T he P ortland O bserver • J anuary
P age
11, 1995
Cl I
Voting Rights Erupts From Selma Bridge
B y M arilyn M iller
In Selm a, Ala. lived the more
than 15,000 b lacks who m ade up
m ore than h alf o f its p o p u latio n .
E arly in th e a fte rn o o n of
M arch 7, 1965, groups o f these
b la c k s w ere stre a m in g out o f
B r o w n 's C h a p e l M e th o d is t
C hurch. B ro w n ’s was located in
the heart o f the black co m m u
nity. D uring the past tw o m onths,
the ch u rch had been the nerve
c e n te r o f a d riv e to gain v oting
rights fo r S e lm a ’s blacks.
The fifteen th A m endm ent to
the C o n stitu tio n , passed in 1870,
stated that the rig h t to vote could
not be d en ied on the b asis of
race. Y et in S elm a in 1965, only
156 b la c k s o f voting age w ere
re g is te re d . T h is situ a tio n w as
ty p ical o f a num ber o f states in
the deep South. U sing a variety
o f ta c tic s-so m e legal, som e not-
w hites had kept b lacks from v o t
ing.
S in ce Ja n u a ry , b lack s had
been m arch in g in groups to the
D alles C ounty co u rth o u se in an
attem p t to re g iste r to vote. So
far, not a sin g le black had su c
ceed ed . S u n d ay , M arch 7, was
an o th er day to try.
This time, the destination was
the state ca p ito l, in M o n tg o m
ery, lo cated about 50 m iles east
o f Selm a. Som e 525 m en, w om en
and ch ild re n w ere going there to
p ro test the lack o f voting rights
to G ov. G eorge C. W allace. G o v
ern o r W allace had banned the
m arch, and the m arch ers w ere
afraid that state tro o p e rs w ould
try to stop them , as had already
happened in o ther parts o f A la
bama.
In sm all g roups, the m a rc h
ers left the chapel. On th e ir backs
they c arried b ed ro lls and packs.
Four am b u lances trailed behind
them . The first ob jectiv e w as the
Edm und Pettus B ridge, m ore than
three q u arters o f a m ile aw ay.
The bridge form ed part o f H ig h
way 80, w hich let to M o n tg o m
ery. T hree hundred yards aw ay
from the bridge, the m arch ers
passed three dozen state tro o p ers
standing in the shadow o f the
Selm a T im es-Jo u rn al bu ild in g .
The tro o p ers m ade no m ove to
interrupt the march.
The marchers could see the dingy
brown bridge as they approached,
but they could not yet see over the
rise to the other side. On the other
Crossing the Edmund Pettus Bridge
Dr. King speaking from the pulpit of Brown's Chapel. To his immediate left Cornetta Scott King, his wife.
side waited more than 50 state troop
ers massed about two hundred yards
beyond the bridge. They were armed
with clubs and they had gas-mask
pouches slung across their shoul
ders. Behind them , three dozen
possemen loomed menacingly. Fif
teen of them were on horseback. The
possemen where volunteers engaged
by Dallas County Sheriff Jim Clark
who believed in using force against
black demonstrators. The sheriff was
well known as a militant racist.
On the sidelines stood some 50
white spectators. Beside a yellow
bus, some distance from the troop
ers, about 50 blacks also watched.
The marchers kept moving across
the bridge.
What happened next was to af
fect Americans all over the country.
It was also to affect the president and
the Congress, leading to the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. What happened
next led observers to refer to March
7, 1965, as “Bloody Sunday.”
On Monday, March 8, all that
could be seen on the six o ’clock news
was the images of "Bloody Sunday"
the bleeding, broken and unconscious
passed across the screen, some of
them 1 imping alone, others supported
on either side, still others carried in
arms or on stretchers.
People from all over America
came to Selma after the news stories.
Throughout Monday, President John
son was on the phone about Selma.
He was concerned about possible
violence during Tuesday’s march,
and he urged movement leaders to
postpone the action. Dr. K ing's aides
were also worried. They feared King
might be killed if violence erupted.
No one really knew if the march
would take place. Blacks had asked
Service, to Alabama. Collin’s task
was to try to persuade both sides to
compromise. King refused to stop
the march. Collins then went to Sher
iff Clark and Colonel Lingo. They
agreed not to use force against the
marchers on one condition - that the
marchers turned back when they
reached the troopers.
Collins informed King of their
promise. King merely smiled in re
ply.
On Tuesday morning, Judge
Johnson banned any march before
Thursday. W hat would King do? At
2:25 p.m. M arch 9, the answer came.
Arriving at Brow n’s Chapel, he stated
that he was ready to march. At 3 p.m .,
marchers once again reached the
Edmund Pettus Bridge.
There, a U .S . marshal read aloud
Judge Johnson’s order. King said
that he would continue to march and
Sunday would not be repeated.
Some things about the march
seemed familiar. The 3,200 m arch
ers moved down W ater Street. Be
fore them stood the Edmund Pettus
Bridge, which twice before they had
failed to cross. But this time pro
tected by the National Guard, they
crossed it. The road to M ontgomery
lay open once again.
Three days later, they reached
St. Jude, a Roman Catholic confer
ence center outside M ontgom ery
where they were to spend the night. A
reporter noted that their entry had an
almost biblical grandeur.
The next afternoon, March 25,
1965, Dr. King addressed a crowd of
more than 25,000 gathered before
the A labama Statehouse. He said,
“This is a shining moment. W e are on
the move now. W e ar moving toward
the land of freedom.”
King addresses demonstrators at Brown's Chapel on Tuesday, March 9, after their return from the
bridge.
“Love is somehow the key that
unlocks the door which leads to
the ultimate reality.”
Martin Luther King Jr.
815 Northeast Halsey
Portland, Oregon 97232
(503) 287-4594
FAX (503) 282-7833
federal judge Frank M. Johnson to
lift the ban on a march to M ontgom
ery and tension continued to mount
while everyone waited to hear Then
Judge Johnson contacted the black
leaders and recommended that they
postpone the march until he could
hold hearings, which were to begin
on Thursday, to decide if the march
should be permitted.
The matter was now left to Dr.
King and his associates. Should they
postpone? If they did, they might
lose the public’s attention If they
went ahead, they would risk King’s
life and break the law They decided
to postpone.
S om etim e M o n d ay , K ing
changed his mind. He announced to
the people at Brown's Chapel that he
would lead a march on Montgomery
the next day After hours of discus
sion, at 4 am . Tuesday, other black
leaders agreed to follow his decision.
In a little more than 10 hours the
second attempt to march on Mont
gomery would begin.
In the meantime, President John
son sent LeRoy Collins, director of
the Federal Community Relations
protesters began to move across the
bridge. State troopers waited several
hundred feet in front of them for the
second time that week.
The next thing that happened
caught most marchers, news people,
and onlookers by surprise. King
turned back. A moment later, the
troopers moved to the side o f the
highway, the road to Montgomery
was open.
It w as o pen, but the m a rc h
ers w ere re tu rn in g , w ith o u t e x
p lan atio n , to Selm a. The co lu m n s
o b e d ie n tly fo llo w ed K ing back.
A m o n g m a n y o f th e m , fu ry
m ingled w ith surprise.! H ad th e ir
le a d e r b e tra y e d them . Som e re a l
ized that the tro o p e rs’ g e stu re
w as one o f c o n tem p t. D id K ing
have a reason for w hat he had
ju s t d o n e? For the m om ent. K ing
said nothing.
On March 17,1965 Judge John
son handed down his decision that he
demonstrators could march to M ont
gomery legally on March 21, 1965.
At Gov Wallace 's request, the presi
dent ordered 18 hundred National
Guardsmen to protect them. Bloody
In the same speech, King warned
of a season of suffering still to come.
His words were prophetic. That night,
Viola Liuzzo, from M ichigan, a
mother of five, drove some of the
marchers back to Selma. On the re
turn trip to Montgomery, she was
shot to death by members of the Ku-
Klux Kian.
Still, despite this tragic event,
relative quiet reigned the next day in
Selma. The events that had begun
three months before and climaxed on
Bloody Sunday had made voter reg
istration in the South a nationwide
concern.
Nearly five months later, on
August 6, President Johnson signed
the Voting Rights Act o f 1965. The
act aided not only black voters but
also the economically impoverished,
the poorly educated, and non-En
glish-speaking minorities. O pposi
tion to the black vote did not end
once and for all after Selma and the
Voting Rights Act. But now, finally,
some one and a half million blacks
who had been kept from the ballot
box would have the strength of fed
eral law on their side