STORY OF THE FIGHT

SCHLEY CONTINUED HIS TESTIMONY BEFORE THE NAVAL COURT.

The Admiral Detailed the Particulars of the Encounter With Cervera's Fleet—The Loop.

(Continued from First Page.)

that the proper military maneuver would be to proceed westward toward the bases at Havana and Key West. He had arrived with the squadron off Santiago at about 7 o'clock P. M., May 28, he said, and had then taken up his position five or six miles out, afterwards holding the fleet in formation day and night. He had, on that first night, sent the Marblehead closer in with instructions to keep close watch on the mouth of the harbor. That night he had, he said, noticed the signals on the shore known as "blinkers," and he had also observed at that time lights on the lower plane, which he had since become convinced were from the Colon lying in the harbor.

The next day he had discovered the presence of that Spanish vessel and also that of the enemy's other war vessels. He said that when he had thus secured irrefutable proof of the fact that the vessels were there and told Captain Sigsbee of the fact, that officer expressed surprise. It was at this period that he sent his dispatch to the department giving absolute information of the presence of the Spanish vessels, and Sigsbee had carried this message to Mole St. Nicholas.

Mr. Raynor—After sending this dispatch what did you do?

Admiral Schley replied: "After sending that dispatch the squadron maintained its position in blockade of the harbor and the formation of the fleet was in my judgment the only available plan of formation. That was to keep the squadron constantly beyond the batteries, and to that end I called the Captains on board and explained to them not only the method of blockade, but the method of attack in case the enemy should appear. The squadron was to be broadside on the channel, simply a wheel in either direction. In that case, if the enemy should come out one way or the other, the fleet would simply go to the right or left, to the east or west, accordingly.

The Plan of Attack.

"The general plan adopted was to attack the head of the column, a few guns, of course, being turned upon the others. The picket boats were simply to be employed as torpedo-boat destroyers, to be protected under the lee of the larger ships and to follow the fleet.

"The squadron then took up its position and maintained it usually during the day. The order was given to maintain at all times enough steam to develop a speed of 12 knots, and also to maintain that formation. I do not think at any time we were over five miles from the shore and I always determined upon the position from bearing upon the Morro itself.

"In all these matters the surf regulated me a good deal, because it was always visible from the ship. During the entire time of the blockade, until the first of June, I saw the surf every day and watched it carefully. When night came on we formed a column and steamed east and west as slowly as possible. We did not get up as much speed as some people have imagined, because of the conditions of the bottoms of the vessels. I know that in the case of the Brooklyn she had not been in dock at any later period than the other vessels and I knew her condition at that time. The order was given to go east and west two or two and a half miles from Aguadores to Companias. Back of Santiago, like most of the ports on the southern side of Cuba, there were high hills. There was a table land 200 or 250 feet high, and back of that, to the west, was a peak 3000 feet high, and to the eastward was another one 4000 feet in height and maybe more. These peaks were used as bearings in locating our positions.

"At night I invariably took a couple of turns in toward the shore. Going east we turned with the starboard helm and going west we turned with a port helm. There was never a night that I did not look out for the picket boats before I went to bed, and I always saw them. I could see them through glasses and many times I could distinguish the outline of the land and could see the Morro and the entrance to the harbor. The fact that this blockade off Cienfuegos and also off Santiago was sufficient is borne out by the fact that no vessel entered or escaped during that time."

Reconnoissance of May 31.

Coming to the reconnoissance of May 31, Admiral Schley said:

"On the 31st., while the Brooklyn, Marblehead and Texas were coaling, I transferred my flag to the Massachusetts and determined I would develop the fortifications because of information which we had from the hydrographic office—the impression now is that it was rather undetermined. I think one stated that the batteries were old and another stated that Krupps were mounted. The general belief, however, was that all of the southern places were very heavily fortified. In fact, we knew very little about the effect of high-powered artillery either on shore or on board ship, and feeling that I ought to know something about the fortifications which defended that place I determined to go in and take advantage of what I believed to be the longest range of our guns and develop fully what these defenses were, and, incidentally, if we could, get a shot into the Colon, which was lying somewhat exposed."

"I think we were lying in a position perhaps four or five miles to the westward. The steaming in was at slow speed. I transferred my flag, named 7000 yards and went on board the Massachusetts. When I boarded her it was near the dinner hour and Captain Higginson suggested that we postpone until 1 o'clock the going in to develop these batteries. I assented to that. After the meal, we went to quarters and steamed in pretty nearly head on.

"There was not much opportunity for anybody to seek cover behind a turret unless he got behind the protecting plate, which was a guard to the entrance to the rear. Some weight has been laid upon the fact that we wore white clothes. I would like to invite attention to the fact that that was a matter which I controlled entirely for my squadron and it was the only suitable dress for that region."

Once on board he had, he said, engaged in a conversation with Captain (now Admiral) Higginson.

He Was Not Nervous.

"I was not excited," he went on, "nor nervous for I need not have undertaken the reconnoisance if I had not desired to do so. I had some regard for those standing on the turrets, thinking they were exposing themselves to danger from shock, which was unnecessary to them, though I was differently circumstanced, and so expressed myself. Commander Potts is entirely in error in saying I took advantage of cover. That I did not do, for I was not concerned about myself."

Speaking of the range of 7000 yards, the Admiral said that Commander Potts had himself suggested that range and he (the witness) had not known for several days that the range had been altered.

"The moment we began firing," he went on, "the shore batteries responded, some of them using smokeless powder. There was quite a stream of projectiles, and I was impressed with the idea that they must be from guns of six or eight-inch caliber. The shot from the Zocopa battery evidently reached the fleet. Some went over our ships and one went beyond and over the Vixen, which was half a mile distant.

"The strength of the batteries being established, it would have been military folly to have risked the battleships further to fire from these shore batteries under any instructions. If we had lost one or two of our six or seven vessels, the loss would have been a very great disadvantage and it might have invited attack with destructive results. I thought it better policy to save the ships for wider and better use, and subsequent events justified the decision."

The Coaling Question.

Here the witness abruptly turned from the bombardment of the Colon to a discussion of the coaling question. He said that his instructions had been to coal on every possible occasion. He then quoted and put in evidence a number of dispatches giving the instructions of the department on this question. He related in this connection the receipt of a number of dispatches from the department which had, he said, been brought by Captain Cotton. He was sure that the dispatches could not have been received before May 31. When he received these dispatches, the Admiral, in answer to questions by Mr. Raynor, testified that he had already discovered the Spanish fleet. He had also surmounted the difficulties about coaling and had so informed the department.

In this connection he went back and narrated the incident of the capture by the St. Paul of the Restormel, the English collier bound for Santiago.

Congratulations From Sampson.

On the 31st he received, he thought, by way of a press tug from Port Antonio, the dispatch of Admiral Sampson, congratulating him upon the location of the Spanish fleet.

In reply to his counsel, Admiral Schley explained that Cape Cruz was an exposed place 109 miles from Santiago, and he did not regard it as an available place for coaling.

His attention was called to Lieutenant Barber's testimony, likening the situation south of Cuba with that at Dry Tortugas, where ships had coaled. The Admiral said that the two places were not comparable. The sea to the south of Cuba was exposed for hundreds of miles. Dry Tortugas was surrounded by reefs, in which a sea could hardly enter. From information he received from Captain Cotton, he thought he received the impression that only small ships could be coaled at Mole St. Nicholas or Gonaives Channel.

The witness stated that he had not gone into foreign waters for coal because he wanted to avoid international complications, and especially wanted to avoid the charge of taking advantage of weaker nations, like Hayti and others.

After this digression the Admiral returned to the reconnoissance of May 31. That some of the younger officers who testified regarding that occurrence were mistaken, he said, was proved by the fact that there was today on the deck of the Indiana a plate showing where an eight-inch shell from the land fortification entered June 4 and wrecked her wardroom. The officers referred to had testified that there were no guns of over six-inch caliber in the Santiago land batteries. The Admiral said the shell which wrecked the wardroom of the Indiana might possibly have been fired from a mortar, of which there were several, but that the range of the batteries was beyond the ships, as they went in for the reconnoissance was evident from the fact that there were one or two shells which went over the American ships. There were, he said, many more, perhaps 50. "In fact," said he, "it was very lively for a few minutes."

Again leaving the question of the reconnoissance, the witness related the particulars of the arrival of the New Orleans May 30 with Captain Folger in command and convoying the collier Sterling. Captain Folger had, the Admiral said, brought instructions to sink the Collier in the channel at Santiago, the details to be left to Admiral Schley's discretion.

"I did not understand that this passage was to be blocked up, except in case we should be compelled to abandon the port, in which event the expedient was to be resorted to."

He then proceeded to detail his conversation with Captain Folger, concerning which Captain Folger also testified as a witness for the department. While satisfied that Captain Folger had not meant to do any injury to him (the Admiral), he felt that the Captain had failed to give all the details of the conversation.

"He did not want to explain just what the conversation had been, for I had condemned the circular form of the blockade and advocated the form which I had established as being more mobile and more facile for a small fleet, such as ours was, in case of attack by an enemy, as more easily manipulated and handled under signal.

"The Captain spoke of advising me to keep in closer, whereas, on the next day, he signalled that the enemy would fire on us at the then range. We had not changed our position."

Admiral Schley also took occasion to speak of the instructions to him to examine Guantanamo as a coaling base. To do this was, he said, not practicable, as at least 1000 marines would have been necessary to guard that point and these could not have been spared.

"If we had gone there, we should have invited attack," he said. "These," he added, "were among matters I had to consider."

Arrival of Sampson.

This brought Admiral Schley to the time of the arrival of Admiral Sampson. In speaking of this event and the change in command which it involved, he ventured upon ground which Captain Lemly considered somewhat questionable. Coming to this point the witness said:

"On June 1, Admiral Sampson arrived. He brought with him the New York, Oregon and Mayflower and steamed down to the westward a little inside of the line of blockade. He found us at that time just making the turn and I was on board. He was very cordial, very glad to see me and I explained to him the situation and the fact of the reconnoisance. He seemed to be very glad to find out the situation there and I pointed out to him the Colon lying in the entrance."

Captain Lemly—If the court please, we are getting beyond the court's construction of the scope of the precept.

Admiral Dewey—As I understand, he is turning the command over to the Commander-in-Chief. I want to hear that. I would like to hear that part.

Continuing, Admiral Schley said: "I handed him a number of dispatches, explained to him the situation and told him the form of blockade I had maintained and I heard no word of complaint from him. In fact, in view of the telegram of congratulation, I supposed naturally everything was approved. Admiral Sampson's relations and mine were always cordial. I never had any difference with him."

Admiral Dewey—You have turned the command over. Now go on.

"I turned the command over to Admiral Sampson and my squadron was not broken up until the 18th or 19th of June. I was still in command of the flying squadron and composed the left half of the blockading line at Santiago. Of course, I have no criticisms to offer; merely a plain, straight story to tell of what its operations were up to that time."

Court at this point took recess up to 2 o'clock.

The Afternoon Session.

When the court resumed its session at 2 o'clock, Captain Lemly secured the consent of the court for an adjournment from today until Monday, avoiding a Saturday session. Then Admiral Schley, at the request of Mr. Raynor, stated his observation of suspicious circumstances on land and in the harbor at Santiago on the evening of July 2. He said that the outlying Spanish land forces were at that time being pressed into the city by the American and insurgent forces and he had noticed that several of their block-houses were burning that evening. He had at the same time observed smoke coming from over Zocopa Hill, and he thought the enemy was preparing for a sortie. Of this circumstance he had notified Admiral Sampson, and he had thought the Admiral had acted upon the notice, as the blockading line was moved in closer that night.

He explained why all the engines of the Brooklyn had not been coupled, saying this was largely because of the intense heat and also because Captain Cook had not considered it necessary to do so.

Story of the Battle.

Admiral Schley began his description of the battle of July 3, at 2:15 o'clock.

"On the morning of July 3," he said, "the day broke beautifully. The skies were fleeced with white clouds, and the breeze continued a little bit longer off the land that morning than usual. After I had eaten breakfast I came up to take a survey of the situation with glasses. We were lying at that time possibly three miles or a little bit over from the land and I wondered very much why they had permitted us to remain so close. It was a matter of constant inquiry and discussion on board, and especially why the batteries did not fire on us.

"At a quarter of 9, my orderly reported to me that signal had been made from the flagship to disregard her movements and that she had gone eastward. I did not, of course, know where she had gone. I sat under an awning that we had put in position each day as the sun rose, in order that the officers might collect there. I think we also had one forward for the men. I came on deck with my glasses, after having gone below for a little while, and while I was sitting abaft on a hatchway I heard a call from the forward bridge, 'Tell the Commodore that the fleet is coming out.'

"That was some time after the men had been called to quarters, about 9:35 o'clock. The ship at that moment was lying with her head in toward the land in the direction of Cabanas, which was a little cove to the westward, and one of the marking points we used in maintaining our positions.

"I looked over the starboard side and saw the enemy coming out of the entrance of the harbor. I then looked eastward to see the order of the ships, and I saw the Texas apparently a point or more abaft the starboard beam. My own recollection now, as near as I can state it, is that the ship's head was near north-northwest. The Texas appeared to me to be heading on some of the easterly courses. To the left of her was the Iowa. She was, of course, to the eastward of the Texas. The Oregon was to the eastward of the Iowa. The Indiana was eastward of that position, and the Gloucester was lying in under the land, I thought, in the neighborhood of Aguadores. The New York was out of sight and out of signal distance with glasses. I looked at that in order to determine what my position in the action was to be. If the vessel had not been out of sight, I should never have made a signal.

Cleared Ship for Action.

"The moment that I saw that, I went forward on to the little platform I had constructed on the battle tower, in order to be very close to Captain Cook. I had only been there a moment or two when Captain Cook joined me. In the meantime, Mr. Hodgson, who was on the upper bridge, sang out something to the Captain about being connected up and already, and he at the same time said to me: 'Commodore, they are coming right at us.' 'Well,' I said, 'go right for them.' The helm was put aport. The ship was started ahead, first at perhaps about half speed; I do not remember. She took her way very quickly, and when we headed around I said to Captain Cook: 'Go ahead full speed and hoist signal to clear ship for action.' We generally made that signal because there was, around the quarter-deck and the forecastle of most of these ships, a little temporary railing composed usually of oars and roaps to keep people from falling overboard. Generally an awning of some sort was up. That signal was followed by: 'Close up for close action.'

Advance of the Enemy.

"The Brooklyn, as well as other vessels of the squadron, charged immediately in to the entrance, in accordance with the original plan of seeking the enemy's ships in the entrance or driving them ashore. We continued directly for the head of the enemy's column, the idea uppermost in my mind being that if we could arrest them long enough for the battleships to close in and knock them to pieces, that would be our best point of attack. They continued on this course, porting and starboarding to meet the movements of the leading ship, which I assumed to be the flagship from a flag at her masthead. I suppose from the time we started we were 10 to 12 minutes turning, first with port helm and then advancing direct to the enemy. I saw the ships to the eastward and westward closing in.

"I said to Captain Cook: 'Close action or close up has been hoisted and it means to keep inside of 1000 yards, out of their effective torpedo range.' Captain Cook was standing alongside me and said: 'Yes,' we will soon be within the cross-fire of these ships.' I said 'Yes,' and then I saw we had advanced without firing. The first gun, I think, was fired by Lieutenant Simpson, almost directly over the forecastle of the ship. I saw the leading ship, which apparently had started with the intention of ramming. We were advancing in the direction of the Vizcaya, when she also seemed to have given up the intention to ram and turned to the westward, following the direction of the leading ship. It then became apparent, as we were steering in a diametrically opposite course, that the original plan had failed and that the Spanish fleet, in order and apparently at a distance, had succeeded in passing the battleship line.

The Brooklyn's Loop.

"A new feature of the fight became immediately apparent. Captain Cook gave the order to port helm. I did not. I should have done it in a second. I saw the ship's hold swinging very rapidly and I asked him whether his helm was hard aport, and he replied that it was either port or hard aport. I think he said hard aport. I never saw the ship turn more rapidly than she did at this time. Her turn was continuous. There was no easing of her helm. I never saw the starboard side of the Texas at all. We were never across her bow. I never was at her port side and she never approached any position that was within 600 yards of the Brooklyn. She never entered into my head at all as a menace or danger.

"We passed completely around the circle. The least range that was given was 1100 yards and the fact of the nearness of that ship (the second Spanish shep) impressed itself upon my mind and will never be forgotten, because I could see with the naked eye men running over her turrets to her superstructure deck, and I observed the daylight between their legs as they ran. We turned very rapidly and I had been for a long time under the impression that our starboard engine was backing, from the fact that I was standing upon the starboard and in looking astern I saw an unusual amount of churned water. It looked to me very much as if the engine had been backing. Though the matter was not one of record, I found out subsequently I had always been under the impression that that engine had backed.

No Colloquy With Hodgson.

"During the turn, Mr. Hodgson very properly made some allusion to lookout, perhaps, for the Texas. I do not recall what it is, but there was never any colloquy of any character between Mr. Hodgson and myself. First, he was too good an officer to have transgressed one of the plainest duties of an officer at such a time, and second, if he had undertaken it, I would not have permitted it for a second. That is fiction; there was no colloquy.

"Before we turned, the leading ship was abeam, or a little abaft the beam, and when we turned about she was ahead of us, that is, on the starboard bow, and all four ships and the forts were firing at the same time, and from that moment the following 10 or 15 minutes were the most furious part of the combat. I remember very distinctly seeing, from time to time, as my attention was attracted for a moment, the jets of water ahead and astern and over toward shore. The roar of projectiles was one of the things that can be heard only once in a lifetime, and then never forgotten. It appeared at that moment that all four of those ships were at work upon the Brooklyn and that up to the moment of turning, so far as we could perceive, there was not the slightest evidence they had even been injured. The thought passed through my mind that, after all our precautions and waiting, those fellows would get away.

"At that moment I felt and I thought I remarked to Captain Cook, that we were alone and would perhaps have most of the fight upon ourselves, because I did not know then that the battleships could possibly keep up their speed. But I said to him: 'We must stay with this crowd.' I had no idea that we would escape. Of course, if they could have shot as well as our people did, they certainly would have got us.

The Oregon Appears.

"When we had completely turned around on a westerly course, the ships appeared to have been broken up a little, although still in some semblance of formation and just at that moment I saw the Oregon breaking in through the cloud envelope. She broke through on the starboard quarter. I hoisted the signal of: 'Close up,' and then 'Follow the flag,' feeling that a new disposition was necessary. That signal was replied to and I saw it repeated. Captain Clark knew very well it was not intended for him, because he was following the flag, so he repeated it to the other ships.

"In a very few moments, after the Oregon broke through the cloud of smoke, she was perhaps four or five hundred yards distant. These two ships, the Oregon and the Brooklyn, were firing in a manner I had never seen before. I never before realized what rapid gun fire meant. Both ships were at that time a sheet of flames.

"Soon after that I saw that the leading ship was evidently battered hard. She lagged astern. I saw smoke coming out of her ports and out of her hatches and the fact that impressed itself upon me was that the columns were going straight up in the air. I said to Captain Cook, who was constantly at my side: 'We have got one. Keep the boys below informed of all the movements. They cannot see and they ought to know,' and he did so throughout the action. Every few minutes messages were sent below to the men, that were answered oftimes with cheers which we could hear through the ventilators.

Oquendo Put Out.

"It appeared to be a very short interval of time after that that I saw another ship on fire, which proved later to be the Oquendo. She evidently had suffered very severely and started immediately in shore, leaving the Vizcaya and the Colon. The Vizcaya took a leading position on the bow and I thought for a little while that she would perhaps outfoot us. The Colon worked in shore and the time between the dropping out of action of those two ships until the Vizcaya turned in shore was a period of perhaps 30 minutes, during which she was abreast of the Brooklyn and the Oregon.

"I looked to the eastward and got occasional glimpses of the Indiana and of the Gloucester. I could not see very well what they were doing, owing to the clouds of smoke, though I knew that both were doing admirable work. I felt that the moment those vessels ran into the beach, the commanding officers of the ships, which could not keep up the pace with the two leaders, would take care of the prisoners and would save them from the insurgents, as well as from their own fire.

"About 30 minutes, as nearly as I can remember, was the length of time from the turning in or the wounding of these two first vessels until the Vizcaya went ashore. She was a little forward of the beam of the Brooklyn and I do not think at any time over 2300 or 2400 yards away. She was in most excellent target range, and I remember that a marine stationed in the top reported that he did not see any of the shots of the two ships, the Brooklyn and the Oregon, hitting the water. So I imagined from that they were striking the ship. It was on the trip outward after the turn.

Death of Ellis.

"I was very anxious about the ranges, because I did not want the Vizcaya and Colon to get out of good fighting range. Ellis, who was an expert with the stadimeter, constantly kept that instrument on those vessels and, knowing exactly their heights, reported to me that they were maintaining the same range, but I thought my eye saw a little more sensitive and I said: 'No, they are evidently gaining.' He went from me the second time, and that was the last I saw of him alive. In performing this magnificent duty he lost his life. He was struck about 100 feet from where I was standing. His brains and blood were thrown over a great many people and some of it reached me. He immediately fell, of course, to the deck, and it was a shocking sight to men who had never seen such a thing before. Lieutenant McCauley and Dr. DeValin got down, or rather they were standing between me and the tower. They picked up the body and carried it to the side. I just happened to see them through this opening and called out to them not to throw that body overboard; that I thought thet one who had fallen so gallantly deserved to be buried as a Christian. His body was laid under the lee of the forward turret and covered with a blanket and there kept uptil after the battle.

The Vizcaya Disabled.

"Just before the Vizcaya turned to run ashore, she put her helm starboard, apparently starting out for the Brooklyn or the Oregon, I don't remember which, and evidently at that moment got a very severe wound, for I saw quite an explosion under her bow and in a moment afterward she put her helm hard aport, turning inshore, smoke coming from all her hatches. I thought she was going to capsize, she had such a tremendous list to port.

"Just then I saw a shell strike her that appeared to me to rake her fore and aft and I thought to myself she would sink in deep water, so I told the signal officer to signal to the Texas to look out for her men and to save them, but the Texas was too far astern to receive the message. I made the remark at the time, however, 'Philip is always sensible. He needs no instructions about such things.' During this part of the fight I noticed that all of the signal halyards of my ship were cut, I think possibly with one exception. One of the speed cones we had hoisted was cut and came very near striking me. It came down in front of me and went overboard.

Chasing the Colon.

"After the Vizcaya had turned in afire, her colors down, the Colon edged in near shore and appeared to be following the contour of the coast and I thought that at that time, looking astern and observing what had happened to her consorts, she was seeking the best place she could find in order to end the matter at once. From Assaderos, which was behind, some 16 miles west of the harbor of Santiago, to the point Rio Tarquino is perhaps about 30 miles, so I said to Captain Cook: 'Cease firing,' and to make the signal. I also told Captain Cook to let his men come out of the turrets into the cooler air and get something to eat and hurry up his men below. I think I went into the battle tower myself at that time and sang out to the men below that we had got all of them except one and I thought they could be depended upon to catch the other vessel. I heard a good deal of merriment and rejoicing. I went back to the bridge and soon realized that they were doing their best.

"There was a jingle to the rails and a vibration to the vessel, and I perceived that the motion of the ship was sluggish. I suggested to Captain Cook that we possibly had some compartments filled. He sent the carpenter down, and it developed that one of the after compartments had filled with water, which we thought was due to the fact that we had received some injury below the water line. The carpenter, as well as the Captain, thought it unwise to examine the compartment until we could get into smoother water, where we could possibly handle it much more readily. That course was decided upon.

Getting in Range.

The ship's speed, of course, came up with some rapidity, and toward 12 o'clock it was very apparent that we were gaining upon the Colon. I said to Captain Cook several times during the action: 'Would it not be a good idea to edge in so that we could finish those two fellows?' and he replied that we had them in the most excellent target range, and that the guns of the two ships seemed to be doing most admirable work. We were pointing at that time for Tarquino Point, under Cape Cruz, at the point extending to the southward. My idea was that in steering that course, if the Colon kept up her course, she would be obliged to come out. I then said I would get up a lot of extra ammunition, so that when she came out into close quarters it would be a question of but a few minutes before we knocked her out.

"As we were going out to head her off there were various signals between the Oregon and myself, of a pleasing character. Some were official. I gave the order to Captain Clark to open fire with his 13-inch guns. Captain Clark has testified that he did not receive it; and I always had been under the impression, until I heard him say otherwise, that that order had been transmitted.

"However, we continued to advance, the Oregon and the Brooklyn. I don't think the Oregon was further astern than 800 yards. I do not believe the prolongation of her course at any time would have passed within 500 yards of the Brooklyn. We were practically and relatively at the same distance; perhaps the Brooklyn was a little nearer at times and then the Oregon a little nearer.

Fire Opened on the Colon.

"We continued in this position until about 12:50, when we realized that we were within range of this vessel, and we tried the 13-inch and then the 8-inch guns on her. Several of them fell short, but I remember that one of the Oregon's 13-inch shots passed entirely over the Colon and that one of the 8-inch shots of the Brooklyn passed over her also. I saw with my own eyes the jet of water beyond. I thought at first it had gone through her, but it appears that it did not strike her.

"The position of the Colon being directly under the fire of the two ships, there was no question in the mind of the Captain of the Colon that it would be fatal. I think he did exactly right. A sacrifice of life would have been unnecessary, so he fired a gun to the leeward and hauled down his flag, and ran in on to the bar at the mouth of the Rio Tarquino. I signalled at once to cease firing; that the enemy had surrendered.

"We had some difficulty in getting out a boat. They were more or less jammed. I remember distinctly Captain Cook asking if we should slow up. I said, 'No, continue in.' Captain Cook changed his course. We were all in fighting rig. We arrived in the vicinity of the Colon at 1:30. At the time she hauled her colors down I did not think she was over four miles from us. We were running then in the neighborhood of 15 knots. When the surrender took place I naturally felt interested in the vessels that were following. I was then on the bridge, and with glasses I saw three vessels astern. I could see the masts of two. I could see only the smoke of the third one.

Terms of Surrender.

"We lowered the boat and Captain Cook went ashore. He said to me, 'Commodore, what are the terms of surrender?' I said to him, 'Unconditional. Those are matters that the Commander-in-Chief must arrange. We can only accept an unconditional surrender.'

"At 2 o'clock and 23 minutes, about, the New York came up. I had made signals to her. I think she was quite half an hour in answering one of them. Of course there was not very much breeze under the land. When she came up I made the signal to her that it was a glorious day for our country, and as soon as I could I went on board to pay my respects. In the meantime, Captain Cook, who had been detained some little time, started off to make his report, and went on board the flagship. When he returned I took the boat and went on board myself. There I reported substantially what had occurred, the incidents and events of the battle, in a hurried way. After having stated them to the Commander-in-Chief, a group of officers who were standing on the opposite side came up to me and asked me—of course everybody was interested—for the details of this battle, and I repeated them in a hasty way.

A False Alarm.

"Chaplain Royce, of the New York, came up and said: 'Commodore, your work is not over yet. The Resolute has just arrived. Captain Eaton reports that there is a Spanish battle-ship on the coast, and the Admiral wants to see you.' I went over and there found Captain Clark in the presence of the commander-in-chief. I made some suggestion to him about hoisting the flag on the Colon, and said that I was prepared, if he had not come up, to have sent a force of 50 or 60 men, mechanics and marines, on board to take possession, to avoid anything like—my impression is that I used the words 'monkeying with her.' I said that because they were throwing something overboard, which afterward proved to be the breech-blocks, and I thought that there might be some possibility of injuring her piping below, wounding her and so on. As soon as he mentioned to me to take the Oregon and go eastward and meet this ship, which had been seen by the Resolute, I must say I felt some little delight, because I thought that after the admirable work of the squadron on that day and the part that the Brooklyn and Oregon had in it, there was nothing that carried Spanish colors that we should have hesitated to meet."

After this story of the battle, told by the senior officer who had participated in it, the vast audience, which had listened for an hour in almost breathless quiet, appeared to shift about slightly and then to settle down for the remainder of the narrative. The Admiral told of the pursuit of the strange vessel, how he had met the Vixen and been informed it was the battle-ship Pelayo, and how, when it was ultimately run down, it proved to be the Austrian cruiser Maria Teresa, which was bound for Santiago to carry away neutrals before the city was attacked by the American forces.

Meeting With Cervera.

Returning from this chase, Admiral Schley told of passing the Iowa, when he was hailed by Captain Evans, who informed him that Admiral Cervera was on board and would like very much to see him. Admiral Schley said that he then went on board the Iowa, having in the meantime directed his men not to cheer, as he did not think it would be proper to exult over a foe who had fought and behaved so gallantly.

"I found the Spanish Admiral greatly dejected," said the witness. "I said to him I knew he had lost everything, clothing as well as money, and I informed him that my wardrobe, as well as my purse, as far as that would go, was at his service."

Admiral Cervera, the witness said, thanked him for his courtesy, saying he had never met a sailor who was not a gentleman, but declined the proffer, only asking to be allowed to send a dispatch to his government announcing the fate of his squadron.

"I told him there would be no objection to that whatever," said the witness. "And that," the Admiral said, closing his narrative impressively, "ended the battle of the third day of July, 1898."

"I wish to add," he continued, "that I was very much impressed on that day with the fact that the officers and the men who were engaged in that struggle fulfilled in the very highest and in the very noblest degree the traditions of the American Navy."

Admiral Taylor Contradicted.

Admiral Schley next referred to the testimony given before the court by Admiral Taylor, who, during the Santiago campaign, commanded the Indiana.

"Admiral Taylor," he said, "has testified here that he saw the Brooklyn pass a mile and a half south of the line that day. Captain Taylor's position was distant from that of the Brooklyn possibly four miles. In the preparation of the Senate executive document, which is before the court, the statement is made that the movement of the Brooklyn in making the loop separated her 800 yards from the enemy. Captain Taylor was a member of the board which made that declaration. His evidence of 300 yards, as testified to here, does not agree with that fact. Furthermore, the log-book of the Iowa for July 3, as printed in the report of the Bureau of Navigation, states that the Indiana soon dropped hopelessly behind. So that I did not think Admiral Taylor was in a position to have been cognizant of the fact. I do not think the Brooklyn passed even within her tactical diameter when she made the loop. When she made that turn I do not think she separated herself beyond 600 yards, because when she turned from the Vizcaya her distance was a little less than 1100 yards. After that range was given we had advanced a little, and when she turned around, the leading ship of the Spanish fleet, at least the ship of that fleet west of us, was not over 800 yards away. That was my reason for that conclusion."

The Admiral said he was unable to recall a conversation with Captain McCalla, July 5, when the latter had said to Admiral Schley, according to Captain McCalla's statement on the witness stand, "that there was glory enough for all." Admiral Schley said he had first seen this sentiment as formulated accredited to Senator Hale. "Senator Hale," he said, "expressed my feeling at the time and that feeling I still hold."

Speaking further on this subject, Admiral Schley said:

"My report had been practically written. I do not think I added any material fact to it, as I wrote it on the way down to Guantanamo. I cannot recollect Captain McCalla's observations at all. In fact, a controversy was not thought of at that time."

Why Plans Were Changed.

Here Mr. Raynor reminded Admiral Schley that he had stated that at the beginning of the battle the ships charged in accordance with the original plan. "Now," he asked, "with whom did that plan originate?"

"That was the general order of the Commander-in-Chief during the time of the blockade, but that failed because the enemy succeeded really in passing the battle line," replied Admiral Schley.

Mr. Raynor next asked his client concerning the reported colloquy between himself and Lieutenant-Commander Hodgson during the Brooklyn's turn on July 3. "Did you," he asked, "at any time within the hearing or presence of Mr. Hodgson use the words attributed to you at one time by Mr. Hodgson?"

Responding, the Admiral said:

"No, I have not the slightest remembrance or recollection of using any such words. I have so stated to Mr. Hodgson. I think it is a simple matter of recollection with him. Mr. Hodgson is a very honorable officer and I think the fault lies with his memory, rather than otherwise."

In response to Mr. Raynor, Admiral Schley detailed the particulars of his correspondence with Lieutenant-Commander Hodgson regarding the publication of this alleged colloquy, saying that because of the original publication he had thought proper to ask Mr. Hodgson for an explanation.

The Hodgson Letters.

"Mr. Hodgson," he said, "wrote me quite a long letter in return to this matter, containing terms that appeared to me so intemperate, so denunciatory of this article, that I felt it should not be published, as it would provoke upon him probably a severe and unnecessary assault. I wrote him then that I wanted him to say whether that was true or not, in his own interest, as well as mine, and I suggested to him that his answer be short, because at that time he was before a court of inquiry in relation to the matter of the grounding of the Brooklyn, and he was unusually anxious. That letter I published. It provoked, of course, a reply that led to an investigation in which Mr. Heilner involved himself, but I never was asked anything about it. Then there passed between us a number of letters, he applying for copies, and so on."

Mr. Raynor asked Admiral Schley if he knew anything of an order which went to the men on the Brooklyn during the early part of the battle of July 3, to "stand by to ram," to which the Admiral replied:

"Yes; I directed that order myself, because I called the attention of Captain Cook at the time we were standing in to the Spanish ships and said: "Lookout! They are going to ram you." There was a distinct attempt on the part of both the Teresa and the Vizcaya to ram. There is no doubt about it. They were coming directly at us, and I don't think I mistook their intention at all. It was only after the Vizcaya had changed her course that we made our loop, now so celebrated."

Mr. Raynor—While talking about this loop, why did not the ship turn with helm hard starboard?

The Loop Explained.

"Simply for the reason that it would have carried us into dangerous proximity to torpedo attacks, a broadside torpedo attack of the enemy's vessels. My judgment was that at that stage of the action the Brooklyn ought not to be sacrificed; that, so far as it might affect the result to individuals, I thought was a consideration that should be turned aside for the higher and more important one—the interests of the country she was there to subserve."

As to the uncoupling of the engines Admiral Schley testified that he thought they were uncoupled by a standing order of the commander-in-chief. At the same time, he said, he believed the uncoupling was wise both because it would keep down the heat below decks, which was well-nigh insufferable for the men as it was, and also on account of the desirability of economizing coal.

Mr. Raynor then asked Admiral Schley if he asked Admiral Sampson if there were any signals with the insurgents.

"I did," he replied, "but the Admiral said he knew of none."

Mr. Raynor then called the attention of Admiral Schley to the following dispatch, dated Key West, Fla., May 21, 1898, to the Secretary of the Navy:

"Schley has been ordered to Santiago de Cuba. SAMPSON."

Mr. Raynor asked if he had ever been ordered to Sanitago before the dispatch of May 27, which, it had been stated, he did not receive until June 10, to which he replied:

"No, except under order No. 8, leaving the matter to my discretion."

"There is nothing, then, between order No. 8 and the dispatch I have given?"

"No, nothing."

Possibility of Spaniards Escaping.

Here Mr. Raynor reminded the Admiral that there had been more or less discussion of the possibility of the escape of the Spanish squadron through the blockading line at either Cienfuegos or Santiago without being detected, and requested from the Admiral an expression on this subject. Responding, Admiral Schley said:

"I do not believe that that could have been possible; simply because the squadron, from the position which it occupied before these ports, always would have had that squadron, had it attempted to escape, under its gunfire. I had no trouble in seeing the beach 90 per cent of the time, and I looked at it with every care."

Here Mr Raynor asked a number of questions concerning interviews with Captains Cotton and Wise and other officers, intended to bring out information to make perfect the record. Admiral Schley also reviewed the testimony of Lieutenant Wood, Lieutenant Hood and Captain McCalla.

Before the court adjourned Judge-Advocate Lemly arose and revived the question of summoning Admiral Sampson as a witness in the case. The court then adjourned until Monday morning at 11 o'clock.

PERMISSION TO CALL SAMPSON.

Raynor Does Not Believe He Is in Condition to Attend.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 25.—Just before the Schley court of inquiry adjourned today Judge Advocate Lemly addressed the court as follows:

"Before the court adjourns I would like to ask counsel a question. He announced publicly that he desired a summons issued for Admiral Sampson. I have stated from time to time if he would give me notice when he wanted the Admiral summoned I would summon him. I have not received any notice, and I do not want to leave the record in this shape, and I would like to know what his wishes are in the matter."

Mr. Raynor—My wishes are that if you can summon him, do so. As I understand it Admiral Sampson is not in a condition to be summoned. He is not well enough to come into court. I am perfectly willing to have him here, and I, of course, don't retract for a moment anything I said at the time. The court will recollect the use of the words "Cienfuegos" and "Santiago." The word used in that dispatch was "Santiago." At the time Admiral Schley sent the dispatch into the Navy Department there was in the paragraph "This evidently means Cienfuegos, W. W. S." I took it for granted that of course would be admitted. There was only one person in the world who could explain that, and that was Admiral Sampson. My learned brother declined to admit it. I do not think now the question is as serious as I did at that time. Now you and I both know that Admiral Sampson is not in condition to be called into court. I do not want to be put in the position of abandoning my position or of calling Admiral Sampson into a controversy where his presence is not necessary, and when he is in no condition whatever to be brought into court, even if his presence was necessary.

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

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