# IN HIS OWN DEFENSE

## ADMIRAL SCHLEY TAKES THE STAND IN THE NAVAL COURT.

### His Loyalty to the Commander-in-Chief—The Blockade of Cienfuegos and Arrival at Santiago.

(Continued from First Page.)

West at a very early date to replenish it. Admiral Schley said that he had terminated this part of the conversation by saying to Captain Chester that as his ship was not in his (Schley's) command, he could not attach him to the squadron. In the same connection, the witness said that Captain Chester had asked permission to coal the Cincinnati from the flying squadron collier, but he (Schley) had declined this proposition. Continuing his report of this conversation, the Admiral said:

"I then asked him if he had ever cruised in the West Indies as I had never been on the south side of Cuba, and if he knew of any place that would be favorable for coaling, where fairly smooth water could be expected. He suggested a place some 30 miles to the eastward on a bank, or to the southward on another bank, coaling upon which would be problematical and dependent upon the state of the weather and the sea. I do not," the Admiral added, "recollect just at this moment any other conversation, except Captain Chester's disappointment that he could not join my squadron, which I thought extremely praiseworthy."

In response to a request from Mr. Raynor, the Admiral said that one of the places that had been recommended by Captain Chester for coaling was to the southward of Cienfuegos, in the open sea.

"I did not agree," he said, "that that would be a good place to coal, because conditions in an ordinary sea would be aggravated in shoal water."

**The Cienfuegos Salute.**

Admiral Schley placed his arrival off Cienfuegos at near midnight of May 21. He told of hearing guns that evening while still 30 or 40 miles distant from the Cuban port. Describing this incident he said:

"Toward sundown of that afternoon I was standing on the bridge of the Brooklyn and distinctly heard six or seven guns fired with the cadence of a salute. The fact of hearing these guns was undoubted, so much so that the officer of the deck spoke of it. I happened to be there at the time."

He said that the fleet stopped for the night 10 or 12 miles off shore at Cienfuegos; that he had sent the Scorpion ahead of the fleet as a pilot and toward daylight on the following morning, May 22, all the ships had steamed in close to the harbor entrance.

"My recollection now is," he said, "that we went within a mile and looked at the harbor. But owing to the trees and other obstructions, it was impossible to see into the harbor. I never saw any smokestacks and I was a very close watcher on deck, generally from 8 o'clock in the morning until 12 or 1 o'clock at night. There was scarcely a circumstance of any kind that escaped me."

The Admiral said that after this inspection of the harbor he had taken a position with the fleet three or four miles out.

"I generally," he said, "guaged the position that the squadron was from the beach by the appearance of the surf, which ordinarily is not seen beyond six miles, except at a great elevation."

**"Dear Schley" Letter.**

At 9 o'clock on the evening of the 23d, the torpedo-boat Dupont, the Admiral said, arrived with a dispatch from Admiral Sampson. The dispatch referred to was the "Dear Schley" letter. The witness said:

"I did not remember the fact until within the past few months, because there were duplicates of that letter, but I now recall it from the fact that I sent the Scorpion to the eastward in obedience to the injunction contained in that letter to communicate with the scouts about whose presence off Santiago I was uncertain, as I think the Admiral was, on account of orders that had been sent direct to them to proceed in the direction of the Spanish Main to look for the squadron. The Admiral was not certain whether they had got back, nor was I. Therefore, I sent the Scorpion east, and that fact fixed the receipt of that letter."

Admiral Schley also said that the Iowa had arrived to join the fleet on the 22d, but he did not remember that it had brought any dispatches beyond an envelope containing some letters, one of which was from his (Schley's) wife.

"That fact," he said, "fixed that in my mind. A good many of the things about which I am testifying were burned into my memory because I was the most interested party. I cannot recall anything in connection with the Iowa at all."

**Blockade at Cienfuegos.**

Coming to the blockade off Cienfuegos the Admiral explained the formation of his fleet there, saying that the steaming which has been mentioned in the logs was for the purpose of overcoming the effect of a current which set directly into the shore. He said the ships were constantly settling into the beach and were obliged almost every hour to steam for a mile or two, "and that," he said, "accounts for a good deal of what is stated in the logs about steaming."

In this same connection the Admiral said that he had fixed the position of the squadron every morning and every afternoon by what is known as the four point bearing.

"At night," he continued, "we had an invariable light breeze, and we kept in a general direction on a general bearing. We were closer at night, and that," he said, emphatically, "was the rule of the squadron always. We were closer at night at both Cienfuegos and Santiago. The idea of keeping the squadron in formation during the night or in line of battle ready for any emergency was never abandoned. The arrangement during the day was some little feigned disorder, in the hope that we might invite those people out. We knew there would be difficulty in getting in, because my flagship was of greater draught than most of the others; the channels were very tortuous and our only hope, at least our only wish, was that they might come out. The movements of the squadron were rather an invitation, usually. That was what I felt during all the period of this blockade."

At this point Admiral Schley digressed for a moment to refer to the conversation he had with Admiral Sampson before leaving Key West, which he said had induced the belief that the Spanish squadron's objective was Cienfuegos. The Admiral then related the particulars of the visit of Lieutenant Wood, of the Dupont, to him on board the Brooklyn, when the Dupont arrived off Cienfuegos. He said that Lieutenant Wood was in a pitiable condition of exhaustion, because of his arduous duties on a torpedo-boat. "I told him," said the Admiral, "that if I were a King I would promote every torpedo officer five grades, if I could."

Continuing, the Admiral related how Lieutenant Wood had handed him the dispatch, and added:

"I think he did me injustice when he spoke of my speaking disrespectfully of Admiral Sampson. I used no such term. There was no reason why I should have done so. I invariably spoke of him as Admiral Sampson, and I do not recall one word of the conversation which Lieutenant Wood recites—not one word, and I recollect a good many things pretty well, I am glad to say, and have very little imagination."

The Admiral said that the Hawk arrived about 8 o'clock on the morning of May 22. This vessel, he said, had brought the dispatch from Sampson which is designated as "No. 8." This is the dispatch in which the commander-in-chief notified the commander of the flying squadron that the Spanish fleet probably was at Santiago and directed him, "if satisfied that they are not at Cienfuegos, to proceed with all dispatch to Santiago." The witness said he had received duplicate copies of dispatch No. 8, and said he identified the copy brought by the Hawk as the first received, by marginal notes which had been made on the copy. He also said that a copy of No. 7, the "Dear Schley" letter, and also a copy of the McCalla memorandum had been received by the Hawk, saying that these facts were fixed in his mind by the circumstances that on that date a signal had been given to the squadron notifying the vessels that there was a rumor that Cervera's fleet was at Santiago.

"That," he said, "is fixed in my mind because if I had got it the day before I would have made that signal to the squadron, as my habit was to keep them all informed."

**What Hood Forgot.**

Relating the fact of the arrival of the Castine and a collier on the 23d, Admiral Schley referred to his reported conversation with Lieutenant Hood which, he said, "is one of the other conversations I do not remember. I think," he went on, "that I can show you, by a memorandum of Mr. Hood's, that if he had any verbal orders he forgot to report them."

The Admiral then referred to a memorandum from the Dolphin, published in the appendix to the report of the chief of the bureau of navigation, reading as follows:

"The Hawk has just reported from Cienfuegos with dispatches from Schley. Hood says a good number of officers don't believe the Soanlards are there at all, also they can only surmise."

"That," remarked the Admiral, "would go to indicate that Mr. Hood was not very certain in his own mind, or if he had brought any verbal instructions to me that he failed to report the fact to the Commander-in-Chief. Below it is also a border information which I should have been very glad to have had. Mr. Hood got into the anchorage, I think, some time about 8 o'clock. The Adula did not get into the anchorage at Cienfuegos before 10 or 11 o'clock. Lieutenant Hood did not board that ship in my presence. She had already been boarded. If he boarded her and got this news and failed to deliver it to me, then he committed an indiscretion, for I was the senior officer and he did not know what I was going to do with her. I should have been glad to have had his information. So that with this note and this information, I think Mr. Hood remembers a good deal of what he said to me, but he forgot a good deal that he should have done."

Admiral Schley gave further details concerning the blockade at Cienfuegos, telling how he had observed men laying mines across the river and how he had established a picket line inside the main line of blockade. He again referred to the arrival of the Dupont, which, he said, was very short of coal, having, as, was reported, only five or six tons aboard. He also told of the difficulties experienced in putting a few additional tons aboard the torpedo boat and in this connection said:

"The work struck me as being one of such difficulty that any attempt to coal a larger vessel by boats would not only be exhausting and fatiguing, but almost impossible, beyond a day or two."

**Adula's False Report.**

The incident of the arrival of the British ship Adula was related in much detail, the Admiral telling how he had had her boarded and how she had brought information in the shape of a war bulletin which had stated that the Spanish fleet had arrived at Santiago May 19 and had left there on the following day. Remarking upon the report contained in this bulletin, the Admiral said:

"That, of course, taken with the manner of my approach and the distance being about 36 to 48 hours away, lent color to the belief that I entertained."

The Admiral then related how the commander of the Adula had been allowed, upon specious promises, to go into the harbor and had not come out the following day, as he had promised to do. Admiral Schley said that the night of the 23d he had seen three horizontal lights to the eastward and to the westward of the harbor of Cienfuegos. "The one to the eastward," he said "was in the mountains, and I should say 10 miles from the coast and certainly 500 feet up; the others to the westward, about five or six miles in on the beach, but back of it on the highland."

He said thatw hile the squadron lay off Cienfuegos the winds were fresh and there was quite a rolling swell to the sea. In this connection Admiral Schley referred to the fact that he had not been informed that there was any system of signals for communicating with the insurgents and he said he did not know that there were any insurgents to the westward of Cienfuegos. This fact, he said, together with the circumstances that the Adula had not come, that Lieutenant Southerland had failed to communicate any information and the further fact that McCalla's squadron had been withdrawn from the vicinity, were responsible for the delay in communicating with the insurgents.

**Unsafe to Land.**

"Of course," he said, "to risk a boat through the surf on a coast believed to be occupied by the enemy must have resulted in a repetition of Captain McCalla's experiment. He found that the coast was pretty well occupied. I saw cavalry once or twice, both to the east and to the west of this point. They appeared for a moment and immediately got out of sight. I did everything that was possible during the time we were there to maintain the blockade that was contemplated. I did all the coaling that was practicable or possible."

Continuing on the subject of coaling, Admiral Schley said:

"After we got hold of colliers which were very much better fitted to resist shock as well as to deliver coal rapidly, perhaps, and with the later experience of the war, I might have coaled on days with worse weather. We had a good many accidents about which no mention has been made because they came after the period of time. One of the colliers had to go to New York absolutely smashed in. The Merrimac herself had several holes punched through her, and my impression now is that a portion of the top works of the Sterling was injured in some way, but we managed, with more patience, to do a little better than at first. There always was at Cienfuegos a rolling swell. Vessels with projecting sponsons or guns were always in danger. I recollect once that one of the six-pounder guns of the Brooklyn was bent at an angle of 30 degrees by coming into collision with one of these colliers. Of course, the twin screws made it extremely dangerous to coal, except under the most favorable conditions. The problem presented to me at Cienfuegos to solve—that of coaling—has disturbed the navies of the world for 50 years. I think we accomplished this reasonably well under the circumstances."

**McCalla's Code of Signals.**

On the morning of May 24, Captain McCalla had arrived off Cienfuegos with the Marblehead and the Vixen, and the Captain had, according to Admiral Schley, immediately reported to him on board the Brooklyn. The witness said he then heard for the first time of the code of signals arranged for communicating with the insurgents at Cienfuegos.

"I was a great deal surprised," said the witness, "and asked who made these arrangements. He said: 'I did when I was here before.' I asked why it was not communnicated to me. That he did not know, of course. He was not answerable for that. I said: 'Where are those fellows?' He said: 'I communicated with them when I was here last to the westward some 12 or 14 miles, but they are migratory, and may or may not be there.' I said: 'Go ahead and take up the line of search and let me know.'"

The Admiral then told of his sending Captain McCalla ashore, and of the latter's reporting about 4 o'clock on the 24th, he thought, that the enemy was not at Cienfuegos, which fact he had learned by communication with the Cubans on shore. An hour or two had then been consumed in the preparation of dispatches, including a dispatch to be sent to the Secretary of the Navy, and about 6 o'clock the squadron steamed to the south.

**Started for Santiago.**

"I think," he said, "that we finally got under way between 7 and 8 o'clock on a course of about southeast. The orders to the squadron were by signal. I did not care whether the enemy saw them or not. I am quite sure the distance which we had steamed from the preliminary formation until the final departure was outside of any distance they could have been read or seen from shore."

Speaking of the weather conditions on the night of the 24th, after the squadron had got under way, the Admiral said that he remembered that the night was a dirty one and the sky lowering. It was rainy in squalls, he said. He recalled especially that he had looked out through a port hole 20 feet above water and that the spray dashed in. "Of course," he said, "weather of that sort did not mean much to the larger ships, but to the smaller ones it did."

Giving the formation of the squadron, he said that he had kept the collier on his weather side, so that in case the enemy should appear, that vessel could be protected or sunk. The arrangement also had contemplated that the Marblehead would be able, with the two smaller vessels, to act as torpedo-boat destroyers. He said that his policy had been to keep the squadron together as a unit and added:

"I think it will be admitted, in changing the location of a squadron from one port to another, that it would be unmilitary and unwise to proceed in any other formation than as a unit. My impression is that useful auxiliaries and necessary supplies never should be abandoned except under the very strictest military necessity."

Admiral Schley spoke of the weather on the 25th as rough for the smaller ships.

"I remember," he said, "that the Marblehead carried away one of her booms that was alongside on account of the seas. The Vixen took green seas over her bows and badly injured a man. The Eagle filled one of her forward compartments. Both of these ships constantly dropped astern. The squadron, of course, slowed for them. On several occasions the Merrimac signalled the disarrangement of her steering gear, and of her engines, necessitating stops.

**Coaling Was Impossible.**

"Coaling on the 25th," he continued, would have been absolutely impossible. I watched the sea perhaps more carefully than any one else, and was ready to avail of the earliest opportunity, and I felt that I was very much more capable and very much more competent than any one else in the squadron of judging when coaling was possible."

Coming to the 26th, Admiral Schley said that the weather was still rough and he related the incident of sending Commander Southerland away with the Eagle.

"He did not," the Admiral said, "insist upon coaling his ship, because it would have been absurd; it was impossible. His ship at the time was taboring a great deal, slashing and rolling about. He regretted having to leave the squadron for coal, as well as myself. His contention, however, that he could coal on that occasion was utterly untenable. He could have coaled, I suppose in boats, but he would have burned coal as fast as he got it on board.

"We continued in an easterly course," said the Admiral, "again taking up the thread of his narrative, "as my orders contemplated approaching cautiously and as they also conveyed to me the information that probably when I left Cienfuegos the enemy would leave Santiago. I laid such a course as I thought would give me a wide horizon and if he did leave I could not imagine he would try to pass inside of me. I estimated, of course, he would pass to the southward. My course, as projected, would have, of course, gone to China if there had been no islands in the way."

The Admiral then told how, upon reaching a point southward from Santiago, about 4 or 5 o'clock in the afternoon of May 26, he had encountered the scoutboats St. Paul, Minneapolis and Yale, but before relating the details of coming up with them, he digressed sufficiently to refer to a dispatch in which he had mentioned his intention of delaying until the 25th his departure from Cienfuegos, which he explained was for the purpose of taking up the Scorpion, which vessel had been expected back on the 24th or 25th. "That," he said, "was the suggestion, but we can make a great many suggestions and say a good many things, and then we are privileged not to follow them."

**Defended His Course.**

At this point the Admiral entered upon another defense of his course by saying:

"I was on the south side of Cuba, of course invested, I thought, with entire responsibility. I was not in communication by telegraph. I did not know that we had secret agents in Havana. I did not know that there was any means of communicating with the insurgents. If that were known I should have known it also, because I was acting in an entirely independent capacity, I may almost say. I could not be reached by telegrams and a good deal I did had to be left to guessing. And sometimes I guessed right and sometimes I guessed wrong, and I suppose, in the light of recent events, we are all liable to do that."

The witness then referred to his picking up the scoutboats. In this connection he again spoke of the weather conditions on the voyage from Cienfuegos over, saying that Captain Cook reported that he had never seen more motion on the Brooklyn and that some of the youngsters in the steerage were sick, which is an unusual thing.

He then related the incident of Captain Sigsbee's coming aboard the Brooklyn from the St. Paul, saying that the visit had impressed itself vividly upon his mind. The Admiral proceeded to give the information which Captain Sigsbee had brought, prefacing what he had to say with the statement that he did not believe Captain Sigsbee would misstate anything for his commission.

"I do not believe," the Admiral said, "that he is capable of stating what is not true. In this instance I think his recollection is at fault, and not his veracity. I said to him: 'Captain, have you got the Dons here?' He said to me: 'No, they are not in here. I have been in very close.' I do not know but what he said 'sktching,' but he certainly said: 'They are not here; they only reported here.' I said to him: 'Have any of the other vessels seen them, the Yale or the Minneapolis?' He said: 'No, they have not. They have assured me so.' That was the assurance to which I referred when I spoke of the assurance of such men as Wise and Jewell and Sigsbee. I do not believe that any of those men would misstate the conditions at all, but I assume from the communication from Sigsbee that he was bearing to me the assurance of all of them."

Relating his interview with Pilot Eduardo Nunez, Admiral Schley said that Nunez had expressed the opinion that it would have been almost impossible for ships of the size of those of the Spanish fleet to enter Santiago harbor, the pilot saying that the entrance was not only shallow, but tortuous.

Referring in a general way to Captain Sigsbee's visit, Admiral Schley said:

"My habit of life, not only in point of command of a squadron, but also in command of a ship, was to assume the responsibility and danger of censure of any movement that might justify it, but I was never willing, under any circumstances, to be a participant in glories I would not divide. That was the general principle on which I acted in this matter. I did not call any council of war. The information which these people gave me, led me to infer that the telegraphic information was a ruse precisely similar to that which was telegraphed from Cadiz, that the squadron had returned from the Cape Verde Islands. That would have been my policy, if I had been in control, and if any of us at any time made any mistakes during the campaign of Santiago or elsewhere, it was in supposing the Spaniards would ever do right at the right time. That probably was the only reason we made any mistakes that we did make.

**Movements Known to the Spaniards.**

"I determined that that being the case, a move eastward would be unwise, in that I knew Admiral Sampson would have moved to the eastward of Havana. It would not have been wise for me to have uncovered Santiago. The military importance of that movement would have been to guard the westward, as that would have been the only place they could have got in behind. As those in the interior had an absolute control of the entire line, our movements every minute of the day were known in Havana, and I have often been surprised that Cervera did not leave Sanitago when I left Cienfuegos. I found out afterward why he did not do it—simply because he could not, and, therefore, we did not suffer any."

Relating the particulars of the breaking down of the collier Merrimac on the evening of the 26th, Admiral Schley said that his first determination had been to have her towed to Key West by the Yale, as he did not consider it desirable to have an unmanageable collier with him.

"It then occurred to me," he said, "that if we did send her to Key West with the Yale and she was overtaken we would be out a collier and the Spanish force, if they were outside, would be in so much coal."

**The Retrograde Movement.**

In this connection Admiral Schley explained his retrograde movement, so-called, to the westward, saying that he had not considered the economical aspect of this step, as economical features could never be taken into consideration in military movements. He had, he said, made careful inquiry as to the coal supply of the various ships and had turned over in his mind the question of their endurance in battle.

"I was," he said, "thinking over in my mind that a squadron, in its coaling endurance, or at least in its speeding endurance, was equal only to its weakest members, just as the speed of a fleet depends upon its slowest vessel; that it would be necessary to equalize, as nearly as we could, their standards of steam in order to be of effective use as a unit, and that determined the westward movement.

"Now, the telegram I sent to the Honorable Secretary of the Navy did not refer only to the battle-ship, as interpreted, but it referred to the entire fleet. We had at that time 10 ships in the squadron, seven of which were short of coal. There were the auxiliaries and the Texas. The auxiliaries and the Marblehead and the Vixen, I think, were moderately well-filled. The amount of coal which we transmitted should have, I think, called attention to that fact. Now, as has been testified to and shown, I think, almost every one who has had any command during a war wherein large responsibilities were involved would have been unwise not to have considered his own accomplishments. We could not assume that the enemy were going to chase toward our base; it was probable he would chase toward his own. He would have been there pretty regularly, or among his more intimate friends at Martinique. I do not think he would have been liable to have gone to our base and, therefore, any calculation which took into consideration the efficiency of the squadron had to assume that it would be in direction least favorable to us and most favorable to the enemy."

Admiral Schley again referred to the unmanageable condition of the collier Merrimac, saying that no prudent commander would have sent a ship alongside of her.

**Cotton's Mistake.**

Referring to the arrival of the Harvard, the witness spoke of the discrepancy in the report as to the information which Captain, now Rear-Admiral, Cotton, of that vessel, had brought aboard the Brooklyn. He said that the dispatch which Captain Cotton had brought aboard had said that the department's advices indicated that the Spanish fleet was at Santiago. Continuing he said:

"Captain Cotton said he delivered a dispatch to me from Admiral Sampson stating that they were there. That dispatch never reached me. I never saw it. I never heard of it until the other day. If it ever was delivered it should have been found among my papers, but it could not have been delivered to me, for the reason that a dispatch of that character would have burned itself so indelibly on my mind I never could have forgotten it, never. Captain Cotton did not communicate it to me, and there, I think, his recollection is at fault and not his veracity, because I do not believe he would state anything that was not so. Neither my First Lieutenant, neither my Flag Lieutenant nor my secretary ever saw it or can remember it, and it is a little strange that three persons who had access to my papers at all times should have failed to remember a dispatch of that importance. So it is a mistake. I never saw it, I do not remember it. I have no recollection of it, nor of a good many things which I have heard during this investigation."

Admiral Schley, at this point, returned to his conversation at Cienfuegos with Captain McCalla. He exonerated the Captain from any intention to do him injustice, but he said that the Captain had failed to give all of that conversation.

**The Charge of Disobedience.**

Discussing again his dispatch to the department concerning the department's orders, the Admiral said:

"If my reply to the telegram of the Secretary of the Navy is not on the record, I would like to put it there in the terms I sent it, because I wrote it in English, gave it to Captain Cotton, asked him to turn it into cipher and confirmed it afterward in a letter to the Department, which was received. The dispatch is there and has been in the Department for nearly three years. I do not believe for one moment that in the translation of it there was any intention to mutilate it, but I think, in the choice of words which were not exactly of the same meaning, the dispatch did not get to the Department entirely as I intended it should. Upon this dispatch is based the charge of disobedience of orders. I contend that there was no disobedience of orders. There would have been disobedience if I had abandoned my station, but having returned to the station without other direction, and having found that the Department's information was correct, I hold that I did not disobey orders, and I think that this dispatch, read and interpreted as sent, will relieve that charge."

Admiral Schley pointed out that the information sent from the Navy Department as to the whereabouts of the Cuban insurgents in the vicinity of Santiago was erroneous, the dispatch placing them much nearer that city than they were.

"If we had gone to the place indicated," he said, "at the time we received the dispatch, we would have been, in all probability, gobbled."

Again, referring to his own dispatch Admiral Schley said that it had been delivered in English, but, he added, "read in the light of this order and in view of the fact that the squadron did not return to Key West, whatever may have been our intention or purposes, I say there was no disobedience of that order, and there is no order there to go back. It was simply that the department looked to me to establish a fact of which it was not certain."

In response to a request from Mr. Raynor, for the exact wording of the sentence in the dispatch in dispute, Admiral Schley gave it as follows:

"It is to be regretted that the Department's orders cannot be obeyed, earnestly as we have all striven to that end."

This, he said, was the authentic version of the sentence and was as he sent it.

The Admiral was in the midst of the discussion of the "disobedience of orders" dispatch when the old clock in the court room struck 4, and Admiral Dewey announced an adjournment for the day, notwithstanding that Admiral Schley told him that he would like to conclude his testimony at this sitting. The Admiral was calm and collected throughout the two hours that he was in the witness chair, and he spoke in tones which, while not loud, were so distinct that his words were easily heard.

**The Other Witnesses.**

Lieutenant B. W. Wells, the first of former witnesses called for the purpose of correcting testimony, said in response to a question from Captain Lemly, that he had made a translation of a cipher dispatch prepared at Commodore Schley's instance on May 24, 1898, to which reference was made while Lieutenant Wells was on the stand yesterday.

"Was the dispatch sent?" asked Admiral Dewey, and when he was told that it had not been, the Admiral said it was not relevant. "We only want the facts," he said.

Captain Lemly and Mr. Hanna contended for its admission. Mr. Hanna said that it indicated hesitation at a critical time. "The court decided it, that this cannot go in," said Admiral Dewey. "Now let us go on to something else. We are losing a lot of time here."

Major Murphy corrected his testimony of yesterday so as to say that the vessels of the flying squadron in steaming back and forth at night in front of the mouth of the harbor at Santiago had gone only about 800 yards to either side of the harbor instead of 1500 yards, as stated yesterday. In response to a question by Mr. Raynor, Major Murphy detailed an incident in which Commodore Schley figured at the close of the battle of July 3.

Major Murphy said: "I remember the incident distinctly because it made a very great impression on me at the time. It was when they were preparing a cutter to take Captain Cook to the Colon to receive the surrender of that ship. She had hauled down her flag and was ashore. The officers and many of the men were gathered forward in the neighborhood of the forecastle and Commodore Schley addressed the men, cautioning them not to cheer when the Spanish Captain came on board. He spoke of their gallantry, that they had made a good fight and that they should not be humiliated; that we should treat them chivalrously and not humiliate them by cheers. It was a gallant speech, and we all felt it very deeply. The Commodore made the same speech about midnight of the same day when we were ranging alongside the Iowa, and we learned that Admiral Cervera and his officers were on board that ship. It afterward developed that Admiral Cervera heard Commodore Schley make the remark, and he appreciated it very much, so we were told."

**Commander Harlow's Notes.**

Major Murphy was then excused and Commander Harlow called. Captain Lemly asked him about the coaling of the ships of the flying squadron on May 25 and 26. He said that on the 25th no one would have attempted to coal ships, and that without experiencing trouble coaling could not have been undertaken in the forenoon of the 26th. The notes taken by himself during the battle of July 3, he said, gave the exact time consumed by the Brooklyn in making its turn, but showed that time to be less than 25 minutes. When asked to state how long a time elapsed after the Spanish vessels came out of the harbor before they turned to the westward, the witness said that the time was only such as would have been consumed in going a few ship's lengths.

In reply to a question from Captain Lemly, the witness said that he remembered the incident of Commodore Schley's transferring his flag from the Brooklyn to the Massachusetts for the purpose of making a reconnoissance, the Vixen having been used for that purpose. He had seen the Commodore both going and coming, and had spoken to him on his return.

"What, if anything, was said when returning about the guns that were discovered or developed?"

"A remark was made, I think, by myself, that at any rate we had developed the batteries. The Commodore replied 'That was what we went in for.' A remark was also made by Commodore Schley about a 10-inch disappearing carriage gun which we did not believe. We found afterward that the disappearing carriage was there."

"What was the manner and bearing of Commodore Schley upon this occasion."

"Commodore Schley looked badly, and as I would have suspected from a man who probably had been up a great deal at night and laboring under a great deal of feeling of responsibility. From that expression at the time he seemed to be seriously affected by the situation as a result of his watching and feeling of responsibility."

**Schley Was Worried.**

"Have you ever said in regard to this matter that there is no doubt about it that Schley was worrying over the situation and afraid to take the responsibility?"

"I said that in my own private notes, my diary, as my opinion at the time."

Mr. Raynor called attention to this answer, and said that the witness' opinion was not evidence.

Admiral Dewey—The question was eminently proper. The answer went a little too far. Answer that question not from your opinion

The witness—Of course I shall have to limit my reply to that by saying he looked badly.

The witness added that he did not know from what cause.

Describing the course of the Brooklyn during the battle of July 3, he said:

"I saw the Brooklyn receiving almost the entire fire of the two leading ships, with an occasional shot from the Colon. I was in a position to see a flash and shortly afterwards the fall of the projectile, and these showed that a large proportion was about the Brooklyn. The Colon evidently was using smokeless powder and I was not able to tell so well where her shots fell."

The witness said he was satisfied that the fire from the Brooklyn set the Vizcaya on fire and caused her to run ashore. There was no other American ship within range of the Vizcaya at that time, he said. The Maria Teresa was driven ashore by the concentrated fire of all the ships of the American fleet. The Oquendo was so far in the rear he could not estimate what vessels caused her destruction.

The court asked: "Were there any vessels of our fleet between the Brooklyn and the Spanish vessels at any time prior to the turn made by the Brooklyn?"

"No, I should say there was not."

The witness also said that he did not consider that the Texas was near enough to the Brooklyn at the time of the loop to render a collision liable, and that he thought the Vizcaya made an effort to ram. Lieutenant Harlow was then excused, and Captain C. E. Clark, of the Oregon, called.

**Captain Clark Called.**

The large audience manifested signs of interest as the Captain of the Oregon approached the witness stand. Admiral Dewey, as he walked around to the end of the table to administer the oath, smiled broadly.

At the request of Mr. Raynor, Captain Clark began a description of the battle of July 3 as follows:

"When we discovered the Spanish ships coming out our fleet closed in at once to attack them, each ship being ordered to keep her head directly toward the harbor entrance. The Spaniards turned to the westward, breaking through our line and crossing it and our ships swung off to the westward in pursuit. Both sides opened fire promptly and fired rapidly. Dense smoke soon obscured the vessels, making it difficult to distinguish them.

"The Oregon ran between the Iowa and Texas, the next ships to the westward in our line, and soon after we sighted four Spanish ships ahead, apparently uninjured at the time. They had gained so much ground that I believed they had been successful in attempting to escape, but it was soon evident we were gaining at least on one of them, which afterwards proved to be the Maria Teresa, the flagship, and I thought we should bring her to close action, but might be exposed to the concentrated fire of all the Spanish ships. Just then the smoke lifted or broke away to the left and I discovered the Brooklyn. She was well forward of our port beam and broadside to the enemy's fleet. Her course was perhaps a little divergent from ours, because the Oregon was attempting to draw up on the Teresa. But the Brooklyn and Oregon maintained this relative position, bow and quarter, approximately to the end of the battle, the Brooklyn steaming straight ahead as nearly as I could judge and engaging any and all of the Spanish ships, the Oregon endeavoring to come to close action with the sternmost one, and when she was driven out of action and pointed to the beach, then pushed on for the next one ahead and so on until the entire fleet was driven ashore, burning or sinking."

Mr. Raynor—Did you get any signals from the Brooklyn on the day of the battle?

"Yes sir."

"Can you recall what they were?"

**Signals From the Brooklyn.**

"Of my own knowledge and remembrance the signals that impressed themselves upon me at the time were 'Follow the flag. I had this repeated to the vessels following, thinking that they might not see the Brooklyn and might see us. I remember another signal, 'One of my compartments filled with water.' I recollect it because it perplexed me a little. I was fearful that the Brooklyn might have to haul out of action and run inshore, and I concluded it was given to me as a warning in case she did haul out that I would be prepared to look out for the chase alone, and not to pay any attention to her, and that she would look out for herself. I also remember a signal, because I did not understand it at first, 'The enemy's ship appears to have been built in Italy,' to which I told the signal officer to answer, 'She will end on the coast of Cuba.' I also remember a signal, 'Congratulations over the grand victory, and thanks for your splendid assistance.' There were other signals made. I have seen the list of them, but these are the ones I recollect that made any impression upon me at the time."

"Can you tell me with how many ships the Brooklyn was engaged when the smoke lifted and you saw her on her westward course?"

"She must have been engaged with all four."

"Did you see the turn of the Brooklyn?"

"No, sir; I never saw the Brooklyn until I came out of the smoke."

"How did the Brooklyn's fire appear to you at that time?"

"I remember nothing about that. I remember seeing her. It made a deep impression upon me to find her there, and I felt that we should mutually support and sustain each other. I felt that a battle-ship was needed, and that we were to be there together."

"Did you see the Commodore on the day of the battle of July 3?"

"Yes."

"Will you kindly state where and when you saw him?"

"After the New York came up, after the surrender of the Colon."

"Was any conversation held between you and the Commodore on board the New York?"

**Conversation on the New York.**

"A Spanish battle-ship was reported by Captain Easton, of the Resolute. She had arrived off Santiago, and I think he said he had been pursued by her. The Admiral did not seem to be impressed by that. It seemed incredulous, but I remarked that it must be Camara's fleet; that they had arrived there to form a conjunction with Cervera's fleet, but had arrived too late. The Admiral did not assent. Finally he said: 'Well, Clark, you will have to go after that ship,' and believing as I did that there was really a Spanish vessel there, I said: 'Admiral, in war, we ought to overpower an enemy if possible. Why could not the Brooklyn go along?'

"He turned around and said: 'Certainly, Schley, you go also,' I then felt that I had perhaps assumed too much in speaking to an Admiral and suggesting that a Commodore also accompany me. I turned to the Commodore and said: 'Commodore, we have knocked out several vessels this morning. We can knock out another, can't we?' He said: 'Certainly we can. Come on.' He then started over the side and I started after him, for my boat was on the other side. What impressed me was his cheery manner of approving of my having mentioned his going along, that he had no feeling against me for mentioning it as a senior, and was rather approving in his manner."

Mr. Hanna then began the cross-examination.

"Did you," he asked, "see the Iowa during the earlier portion of the engagement?"

**Iowa During the Engagement.**

"Yes," replied the witness, "I saw the Iowa standing in toward the entrance of the harbor, and her position was a little to the westward of the Oregon. At first she seemed to be steaming faster than we were, and I thought she was gaining ground and would get in ahead of us. Then the smoke became so dense that I lost sight of her, but I could see the Spanish ships as they came out. Later I saw her again so near that I was fearful that the two ships would collide. Consequently I gave the order, 'Hard to starboard' and cleared her. I never saw the Iowa again during the action."

Captain Clark was questioned regarding his statement in chief that the Brooklyn had at one time during the engagement engaged four different vessels, and confirmed his previous testimony, saying that she was alongside all four of the enemy's ships, and in response to a question from Mr. Hanna as to whether there were not other American vessels engaged at the same time, he replied:

"The Oregon was firing as fast as she could with her bow guns."

At this point the court took a recess for luncheon. Captain Clark resumed the witness stand after luncheon. Captain Lemly announced that he had no further questions.

Mr. Raynor asked: "Were any of the Spanish vessels run ashore or destroyed in the channel, as provided in the standing squadron orders to close in and destroy the enemy in the channel?"

"No, sir."

"Was the battle of July 3 completed in accordance with any squadron orders previously issued?"

"No, sir."

"Do you know anything about a signal to close up and follow the flag, made by Commodore Schley from the Brooklyn?"

"I remember a signal, 'Follow flag,' being made, because I ordered it repeated. We did close up."

The court asked Captain Clark the following questions:

"Did any of the enemy's ships indicate an intention of ramming our ships during the early part of the battle?"

"Not that I know of. I saw nothing of it."

"Did you at any time receive an order from either the Navy Department or the Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic squadron not to expose the Oregon to the fire of land batteries?"

"No, sir."

**Admiral Schley Called.**

Captain Clark was then excused and Rear-Admiral Schley was called to the stand at 2:06 P. M. There was a flutter of excitement when the name of the Rear-Admiral was called. When he took the stand, and after giving his name and rank, he was requested by Mr. Raynor to relate his conduct of the campaign in narrative form, which he did.

## JOHN J. VALENTINE DANGEROUSLY ILL.

**PRESIDENT OF THE WELLS, FARGO EXPRESS COMPANY.**

OAKLAND, Cal., Oct. 24.—John J. Valentine, president of the Wells, Fargo Express Company, is lying dangerously ill at his residence in East Oakland. Ever since last July he has been suffering from acute heart trouble, but not until a month ago was his condition considered serious. A short trip to the springs at Paso Robles did the capitalist no good, and on October 14 he returned to his home, and has been confined to his bed ever since.

## OVER NIAGARA FALLS.

### Woman Accomplished the Feat Without Serious Injury.

NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y., Oct. 24.—Mrs. Anna Edin Taylor went over Niagara Falls on the Canadian side this afternoon and survived, a feat never before accomplished and, indeed, never attempted, except in the deliberate commission of suicide. She made the trip in a barrel. Not only did she survive, but she escaped without a broken bone, her only apparent injuries being a scalp wound one and a half inches long, a slight concussion of the brain, some shock to her nervous system and bruises about the body. The barrel in which Mrs. Taylor made the journey is four and a half feet high and about three feet in diameter. A leather harness and cushions inside protected her body. Air was obtained through a rubber tube connecting with a small opening near the top of the barrel. Mrs. Taylor is a school teacher, and recently came here from Bay City, Mich.

## THE DEATH ROLL.

**Charles Smith, Violinist.**

SIOUX CITY, Ia., Oct. 24.—Charles Smith, one of the best known violinists in the West, died in the hospital here of consumption today.

**Prince Joachim Murat.**

PARIS, Oct. 24.—Prince Joachim Murat died today at his chateau at Chambly.

**Wanted to Die Together.**

DENVER, Oct. 24.—Mrs. Nellie Hardifer, wife of Philip C. Hardifer, a contractor of this city, is dead from morphine poisoning and William P. Flanders, a Lyons, Colo., hotel-owner, is in a hospital and may die from the same cause.

"We fixed it up to die together, for we loved each other and could not live apart," said Flanders, who is a married man, after the woman was found dead today in his room in the Midland Hotel. Should Flanders recover he will be charged with murder.

**Dead Body Identified.**

NEW YORK, Oct. 24.—The body of the woman found yesterday in the Hotel Melvin in company with Emil Schillinger, who had shot her and himself, was identified today by Joseph Cadish as that of his wife. Cadish refused to give any information concerning himself or the woman.


## HEART DISEASE.

**Some Facts Regarding the Rapid Increase of Heart Trouble.**

Heart troubles, at least among the Americans, are certainly increasing and while this may be largely due to the excitement and worry of American business life, it is more often the result of weak stomachs, of poor digestion.

Real organic disease is incurable, but not one case in a hundred of heart trouble is organic.

The close relation between heart trouble and poor digestion is because both organs are controlled by the same great nerves, the Sympath