Image provided by: University of Oregon Libraries; Eugene, OR
About Morning Oregonian. (Portland, Or.) 1861-1937 | View Entire Issue (May 16, 1911)
6 THE MORXTNG OREGOXTAN. TUESDAY MAT 16, 1911. STANDARD OIL TO DIE IH 6 CHIEF JUSTICE OP SUPREME COURT, WHO BEAD OPINION DISSOLVING STANDARD OIL COMPANY, AND MAGNATES WHO CONTROL THE TRUST. Supreme Court Orders Big Monopoly to Dissolve as Against Law. SOME RESTRAINTS Gorernjiieot'a Attack on Oil Monop. oly Upheld a Every Point Pur- poe of Company Declared to Bo Trade Monopoly. BISTORT Or THE THCST AND M. IT TO DHHlLVt IT. 1M3 Joha IX Rorbsfsller stsrtsl ta the oil bastaess with H 1&S -Rocksfelitr btarnt the o-sroer of a refinery la Cleveland. I;ik Orsaatsatloa f Standard 0!l company of Ohio by r.rksfetlr and etnsrs. 1S71 etoutti ImproTsmeet Company arrm&sad for rebates from rstlrood. 13.79 Orxsalsatma of -VUs-KIU-Caester Trusx." 1132 rwanlaatloo of so-called "Standard Oil Iran." 15SO Fasssce of Bbormaa anti trust act. 1J Dissolution of "Standard Oil Trust. Reorganisation of Standard OU Csmparr of Now Jersey aa hali tes company. ntln of petition for d Ivtlooj of Standard. mo Circuit Court at St. Leuls de crees dissolution ask id for by Got. ernmsnt. 1K10-Appeal to Supreme Court of toe Called Stataa aormmo Coon ardors dlseo- railon. (Cwotlsned From TTrmt pace.) opinion, bat not once referring to It In order to refresh h la memory. Before blm aat an audience of tho moat (uBOtu man of tho country. Sen ators and Representatives left their chambers la the Capitol to llatan to the epoch-making decision of the court Vost eager to hear were Attorney General Wlckenshatn and frank J. Kellogg, special counsel for the Qov emraent. who had conducted the great nght against the Standard oil. Today, aa on previous decision days for months, rlral brokers' agents with messengers In line to the various tele phone and telegraph Instruments throughout the capital, were on hand, but to their dismay the announcement Bf the decision was not begun until an hoar after the close of the stock mar kets. Tobacco Irrclvlon May SI. Many expected tbat the decision In the dissolution suit against the tobacco corporation would be handed down Im mediately after the decision In the Standard Oil case. This waa not done. However, the decision la expected on May it, the last decision day of the court nntll next October. The opinion of the court waa con ttrued to mean that the tobacco case, like every other case la which re straints of trade are alleged, must be subject to the new test of reasonable ness of the restraint, aa laid down In the Standard Oil decision. Reason Mat Rule. MONTHS b: - -,vr I COPyX TGHT "JS tsse- e 9 ., . 1 Ji-iia- . 1 1 , . , 1 TT B . r .- ' .a I V - . . I It- v-- J if i i -ii'Tsst rmimtuL 1 ' i 1 r- -a By far the greater portion of the opinion of the Chief Justice was devoted to the Justifica tion of the court In requiring that the "rule of reason" be applied to re straints of trade before they were held to be violations of the Sherman anti trust law. The court found this jus tification In the common law and in the general law of the country at the time the Sherman anti-trust law waa passed. In short, the court held that the technical words of the statute were to be glvon the meaning which those words had In the common law and In the law of the country at the time of the enactment. This meaning of the words, according to the court, called for the exercise of reason In determin ing what restraints on trade were pro hibited. Case Rests on Law Interpretation. Chief Justice White la his opinion first reviewed the preliminary proceed ings ta the case In the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Mlaaourl. lie reatated the essential points in the bill of the Gov ernment asking for the dissolution of the Standard Oil Company, and the an swer questioning the Jurisdiction of the court and denying the claims of the Oovernment. He dismissed the objec tion to the Jurisdiction In a few words by holding that It was not well found ed. He then came to the ariruments as to the law and the saying that out f the "June" of law and facts both sides were agreed that the deter mination of the controversy rested upon proper construction and applica tion of the nrst and second aecttos of tho anti-trust act. The views of the two sites aa to the law. the Chief Justice said, were aa wMe apart as the po,e. The same, he said, was true as to the facta. "Thus on the one hand with relent less pertinacity and minuteness of anaJysla. said the Chief Justice, "it ta Insisted that the facts established that the assailed combination took Its birth la a purpose unlawfully to acquire wealth by oppressing the public and de stroying the Just rights of others and that Its entire career exemplifies an in exorable carrying out of such wrongful Interns, since. It Is asserted, tie pathway of the combination from the beginning to the time of the filing of the bill Is marked with constant proofs of wrong Inf'.tcted upon the public and Is strew q with the wrecks resulting from erusblng out. without regard to law. the Individual rights of others. Trust Panrrr to freedom. "It Is asserted that the existence of the principal corporate defendant, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, with its vast accumulation of property, bexmuse of tta potency for harm and tho dangerous example which Its continued existence af orris, la an open and endur ing menace to ail freedom of trade and reproach to all modern economic methods. "On the other band. In a powerful analysis of the facts. It la Insisted they have demonstrated that the origin and , development of the vast business which the defendants control was but the re sult of lawful competitive methods guided by economic genius of the highest order, sustained by courage, by a keen Insight Into the commercial situation. resulting In the acquisition of great wealth, but at the same time serving to stimulate an Increased production, to widely extend the distribution of the products of petroleum at a cost largely below tbat which would otherwlee have prevailed, taxis proving to be at one and the same'tlrae a benefaction to the gen eral publta as well as an enormous ad vantage to Individuals." r In this state of affairs the Chief Jus tice selxed upon the single point of concord, namely, the, application of the two sections or the bnerman anu-truet law. as the lnltal beats of an examina tion of the contention. The rest of his opinion divided Itself Into a consideration of the meaning of the Sherman anti trust law In the light of the common law and of the law of the United States at the time of Its adoption, the contentions of he parties concerning the act and the scope and effect of the decisions of the Supreme Court the application of the statute to the facta and lastly the remedy. Meaning of Law Sought. In striving to get at the meaning of the two sections of the lew, be said the sole subject with which, the first section dealt was "restraint of trade, nd that the "attempt to mononollx and monopolization" was the subject of the second section. e The Chief Justice said that In get ting at the meaning of these words he would be guided by the principle thai where words are employed In a statute hlch at the time bad a well-known meaning la common law or In the law of this country, they were presumed to have been so used In this case unless the context compelled to the contrary. He summarised his search into the common law and the law of the coun try at the time the Sherman anti-trust law waa passed, so far as the first sec- tion was concerned, as follows: A That the context manifests that the statute waa drawn In the light of the existing practical conception of the law of restraint of trade, because It groups as within that class not only contracts which were In restraint of trade In the subjective sense, but all contracts or acts which theoretically were attempts to monopolise, yet which In practice had come to be considered aa in restraint OI traae in a Droaa sense. B That In view of the many forms of contracts and combinations which were being evolved from existing eco nomic conditions. It was deemed essen t'al by an all-embracing enumeration to make sure thst no form of contract or combination by which an undue re straint of Interstate or foreign com merce was brought about could save such restraint from condemnation. The statute under this view evinced the In tent not to restrain the right to make and enforce contracts, whether result tnc from combination or otherwise. which did not unduly restrain Inter state or foreign commerce but to pro tect that commerce from being atralned by methois. whether old or new, which would constitute an Inter ference that Is an undue restraint. "C And. as the contracts or acts em braced In the provision were not ex pressly defined, since the enumeration addressed Itself simply to classes of acts, those classed being broad enough to embrace every conceivable contract or combination which could be made concerning commerce or the subjects of such commerce, and thus caused any act done by any of the enumerated methods anywhere In the whole field of human activity to be Illegal If In restraint of trade. It Inevitably follows that the provision necessarily called for the exercise of Judgment which re quired that some standard should be resorted to for the purpose of deter mining whether the prohibitions con tained In the statute had or had not In any given case been violated. "Thus, not specifying but tndubltably contemplating and requiring a stan dard. It follows that It was Intended that the standard of reason which had been applied to the common law and the law la this country In dealing with subjects of the character embraced by the statute waa intenaea to oe the measure used for the purpose of deter mining whether In a given case a par ticular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which the statute provided." to the second sec Lion, no said the Investigation of the common law and of law at the time the Sherman act was established showed that it was Intended to aupplement the first and to make sure that by no possible guise could the public policy embodied In the first section be. frustrated or evaded. Having In the first section forbidden all , Above, Snapshot of Johm D. Rockefeller sad Portrait of Chief Justice White. Below, William Rockefeller, II. M. Flagler and Joaa D. Archhold. (Phots Copyrighted by George GraatJ Bala.) means of monopolising trade, that Is, unduly restraining It by means of every contract combination, etc. the second section, according to the Chief Justice, "seeks. If possible, to make the pro hibition of the act all the more com plete and perfect by embracing all at' tempts to reach the end prohibited by the first section by any attempt to mo nopolise, even although the acts by which such results are attempted to be Drought about, or are brought about, be not embraced within the general enumeration 01 tne nrst section." Rale of Reason Is Guide.. Here the Chief Justice first spoke of using tne "rule or reason" In apply lng the statute to any given case. Ha said: "And of course when the second sec tion Is thus harmonized with and made, as It was Intended to be, the complement of the first, it becomes ob vlous that the criteria to be resorted to In any given oase to ascertain whether violations of the section have been com mitted Is the rule of reason guided by the esabltshed law and by the plain duty to enforce the prohibitions of the act and thus the publlo policy which Its restrictions were obviously enacted to subserve. it is worthy of observation, as we have previously remarked concerning the common law. that, although the statute by the comprehensiveness of the enumerations embodied In the first and second sections makes It obviously certain that its purpose was to pre vent undue restraints of every kind or nature, nevertheless by the omission of any direct prohibition against monop oly in tne concrete, it indicates a con sciousness that the freedom of the In dividual right to contract, when cot unduly or Improperly exercised, waa the most efficient means for the pre vention of monopoly, since the opera- t-.V'' 'j- -.it Fraak B. Kellogg, Who as Spe cial Preaoeator SaerewafnJIy roadnetew Standard Oil Case for Goverasaeat, - . tlon of the centrfugal and centripetal forces resulting from the t4bt to free ly contract was the me. ass by which monopoly would be Inevitably pre vented. If no extraneoua or sovereign power Imposed It and no right to make unlawful contracts having a monopo- 'stle tvdency were permitted. In oWer words, the freedom to con- ract was the essence of freedom from undue restraint on the right to contract." The Chief Justice next considered the contention of the parties as to the meaning of the statute. He said. In substance, the propositions of the Gov ernment were reducible to the claim that the language of the statute em braced "every contract, combination, etc.. In restraint of trade," and left no room for the exercise of Judgment but simply Imposed the plain duty of ap plying Its prohibitions to every case within its liberal language. The error of the Government on this point. Chief Justice White said, was In assuming that the 'decisions of the court had decided In accord with. Its Intentions. "This is true, because, aa the acta which may come under the classes stated In the first section and the re straint of trade to which that section applies are not specifically enumerated or defined. It is obvious that Judgment must In every case be called Into play In order to determine whether a par ticular act Is embraced within the 1 statutory classes, and whether, if the act Is within such classes. Its nature or effect causes It to be a restraint of trade within the Intendment of the act." said the Chief Justice. 'To hold to the contrary would re quire the conclusion either that every contract, act or . combination of any kind or nature, whether 'It operated In restraint of trade or not, was within the statute and thus the statute would be destructive of all right to contract or agree or combine -in any respect whatever aa to subjects embraced in Interstate trade or commerce; or. If this conclusion were not reached, then the contention would require It to be held that, as the statute did not define the things to which It, .related and ex cluded resort to the only means by which the acts to which It relates could be ascertained the light of reason the enforcement of the statute was Impos sible because of Its uncertainty." "The merely generio enumeration which the statute makes of tbe acts to which It refers and the absence of any definition of restraint of trade as used In the statute leaves room for but one conclusion, which Is that it Is expressly designed not to limit unduly the appli cation of the act by precise definition but, while clearly fixing a standard, that Is, by defining the ulterior boundaries which could not be transgressed with Impunity, to leave It to be determined by the light of reason, guided by the principles of law and the duty to apply and enforce the publlo policy embodied In the statute In every given case, whether any particular act or contract was within the contemplation of the statute." j Harlan's Objection Answered. At this point Chief Justice White touched upon the phase of tbe case which formed the basis of Justice Har lan's dissenting opinion, it was that the opinions of the Supreme Court In the cases of the United States vs. the Freight Association and the United States vs. the Joint Traffic Association excluded the right thus to reason in in terpreting the statute. Chief Justice White said the general language of those onlnlons had been subsequently ex plained and held not to Justify the broad significance attributed to them. And In order not In the ellghtest de gree to be wanting in frankness." said the Chief Justice, "we say that. Insofar, however, as by separating the general language used In the opinions in the Freight Association and Joint Traffic cases from the context rnd the subject and parties with which the cases were concerned. It may be conceived that the ! language referred to conflicts with the constructions which were given the stat ute, they are necessarily now limited and qualified." 'We see no possible escape from this conclusion If we are to adhere to the many cases decided in this court In which the anti-trust law has been ap plied and enforced, and if ths duty to apply and enforce that law In the fut ure Is to continue to exist. The first Is true, because the construction which we now gi-e the statute does not in the slightest degree conflict with a sin gle previous case decided concerning the anti-trust law, aside from the con tention as to the freight association and Joint traffic cases, and because every one of those cases applied the rule of reason for the purpose of deter mining whether the subject before the court was within the statute. The second also is true, since, as we have already pointed out, unaided by the light of reason, -It la Impossible to understand how the statute may In 'the future be enforced and the public pol icy which It establishes be made effica cious. The Chief Justice next toon up the facts and the application of the statute to them. Aa a matter of fact, the court found that the result of enlarging the capital stock of the Standard Oil Com pany of New Jersey and the acquisition by that company of the shares of stock of the other corporations in exchange for Its certificates gave to the corpora tion an enlarged and more perfect sway and control over the trade and com merce In petroleum and its products. The effect of this. Chief Justice White said, the lower court held was to de stroy "the potentiality of competition," which otherwise would have existed to such an extent as to be a combination or conspiracy In restraint of trade, in violation of the first section of the act, and also be an attempt to monopolize. and a. monopollzatson would bring about a perennial violation of the sec ond section. v """We see no cause to doubt the cor rectness of these conclusions." said the Chief Justloe, "considering the subject from every aspect: that Is, both in view of the facts established by the record and the necessary operation and effect of the law .as we have construed It upon the Inferences deductble from tbe facts for the following reasons: Big; Company Implies Monopoly. "A Because the unification of power and control o,ver petroleum and Its products which was the Inevitable re sult of the combining in the New Jer sey corporation by the increase ef Its stock and the transfer to It of the stocks of so many other corporations, aggregating' so vast a capital, gives rise, in and of itself in the absenoe of countervailing' circumstances, to say the least, to the prima facie presump tion of intent and purpose to maintain the domlnancy over the oil Industry, not as a result of normal methods of in dustrial development, but by new means of combination which were re sorted to in order that greater power might be added than would otherwise have arisen had normal methods been followed, the whole with the purpose of excluding others from the trade and thus centralizing in the combination a perpetual control of the movements of petroleum and Its products In ths chan nels of interstate commerce." Intent to Monopolize Proved. "B Because the prima facie presump tion of Intent to restrain trade, to mon opolize and to bring about monopoliza tion resulting from the act of expand ing the stock of the New Jersey corpor ation and vesting it with such control of the oil Industry Is made -conclusive by considering, (1) the-conduct of the persons or corporations who were mainly Instrumental In bringing about the ex tension of power In the New Jersey cor poration before the consummation of that result and prior to the formation or tne trust agreements or istv ana ja&: (2) by considering the proof as to what was done under those agreements and the acts which Immediately preceded the vesting of power In the New Jersey corporation, as well as by weighing the modes In wrflch the power vested In that corporation had been exerted and the results which have arisen from it." Conclusion. Is Inevitable. In subjecting to scrutiny the acts and doings of the Standard Oil Company in the long distant past for the purpose of discovering Intent and purpose, the Chief Justice said: "We think no disinterested mind can survey the period in question without being Irresistibly driven to the conclu sion that the very genius for commercial development and organization, which it would seem was manifested from the beginning, soon begot an intent and purpose to exclude others, frequently manifested by acts and dealings wholly noonslstent with the theory that they were made with the single conception of advancing the development of bus! ness power by usual methods, but which on the contrary necessarily Involved the Intent to drive others from the field and to exclude them from their right to trada and thus accomplish the mastery which was the end In view. "And, considering the period from the date of the trust agreements of 1879 and 1SS2 up to the time of the expan sion of the New Jersey corporation, tbe gradual extension of power over the commerce in oil which ensued, the deci sion of the Supreme Court of Ohio, the tardiness and reluctance in conform ing to the commands of that decision, the method first adopted and that which finally culminated In the plan of the New Jersey corporation, all additionally served to make manliest the continued existence of the intent which we have previously Indicated and which, among other things. Impelled the expansion of the New Jersey corporation. "The exercise of the power which re sulted from that organization fortifies the foregoing conclusions, since the de velopment which came, the acquisition here and there which ensued, of every efficient means by which competition could have been asserted, the slow but resistless methods which followed by which means of transportation were ab sorbed and brought under control, the system of marketing which was adopted by which the country was divided into districts and the trade in each district turned over to a designated coiporatlon within the combination and ail others excluded, ail lead the mind up to a conviction of a purpose and Intent which, we think. Is so certain as practically to cause the subject not to bo within ths domain of reasonable contention." Knight Decision Unsound. The Chief Justice at one point in his opinion took up some of the con tention of the defendants, particularly that based on tbe famous Knight case criticised last Fall by ex-President Roosevelt. The contention was that the Sherman anti -trust law could not be applied to the Standard Oil because to do so would be to extend the power of Congress to subjects beyond the reach of its authority to regulate in terstate commerce by enabling that body to deal with mere questions of production of commodities within the states. The Chief Justice said that this con tention as to the holding of the Knight case was unsound and required no ex press notice beyond tbat given it in cases already decided. The court then considered the argu ments that the statute could not be j applied under the facts in the case without impairing rights of property and destroying the freedom of contract of trade, which is essentially neces sary to the wellbelng of society. "But the ultimate foundation of all these arguments," said the Chief Justice, "is the assumption that reason may not be resorted to in interpreting and applying the statute and therefore that the statute unreasonably restricts the righf to contract and unreasonably operates upon the right to acquire and hold property. As the premise is dem onstrated to be unsound by the con struction we have given the statute, of course, the propositions which rest upon that premise need not be further noticed." Dissolution Is Ordered. Finally the Chief Justice came to ap ply the remedy. He said that ordi narily, where violations of the act were found to have been committed it would suffice to .enjoin further viola tions. In a case, however, where a monop olization or attempt to monopolize was established, or the existence of a combi nation la proven, the continuance of which was a perennial violation of the statute, further relief was called for. The lower court, he pointed out, had first enjoined the combination and in effect directed Its dissolution: second, forbidden the New Jersey corporation from exercising any control by virtue of Its stock ownership over the sub sidiary corporations, and enjoined these corporations from recognizing in any manner the authority or power of the SEASONABLE SPECIALTIES "WOODLARK" OIL OF CALIFORNIA OLIVES Half Pints, 30c;' Pints, 50c; Quarts, 85c; " Half Gallons, $1.75; Gallons, . $3.50 Pure and Healthful. There's golden sun shine in it. Expressed from perfect fruit grown in California's sunny olive groves. THERMOS, THE BOTTLE, $3.75 UP Keeps boiling liquids hot for 2-4 hours; keeps ice-cold liquids cold three days; at once a luxury, a convenience, and a neces sity. "We have them in all needed sizeg. Let us give you a descriptive, illustrated catalogue. . JETUM 25c Gives new life and a glossy color, to old straw hats, leather belts, and metal work. Black, blue, green, brown and red. "WOODLARK" PANA-BLANCO 25c Cleans and restores the color of Panama' hats and canvas shoes. Put your hat in order for the first warm, sunny day. SANITARY PAPER BLANKETS 50c Healthful; warm. Made of strong kid finish, sterilized paper. Use them between sheet and top cover, avoiding the depres sing weight of blankets and thick counter- panes. . WOODARD, CLARKE & CO. "Washington and Fourth Streets Eemember our great sale of travelers' luggage is in progress. Every article re duced in price. J New Jersey corporation by virtue of such owneship: third, enjoined in the sixth section of the decree the subsidi ary corporations, after the dissolution, rxbm doing any act which could create a like Illegal combination; fourth, en Joined the New Jersey corporation and all the subsidiary corporations from doing any business in interstate com merce pending the dissolution of the combination by the accomplishment of the transfer of stocks which the de cree In Its essence required; and, fifth, gave SO days to carry out the directions of the court. The court said this decree was right and should be affirmed, except as to what are termed "minor matters." One of these was the extension of the time within which the decree should be put into effect from one month to six months. tlon the subserviency of corporate In terests to the law of the land." ' Some Agreements Allowed. The other modification, was more lnv portant and had to do with the sixth section of the decree, which forbade the formation by the subsidiary corpora tions or their stockholders of like com. binations. "We must construe the sixth para graph of the decree," said the Chief Justice, "not as depriving the stock holders or corporations of the right to live under the law of the land, but as compelling obedience to that law. He said It did not follow, because an illegal restraint of trade or an attempt to monopolize or a monopolization re suited from the combination of corpora tions in the New Jersey corporation, that a like restraint or attempt to mo nopolize or monopolization would nec essarily arise from agreements between one or more of the subsidiary corpora tions after transfer of the stock by the New Jesey corporation. "For illustration," said he, "take tne pipelines. By the effect of the transfer of the stock, the pipelines would come under the control of various corpora tions Instead of being subjected to uniform control. If various corpora tions owning the lines determined in the publlo interests so to combine as to make a continuous line, such agree ment or combination would not be re pugnant to the act, and yet it might be restrained by the decree. 'As another example, take the Union Tank Line Company, one of the sub sidiary corporations, the owners practi cally of all the tank cars in use by the combination. If no possibility existed of agreements for the distribution of these cars among the subsidiary corpo rations, the most serious detriment to the public interest might result,' CORPORATIONS MUST SUBMIT Hadley Says Decision Proves They Are Subservient to Law. JEFFERSON CITY. Mo., May 15. Since the greatest combination of money and power that the world has ever known has been defeated in Its contest for existence, all other combina tions must of necessity submit." This is the view taken of the Standard Oil decision by Governor Herbert S. Hadley, who, as Attorney-General of Miseolrl, asked and obtained, after a notable fight, the ouster of the Stand ard OU Company of Indiana from Mis souri. "The effect of this decision. Insofar as the Standard Oil is concerned," he said, "will depend on how vigorously the National Government enforces its decree, but the greatest importance and value of this decision Is that it estab lishes for all time and beyond all ques- STAXDARD OIL KEEPS SILENT Newsboy Announces Decision on Steps of 2 6 Broadway. NEW. TORE, May 15. On the steps of the Standard Oil building at 26 Broad way, there stood a newsboy this after noon crying "Standard Oil loses." Inside not an officer of the company would speak. William Rockefeller sel dom talks and did not break his rule. John I. Archhold is 111 at his home In Tarrytown. Mortimer F. Elliott, solicitor-general for the company, said that he could have nothing to say un til he had read the full text of the de cision. Many brokers' offices kept open late into the night for London accounts. When similar previous decisions were handed down after, the market- closed, the financial powers were, able to get together over night on plan for action In the market the following morning. TWO KILLED BY WIRE VANCOUVER, B. C, EXPRESSMAN MEETS DEATH INSTANTLY. Stranger, Still Unidentified, Rushes to His Assistance and Also Is Electrocuted. VANCOUVER. B..C, May 15-Two men were killed Instantly today by an electric wire at the comer of Robson and Bldwell streets. Charles TXibrau, an expressman, was walking around his wagon when his head came in. contaot with a wire dangling from a pole, and he staggered. The second man, who was passing and who has not been identified, rushed to Dubrau's assistance and caught hold of him by the shoulder. Both fell to the ground together and lay quiet. A third man ran to the as sistance of the two and received a shock that disabled him, but by this time the wire had been disengaged from XMi- brau's head and several persons who came running from different directions carried the men to the sidewalk. The Jjflrst two were dead. The wire which Dubrau s ehad had struck, was a messenger cable which lately had been unused. The upper end of the wire had come in contact with the SOOO-volt wire of the lighting circuit. The lower end dangled within five feet of the ground. How long it had been In that nosition no one seems to know. The unidentified man was well dressed and about 35 years old. Women to Beautify Athena. ATHENA. Or.. May 15. (Special) The women of this place have taken it upon themselves to beautify the city park. They made arrangements for setting out a large number of plants and shrubs and then at the suggestion of a' nursery company postponed the planting until next Spring. Owing to the lateness of the season and the un- seasonableness of the weather the nurserymen said it would be time and energy wasted to attempt to do much this year. For the purpose of raising a park fund they held a pastry sale recently and expect to give others soon. fco so NATURES CUBE FOR BLOOD POISOH A great many medicines used in treating Contagions Blood Poison are composed largely of mercury and potash, and are intended to dry up or re move the hvaiiliating; outward symptoms. But such treatment cannot cure the disease, and its continued use will often so weaken and disease the stom- -ach as to make a nervous wreck of the patient. And too, when these min eral medicines are left off the smoldering poison takes on new life, and soon, the old symptoms of ulcerated mouth and throat, brown, scaly splotches, falling hair, sores and ulcers, etc., return with increased virulence. S. S. S. cures Contagious Blood Poison by purifying the blood and keeping the stomach and digestive members in perfect condition all the while by its fine tonic effects. S. S. S. is a purely vegetable remedy, made entirely of roots, herbs and barks of recognized virtue as blood purifiers. S. S. S. cures on the principle that not only must the poison be removed from the blood, but also the circulation must be enriched and vitalized with nourishing powers. S. S. S.sis known everywhere as the greatest of all blood purifiers and a safe, certain cure for Contagious Blood Poison. Home treatment Book and medical advice free. S. S. S. is for sale at drug stores. THE SWIFT SPECIFIC. CO ATLANTA, GA.