monster mili
tary picnic. Among others, th ven
erable Secretary of "War, Cameron,
called upon McDowell.
McDowell's plan of battle, promul
gated on the 20th. was to turn th
enemy's left, fore him from his defen
sive position, and "if possible, destroy
th railroad leadrng from Manassas to
th Valley of Virginia, where the
enemy has a large force." He did not
know when h Issued this order that
Johnston had Joined Beauregard,
though he suspected it.
Tyler's First Division, which was on
the turnpike ln advance, was to mov
at 2:30 A. M., threaten the Stone Bridge
and open fire upon it at daybreak. This
demonstration was to be vigorous. Its
first purpose being to divert attention
from the movements of the turning col
umn. As soon as Tyler's troopa cleared
the way. Hunter's Second Division, fol
lowed by Helntzelman's Third Division,
was to move to a point on the 'Warren
ton Tunrplke about one or two miles
east of Stone Bridge and there take a
country road to the right, cross the
Run at Sudley Springs, coma down up
on the flank and rear of the enemy at
tha Stone Bridge, and force him to open
the way for Tyler's division to cross
there and attack, fresh and In full force.
Tyler's start waa so late and his ad
vance waa so slow as to hold Hunter
and Helntzelman two or three hours on
the mile or two of the turnpike between
their camps and the point at which they
wer to turn off for the flank march.
This delay, and the fact that the flank
march proved difficult and some twelve
miles Instead of about six, as was ex
pected, were of serious moment. The
flanking column did not cross at Sudley
Springs until 9:30 Instead of 7. the long
march, with its many Interruptions,
tired out the men, and the delay gave
the enemy time to discover the turning
movement,
Tyler's operations against the Stone
Bridge were feeble and Ineffective. By
3 o'clock Evans was satisfied that he
was ln no danger ln front, and per
ceived the movement to turn his posi
tion. He was on the left of the Con
federate line, guarding the point where
the Warrenton Turnpike, the great
highway to the field, crossed Bull Run.
the Confederate line of defense. He
had no Instructions to guide him in the
emergency that had arisen. But he did
not hesitate. Reporting his Information
and purpose to tha adjoining comman
der, Cocke, and leaving four companies
of infantry to deceive and hold Tyler
at the bridge, Evans turned his back
upon the point he was set to guard,
marched a mile away, and, seizing the
high ground to th north of Young's
Branch of Bull Run. formed line of bat
tle at right angles to his former line,
his left resting near the Sudley Springs
road, by which Burnslde with tha head
of the turning column was approaching,
thus covering the Warrenton Turnpike
and opposing a determined front to the
Federal advance upon the Confederate
left and rear. Evans" action was proba
bly one of the best pieces of soldiership
on either side during the campaign. In
his rear to the south lay the valley of
Young's Branch, and rising from that
was the higher ridge or plateau on
which the 'Robinson house and the
Henry house were situated, and on
which the main action took place In
the afternoon.
Burnslde, finding Evans across his
path, promptly formed line of battle and
attacked about 9:45 A. M. Evans not
only repulsed, but pursued the troops
that made the attack upon him. An
drew Porter's brigade of Hunter's divi
sion followed Burnslde closely and came
to his support- In the meantime Bee
had formed a Confederate line of bat
tle with his and Bartow's brigades of
Johnston's army on tha Henry honss
JL- DESPERATE CHARGE ITf THE FACE OS" ARTILLERY FIRE.
plateau, a stronger position than the one
held by Evans, and desired Evans to
fall back to that line; but Evans Insist
ed that Bee should move across the val
ley to his support, which was done.
After Bee joined Evans, the prelimi
nary battle continued to rage upon the
ground chosen by the latter. The Con
federates were dlsloged and driven back
to the Henry House plateau, where Bee
had previously formed line and where
what Beauregard called "the mingled
remnants of Bee's, Bartow's and Evans'
commands" were reformed under cover
of Stonewall Jackson's brigade of John
ston's army.
The time of this repulse, as proved by
so accurate an authority as Stonewall
Jackson, was beore 11:30 A. M. and this
Is substantially confirmed by Beaure
gard's official report made at that time.
Thus, after nearly two hours' stubborn
fighting with the forces of Johnston,
which General Scott ' had promised
should be kept away, McDowell won the
first advantage; but Johnston had cost
him dearly.
Commanders ln Thick of Fight.
During all this time Johnston' and
Beauregard had been waiting near
Mitchell's Ford for the development of
the attack they had ordered by their
right upon McDowell at CentervlUe. But
the heavy firing on the left soon di
verted Johnston and Beauregard from
all thought of an offensive movement
with their right, and decided them, as
Beauregard has said, "to hurry up all
available re-enforcements. Including the
reserves that were to have moved upon
CentervlUe, to our left, and fight the
battle out ln that quarter." Thereupon
Beauregard ordered "Ewell, Jones and
Longstreet to makt a strong demonstra
tion all along their front on the other
side of Bull Run. and ordered the re
serves. Holmes' brigade with six guns,
and Early's brigade to move swiftly to
the left." and he and Johnston set out at
full speed for the point of conflict,
which they reached while Bee was at
tempting to rally his men about Jack
son's brigade on the Henry House
plateau.
McDowell reached the scene of actual
conflict somewhat earlier than Johnston
and Beauregard . did, and, seeing the
enemy driven across the valley of
Young's Branch and behind the Warren
ton Turnpike, at once sent a swift aide-de-camp
to Tyler with orders to "press
the attack" at the Stone Bridge. It was
Tyler's division upon which McDowell
relied for the decisive fighting of the day.
He knew that the march of the turning
column would be fatiguing, and when by
a sturdy fight It had cleared the War
renton Turnpike for the advance of
fvier' division. It had. ln fact, done
more than ibs fair proportion of the work.
But Tyler did not attempt to force the
passage of the Stone Bridge, wnicn. alter
about 8 o'clock, . was defended by only
four companies of Infantry.
HiTinr sent the order to Tyler to press
his attack and orders to the rear of the
turning column to hurry forward, Mc
Dowell, like Beauregard, rushed ln per
son Into the conflict, and by the force of
circumstances became for the time the
commander of the turning column and
the force actually engaged, rather than
the commander of his whole army. Un
like Beauregard, he had no Johnston in
rear with full authority and knowledge
of the situation to throw forward re
serves and reinforcements.
It was not until 13 o ciock mat uiionri
W. T. Sherman received oraers irora
Tyler to cross the stream, wnicn ne aid
at a ford above the Stone Bridge. Sher
man reported to McDowell on the field
and Joined ln the pursuit of Bee's forces
across the valley of Young's Branch.
The line taken up Dy Bionewau jaca- ,
son upon which Bee, Bartow and Evans
rallied on the southern part of the
plateau was a very strong one. The
ground was high and afforded the cover
of a curvilinear wood with the concave
side toward the Federal line or auacs.
To carry this formidable position, aic-
. i v. , -j T.i thn hritrades of
i KMM .1 11 1 i- "
Franklin, Willcox, Sherman and Por
ter, Palmer's battalion of regular cavalry
and Rlcketfs and Griffin's regular bat-
tvioti tinnsoH to field servirw.
and not yet over the hot and dustj
march from the Potomac, had been un
- mtHnicht Thn olateati.
OCr 41X1119 ..". r. ti
however, was promptly assaulted, tha
northern part or ic was cameu, i
batteries of Rickotts and Griffin were
planted near the Henry house, ana jic
Dowell clambered to the upper story of
that structure to get a glance ai
whole field. 1'pon the Henry liow
plateau, of which the Confederates held
v. . k a-nA fhex ttVderalu the north-
lllt! BWULUCiu - .
em part, the tide of battla ebbed and
flowed as McDowell pusnea in
lln's. Wilcox', Sherman's, Porter's, and
at last Howard's briRades, and as Beau-
tntr, action IVSPrVM Which
Johnson sent from the right and re-en-
foreemente which ho nurrieu ioriiu
from the Shenandoah Valley as they ar
rived by cars.
The several struggles for the plateau
were at close quarters and gallant on
both sides. The batteries of Ricketts
and Griffin, by their fine discipline,
wonderful daring and matchless skill,
were the prime features in the fight.
The battle was not lost till they were
lost. When in their advanced and
perilous . position, and Just after their
infantry supports had been driven
over the slopes, a fatal mistake oc
curred. A regiment of Infantry came
out of the woods on Griffin's right,
and as he was in the act of opening upon
It with canister, he was deterred by
the assurance of Major Barry, the chief
of artillery, that it "was a regiment
sent by Colonel Helntzelman to sup
port the battery." A moment more
and the doubtful regiment proved its
Identity with a deadly volley, and, as
Griffin states In his official report,
"every cannoneer was cut down and a
large number of horses killed, leaving
the battery (which was without sup
port excepting in name) perfectly help
less." The effect upon Ricketts was
equally fatal. He. desperately wound
ed, and Ramsay, his Lieutenant killed,
lay in the wreck of the battery.
After the arrival of Howard's brig
ade, McDowell for the last time
pressed up the slope to the plateau,
forced back the Confederate line, and
regained possession of the Henry and
Robinson houses and of the lost bat
teries. But there were no longer can
noneers to man or horses to move the
guns that had done so much. By the
arrival upon this part of the field of
his own reserves and KIrby Smith's
brigade of Johnston's army about half
past three. Beauregard extended his
left to outflank McDowell's shattered,
shortened, and disconnected line, and
the Federals left the field about half
past four.
Retreat; Then Panic.
Until then they had fought wonder
fully well for raw troops. There were
no fresh forces on the field to support
or encourage them, and the men
eeemed to be seized simultaneously by
the conviction that it was no use to
do anything more and they might as
well start home. Cohesion was lost,
the organizations with some excep
tions being disintegrated, and the men
quietly walked off. There was no spe
cial excitement except that arising
from the frantic efforts of officers to
etop men who paid little or no atten
tion to anything that was said.
On the high ground by the Matthews
house, about where Evans had taken
position ln the morning to check Burn
side. McDowell and his staff, aided by
other officers, made a desperate but
futile effort to arrest the masses and
form them into line. There, I went to
Arnold's battery as it came by, and ad
vised that he unlimber and make 8
stand as a rallylng-point, which he did,
saying he was in fair condition and
ready to fight as long as there was
any fighting to be done. But all ef
forts failed. The stragglers moved
past the guns, in spite of all that could
be done, in great disorder across Bull
Run.
There was no pania. in the ordinary
meaning of the word, until the retiring
soldiers, guns, wagons, Congressmen,
and carriages were fired upon, on th
road east of Bull Run. Then the panic
began, and the bridge over Cub Run
being rendered Impassable for vehicles
by a wagon that was upset upon it,
utter confusion set in; pleasure-carriages,
gun-carriages, and ammunition
wagons which could not be put across
the Run were abandoned and blocked
the way, and stragglers broke and
threw aside their muskets and cut
horses from their harness and rode off
upon them.
In leaving the field the men took the
same routes, ln a general way, by which
they had reached it. Hence, when the
men of Hunter's and Helntzelman's di
visions got back to Centrevllle, they
had walked about 25 miles. That night
they walked back to the Potomac, an
additional distance of 20 miles: so that
these undisciplined and unseasoned
men within 36 hours walked fully 45
miles, besides fighting from about 1')
A M. until 4 P. 1L on a hot and dusty
day in July.
McDowell in Defeat.
McDowell in person reached Centre
vllle before sunset. He consulted the
division and brigade commanders who
were at hand upon the question of mak
ing a stand or retreating. The verdict
was in favor of the latter, but a de
cision of officers one way or the other
was of no moment; the men had already
decided for themselves and were
streaming away to the rear, in spite of
all that could be done. They had no
interest or treasure in Centrevllle. and
their hearts were not there. Their
tents,, provisions, baggage and letters
from home were upon the bank3 of the
Potomac, and no power could have
stopped them short of the camps they
had left less than a week before. Mc
Dowell accepted the situation, detailed
Richardson's and Blenker's brigades to
cover the retreat, and the army, a dis
organized mass, with some creditable
exceptions, drifted as the men pleased
away from the scene of action.
When McDowell reached Fairfax
Courthouse ln the night, he was In
communication with Washington and
exchanged telegrams with General
Scott, in one of which the old hero
said, "We are not discouraged : but
that dispatch did not lighten the gloom
ln which it was received. McDowell
was so tired that while sitting on the
ground writing a dispatch he fell
asleep, pencil in hand, in the middle of
a sentence. His Adjutant-General-aroused
him: the dispatch was finished,
and the weary ride to the Potomac re
sumed. When the unfortunate com
mander dismounted at Arlington next
forenoon in a soaking rain, after 3
hours ln the saddle, his disastro-s cam
paign of six days was closed.
The first martial effervescence of the
country was over. The three-months
men went home, and the three-months
chapter of the war ended with the
South triumphant and confident: the
North disappointed, but determined. '
(Copyright, 1911. by the Century Company.)