Page 2 Portland Observer, November 24 1982
El Salvador's options: Negotiate or fall
by Nelson Valdez.
Pactffc News Service
American policy on El Salvador
has shifted significantly in the last
two months, but the change has not
made things easier for the Reagan
Administration.
The shift centers on the best way
to deal with the internal war going
on in that Central American
country. Not long ago, the U.S.
government believed that a military
victory was possible if only the gov
ernment coud legitimize itself and
improve the q uality o f its armed
forces.
Since 1981, numerous measures
have been taken to do just that, in
cluding the elections in March and
the training o f rapidly mobile spe
cial forces by the United States. This
two-track approach has failed on
both fronts. The March elections,
rather than earning legitimacy,
merely reduced the base o f support
when the Christian Democrats lost
power and joined the ranks o f the
loyal opposition. A government that
could not or would not end the ter
ro rist attacks and assassinations
could not win the allegiance o f its
people nor the respect o f the world.
As fo r the armed forces, the U.S.
training has failed to blunt the abili-
ity o f the guerilla forces to survive
and launch costly offensives.
Sometime in August and Septem
ber o f this year, the Reagan Admin
istration reassessed the whole situa
tion. By early October some State
Department officials were express
ing off-the-record optimism about
possible negotiations w ith the
rebels. The new thinking in Wash
ington reflected some o f the ideas
explored by the foreign policy estab
lishment in the last weeks o f the
Carter A dm in istra tio n . The new
perspective went as follow s: The
struggle against the rebel opposition
should be concluded by p o litica l
means rather than through the use
o f military power. In order to do so,
the government o f El Salvador, fol
lowing the initiatives o f Venezuela,
Mexico and France, would engage
in negotiations with the political sec
tion o f the opposition, the Frente
R e v o lu tio n a r io D e m o c ra tic o
(FDR). In the negotiations, the FDR
would be defined as the only repre
sentative o f the rebels. This would
be done in order to isolate the m ili
tary component, the guerillas un
der the Faribundo Marti Liberation
Front. The idea, in other words, was
to split the uneasy alliance between
the two sectors o f the opposition.
To put the plan into effect, it was
essential to persuade the govern
ment o f El Salvador o f its value.
Moreover, the guerillas had to be
delivered some hard blows in order
to persuade the FDR that negotia
tions were desirable.
Again, both o f these prerequisites
failed to succeed. The rightwing Sal
vadoran authorities remained com
mitted to large and massive military
offensives in the belief that a m ili
tary solution was around the corner.
A new offensive began on October
10, even though U.S. military advi
sors cautioned against it. In fact,
American m ilitary personnel sug
gested that counter-insurgency
would be conducted with small, effi
cient and highly professional forces.
But that required a certain degree of
autonomy in the battlefield at the
battalion level, and the Salvadoran
Joint Chiefs of Staff balked at that.
They were afraid any dispersal o f
authority would create other centers
o f power within the armed forces.
Consequently, all the special
training that the United States had
provided had no real impact in the
field. Within two weeks the guerillas
had captured 107 soldiers. Demoral
ization within the military ranks be
gan to grow.
Moreover, the State Department
also conveyed to the Salvadoran
government the need to improve its
human rights record. There were in
dications that throughout Septem
ber and early October the United
States reminded the governmnent
that if some radical changes did not
occur, then the Reagan Administra
tion would be unable to ce rtify to
the U.S. Congress that human rights
had improved in El Salvador, and
aid would be terminated. The Salva
doran ambassador to the United
States, Ernesto Rivas, declared that
the requirement for American certi
fication was “ a modern version of
colonialism.**
On the same day, October 25, the
opposition, sensing the change in
American policy, tried to exploit it.
Spokesmen fo r the FDR and the
F M L N in New York C ity and
Mexico called for a direct dialogue
w ith o ut conditions. W ith in two
days, splits began to surface in El
Salvador. A t the National Assem
bly, the Christian Democrats, the
Democratic A ction Party and the
N ational C o n cilia tio n Party ex
pressed their desire to negotiate.
The Catholic Church publicly sup
ported the idea. But the extreme
rightwing parties rejected the fo r
mula, and leading figures o f the
FDR were kidnapped. The A m
erican bid for negotiations thus suc
ceeded not in splitting the left, as in
tended, but the government itself.
The Salvadoran m ilitary, business
community and rightist parties had
no intention o f pursuing a political
settlement.
This is the context in which U.S.
Ambassador Deane H inton ap
peared before a gathering o f busi
nessmen in San Salvador on Oct. 28.
He noted that American citizens, as
well as 30,000 Salvadorans, had
been murdered in recent years. He
urged the businessmen to defend hu
man rights rather than remain indif
ferent, and he issued a threat that if
the assassins o f Americans were not
brought to justice, “ the U.S ., in
spite o f our interest, in spite o f our
commitment to the struggle against
communism, would be forced to
deny assistance to El Salvador.’ ’
The business community respond
ed loud and clear by accusing the
ambassador o f interfering in the in
ternal affairs o f a sovereign coun
try.
By now, the U.S. government was
clearly at odds with a portion o f the
m ilitary, the government and busi
ness. On Oct. 29, the president and
the military o f El Salvador officially
rejected the dialogue offer.
As a result o f the Democratic
gains in the U.S. elections on N o
vember 2, the issue o f certification,
which comes due in January, has
become ever more critical. Conse
quently, steps were taken to put on
tria l those who had murdered the
fo u r American missionaries, but
nothing has been done to find out
who gave the orders, and no further
progress has been made toward ne
gotiations.
Yet something very significant
has occurred within the Salvadoran
military. On November 7 an undis
closed number o f high-ranking o f
ficers were purged. Moreover, the
Mexico City daily Excelsior reports
that a document has been c ir
culating in San Salvador, allegedly
URBAN LEAGUE: LOW-INCOME ENERGY ASSISTANCE
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INCREDIBLE.
FIGHTING FOR LIBERATION
w ritten by non-commissioned o f
ficers, urging serious consideration
o f negotiations and stressing that
the writers no longer are willing to
sacrifice theiur lives in a futile war.
The signs o f a major breakdown
in the authority and power o f the
government in El Salvador are
everywhere. As the splits within the
political and military institutions in
crease, and as the government grows
more isolated from the United
States, one o f three options becomes
increasingly likely: One, an actual
rebel m ilita ry victo ry becomes
thinkable; two, negotiations w ill
finally occur, but with the govern
ment in a position o f weakness vis-
a-vis the rebels; or three, a military
coup d'etat will install a centrist au
th o rity and negotiate a settlement
from a relatively stronger position.
In all three o f these possible scen
arios, the January deadline for U.S.
congressional certification looms as
the trigger for inevitable action.
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