

AMERICA WASTES IN FAR EAST PACT

Oriental Problems Declared
New Stumbling Block.

SENATE'S COURSE FEARED

Upper House's Possible Rejection
of Proposed Treaty Source
of Worry to Powers.

BY MARK SULLIVAN.

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WASHINGTON, D. C., Nov. 17.—

(Special.)—We are now directly at

the heart of the armament conference.

We are at the point where the

only possibility of deadlock lies. It

will not end in a deadlock, but the

cause of real difference is there.

Superficially it looks like a mere

matter of procedure, but fundamentally

it goes to the foundations.

Your correspondent is familiar

with the point of view of all the

delegations, and a careful comparison

of these various positions reveals

astonishingly little difference. Espe-

cially surprising and hopeful is the

slight difference between what the

United States wants in the far east

and what Japan and Great Britain

are willing to have done there, pro-

vided it is done in the way they re-

gard as the only sound way.

Attitude Is Tolerant.

Even as regards this one difference,

which is big and fundamental, the

attitude of the powers concerned is so

tolerant, so disposed to make conces-

sions, so intent upon success that it

cannot be predicted that this differ-

ence endangers success. It is cer-

tain, however, that it does contain

elements of delay and uncertainty.

If an open-minded American, with

a disposition to be fair, were to put

himself in the position of Great Brit-

ain and Japan, and were to imagine

himself as the representative of those

two governments talking informally

and reasonably to the American gov-

ernment, he would probably say

something like this:

"We are entirely willing to do

things in your way, if you strongly

wish it, and if you see no possibility

of adopting our way. But we would

like to ask your reasonable considera-

tion of certain conditions that we

cannot help having heavily on our

mind.

Pact Held Unessential.

"We are entirely willing to discard

the Anglo-Japanese alliance, but we

think that certain functions, which

that alliance performs are necessary

and must be cared for by someone.

We think it would be dangerous to

discard that alliance without setting

up a substitute, and the substitute

that suggests itself to us is an alli-

ance taking in the United States as

well as Japan and Great Britain.

"Also we are entirely willing to ac-

cept your point of view about the

open door in China. But we respect-

fully point out that a rigid adherence

and living up to the principle of the

open door would involve several

things which can only be handled

adequately by a continuing and func-

tioning institution. That is, after

for keeping the door open in China

after it has been declared open

should be, we suggest, the same thing

we have suggested as a substitute for

the Anglo-Japanese alliance, namely,

a tripartite alliance, taking in the

United States, Great Britain and

Japan.

Precedence Is Asked.

"We think that these things, namely,

the discarding of the Anglo-Japanese

alliance and the agreement upon the

open door, together with the setting

up of an institution to act as a

substitute for the Anglo-Japanese

pact and to maintain the open door

in China for the future, should pre-

cede and be a condition of an agree-

ment limiting armament. Most of the

remaining causes of friction in the

world of the sort that led to the war

in the far east, you yourself have

made this in the invitation to the

conference. We think these causes of

friction in the far east should be dis-

cussed and settled, and that a tri-

partite alliance should be set up for

carrying out these agreements.

"We think this should be done first.

After this has been done, we think it

will be possible to arrive at an agree-

ment about limitation of armament

such as will make us all feel more

comfortable about the future.

Far East Comes First.

"We think, also, that if these causes

of friction in the far east are ade-

quately cared for first, thereafter the

agreement to limit armament can go

much further than it is possible to

go safely as long as the far eastern

questions remain unsettled.

"Certainly we think that at least

the two agreements, that is, the

should be separate from any agree-

ment which includes our commitment

to future action in concert with other

nations in the far east.

In short, the American point of

view, if expressed colloquially and in-

formally, would be this:

"We have a number of difficult

questions to settle among us, and a

number of causes of friction to elim-

inate. We are about to go into a con-

ference to settle these questions, and

to eliminate these causes of friction.

Our proposal is that we first agree to

limit our armament. Our proposal

briefly, that we check our guns at

the door before we enter the room

to discuss the causes of friction. We

think we are more apt to agree and

less apt to take stubborn positions on

controversial matters, if we haven't

any guns on our hips."

Senate Causes Worry.

Mr. Hughes may be uneasy, too.

Superficially, this American position

reads very well. But it should be

prepared not to resent it if Great

Britain and Japan should be a little

suspicious that maybe the American

state department is as uneasy about

the senate as they are; that one of

the reasons Mr. Hughes wants the im-

mediate agreement first and indepen-

dent of the far east agreement, is

that he can be confident of the first

being "ok'd" by the senate and can't

be equally confident as to what the

senate might do about a far eastern

agreement, especially the latter

should include, as Great Britain and

Japan think it should, an agreement

to act in concert in future.

This latter is just the sort of agree-

ment about which the senate is most

disposed to be reluctant. Most of the

arguments on which the league of

nations was defeated could be brought

up to defeat a far eastern agreement

of the sort that most of the statesmen

of Great Britain and Japan contem-

plate.

China Also Objects.

And the United States senate is not

the only "nigger in the woodpile." At

this moment enters China herself.

China doesn't want any political con-

sortium for the future to supervise

her. China strongly resents the idea

that she is in need of any political

guardian. At least the Chinese dele-

gates here at Washington resent it.

Whether the Chinese people would

resent it may be a different matter.

There is always the question as to

just how far these American-dressed

and American-educated and highly

occidentalized Chinese delegates really

represent the heart of China. How-

ever, for the present, they appear for

China, and they oppose any political

consortium.

If you look at it closely, China

either is or is not capable of taking

care of herself. If China is capable

of taking care of herself, there is

not much need of any conference

about the far east. If China is not

able to stand alone and look after

herself, then a consortium of the

powers would seem to be the only

answer.

Difficulties Are Seen.

Establishing the open door in

China means undoing a lot of things

that have been done for centuries.

It would bring added diffi-

culties to the chaos that already ex-

ists in China. Moreover, if the con-

ference merely agrees on the prin-

ciple of the open door, and doesn't set

up some consortium to enforce that

principle, then there is no reason to

believe that things will differ from

the past. The individual nations are

likely to go ahead as they have in

the past, grabbing things, each for

itself.

All this is the heart of the situa-

tion as it exists today. It contains

the only real possibility of deadlock

or serious discussion. No one can

say what the outcome will be, but

the whole atmosphere of the confer-

ence is so hopeful that success in some

form or other can be much more

surely predicted than failure.

2 REPUBLICANS DESERT

SINNOTT, SUMMERS VOTE FOR

50 PER CENT SURTAX.

Oregon Representative Speaks in

Support of Attitude—Hawley,

Hadley With Majority.

THE OREGONIAN NEWS BUREAU,

Washington, D. C., Nov. 17.—Only two

republicans of the ten representatives

in the house from Oregon, Washing-

ton, and Idaho, voted with the ma-

jority today to accept the 50 per cent

surtax in the revenue bill as passed

by the senate. Sinnot of Oregon and

Summers of Washington were the

two insurgents.

Mr. Sinnot made a speech in sup-

port of his vote. Representative

Hawley of Oregon and Hadley of

Idaho, who were in the majority, op-

posed to the bill, and means commit-

tee, which framed the original house

bill, energetically supported the ef-

forts of the majority leaders to hold

all republicans in line for the lower

house as desired by President

Harding.

The house conferees on the revenue

bill agreed today to the amendment

PRESIDENT HAD OF CONFERENCE

Question of Who Evolved Pro-
posals Answered.

INSIDE STORY GIVEN OUT

Inspiration Said to Have Come to

Executive While on Cruise.

"Great Secret" Well Kept.

WASHINGTON, D. C., Nov. 17.—

(By the Associated Press.)—Who for-

mulated and executed the call for the

armament conference? Who evolved

the American proposals for naval

limitation?

The country has been asking these

questions and has been hearing many

answers. The best "inside story" here

today has all the earmarks of being

the correct answer. President Hard-

ing on a week-end cruise down the

Potomac this autumn, so the story

hunts, looked himself in his state-

one evening and left word that he

did not wish to be disturbed. A lit-

tle later he called to his room, one

of the close friends in the White

house who had accompanied him

and laid before them sheets of paper