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PORTLAND, WEDNESDAY, JULY 7, 1909.

WHAT THE SENATE'S BOSS HAS DONE

There can be no doubt that the constitutionality of the corporation tax will be tested. The ground on which it will be tested is the same as on which the income tax was questioned—namely, the second section of article one of the Constitution, which requires that "direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers."

Moreover, corporations organized under the laws, and for the purposes of the several states, cannot fairly be regarded as objects of taxation. This point was made by many speakers in the Senate.

A writer in the New York Sun says: "Since the Constitution forbade the General Government directly to tax property except by apportionment among the states in proportion to population, it surely will prevent the taxing of the income from that property, whether of individuals or of corporations."

The amendment to the Constitution, now proposed, will, however, if adopted, remove the restriction as to taxation of incomes. Yet it is doubtful whether three-fourths of the states will ratify it. States containing many citizens who have incomes that would be taxed are likely to object to it on the ground that it discriminates against the capital of their own citizens and favors states whose proportion of incomes that would pay taxes is small. There are 103-200 states. Twelve could defeat this amendment.

The corporation tax is a device to increase the revenues till the income tax amendment shall carry. But it will carry, and in the next place certain that resistance will be made to the corporation tax, by appeal to the courts against it.

It is the Aldrich juggle with protection that brings things to this condition. Protective tariff enactments, intended to favor monopolies and protect trusts, will also abridge the revenues as to call for this expedient of a corporation tax. The New York "World's" clever cartoonist pictures the Aldrich having handed a gold brick by Aldrich—the latter walking away.

Oregon doubtless will cast her vote for the income tax amendment. The Oregonian will support it. This will be held in our state, and in a majority of the other states, and in a majority of the nation, who have incomes above the minimum of the corporation tax, or tax on profits of corporations, is, on the other hand, unfair and grossly inequitable—the Aldrich plan, not necessary to repeat now. And besides, it certainly will be appealed to the courts of the United States, and probably by them will be declared unconstitutional. This mud-slinging is wholly a consequence of the work of "protected interests" in the Senate.

OUR WONDERFUL FUTURE.

With the possible exception of the half-baked socialist who, on the street corners and in beer halls, rants over the unequal division of wealth, every American citizen will feel a thrill of pride in contemplation of the remarkable progress which this country is making. In another column will be found some interesting figures that show the first glance are almost startling in their immensity. A brief analysis and comparison of these estimates for 1920, with the actual figures for the years leading up to 1908 will, however, convince one that, in spite of the seeming immensity, the figures can safely be taken as conservative. These figures, which have been compiled by Fisk & Robinson, New York investment brokers, place the population of the United States in 1920 at 100,000,000, and the total wealth of the country at \$15,000,000,000. The value of the manufactured products is placed at \$19,000,000,000, and of agricultural products at \$14,000,000,000.

Judged by the standards of age, established by old-world countries, the United States is very young, but it is growing and developing with a rapidity never equaled by any other country the sun ever shone on. Unaccompanied by details, the big figures are stated in a way that is both clear and would be somewhat vague and uncertain, but when it is shown that a conservative annual increase from the \$17,848,000,000 value of agricultural products in 1908, would, in 1920, yield \$14,000,000,000, and that an even more moderate rate of increase in manufacturing would, eleven years hence, show a total of \$19,000,000,000, it is easy to understand the value of the estimates.

The figures given elsewhere include the entire country, and for this reason are all the more interesting when we consider the part that the Pacific Northwest is destined to play in this growth. In this table, it is shown that the value of the agricultural products doubled between 1900 and 1908, and the increase for the intervening years, until 1920, is placed at 80 per cent. With the remarkable progress made in all branches of the agricultural industry, with irrigation and intensified farming yielding dollars where only pennies were secured before, and with thousands of square miles of new territory to be brought under cultivation in this part of the country, the 80 per cent increase is entirely too conservative to

represent, accurately, what we may expect in Oregon and the Pacific Northwest. The results of the past are the only safe basis on which to estimate what the future will bring forth. Judged from that standard, the Pacific Northwest, as well as the rest of the country, is scheduled for a wonderful transformation in the coming decade.

THERE IS WORK TO DO.

That Middle and Eastern Oregon will be opened to the world by railroads, within the next two or three years, there is good and sufficient reason to believe. Preliminaries for the construction through Deschutes Canyon are actively under way. It is a very difficult work, but worth the effort, since it will be a water grade into Middle Oregon. Construction through the Cascade Mountains from the Upper Willamette, to connection with the road from California, by the Klamath project, will, within a year and within three years its completion may be expected. The plan of development includes a line across Middle Oregon from east to west—down Snake River through the Deschutes connection.

There is, indeed, we could obtain assurance of renewal of water power on the Umpqua Valley to Coos Bay. But that road must be realized, too. Meantime, parts of our state amply developed with railroads yet lack development. The railroads can't do it all. Large bodies of land, uncultivated and unproductive. Meantime our people are bringing in food products from the East that ought to be grown on our own lands. It is an erroneous notion that irrigation in Oregon would be restricted to the eastern part of the state. The valleys of Western Oregon are even more advantageous for intensive farming, since the streams are more numerous and stronger, and the soil more abundant and more easily managed. In the western part of Oregon the population ought to be multiplied five fold, within a few years; and even then their resources will not be one-half employed.

Suppose Jesus were on earth today and should feed six or seven thousand people with half a dozen loaves of bread and a few little fish. Would it not raise a sensation? Would it not be a sensational thing to do? What is true of it now was true when it was actually done. From an only escape from the sensation by denying the miracle, the account of the miracle. Take another example. Suppose Jesus were to appear in some village today and drive a large herd of pigs into the sea by filling them with devils. There would be a great sensation. If, in a transaction, would it not be particularly disturbed in their minds. We cannot understand how our country can avoid admitting that Jesus actually appeared in his ministry, or how he would wish to do so. There is no harm in sensation, if it is of the right kind.

LONG STAIRWAYS AND YOUNG GIRLS.

There is common sense, backed by wide experience, in the protest of Spokane educators against high school buildings, many of the study and recitation rooms of which are accessible only by long flights of stairs. To compel the ascension of this protest by any doubting Thomases among us, it is only necessary to have him climb the stairs to the auditorium in the Lincoln High School building of this city. No wonder women who teach in this and other high schools constructed buildings come through the weary ascent almost to the point of exhaustion. It is a young girl subjected to the ascent of those long, steep flights of stairs after day, and perhaps half a dozen times a day, for ten months, not infrequently to break down before the four years' course is completed.

The studies of the high school course are sufficiently exacting. Some of them may be useless for all practical purposes, but a young girl in ordinary health and with intelligent care should be able to complete the four years' course without undue mental strain or physical inconvenience. To add to this the ascent and descent of those long, steep flights of stairs from ten to twenty or thirty times a day, to the detriment of this class of students, is a menace of injury to the close of the course, or the probability of a breakdown before it is completed. Parents should not be blind to these facts, and with knowledge of them, refuse to permit their young daughters to enter such buildings.

MISLEADING THE FARMERS.

A number of excellent people of Astoria have repeatedly asked The Oregonian to pay no attention to the wild claims of some of its citizens regarding the shifting of its citizens from Portland to Astoria. Ordinarily The Oregonian is inclined to heed these requests, but when the Associated Chamber of Commerce, by misrepresenting facts, succeeded in enlisting the sympathies of an organization of the standing of the Farmers' Educational and Co-Operative Union, it is perhaps advisable to correct any misrepresentations. Manager Whyte, of the Chamber of Commerce, has notified the Farmers' Union that "Astoria will soon have completed a monster elevator which will be given free of charge for the use of the Farmers' Educational and Co-Operative Union whenever the executive committee sees fit to accept it." The gentleman who also informs the union that this elevator "will save at least one cent per bushel, or a grand total of \$250,000, on the 25,000,000 bushels of grain of the Island Empire, for Washington, Idaho and Oregon."

Naturally, with such a heavy saving in prospect, the Farmers' Union, in the newspaper bearing its name, expresses the belief that— "The grain of the natural shipping point for the grain of the Pacific Northwest is on the sea coast and grain sent there could escape the long towage charge from sailing vessels must pay, at Portland, for true in reaching Seattle or Tacoma, for which vessel must be towed from the entrance to the straits, a distance of near 150 miles, and a heavy expense to sailing vessels."

grain can be moved from Portland to Astoria by water at a cost so low that it would bankrupt any railroad that attempted to meet it. In some cases this cost by water has been as low as 5 cents per ton, and it never reaches 10 cents per ton for the 100-mile voyage.

Any attempt to force the railroads to haul wheat beyond the point at which it can be reached by the cheapest carrier in the world—the ocean freighter—means an economic loss to the shipper. Sooner or later the Farmers' Union, or some other agency, will start a movement for lower freight rates to the water. The likelihood of securing these rates would not be enhanced if the railroad were forced to haul the grain 100 miles farther than would be necessary. This is a matter which will bear investigation. The desirability of it is given by the Farmers' Union, the better it will be for all concerned.

JESUS' SENSATIONAL METHODS.

A contributor who is so sincere that it is painful to differ with him in opinion, reproaches The Oregonian for saying that Jesus used sensational methods in his ministry. The letter will be found in today's issue. Of course, we could have a pretty little controversy over this subject, but it would be purely a war of words. Everything depends on what one actually means by "sensational." For our part, do not necessarily mean anything disreputable by it. A transaction may be sensational in a bad sense or in a good one. The object in view makes the difference. We must insist, though, that anything which excites a sensation is sensational. We, for our part, do not necessarily mean anything disreputable by it. A transaction may be sensational in a bad sense or in a good one. The object in view makes the difference. We must insist, though, that anything which excites a sensation is sensational. We, for our part, do not necessarily mean anything disreputable by it. 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