BEEFTRUSTDECISION

ull Text of the Supreme Court's Pronouncement.

COMBINE CONTRARY TO LAW

Agreement of Packers Is Held to Prevent Lawful Competition-New Ground Taken on Interstate Commerce.

In response to inquiries from several preme Court of the United States against the Beef Trust, viz.:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE. This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court, on demurrer, granting an injunction against the appellants' comssion of alleged violations of the act of July 2, 1890, chapter 647 (26, Stat. 209). "to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies." It will be necessary to consider both the bill and the decree. The bill is brought against a number of corporations, firms and individuals of different states, and makes the following allegations: First—The defendants (appellants) are

ngaged in the business of buying livestock at the stockyards in Omaha, St. Joseph, Kansas City, East St. Louis and St. Paul, and slaughtering such livestock at their respective plants in ces named, in different states, and

Second-The defendants "are also engaged in the business of selling" such ments, at the several places where they are so prepared, to "dealers and con-sumers in diverse states and territories of the said United States other than chose wherein the said meats are so preed and sold," as aforesaid, and in the trict of Columbia and in foreign countries, "and shipping the same meats, then so sold from the said places of heir preparation over the several lines transportation of the several railroad panies serving the same as common ders to such dealers and consumers, ant to such sales.

defendants also are enred in the business of shipping such h meals to their respective agents at principal markets in other states, etc., de by those agents in those markets

urth-The defendants together cor about six-tenths of the whole trade commerce in fresh meats among the s, territories and District of Colum-

-But for the acts charged would free competition with one another. xth-In order to restrain competition ng themselves as to the purchase of estock, defendants have engaged in, intend to continue, a combination requiring, and do and will require, respective purchasing agents stockyards mentioned, where defendants buy their livestock (the being stock produced owned principally in other states and

shipped to the yards for sale) to refrain from bidding against each other "except perfunctorily and without good faith,"
d by this means compelling the owners of such stock to sell at less prices than they would receive if the bidding really

Seventh-For the same purpose the dedendants combine to bid up, through their agents the prices of livestock for a few days at a time, "so that the market reports will show prices much higher than the state of trade will warrant," thereby inducing stockowners in other states to make large salpments to the stockyards to their disadvantage.

Eighth-For the same purposes, and dize the commerce protected by the statute, the defendants combine "to arbitrarily, from time to time, raise, lower and fix prices and to maintain uniform prices at which they will sell' lealers throughout the states. This is effected by secret periodical meeting where are fixed prices to be enforced until changed at a subsequent meeting. The prices are maintained directly, and by collusively restricting the meat shipped the defendants, whenever conductive to the result, by imposing penalties for deviations by establishing a uniform rule for the giving of credit to dealers, etc., and by notifying one another of the uents of such dealers and keeping blacklist of delinquents, and refusing

Ninth-The defendants also combine to make uniform charges for cartage for the delivery of meats sold to dealers and consumers in the markets throughout the etc., shipped to them by the defencants, through the defendants' agents at the markets, when no charges would have been made but for the combination.

Tenth-Intending to monopolize the said commerce and to prevent competi-tion therein, the defendants "have all and each engaged in and will continue" ar-rangements with the railroads whereby the defendants received, by means of re-bates and other devices, rates less than the lawful rates for transportation, and were exclusively to enjoy and share this unlawful advantage to the exclusion of competition and the public. By force of the consequent inability of competitors to engage or continue in such commerce, the defendants are attempting to monopolize, have monopolized and will monopolize the commerce in livestock and fresh meats among the states and territories and with foreign countries.

Eleventh-The defendants are and have een in conspiracy with each other, with the railroad companies and others unknown, to obtain a monopoly of the sup-ply and distribution of fresh means throughout the United States, etc. And to that end defendants artificially restrain the commerce and put arbitrary regulations in force affecting the same from the shipment of the livestock from the plains to the final distribution of the meats to the consumer. There is a prayer for an injunction of the most comprehensive sort, against all the foregoing proceedings, and others, for discovery of oks and papers relating directly or indirectly to the purchase or shipment of bestock, and the sale or shipment of fresh meat and for an aneswer unde oath. The injunction issued is appended

TERMS OF PERPETUAL INJUNCTION. Packers Are Allowed to Agree on Certain Details Held Not to Involve a Possible

Restrait of Trade. And now, upon motion of the said attorney, the court does order that the pre-iminary injunction heretofore awarded in this cause, to restrain the said defendants and each of them, their respective agents and attorneys, and all other persons acting their behalf, or in behalf of either of claiming so to act, from entering taking part in or performing any conombination or conspiracy, the pur-effect of which will be, as to trade serce in fresh meats between the states and territories and the Dis-Columbia, a restraint of trade, in ontion of the provisions of the act of our of the act of our or our out of the act of our or out of the act of t "An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopoeither by direction or requesting their respective agents to refrain from ing against each other in the purchase of livestock; or collusively and by

agreement to refrain from bidding against each other at the sales of livestock; or by combination, conspiracy or contract raising or lowering prices or fixing uni-form prices at which the said meats will be sold, either directly or through their respective agents; or by curtailing the quantity of such meats shipped to such markets and agents; or by establishing and maintaining rules for the giving of credit to dealers in such meats, the effect of which rules will be to restrict com-petition; or by imposing uniform charges for cartage and delivery of such meats to dealers and consumers, the effect of which will be to restrict competition; or by any other method or device, the pur-pose and effect of which is to restrain emmerce as aforesaid; and also from wlolating the provisions of the act of Con-gress, approved July 2, 1896, entitled, "An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraint and monopolies" by combining or conspiring together, or with attempt to monopolize any part of the trade and commerce in fresh meats among the several states and territories and the District of Columbia, by demanding, obtaining or, with or without the connivance of the officers or agents thereof, or of quarters. The Oregonian prints herewith any of them, receiving from railroad comporting such fresh meats in such trade and commerce, either directly or by means of rebates, or by any other device, transportation of or for such meats, from the points of the preparation and production of the same from livestock or elsewhere, to the markets for the sale of the same to dealers and consumers in other states and territories than those wherein the same are so prepared, or the District of Columbia, at less than the regular rates which may be established or in force on their several lines of transportation, under the provisions in that behalf of the law of the said United States for the

But nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit the said defendants from agree-ing upon charges for cartage and delivery and other incidentals connected with local sales, where such charges are not calculated to have any effect upon comconverting the livestock into fresh meat petition in the sales and delivery of for human consumption. taining rules for the giving of credit to dealers where such rules in good fuith are calculated solely to protect the de-fendants against dishonest or irresponsi-ble desiers, nor from curtailing the quantity of meat shipped to a given market where the purpose of such arrangement in good faith is to prevent the over-accunulation of meats as perishable articles in such markets.

regulation of commerce, be and the same

Nor shall anything herein contained be onstrued to restrain or interfere with the action of any single company or firm, by its e- their officers or agents (whether such officers or agents are themselves personally made parties defendant hereto or not) acting with respect to its or their own corporate or firm business, property

SCHEME WITHIN REACH OF LAW.

Vagueness in Some Specifications Inevitable but Whole Structure of Charge Is Clear and Sustained.

ombination of a dominant proportion of the dealers in fresh meat throughout the United States not to bid against each other in the livestock markets of the different states, to bid up prices for a few days, in order to induce the cattlemen to send their stock to the stockyards, to fix prices at which they will sell and to that end to restrict shipments of meat when neces sary, to establish a uniform rule of credit to dealers, and to keep a blacklist, to make uniform and improper charges for cartage, and, finally, to get less than lawful rates from the railroads to the exclusion of competitors. It is true that the last charge is not clearly stated to be a part of the combination, but as it is alleged that the defendants have each and all made arrangements with the railroads that they were exclusively to enjoy the unlawful advantage, and that their intent in what they did was to monopolize the commerce and to prevent competition, and in view of the general allegation to which we shall refer, we think that we have correctly stated the purport of the bill.

It will be noticed further that the intent to monopolize is alleged for the first time sellers of the cattle, perhaps it is not too he bill as to raising, lowering and fixing prices. In states from either. The intent of the the earlier sections the intent alleged is to restrain competition among themselves. But after all the specific charges there is general allegation that the defendants are conspiring with one another, the rallroads and others, to monopolize the sup-ply and distribution of fresh meats throughout the United States, etc., as has stated above, and it seems to us that this general allegation of intent colors and applies to all the specific charges of the bill. Whatever may be thought concerning the proper construction of the statute, a bill in equity is not to be read and construed as an indictment would have been read and construed a bundred years ago, but it is to be taken to mean what it fairly conveys to a dispareader by a fairly exact use of Englih speech. Thus read this bill seems to intended to allege successive elements of a single connected scheme.

We read the demurrer with the same iberality. Therefore we take it as ap-Hberality. plying to the bill generally for m rlousness and want of equity, and also to each section of it which makes a charge, and to the discovery. The demurrer to the discovery will not need discussion in the view which we take concerning the relief, and therefore we turn at once to that.

The general objection is urged that the bill does not set forth sufficient definite or specific facts. This objection is serious, but it seems to us inherent in the nature of the case,

presents a new problem in pleading. If as we must assume, the scheme is enter-tained, it is, of course, contrary to the very words of the statute. Its size makes the violation of the law more conspicu-ous, and yet the same thing makes it impossible to fasten the principal fact to a certain time and place. The elements, too, are so numerous and shifting; even the constituent parts alleged are, and from their nature must be so extensive in time and space that something of the same impossibility applies to them. law has been upheld, and therefore we are bound to enforce it, notwithstanding these difficulties,

On the other hand, we equally are bound by the first principles of justice not to sanction a decree so vague as to put the whole conduct of the defendant's business at the peril of a summons for contempt. We cannot issue a general in-junction against all possible breaches of the law. We must steer between these opposite difficulties as best we can.

The scheme, as a whole, seems to us to be within reach of the law. The constituent elements as we have stated them, are enough to give to the scheme a body, and, for all that we can say, to accomplish it. Moreover, what-ever we may think of them separately, when we take them up as distinct charges and they are alleged sufficiently as ele ments of the scheme, it is suggested that the several acts charged are lawful, and that intent can make no difference. they are bound together as the parts of a single plan. The plan may make the parts uniawful. (Aikens vs. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194, 296.) The statute gives this proceeding against combinations in restraint of commerce among the states and against attempts to monopolize the same. Intent is almost essential to such a combination, and is essential to such

LAW LOOKS AT INTENT.

Restrait of Interstate Trade an Inevitable Consequence of Facts Proved. Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a result which the law seeks to prevent-for instance, the mo-

tion to the mere forces of nature to bring that result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability that it will happen. Commonwealth vs. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 167, 272. But when that intent and the consequent dangerous probability exists, this statute, like many others and like the common law is some cases dilike the common law in some cases, di-rects itself against that dangerous probarects itself against that dangerous proba-bility, as well as against the completed result. What well as result. What we have said disposes inci-dentally of the objection to the bill as multifarious. The unity of the plan em-

braces all the parts.

One further observation should be made.

The combination alleged embraces restraint and monopoly of trade within a single state, and to that extent is not within the reach of the laws, but its within the reach of the laws, out its
effect upon commerce among the states
is not accidental, secondary, remote or
merely probable. On the allegations of
the bill the latter commerce no less, perhaps even more than commerce within a
single state, is an object of attack. See
Laloun vs Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 569. Laloup vs. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640. 641; Cruother vs. Kentucky, 147 U. S. 47, 58; Allen vs. Pullan Company, 191 U. S. 171, 179, 180. Moreover, it is a direct object, it is that for the sake of which the several specific acts and courses of conduct are done and adopted. Therefore the case is not like United States vs Knight Company, 156 U. S. 1, where the subject matter of the combination was manufacture, and the direct object monopoly of manufacture within a state, However likely monopoly of commerce among the states in the article manufac-tured was to follow from the agreement,

It was not a necessary consequence not a primary end. Here the subject matter is sales and the very point of the combination is to restrain and monopolize commerce among the states in respect of such sales. The two cases are near to each other, as sooner or later always must happen where lines are to be drawn, but the line between them is distinct.

Montague vs. Lowry, 193 U. S. 28. So again the line is distinct between this case and Hopkins vs. United States, 171 U. S. 578. All that was decided there was that the local business of commison merchants was not commerce among the states, even if what the brokers we employed to sell was an object of such commerce. The brokers were not like the defendants before United States, themselves the buyers and sellers. They only furnished certain facilities for the sales; therefore, there again the effects of the combination of brokers upon the ommerce were only indirect and not within the act. Whether the case would have been different if the combination had resulted in exorbitant charges was left open. In Anderson vs. United States, 171 U.S. 604, the defendants were buyers and sellers at the stockyards, but their agreement was merely not to employ brokers or to recognize yard traders who were not members of their association. Any yard trader could become a member of the association on complying with the conditions, and there was said to be no feature of monopoly in the case. It was held that the combination did not directly regulate commence between the conditions are considered. regulate commerce between the states, and, being formed with a different intent, was not within the act. The present case is more like Montague vs. Lowry, 193 U.

For the foregoing reasons we are of the opinion that the carrying out of the scheme alleged by the means set forth, properly may be enjoined, and that the bill cannot be dismissed.

MONOPOLY OF COMMERCE INTENDED.

Transportation of Cattle for Sale in Another State Held to Be Interstate Trade. So far it has not been necessary to consider whether the facts charged in any single paragraph constitute commerce

among the states or show an interference with it. There can be doubt, we ap-prehend, as to the collective effect of all the facts, if true, and if the defendants entertain the intent alleged. We pass now to the particulars and will consider the corresponding parts of the injunction at the same time

ection. That charges a combination of independent dealers to restrict the com-petition of their agents when purchasing stock for them in the stockyards. The purchasers and their slaughtering estab-lishments are largely in different states combination is not merely to restrict competition among the parties, but, as we have said, by force of the general allegaattempt to monopolize commerce among the states.

It is said that this charge is too vague, and that it does not set forth a case of commerce among the states. Taking up the latter objection first, commerce among the states is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business. When cat-tle are sent for sale from a place in one state, with the expectation that they will end their transit, after purchase, in another, and when in effect they do so, with the only interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the stockyards, and when this is a typical, constantly-recurring course, the current thus existing is a current of commerce among the states and the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such commerce. What we say is true, at least, of such a purchase by residents of another state for that of the seller and of the cattle. we need not trouble ourselves at this time as to whether the statute could be escaped by an arrangement as to the place where the sale in point of law is consummated. See Norfolk & Western Railroad vs. Sims, 191 U. S. 441. But the sixth section of the bill charges an interference with such sales, a restraint of the parties by mutual contract and a combination not to compete in order to

monopolize. It is immaterial if the sec-tion also embraces domestic transactions. It should be added that the cattle in a stockyard are not restrained even to the extent that was held sufficient to warrant taxation in American Steel and Wire Company vs. Speed, 1902, U. S. 500. But it may be that the question of taxation does not depend upon whether the article taxed may or may not be said to be in the course of commerce between the states, but whether the tax so far affects

The injunction against taking part in a combination, the effect of which will be a restraint of trade among the states by directing the defendant's agents to re-frain from bidding against one another at the sales of livestock, is justified so far as the subject material is concer-The injunction, however, refers not to trade among the states in cattle, concerning which there can be no question of original packages, but to trade in fresh meats, as the trade forbidden to be restrained, and it is objected that the trade in fresh meats described in the sec-ond and third sections of the bill is not commerce among the states because meat is sold at the slaughtering places, or when sold elsewhere may be sold in less than the original packages. But the allegations of the second section, even if allegations of the second section, even if they import a technical passing of title at the slaughtering places, also import that the sales are to persons in other states, and that the shipments to other states are part of the transaction suant to such sales"-and the third sec-tion imports that the same things which are sent to agents are sold by the sufficiently indicates that some at least of the sales are of the original packages. Moreover, the sales are by persons in one state to persons in another. But we do not mean to imply that the rule which marks the point at which state taxation or regulation becomes permissible neces-sarily is beyond the scope of interference by Congress in cases where such interference is deemed necessary for the pro-tection of commerce among the states. Nor do we mean to intimate that the statute under consideration is limited to that point. Beyond what we have said above, we leave those questions as we tary; R. A. Booth, general manage find them. They were touched upon in treasurer. The capital stock of the

the Northern Securities Company's case, 1903, U. S. 197. We are of opinion, further, that the

charge in the sixth section is not too vague. The charge is not a single agree ment, but of a course of conduct intended to be continued. Under the act the duty of the court is, when applied to, to stop the conduct. The thing done, and in-tended to be done, is perfectly definitewith the purpose mentioned, directing the defendants' agents and inducing each other to refrain from competition in bids. The defendants cannot be ordered to compete, but they properly can be forbidden to give directions or to make agreements not to compete. (See Addyston Pipe & Steel Company vs. United States, 175 U. S. 21L) The injunction follows the charge. No objection was made on the ground No objection was made on the ground that it is not confined to the places specifled in the bill. It seems to us, however, that it ought to set forth more exactly the transactions in which such directions and agreements are forbidden. The trade in fresh meat referred to should be defined somewhat as it is in the bill, and the sales of stock should be confined to sales of stock at the stockyards named. which stock is sent from other states to the stockyards for sale or is brought to those yards for transport to another

GROSSCUP INJUNCTION MODIFIED.

Packers Entitled to Precise Statement Things Forbidden.

After what we have said, the seventh, eighth and ninth sections need no special remark, except that the cartage referred to in section 9 is not an indepen-dent matter, such as was dealt in Pennsylvania Railroad vs. Knight, 192 U. S. 21, but a part of the contemplated transit cartage for delivery of the goods. The general words of the injunction, "or by any other method or device, the purpose and effect of which is to restrain com-merce as aforesaid," should be stricken The defendants ought to be informed accurately as the case permits what they are forbidden to do. Specific devices are mentioned in the bill, and they stand prohibited.

The words quoted are a sweeping in to the objection which we stated at the beginning that it was our duty to avoid. To the same end of definiteness, as far as attainable, the words "as charged in the bill" should be inserted between "dealers in such meats" and "the effect of which rules" and two lines lower, as to charges for cartage, the same words should be inserted between "dealers and consum-ers" and "the effect of which."

The acts charged in the tenth section, apart from the combination and the intent, may, perhaps, not necessarily be unlawful, except for the adjective which proclaims them so. At least we may assume for purposes of decision that they are not unlawful. The defendants severally lawfully may obtain less than the regular rates for transportation, if the circumstances are not substantially similar to those for which the regular rates are fixed. Act of February 4, 1887, chapter 104, 2, 24 St. 379. It may be that the regular rates are fixed for carriage in cars furnished by the railroad companies and that the defendants furnish their own cars and other necessities of transportation. We see nothing to hinder them from combining to that end. We agree, as we already have said, that such a com-bination may be unlawful as part of the general scheme set forth in the bill, and that this scheme as a whole might be enjoined. Whether this particular combination can be enjoined, as it is, apart from its connection with the other elements, if entered into with the intent to monopolize, as alleged, is a more delicate question. The question is how it would stand if the tenth section were the whole bill. Not every act that may be done with intent to produce an unlawful result is unlawful, or constitutes an attempt. It is a question of proximity and degree The distinction between mere preparation and attempt is well known in the crim-It the same time.

The first question arises on the sixth section. That charges a combination of Mass. 267, 272. The same distinction is recognized in cases like the present. United States vs. E. C. Knight Company, 156 U. S. 133; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1,

We are of opinion, however, that such a combination is within the meaning of the statute. It is obvious that no more powerthan an advantage in the cost of trans And even if the advantage is one which the act of 1887 permits, which is denied, perhaps inadequately, by the adjective "unlawful," still a combination to use it for the purpose prohibited by the act of 1890 justifies the adjective and takes

the permission away. It only remains to add that the foregoing question does not apply to the earlier setions, which charge direct restraints of the trade within the decisions of the court, and that the criticism of the decree, as if it ran generally against combinations in restraint of trade or to mon opolize trade, ceases to have any force when the clause against "any other memod or device" is stricken out. So modified it restrains such combinations only to the extent or certain specified to have used and intend to continue to

Decree modified and affirmed.

NEW JERSEY'S REVENUE. Unblushing Boast of a Full Till From Acknowledgedly Dublous Sources.

Chicago Chronicle Edward C. Stokes, the new Governor of New Jersey, stated some facts in his inaugural address which are of interest to people outside of his state.

Congratulating the people of New Jer-sey on their good fortune, he stated that at the close of the last fiscal year the balance in the State Treasury was over \$2,940,000. The ordinary receipts for the same year, he said, amounted to more than \$4,302,000. point of the Governor's congratula

tion lay in the fact stated by him that "of the entire income of the government not a penny was contributed directly by the people," and that nearly 78 per cent of it "came from railroads and the business mpanies domiciled in our state. These business companies, as we all know, are mostly companies originating

outside of the state and doing most of their business elsewhere. The big steel corporation is a conspicuous example. By way of formal compliance with the law these companies have offices in New Jersey, which are within easy reach of their main offices, just across the river in the City of New York. These companies are the source of most of the revenue of which the people of New Jersey indirectly con-

tribute only a trifle.

Happy people! Governor Stokes reminds them that the revenue of which they contribute not a penay directly not only suf-fices to meet all the ordinary expenses of the state government, including those for charities and education, but also to develop "a magnificent road system, em-bracing one-third of the macadam or state roads of the United States."

The people of New Jersey have reason to feel about as comfortable as a certain suburb of Chicago which gets enough out of racetracks and a lot of saloons to cover nearly all its public expenditures. Governor Stokes' inaugural is a snameless confession of Jersey selfishness and of a purpose still further to shape its in-corporation laws not for the good of the

general public, but to get the utmost reve-

nue out of them and by making that home otherwise in New Jersey. Increase Booth-Kelly Stock. EUGENE, Or., Feb. 5 .- (Special.)-The annual meeting and election of officers of the Booth-Kelly Lumber Company result-ed in the re-election of all the old of-ficers—F. H. Buck, president; J. F. Kelly, vice-president; G. H. Kelly, secre-tary; R. A. Booth, general manager and

ance was transacted at the meeting, although some changes are contemplated in the working of the mills.

YOUR CREDIT

IS GOOD

TARIFF BARBARISMS.

Reasons for the Abrogation of the Tax on Art, Books and Lumber.

From an Editorial in the February

Century.
The tariff on art cannot be defended by any of the customary arguments of an economic sort. It is not desired by those whom it "protects"; it accom-plishes nothing in the upbuilding of our industries; it does not result in the ul-timate cheapening of something to the consumer; and thousands of protectionists desire its abolition. If such an absurdity could be conceived as the protection of our portrait painters, for stance, through the tariff, it could be done only by excluding foreigners from plying their brushes within the boundaries of the country. To read the law, one would think we had "Old Master" factories in full blast, but in perpetual infancy, unable to compete with the old masters of other countries. So weak, indeed, is the economic basis of this tax that its defenders have nothing to urge in its favor but the argument that paintings and sculpture are luxuries, like champagne and diamonds, and that their porters should be made to pay rou This is "tariff for revenue only" v a vengeance; it is certainly a tariff for nothing else. Meanwhile the educational and civilizing value of art is left wholly

out of the account. There is probably no one thing that has CASTORIA

The Kind You Have Always Bought Bears the Chart Flitcher.

taste in this country as this tax. The influence of a correct public taste upon the production of art is immense. As the recent comparative exhibition of American and foreign art has indicated, we have admirable painters; but, with few exceptions they have formed their taste and received their culture abroad. That they are not more widely appreciated at home is largely due to the obstacles thrown in the way of the importation of great foreign art. The love of art and the taste for it are formed by a continual acquaintance with its best examples, and ipon these the United States ment puts a stigma amounting to a ban The objection that we should be flooded with trash is specious. For educational influence all the trash in the world—and we have plenty of our own-could not weigh in the balance against one great weigh in the balance against one great Rembrandt. Not only is beauty "its own excuse for being"; it carries its own power and revelation and inspiration. How many soever artists we produce we shall never be an artistic people until we live in closer access to the great art of the world. Every museum in the country is a standing rebuke to the short-sightedness of Congress in thus taxing the development of the people.

Special Terms Sale

GOLDEN OAK

Morris Chairs

You can't begin the week in a better way than by buying one of these

chairs. They are substantially built of selected golden oak-the

frames are well put together and have polish finish. They have

spring seats and backs, upholstered in fine velours-your choice of

green or red. These chairs are all fitted with automatically adjust-

able backs-no troublesome rods to get out of place. You can adjust

the back to five different positions while sitting in the chair. The

\$1.00 DOWN

50c A WEEK

MONDAY, TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY

more you use them the more comfortable they grow.

Another barbarism is the tariff on books. This is as much a tax on knowledge as if it were laid upon the public schools and colleges. By a curious an-omaly, the books thus affected are main-ly those of English origin, the expression of a civilization sympathetic to our own. while books in foreign languages are admitted free. The situation is something to be ashamed of. If any duty is kept on books, there should be a clause pro-viding that all books sent for review to any periodical entered as second-class mail matter shall be admitted free under such regulations as the Secretary of the

Treasury may direct. A hardly less absurd theory seems to have inspired the tariff on lumber. On our northern border is a country of inexhaustible timber, able and eager to supply our wants. And yet, for the enrichment of a comparatively few, we prefer at enormous expense to destroy our own supplies—at many a point to "make a solitude and call it peace." The destruction of forests in Minnesota, Wis-consin and Michigan, New York and New England-by fire and for the needs

is alarmingly on the increase. Against such influences the conservative dencies of forest reservation in the far West, tree planting and scientific cultivation and cutting, seem to be like "saving at the spigot and wasting at the bung." It is high time that Congress should look at this subject in truer perspective and should remember that its duty is to legislate not merely for its constituents today, but for generations to come who are to preserve and defend the ideas for which this Republic stands,

MAKE YOUR

OWN TERMS

GIBBS

Activity in Logging Business.

KALAMA, Wash., Feb. 5 .- (Special.) --Preparations are being made by loggers and millmen to resume active operations, I, G. Wickstrom, in addition to running his mill, is building a logging road into a new body of timber preparatory to logging it off. The McFarlane Bros, have gotten their new piling camp in running order and have a force of men at workfelling timber. They will only employ a small force until the bark will peel, and then they expect to rush work to fill the contract of 600,000 linear feet. The Spencer Creek Lumber Company has finished a plank road from its out to the county road.

I. T. Dray & Sons are running a logging camp on the Kalama River, above the falls, where they have 3,000,000 or 4.000,000 feet of logs to put in.

Pears' Soap is the great alchemist. Women are made fair by its use.

wold continuously since 1780.

