

## YELLOWSTONE

All connoisseurs have pronounced it the leading American Whisky.

**ROTHCHILD BROS.** 20-26 North First Street  
Portland, Oregon  
DISTRIBUTERS.

## AZO

This Afternoon From 2 to 5.

Special demonstration in printing by an expert from the factory. EVERYONE INVITED. Take elevator to Photo Department. Bring your pet negative and get a print free.

**BLUMAUER-FRANK DRUG CO.**  
Wholesale and Importing Druggists.

## EQUITABLE LIFE

"STRONGEST IN THE WORLD"

Assets... \$304,598,063.49 Surplus... \$66,137,170.01

L. Samuel, Manager, 200 Oregonian Building, Portland, Or.

PHIL METSCHAK, Pres. C. W. KNOWLES, Mgr.

## Imperial Hotel Co.

SEVENTH AND WASHINGTON STREETS, PORTLAND, OREGON.

CHARGE OF MANAGEMENT.

European Plan: \$1.00, \$1.50, \$2.00 per Day

## Adamant....

The Perfection of Wall Plaster

Is applied to over one million buildings throughout the United States. Made in forty different factories. It is no experiment. Investigate. For information address

**THE ADAMANT CO.**  
Foot of 14th Street, PORTLAND, OR.

## The "Superior" Steel Range

Is the best constructed and the most durable in the world.

**SUPERIOR STEEL RANGES**

Are made in a variety of styles and sizes, at prices within the reach of all.

BLACK ENAMEL and ALUMINUM FINISH.

**HONEYMAN HARDWARE COMP'Y**  
4TH AND ALDEX STREETS.

## THE PORTLAND

PORTLAND, OREGON

AMERICAN PLAN \$3.00 PER DAY and upward.

COST ONE MILLION DOLLARS

HEADQUARTERS FOR TOURISTS AND COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS

Special rates made to families and single gentlemen. The management will be pleased at all times to show rooms and give prices. A modern Turkish bath establishment in the hotel. H. C. BOWERS, Manager.

## Do You Need Help?

The Pianola is an aid in playing the piano. If you have a piano, you need this assistant. Even Paderewski uses the Pianola to play those selections outside of his repertory.

Visitors welcome at any time. Free public recitals every Wednesday evening and Saturday afternoon.

**THE AEOLIAN COMPANY**  
M. B. WELLS, Sole Northwest Agent, Aeolian Hall, 353-355 Washington St.

## NO TROUBLE IN SAMAR.

General Smith Preparing for Active Measures.

MANILA, Oct. 24.—General Hughes telegraphs from the island of Cebu, reporting that there has been no trouble in the island of Samar since the fight at the Gandara River. General Smith is busy in dressing the garrisons in Samar and preparing for active measures.

## FAST TRAIN WRECKED.

Thrown Over a High Embankment—Three Persons Fatally Hurt.

OTTUMWA, Ia., Oct. 24.—Chicago, Burlington & Kansas City passenger train No. 11 was wrecked two miles east of Exline shortly after 1 o'clock today. The entire train, consisting of day coach, mail and combination cars, with the engine, being thrown over a 40-foot embankment. The cars were splintered into small pieces. There were nearly 30 passengers in the coach, and how they escaped is a mystery. Three are probably fatally injured and seven others badly hurt.

Following is a list of the injured so far as known: James Mace, Unionville, Mo., will die; Wyman S. Wright, Lancaster, Mo., will die; John E. Wright, Kansas City, serious; Miss Sophia Peters, Cedar Rapids, Ia., serious; George Freeland, Brown, Mo., serious; Mrs. M. M. Freeland, Brown, Mo., serious; Mail Clerk Moore, Bloomfield, Ia.

## Daily Treasury Statement.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24.—Today's statement of the Treasury shows:

|                         |               |
|-------------------------|---------------|
| Available cash balances | \$167,438,740 |
| Gold                    | 302,411,594   |

## IN HIS OWN DEFENSE

### Admiral Schley Takes the Stand in the Naval Court.

TELLS STORY OF THE CAMPAIGN

His Loyalty to the Commander-in-Chief—The Blockade of Cienfuegos and the Arrival at Santiago.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 24.—Admiral Schley took the stand today in his own behalf in the court of inquiry which is investigating his conduct as commander-in-chief of the flying squadron during the Santiago campaign. He was summoned a few minutes after the court convened at 2 o'clock for the afternoon session, and when the court adjourned at 4 o'clock he apparently had only gotten well under way in his testimony. Captain Charles E. Clark, of the Oregon, had just concluded his statement when Mr. Raynor, rising from his seat, said:

"I should like to have Rear-Admiral Schley called."

The Admiral accordingly was asked to take the stand. It was a turn in the proceedings for which apparently neither the members of the court, its officers, nor the spectators were prepared, and a murmur of surprise was heard on all sides. It had been expected that the witness' name would be reached toward the close of the afternoon session. There were still two witnesses on the list which had not been heard, and it was understood to be his purpose not to take the stand until the entire list had been exhausted. He, however, responded to the call, and before the audience was well aware of the fact, he had begun his narrative of the campaign which terminated in the destruction of Cervera's fleet.

Mr. Raynor introduced the testimony of his distinguished witness by saying: "Will you give the court your name and rank?"

"Winfield Scott Schley, Rear-Admiral, United States Navy, retired, at present on service in this court of inquiry."

The Admiral then, in answer to a question from his counsel, proceeded to give a careful and detailed narrative of all the events of the campaign up to the battle of Santiago. He had not reached the stage of his testimony where he will tell of the battle when the court adjourned for the day.

### Crowd in the Courtroom.

The audience which listened to his recital was by far the largest which has gathered in the court since the beginning of the trial. All the reserved seats were occupied, as were the seats set apart for the public at large. In the rear of the courtroom probably as many people as standing upon tables, chairs and in windows, in fact everywhere from which they could see the court.

There was no appearance of demonstration of any kind during the Admiral's recital. On the contrary, the silence was almost unbroken, except for the sound of the witness' own voice. Only once was there a stir in the courtroom, and that was on a feeling on the part of the listeners. That was when the Admiral, detailing his conversation with Admiral Sampson in the cabin of the New York, at Key West, told how he had assured the commander-in-chief of fealty to him. When the court adjourned for the day many spectators pressed forward and shook the Admiral's hand.

"I was a Commodore," the witness began, in response to Mr. Raynor's request for a connected narrative of the campaign, "under orders to command the flying squadron on the 28th of March, 1898, and served until the 24th of June of the same year in that capacity."

He took command of the squadron at Hampton Roads, Va., hoisting his flag on the cruiser Brooklyn. After relating the origin of the campaign and his report, he said that he had called the commanding officers of the vessels constituting that squadron together, and then he added: "The plan of campaign was thrashed over. The disposition to be made of the over-water torpedo was thoroughly discussed, and I am frank to say, I found no one of the commanding officers who seemed to agree with the plan. I therefore determined, as happens upon all such occasions, to take the helm myself, and decided that, as they were menaces to the squadron, we should simply keep them company, with their heads below the projected decks. I put the squadron immediately upon a war footing, established pickets and patrols, and also the masking of lights."

### Planning the Campaign.

Admiral Schley plunged into the campaign by outlining the plan which he had indicated to his commanding officers before leaving Hampton Roads, saying:

"During this time I explained to all the commanding officers that as it would be impossible to contrive a plan of battle that would meet the contingencies of the general plan of the squadron would be to cruise in line of battle, and its general principle would be to attack the head and leading vessel, concentrating the fire upon them in order to obtain the moral effect, and, second, to throw them into confusion, making a victory over them probably much more successful and complete. I did that for the reason that the older plans of battle had been all to attack center and rear, resulting in the escape usually of a part of each squadron. I felt that the attack of the head of the squadron, which was to some extent new, would involve the destruction of the whole, and that was the general plan of action as explained to them on that occasion."

The Admiral then detailed the target practice the squadron indulged in daily, saying that no day was bad enough to prevent it. Subalder was used entirely. This practice, said the Admiral, resulted in an accuracy of fire which was fully demonstrated in the action six weeks or two months later. He also said that the squadron was kept in readiness, so far as coal, water and supplies were concerned. May 12 or 13 he received orders from the Secretary of the Navy to proceed to Charleston. The squadron arrived on the 15th, and found orders from the Secretary directing him to proceed to Key West and report to Commodore Remy for further instructions.

### Arrival at Key West.

He went to the Florida port at a 12-knot speed, that being the highest all the vessels of the squadron could make. The squadron at the time consisted of the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Scorpion and Sterling, the latter being a collier. The Admiral said that the Sterling was lost sight of the first night out in a dense fog, and he never saw her again

until he met her off the south side of Cuba. The flying squadron arrived at Key West on the 15th, the Admiral thought, and on the next day he went ashore to try to inspect Commodore Remy, after having saluted his flag. Continuing his narrative, the Admiral said:

"While there the Commodore showed me a telegraphic order from the honorable Secretary of the Navy directing me to proceed with all dispatch to the blockade of Havana. He also showed me a number of other dispatches, the purport of which I remember, but the contents I do not.

"During the time I was on shore, after having had my conference with him, there were several of the Cuban people resident there who informed me that the province in which Cienfuegos was situated was very great. He had had great trouble in keeping his squadron together and he appeared to me as if he was in a good deal of anxiety, which I could readily appreciate. He showed me a number of orders. Among them was one which stated that a division of the two squadrons had been decided upon, one for the north and the other for the south coast of Cuba, in which he was given the preference of command. The order, if I remember correctly, stated that, under any circumstances, I was to remain with the command, and I asked whether either the two squadrons he would take, and he said he supposed to hold the Havana or north one. He also told me whichever side I went that I would be in command. They were very heavily fortified and his confidential instructions, which he delivered to me verbally, were that we were not to take our battleships against the fortified places of the coast until the Spanish squadron had been disposed of. My recollection now is that he told me it was at Curacao. The impression left upon me was that it was somewhere in the Venezuelan Gulf and that it was supplied with ammunition and stores destined for Havana and that that was undoubtedly the point it was to reach. He said his information was that the orders of the Spanish fleet to reach Havana or some point in railroad communication with it were to be sent at once, and he believed that thought that Cienfuegos would be the point that came under the acceptance of the order more directly.

"We looked over maps and I must say I agreed with him. I could not imagine that any one who had studied the military situation of the island at all could have supposed that Santiago would have fulfilled any of the conditions of this instruction."

### Assurance of Loyalty.

"We had a talk together. I said that I had been ordered to report for duty to Admiral Remy and I imagined it necessary to assure him that I was not going to desert him. He said that I should be loyal, absolutely and unreservedly, to the cause we were both representing. He said that he would be present—I do not remember whether all the time or not—said: 'Of course, Commodore, anyone who has known your character would know that it would be impossible for you to be otherwise than loyal.'

"I asked the Admiral if there had been established any means of communicating with the fleet, whether there were any pilots or whether any locality was known where they were to be found. He told me that he did not know, that when he had asked the commander-in-chief to communicate with me, but that he thought it would be better for me to start as early as we could get away and blockade Cienfuegos. He said very well that I was prepared, of course, to go anywhere. I then went aboard my own flagship in order to hasten the operations of coaling. Whilst there the Algonquin came out, bearing an order from the Secretary of the Navy, through Commodore Remy, directing me to go off Havana. I signalled the Admiral to know whether or not he understood that my orders were to go off Havana. He replied by signal that he understood that his coming to Key West modified my orders, and that he should be prepared to carry out the orders we had agreed upon in the afternoon. I do not remember whether that was on the afternoon or in the morning but it was before I left for Cienfuegos."

### Departure for Cienfuegos.

The next move of the flying squadron, Admiral Schley said, was to go to Cienfuegos, and the Admiral told how, as the commander-in-chief of that squadron, he had the vessels coaled so that at 7 o'clock they were ready to start. He said all the ships of the fleet turned their backs upon American soil and held their course for the southern coast of Cuba. This, he said, was done under the order of the commander-in-chief, Admiral Sampson.

At this point the witness quoted Admiral Sampson's order No. 5, not failing to point out as he went along that in this order the Admiral had said:

"After I will write you and give you any information that suggests itself."

"The day after our departure towards Cienfuegos occurred, Admiral Schley said, after he had been out from Key West three or four hours. It was then that he met Captain McCalla, in charge of the sub-squadron with Marblehead at its head, which had been doing duty on the Cuban Coast near Cienfuegos, whither the Commodore with his flying squadron was bound. He related how, in accordance with the usual custom, when a naval officer meets a superior in rank at sea, Captain McCalla had asked permission to pass on. He told how McCalla had sent the Eagle to communicate with the flying squadron. Admiral Schley also mentioned that the Scorpion had been sent to intercept the Eagle for the purpose of securing whatever information she might bring.

"After a little," he said, "the Scorpion returned and reported through the megaphone, this I think is as reported in his log, which was the information he gave us. The Eagle afterward passed close under to the Brooklyn to hail her by megaphone, and reported that there was a good many subjects. The Admiral said that the purpose of securing whatever information she might bring.

### Conference With Chester.

The Admiral also related his meeting with the Cincinnati and the Vesuvius the next morning off San Antonio. Captain Chester, in command of the Cincinnati, came aboard the Brooklyn, remaining for about three-quarters of an hour. He related the details of his conversation with Captain Chester, saying that they had "thrashed out" a good many subjects. The Admiral said that Captain Chester had expressed himself as especially desirous of joining the flying squadron with his ship, but said that his coal supply was so limited that he would be compelled to go to Key

West. He said that he never saw her again until he met her off the south side of Cuba. The flying squadron arrived at Key West on the 15th, the Admiral thought, and on the next day he went ashore to try to inspect Commodore Remy, after having saluted his flag. Continuing his narrative, the Admiral said:

"While there the Commodore showed me a telegraphic order from the honorable Secretary of the Navy directing me to proceed with all dispatch to the blockade of Havana. He also showed me a number of other dispatches, the purport of which I remember, but the contents I do not.

"During the time I was on shore, after having had my conference with him, there were several of the Cuban people resident there who informed me that the province in which Cienfuegos was situated was very great. He had had great trouble in keeping his squadron together and he appeared to me as if he was in a good deal of anxiety, which I could readily appreciate. He showed me a number of orders. Among them was one which stated that a division of the two squadrons had been decided upon, one for the north and the other for the south coast of Cuba, in which he was given the preference of command. The order, if I remember correctly, stated that, under any circumstances, I was to remain with the command, and I asked whether either the two squadrons he would take, and he said he supposed to hold the Havana or north one. He also told me whichever side I went that I would be in command. They were very heavily fortified and his confidential instructions, which he delivered to me verbally, were that we were not to take our battleships against the fortified places of the coast until the Spanish squadron had been disposed of. My recollection now is that he told me it was at Curacao. The impression left upon me was that it was somewhere in the Venezuelan Gulf and that it was supplied with ammunition and stores destined for Havana and that that was undoubtedly the point it was to reach. He said his information was that the orders of the Spanish fleet to reach Havana or some point in railroad communication with it were to be sent at once, and he believed that thought that Cienfuegos would be the point that came under the acceptance of the order more directly.

"We looked over maps and I must say I agreed with him. I could not imagine that any one who had studied the military situation of the island at all could have supposed that Santiago would have fulfilled any of the conditions of this instruction."

### Assurance of Loyalty.

"We had a talk together. I said that I had been ordered to report for duty to Admiral Remy and I imagined it necessary to assure him that I was not going to desert him. He said that I should be loyal, absolutely and unreservedly, to the cause we were both representing. He said that he would be present—I do not remember whether all the time or not—said: 'Of course, Commodore, anyone who has known your character would know that it would be impossible for you to be otherwise than loyal.'

"I asked the Admiral if there had been established any means of communicating with the fleet, whether there were any pilots or whether any locality was known where they were to be found. He told me that he did not know, that when he had asked the commander-in-chief to communicate with me, but that he thought it would be better for me to start as early as we could get away and blockade Cienfuegos. He said very well that I was prepared, of course, to go anywhere. I then went aboard my own flagship in order to hasten the operations of coaling. Whilst there the Algonquin came out, bearing an order from the Secretary of the Navy, through Commodore Remy, directing me to go off Havana. I signalled the Admiral to know whether or not he understood that my orders were to go off Havana. He replied by signal that he understood that his coming to Key West modified my orders, and that he should be prepared to carry out the orders we had agreed upon in the afternoon. I do not remember whether that was on the afternoon or in the morning but it was before I left for Cienfuegos."

### Departure for Cienfuegos.

The next move of the flying squadron, Admiral Schley said, was to go to Cienfuegos, and the Admiral told how, as the commander-in-chief of that squadron, he had the vessels coaled so that at 7 o'clock they were ready to start. He said all the ships of the fleet turned their backs upon American soil and held their course for the southern coast of Cuba. This, he said, was done under the order of the commander-in-chief, Admiral Sampson.

At this point the witness quoted Admiral Sampson's order No. 5, not failing to point out as he went along that in this order the Admiral had said:

"After I will write you and give you any information that suggests itself."

"The day after our departure towards Cienfuegos occurred, Admiral Schley said, after he had been out from Key West three or four hours. It was then that he met Captain McCalla, in charge of the sub-squadron with Marblehead at its head, which had been doing duty on the Cuban Coast near Cienfuegos, whither the Commodore with his flying squadron was bound. He related how, in accordance with the usual custom, when a naval officer meets a superior in rank at sea, Captain McCalla had asked permission to pass on. He told how McCalla had sent the Eagle to communicate with the flying squadron. Admiral Schley also mentioned that the Scorpion had been sent to intercept the Eagle for the purpose of securing whatever information she might bring.

"After a little," he said, "the Scorpion returned and reported through the megaphone, this I think is as reported in his log, which was the information he gave us. The Eagle afterward passed close under to the Brooklyn to hail her by megaphone, and reported that there was a good many subjects. The Admiral said that the purpose of securing whatever information she might bring.

### Conference With Chester.

The Admiral also related his meeting with the Cincinnati and the Vesuvius the next morning off San Antonio. Captain Chester, in command of the Cincinnati, came aboard the Brooklyn, remaining for about three-quarters of an hour. He related the details of his conversation with Captain Chester, saying that they had "thrashed out" a good many subjects. The Admiral said that Captain Chester had expressed himself as especially desirous of joining the flying squadron with his ship, but said that his coal supply was so limited that he would be compelled to go to Key

West. He said that he never saw her again until he met her off the south side of Cuba. The flying squadron arrived at Key West on the 15th, the Admiral thought, and on the next day he went ashore to try to inspect Commodore Remy, after having saluted his flag. Continuing his narrative, the Admiral said:

"While there the Commodore showed me a telegraphic order from the honorable Secretary of the Navy directing me to proceed with all dispatch to the blockade of Havana. He also showed me a number of other dispatches, the purport of which I remember, but the contents I do not.

"During the time I was on shore, after having had my conference with him, there were several of the Cuban people resident there who informed me that the province in which Cienfuegos was situated was very great. He had had great trouble in keeping his squadron together and he appeared to me as if he was in a good deal of anxiety, which I could readily appreciate. He showed me a number of orders. Among them was one which stated that a division of the two squadrons had been decided upon, one for the north and the other for the south coast of Cuba, in which he was given the preference of command. The order, if I remember correctly, stated that, under any circumstances, I was to remain with the command, and I asked whether either the two squadrons he would take, and he said he supposed to hold the Havana or north one. He also told me whichever side I went that I would be in command. They were very heavily fortified and his confidential instructions, which he delivered to me verbally, were that we were not to take our battleships against the fortified places of the coast until the Spanish squadron had been disposed of. My recollection now is that he told me it was at Curacao. The impression left upon me was that it was somewhere in the Venezuelan Gulf and that it was supplied with ammunition and stores destined for Havana and that that was undoubtedly the point it was to reach. He said his information was that the orders of the Spanish fleet to reach Havana or some point in railroad communication with it were to be sent at once, and he believed that thought that Cienfuegos would be the point that came under the acceptance of the order more directly.

"We looked over maps and I must say I agreed with him. I could not imagine that any one who had studied the military situation of the island at all could have supposed that Santiago would have fulfilled any of the conditions of this instruction."

### Assurance of Loyalty.

"We had a talk together. I said that I had been ordered to report for duty to Admiral Remy and I imagined it necessary to assure him that I was not going to desert him. He said that I should be loyal, absolutely and unreservedly, to the cause we were both representing. He said that he would be present—I do not remember whether all the time or not—said: 'Of course, Commodore, anyone who has known your character would know that it would be impossible for you to be otherwise than loyal.'

"I asked the Admiral if there had been established any means of communicating with the fleet, whether there were any pilots or whether any locality was known where they were to be found. He told me that he did not know, that when he had asked the commander-in-chief to communicate with me, but that he thought it would be better for me to start as early as we could get away and blockade Cienfuegos. He said very well that I was prepared, of course, to go anywhere. I then went aboard my own flagship in order to hasten the operations of coaling. Whilst there the Algonquin came out, bearing an order from the Secretary of the Navy, through Commodore Remy, directing me to go off Havana. I signalled the Admiral to know whether or not he understood that my orders were to go off Havana. He replied by signal that he understood that his coming to Key West modified my orders, and that he should be prepared to carry out the orders we had agreed upon in the afternoon. I do not remember whether that was on the afternoon or in the morning but it was before I left for Cienfuegos."

### Departure for Cienfuegos.

The next move of the flying squadron, Admiral Schley said, was to go to Cienfuegos, and the Admiral told how, as the commander-in-chief of that squadron, he had the vessels coaled so that at 7 o'clock they were ready to start. He said all the ships of the fleet turned their backs upon American soil and held their course for the southern coast of Cuba. This, he said, was done under the order of the commander-in-chief, Admiral Sampson.

At this point the witness quoted Admiral Sampson's order No. 5, not failing to point out as he went along that in this order the Admiral had said:

"After I will write you and give you any information that suggests itself."

"The day after our departure towards Cienfuegos occurred, Admiral Schley said, after he had been out from Key West three or four hours. It was then that he met Captain McCalla, in charge of the sub-squadron with Marblehead at its head, which had been doing duty on the Cuban Coast near Cienfuegos, whither the Commodore with his flying squadron was bound. He related how, in accordance with the usual custom, when a naval officer meets a superior in rank at sea, Captain McCalla had asked permission to pass on. He told how McCalla had sent the Eagle to communicate with the flying squadron. Admiral Schley also mentioned that the Scorpion had been sent to intercept the Eagle for the purpose of securing whatever information she might bring.

"After a little," he said, "the Scorpion returned and reported through the megaphone, this I think is as reported in his log, which was the information he gave us. The Eagle afterward passed close under to the Brooklyn to hail her by megaphone, and reported that there was a good many subjects. The Admiral said that the purpose of securing whatever information she might bring.

### Conference With Chester.

The Admiral also related his meeting with the Cincinnati and the Vesuvius the next morning off San Antonio. Captain Chester, in command of the Cincinnati, came aboard the Brooklyn, remaining for about three-quarters of an hour. He related the details of his conversation with Captain Chester, saying that they had "thrashed out" a good many subjects. The Admiral said that Captain Chester had expressed himself as especially desirous of joining the flying squadron with his ship, but said that his coal supply was so limited that he would be compelled to go to Key

West. He said that he never saw her again until he met her off the south side of Cuba. The flying squadron arrived at Key West on the 15th, the Admiral thought, and on the next day he went ashore to try to inspect Commodore Remy, after having saluted his flag. Continuing his narrative, the Admiral said:

"While there the Commodore showed me a telegraphic order from the honorable Secretary of the Navy directing me to proceed with all dispatch to the blockade of Havana. He also showed me a number of other dispatches, the purport of which I remember, but the contents I do not.

"During the time I was on shore, after having had my conference with him, there were several of the Cuban people resident there who informed me that the province in which Cienfuegos was situated was very great. He had had great trouble in keeping his squadron together and he appeared to me as if he was in a good deal of anxiety, which I could readily appreciate. He showed me a number of orders. Among them was one which stated that a division of the two squadrons had been decided upon, one for the north and the other for the south coast of Cuba, in which he was given the preference of command. The order, if I remember correctly, stated that, under any circumstances, I was to remain with the command, and I asked whether either the two squadrons he would take, and he said he supposed to hold the Havana or north one. He also told me whichever side I went that I would be in command. They were very heavily fortified and his confidential instructions, which he delivered to me verbally, were that we were not to take our battleships against the fortified places of the coast until the Spanish squadron had been disposed of. My recollection now is that he told me it was at Curacao. The impression left upon me was that it was somewhere in the Venezuelan Gulf and that it was supplied with ammunition and stores destined for Havana and that that was undoubtedly the point it was to reach. He said his information was that the orders of the Spanish fleet to reach Havana or some point in railroad communication with it were to be sent at once, and he believed that thought that Cienfuegos would be the point that came under the acceptance of the order more directly.

"We looked over maps and I must say I agreed with him. I could not imagine that any one who had studied the military situation of the island at all could have supposed that Santiago would have fulfilled any of the conditions of this instruction."

### Assurance of Loyalty.

"We had a talk together. I said that I had been ordered to report for duty to Admiral Remy and I imagined it necessary to assure him that I was not going to desert him. He said that I should be loyal, absolutely and unreservedly, to the cause we were both representing. He said that he would be present—I do not remember whether all the time or not—said: 'Of course, Commodore, anyone who has known your character would know that it would be impossible for you to be otherwise than loyal.'

"I asked the Admiral if there had been established any means of communicating with the fleet, whether there were any pilots or whether any locality was known where they were to be found. He told me that he did not know, that when he had asked the commander-in-chief to communicate with me, but that he thought it would be better for me to start as early as we could get away and blockade Cienfuegos. He said very well that I was prepared, of course, to go anywhere. I then went aboard my own flagship in order to hasten the operations of coaling. Whilst there the Algonquin came out, bearing an order from the Secretary of the Navy, through Commodore Remy, directing me to go off Havana. I signalled the Admiral to know whether or not he understood that my orders were to go off Havana. He replied by signal that he understood that his coming to Key West modified my orders, and that he should be prepared to carry out the orders we had agreed upon in the afternoon. I do not remember whether that was on the afternoon or in the morning but it was before I left for Cienfuegos."

### Departure for Cienfuegos.

The next move of the flying squadron, Admiral Schley said, was to go to Cienfuegos, and the Admiral told how, as the commander-in-chief of that squadron, he had the vessels coaled so that at 7 o'clock they were ready to start. He said all the ships of the fleet turned their backs upon American soil and held their course for the southern coast of Cuba. This, he said, was done under the order of the commander-in-chief, Admiral Sampson.

At this point the witness quoted Admiral Sampson's order No. 5, not failing to point out as he went along that in this order the Admiral had said:

"After I will write you and give you any information that suggests itself."

"The day after our departure towards Cienfuegos occurred, Admiral Schley said, after he had been out from Key West three or four hours. It was then that he met Captain McCalla, in charge of the sub-squadron with Marblehead at its head, which had been doing duty on the Cuban Coast near Cienfuegos, whither the Commodore with his flying squadron was bound. He related how, in accordance with the usual custom, when a naval officer meets a superior in rank at sea, Captain McCalla had asked permission to pass on. He told how McCalla had sent the Eagle to communicate with the flying squadron. Admiral Schley also mentioned that the Scorpion had been sent to intercept the Eagle for the purpose of securing whatever information she might bring.

"After a little," he said, "the Scorpion returned and reported through the megaphone, this I think is as reported in his log, which was the information he gave us. The Eagle afterward passed close under to the Brooklyn to hail her by megaphone, and reported that there was a good many subjects. The Admiral said that the purpose of securing whatever information she might bring.

### Conference With Chester.

The Admiral also related his meeting with the Cincinnati and the Vesuvius the next morning off San Antonio. Captain Chester, in command of the Cincinnati, came aboard the Brooklyn, remaining for about three-quarters of an hour. He related the details of his conversation with Captain Chester, saying that they had "thrashed out" a good many subjects. The Admiral said that Captain Chester had expressed himself as especially desirous of joining the flying squadron with his ship, but said that his coal supply was so limited that he would be compelled to go to Key

West. He said that he never saw her again until he met her off the south side of Cuba. The flying squadron arrived at Key West on the 15th, the Admiral thought, and on the next day he went ashore to try to inspect Commodore Remy, after having saluted his flag. Continuing his narrative, the Admiral said:

"While there the Commodore showed me a telegraphic order from the honorable Secretary of the Navy directing me to proceed with all dispatch to the blockade of Havana. He also showed me a number of other dispatches, the purport of which I remember, but the contents I do not.

"During the time I was on shore, after having had my conference with him, there were several of the Cuban people resident there who informed me that the province in which Cienfuegos was situated was very great. He had had great trouble in keeping his squadron together and he appeared to me as if he was in a good deal of anxiety, which I could readily appreciate. He showed me a number of orders. Among them was one which stated that a division of the two squadrons had been decided upon, one for the north and the other for the south coast of Cuba, in which he was given the preference of command. The order, if I remember correctly, stated that, under any circumstances, I was to remain with the command, and I asked whether either the two squadrons he would take, and he said he supposed to hold the Havana or north one. He also told me whichever side I went that I would be in command. They were very heavily fortified and his confidential instructions, which he delivered to me verbally, were that we were not to take our battleships against the fortified places of the coast until the Spanish squadron had been disposed of. My recollection now is that he told me it was at Curacao. The impression left upon me was that it was somewhere in the Venezuelan Gulf and that it was supplied with ammunition and stores destined for Havana and that that was undoubtedly the point it was to reach. He said his information was that the orders of the Spanish fleet to reach Havana or some point in railroad communication with it were to be sent at once, and he believed that thought that Cienfuegos would be the point that came under the acceptance of the order more directly.

"We looked over maps and I must say I agreed with him. I could not imagine that any one who had studied the military situation of the island at all could have supposed that Santiago would have fulfilled any of the conditions of this instruction."

### Assurance of Loyalty.

"We had a talk together. I said that I had been ordered to report for duty to Admiral Remy and I imagined it necessary to assure him that I was not going to desert him. He said that I should be loyal, absolutely and unreservedly, to the cause we were both representing. He said that he would be present—I do not remember whether all the time or not—said: 'Of course, Commodore, anyone who has known your character would know that it would be impossible for you to be otherwise than loyal.'

"I asked the Admiral if there had been established any means of communicating with the fleet, whether there were any pilots or whether any locality was known where they were to be found. He told me that he did not know, that when he had asked the commander-in-chief to communicate with me, but that he thought it would be better for me to start as early as we could get away and blockade Cienfuegos. He said very well that I was prepared, of course, to go anywhere. I then went aboard my own flagship in order to hasten the operations of coaling. Whilst there the Algonquin came out, bearing an order from the Secretary of the Navy, through Commodore Remy, directing me to go off Havana. I signalled the Admiral to know whether or not he understood that my orders were to go off Havana. He replied by signal that he understood that his coming to Key West modified my orders, and that he should be prepared to carry out the orders we had agreed upon in the afternoon. I do not remember whether that was on the afternoon or in the morning but it was before I left for Cienfuegos."

### Departure for Cienfuegos.

The next move of the flying squadron, Admiral Schley said, was to go to Cienfuegos, and the Admiral told how, as the commander-in-chief of that squadron, he had the vessels coaled so that at 7 o'clock they were ready to start. He said all the ships of the fleet turned their backs upon American soil and held their course for the southern coast of Cuba. This, he said, was done under the order of the commander-in-chief, Admiral Sampson.

At this point the witness quoted Admiral Sampson's order No. 5, not failing to point out as he went along that in this order the Admiral had said:

"After I will write you and give you any information that suggests itself."

"The day after our departure towards Cienfuegos occurred, Admiral Schley said, after he had been out from Key West three or four hours. It was then that he met Captain McCalla, in charge of the sub-squadron with Marblehead at its head, which had been doing duty on the Cuban Coast near Cienfuegos, whither the Commodore with his flying squadron was bound. He related how, in accordance with the usual custom, when a naval officer meets a superior in rank at sea, Captain McCalla had asked permission to pass on. He told how McCalla had sent the Eagle to communicate with the flying squadron. Admiral Schley also mentioned that the Scorpion had been sent to intercept the Eagle for the purpose of securing whatever information she might bring.

"After a little," he said, "the Scorpion returned and reported through the megaphone, this I think is as reported in his log, which was the information he gave us. The Eagle afterward passed close under to the Brooklyn to hail her by megaphone, and reported that there was a good many subjects. The Admiral said that the purpose of securing whatever information she might bring.

### Conference With Chester.

The Admiral also related his meeting with the Cincinnati and the Vesuvius the next morning off San Antonio. Captain Chester, in command of the Cincinnati, came aboard the Brooklyn, remaining for about three-quarters of an hour. He related the details of his conversation with Captain Chester, saying that they had "thrashed out" a good many subjects. The Admiral said that Captain Chester had expressed himself as especially desirous of joining the flying squadron with his ship, but said that his coal supply was so limited that he would be compelled to go to Key

West. He said that he never saw her again until he met her off the south side of Cuba. The flying squadron arrived at Key West on the 15th, the Admiral thought, and on the next day he went ashore to try to inspect Commodore Remy, after having saluted his flag. Continuing his narrative, the Admiral said:

"While there the Commodore showed me a telegraphic order from the honorable Secretary of the Navy directing me to proceed with all dispatch to the blockade of Havana. He also showed me a number of other dispatches, the purport of which I remember, but the contents I do not.

"During the time I was on shore, after having had my conference with him, there were several of the Cuban people resident there who informed me that the province in which Cienfuegos was situated was very great. He had had great trouble in keeping his squadron together and he appeared to me as if he was in a good deal of anxiety, which I could readily appreciate. He showed me a number of orders. Among them was one which stated that a division of the two squadrons had been decided upon, one for the north and the other for the south coast of Cuba, in which he was given the preference of command. The order, if I remember correctly, stated that, under any circumstances, I was to remain with the command, and I asked whether either the two squadrons he would take, and he said he supposed to hold the Havana or north one. He also told me whichever side I went that I would be in command. They were very heavily fortified and his confidential instructions, which he delivered to me verbally, were that we were not to take our battleships against the fortified places of the coast until the Spanish squadron had been disposed of. My recollection now is that he told me it was at Curacao. The impression left upon me was that it was somewhere in the Venezuelan Gulf and that it was supplied with ammunition and stores destined for Havana and that that was undoubtedly the point it was to reach. He said his information was that the orders of the Spanish fleet to reach Havana or some point in railroad communication with it were to be sent at once, and he believed that thought that Cienfuegos would be the point that came under the acceptance of the order more directly.

"We looked over maps and I must say I agreed with him. I could not imagine that any one who had studied the military situation of the island at all could have supposed that Santiago would have fulfilled any of the conditions of this instruction."

### Assurance of Loyalty.

"We had a talk together. I said that I had been ordered to report for duty to Admiral Remy and I imagined it necessary to assure him that I was not going to desert him. He said that I should be loyal, absolutely and unreservedly, to the cause we were both representing. He said that he would be present—I do not remember whether all the time or not—said: 'Of course, Commodore, anyone who has known your character would know that it would be impossible for you to be otherwise than loyal.'

"I asked the Admiral if there had been established any means of communicating with the fleet, whether there were any pilots or whether any locality was known where they were to be found. He told me that he did not know, that when he had asked the commander-in-chief to communicate with me, but that he thought it would be better for me to start as early as we could get away and blockade Cienfuegos. He said very well that I was prepared, of course, to go anywhere. I then went aboard my own flagship in order to hasten the operations of coaling. Whilst there the Algonquin came out, bearing an order from the Secretary of the Navy, through Commodore Remy, directing me to go off Havana. I signalled the Admiral to know whether or not he understood that my orders were to go off Havana. He replied by signal that he understood that his coming to Key West modified my orders, and that he should be prepared to carry out the orders we had agreed upon in the afternoon. I do not remember whether that was on the afternoon or in the morning but it was before I left for Cienfuegos."

### Departure for Cienfuegos.

The next move of the flying squadron, Admiral Schley said, was to go to Cienfuegos, and the Admiral told how, as the commander-in-chief of that squadron, he had the vessels coaled so that at 7 o'clock they were ready to start. He said all the ships of the fleet turned their backs upon American soil and held their course for the southern coast of Cuba. This, he said, was done under the order of the commander-in-chief, Admiral Sampson.

At this point the witness quoted Admiral Sampson's order No. 5, not failing to point out as he went along that in this order the Admiral had said:

"After I will write you and give you any information that suggests itself."

"The day after our departure towards Cienfuegos occurred, Admiral Schley said, after he had been out from Key West three or four hours. It was then that he met Captain McCalla, in charge of the sub-squadron with Marblehead at its head, which had been doing duty on the Cuban Coast near Cienfuegos, whither the Commodore with his flying squadron was bound. He related how, in accordance with the usual custom, when a naval officer meets a superior in rank at sea, Captain McCalla had asked permission to pass on. He told how McCalla had sent the Eagle to communicate with the flying squadron. Admiral Schley also mentioned that the Scorpion had been sent to intercept the Eagle for the purpose of securing whatever information she might bring.

"After a little," he said, "the Scorpion returned and reported through the megaphone, this I think is as reported in his log, which was the information he gave us. The Eagle afterward passed close under to the Brooklyn to hail her by megaphone, and reported that there was a good many subjects. The Admiral said that the purpose of securing whatever information she might bring.

### Conference With Chester.

The Admiral also related his meeting with the Cincinnati and the Vesuvius the next morning off San Antonio. Captain Chester, in command of the Cincinnati, came aboard the Brooklyn, remaining for about three-quarters of an hour. He related the details of his conversation with Captain Chester, saying that they had "thrashed out" a good many subjects. The Admiral said that Captain Chester had expressed himself as especially desirous of joining the flying squadron with his ship, but said that his coal supply was so limited that he would be compelled to go to Key

West. He said that he never saw her again until he met her off the south side of Cuba. The flying squadron arrived at Key West on the 15th, the Admiral thought, and on the next day he went ashore to try to inspect Commodore Remy, after having saluted his flag. Continuing his narrative, the Admiral said:

"While there the Commodore showed me a telegraphic order from the honorable Secretary of the Navy directing me to proceed with all dispatch to the blockade of Havana. He also showed me a number of other dispatches, the purport of which I remember, but the contents I do not.

"During the time I was on shore, after having had my conference with him, there were several of the Cuban people resident there who informed me that the province in which Cienfuegos was situated was very great. He had had great trouble in keeping his squadron together and he appeared to me as if he was in a good deal of anxiety, which I could readily appreciate. He showed me a number of orders. Among them was one which stated that a division of the two squadrons had been decided upon, one for the north and the other for the south coast of Cuba, in which he was given the preference of command. The order, if I remember correctly, stated that, under any circumstances, I was to remain with the command, and I asked whether either the two squadrons he would take, and he said he supposed to hold the Havana or north one. He also told me whichever side I went that I would be in command. They were very heavily fortified and his confidential instructions, which he delivered to me verbally, were that we were not to take our battleships against the fortified places of the coast until the Spanish squadron had been disposed of. My recollection now is that he told me it was at Curacao. The impression left upon me was that it was somewhere in the Venezuelan Gulf and that it was supplied with ammunition and stores destined for Havana and that that was undoubtedly the point it was to reach. He said his information was that the orders of the Spanish fleet to reach Havana or some point in railroad communication with it were to be sent at once, and he believed that thought that Cienfuegos would be the point that came under the acceptance of the order more directly.

"We looked over maps and I must say I agreed with him. I could not imagine that any one who had studied the military situation of the